Carey v. Federal Election Commission , 864 F. Supp. 2d 57 ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    REAR ADMIRAL JAMES CAREY     )
    (Ret.), et al.,              )
    )
    Plaintiffs,         )
    )
    v.                       )                      Civil Action No. 11-259 (RMC)
    )
    FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )
    )
    Defendants.         )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Rear Adm. (Ret.) James J. Carey, the National Defense Political Action
    Committee (“NDPAC”), and Kelly S. Eustis filed this suit together with a motion for preliminary
    injunction, asking the Court to enjoin the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or
    “Commission”) from enforcing 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) & 441a(a)(3) as applied to
    contributions to NDPAC and independent expenditures by NDPAC. The Court granted the
    injunction. See Carey v. FEC, 
    791 F. Supp. 2d 121
     (D.D.C. 2011). Subsequently, the parties
    entered into a consent judgment. As the prevailing party, Plaintiffs now move for costs and
    attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    . The motion
    will be granted in part and denied in part.
    I. FACTS
    A. Federal Election Campaign Law
    The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 
    2 U.S.C. §§ 431
     et seq., inter alia,
    imposes limits on the sources and amounts of contributions1 that may be made by individuals and
    groups to federal candidates, party committees, and political action committees. Key to assessing
    these limits is the identity of the receiver of those contributions and the purpose for which
    contributions are expended. If contributions are directed toward a federal candidate’s personal
    coffers, a candidate’s political action committee, or a committee of a political party, they are
    subject to statutory limits because of the “strong governmental interest in combating corruption
    and the appearance thereof” and because of the “close relationship between candidates and
    parties.” EMILY’s List v. FEC, 
    581 F.3d 1
    , 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Section 441a(a)(1)(C) provides
    that no person shall make contributions “to any other political committee . . . in any calendar year
    which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C). Section 441a(a)(3) provides:
    During the period which begins on January 1 of an odd-numbered year
    and ends on December 31 of the next even-numbered year, no individual
    may make contributions aggregating more than –
    (A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to candidates and the
    authorized committees of candidates;
    (B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which not
    more than $37,500 may be attributable to political committees which are
    not political committees of national political parties.
    Id. § 441a(a)(3). All contributions and expenditures made subject to these source and amount
    limitations are referred to as “hard money.” See EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at 27
    .
    Under §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) & 441a(a)(3), there is no distinction made between
    1
    Under FECA, a contribution is “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
    money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
    Federal office; or the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another
    person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any purpose.” 
    2 U.S.C. § 431
    (8).
    -2-
    political committees directly associated with parties/federal candidates and non-connected
    political action committees.2 No distinction need be made if the non-connected political action
    committee is merely funneling its contributions to federal candidates, their personal political
    action committees, or political party committees. See EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at
    24–26.
    However, if a non-connected political action committee is making independent expenditures3
    wholly separate from federal candidates or parties, the analysis is different because there is not
    the same governmental interest in preventing corruption. See 
    id.
     at 9–11.
    Recent Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases have partially invalidated statutory
    provisions within FECA with respect to limits placed on contributions for independent
    expenditures in federal election campaigns. See Citizens United v. FEC, 
    130 S. Ct. 876
     (2010);
    SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 
    599 F.3d 686
     (D.C. Cir. 2010); EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d 1
    . Contributions
    for independent expenditures are not limited for this purpose and may be made from a “general
    treasury account that is not subject to source and amount limits,” otherwise known as soft money.
    See EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at 27
    . These cases held that limits on soft money contributions used
    for independent expenditures are unconstitutional because such a limitation violates a
    contributor’s First Amendment right. See generally Citizens United, 
    130 S. Ct. 876
    ;
    2
    “‘Non-connected’ means that the [political action committee] is not a candidate
    committee, a party committee, or a committee established by a corporation or labor union.”
    EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at
    15 n.7.
    3
    Independent expenditures are “expenditure[s] by a person – (A) expressly advocating
    the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that [are] not made in concert or
    cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized
    political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 
    2 U.S.C. § 431
    (17).
    -3-
    SpeechNow.org, 
    599 F.3d 686
    ; EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d 1
    .4
    B. Background
    Admiral Carey is the founder and treasurer of NDPAC, a political action
    committee. NDPAC advocates limited government and enhanced commitment to American’s
    veterans and soldiers. Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 12. It raises and expends funds “in support of
    candidates for federal office who are military veterans and agree with its values.” 
    Id.
     NDPAC
    “makes contributions to candidates for federal office up to the applicable limit and makes
    independent expenditures in support or opposition of candidates.” 
    Id.
     Ms. Eustis is a potential
    contributor to NDPAC who would like to contribute more than the amount currently allowed
    toward NDPAC’s independent expenditures in federal campaigns. Id. ¶ 13.
    On August 11, 2010, Plaintiffs submitted a request for an advisory opinion to the
    Commission. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f (specifying the procedure for requesting advisory opinions).
    They sought permission to accept unrestricted donations for independent expenditures into one
    account so long as contributions to candidates were made and administered with restricted
    donations from a separate account. On September 17, 2010, FEC issued a draft advisory opinion,
    Draft A, concluding that contributions to NDPAC made to finance independent expenditures
    were subject to the contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) and related regulations.
    Compl., Ex. B. A few days later, on September 21, the Commission issued an alternative draft
    advisory opinion, Draft B, concluding that contributions to NDPAC made to finance independent
    4
    These cases also found that hard money limits on expenditures that directly support
    federal candidates, their authorized committees, or any political committee established and
    maintained by a national political party are constitutional. See generally Citizens United, 
    130 S. Ct. 876
    ; SpeechNow.org, 
    599 F.3d 686
    ; EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d 1
    . Plaintiffs do not contest the
    Commission’s authority to regulate “hard money” under § 441a(a)(1)(A) and (B).
    -4-
    expenditures were not subject to such limits. Compl., Ex. C. The Commission failed to approve
    Draft A by a 2-3 vote and failed to approve Draft B by a 3-2 vote. A binding advisory opinion
    requires at least four votes.5
    Unable to obtain a binding and favorable advisory opinion, Plaintiffs filed this
    suit. Here, they alleged that §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) & 441a(a)(3) imposed unconstitutional limits on
    amounts an individual may contribute to a non-connected political committee such as NDPAC
    with respect to independent expenditures. Plaintiffs disputed the constitutionality of any limit
    when those contributions are maintained separately and used for independent federal
    expenditures. Compl. ¶ 13.
    This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Carey v.
    FEC, 
    791 F. Supp. 2d 121
     (D.D.C. 2011). FEC had opposed the request for preliminary
    injunction, failing to appreciate binding precedent: Citizens United, 
    130 S. Ct. 876
    ;
    SpeechNow.org, 
    599 F.3d 686
    ; and EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d 1
    .6 Before this case was ever filed,
    EMILY’s List had clearly and explicitly held, based on prior Supreme Court precedent, that soft
    5
    There are six commissioners. The sixth did not vote.
    6
    The Court noted:
    This Court is instructed and bound by the decisions of the Supreme
    Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Commission
    attempts to limit the scope of the Circuit’s recent decision in
    EMILY’s List without success. The Circuit’s ruling was not
    limited to the authority of the Commission to issue regulations, as
    the Commission would posit, but included binding precedent on
    the constitutional rights of non-connected political committees,
    which the Commission unpersuasively argues is dicta.
    Carey, 
    791 F. Supp. 2d at 129
    .
    -5-
    money maintained in a separate account was not subject to contribution or expenditure limits:
    First, the Court has held that campaign contributions and expenditures
    constitute “speech” within the protection of the First Amendment.
    ....
    Second, the Court has ruled that Government cannot limit campaign
    contributions and expenditures to achieve “equalization” – that is, it cannot
    restrict the speech of some so that others might have equal voice or influence in
    the electoral process. In perhaps the most important sentence in the Court’s entire
    campaign finance jurisprudence, Buckley [v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
    , 48-49 (1976)]
    stated: “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
    of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
    the First Amendment.”
    ....
    Third, the Court has recognized a strong governmental interest in
    combating corruption and the appearance thereof . . . . This anticorruption interest
    is implicated by contributions to candidates . . . .
    ....
    Fourth, in applying the anti-corruption rationale, the Court has afforded
    stronger protection to expenditures by citizens and groups . . . than it has provided
    to their contributions to candidates or parties.
    ....
    Fifth, the Court has been somewhat more tolerant of regulation of for-
    profit corporations and labor unions.
    ....
    To sum up so far: In reconciling the competing interests, the Supreme
    Court has generally approved statutory limits on contributions to candidates and
    political parties as consistent with the First Amendment. The Court has rejected
    expenditure limits on individuals, groups, candidates, and parties, even though
    expenditures may confer benefits on candidates.
    Carey, 
    791 F. Supp. 2d at
    129-30 (citing EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at 5-8
    ) (footnotes omitted).
    This Court held that EMILY’s List squarely applies to NDPAC because both
    -6-
    organizations are “hybrid non-profits.” Carey, 
    791 F. Supp. 2d at 130
    . “EMILY’s List is a good
    example of such a hybrid non-profit: It makes expenditures for advertisements, get-out-the-vote
    efforts, and voter registration drives; it also makes direct contributions to candidates and parties.”
    EMILY’s List, 
    581 F.3d at 12
    . “The constitutional principles that govern such a hybrid non-profit
    entity follow ineluctably from the well-established principles governing the other two categories
    of non-profits.” 
    Id.
     This Court explained that by maintaining separate accounts for hard and soft
    money, a hybrid non-profit like NDPAC can raise and spend unlimited funds for independent
    federal expenditures. Thus, Plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, see Carey,
    
    791 F. Supp. 2d at 131-32
    , and satisfied the other criteria for an injunction. 
    Id. at 132-36
    .
    On August 19, 2011, these parties all agreed to a Stipulated Order and Consent
    Judgment, which provides as follows:
    1. The contribution limits contained in 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C)
    & 441a(a)(3), as well as any implementing regulations, are
    unconstitutional as applied to contributions NDPAC receives to
    make independent expenditures.
    2. The Commission shall not enforce 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C)
    & 441a(a)(3), as well as any implementing regulations, against
    Plaintiffs with regard to contributions NDPAC receives to make
    independent expenditures, as long as NDPAC maintains separate
    bank accounts (1) to receive such contributions for the purpose of
    making independent expenditures, and (2) to receive source- and
    amount-limited contributions for the purpose of making candidate
    contributions, and as long as each account pays a percentage of its
    administrative expenses that closely corresponds to the percentage
    of activity for that account, and complies with the applicable limits
    for the source- and amount-limited contributions it receives for the
    purpose of making candidate contributions.
    Order and Judgment [Dkt. 28] at 2-3.
    Having prevailed, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to EAJA. The
    -7-
    Commission agrees to an award of costs,7 but opposes an award of fees, arguing that its position
    was substantially justified. The Commission also argues that, even if its position is found not to
    be substantially justified, the fees sought are excessive.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    To qualify for an EAJA award, a plaintiff must establish that he was the prevailing
    party; the burden then shifts to the government, which may avoid paying an EAJA award if its
    position was substantially justified. Id. § 2412(d)(1).8 “Substantially justified” means “justified
    in substance or in the main — that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.”
    Pierce v. Underwood, 
    487 U.S. 552
    , 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). An agency’s
    position is substantially justified if it is both legally and factually reasonable. Hill v. Gould, 
    555 F.3d 1003
    , 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The government carries the burden of showing that the
    underlying agency action giving rise to litigation and its litigation position were substantially
    justified. See Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 
    844 F.2d 867
    , 871 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
    7
    Plaintiffs request $350 in costs. Costs are recoverable under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (a)(1) and
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1920
    . Because the Commission does not object, these costs will be awarded to
    Plaintiffs.
    8
    The EAJA provides:
    [A] court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other
    expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including
    proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or
    against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position
    of the United States was substantially justified or that special
    circumstances make an award unjust.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(1)(A).
    -8-
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. The Government’s Position Was Not Substantially Justified
    The government does not dispute that Plaintiffs qualify as the prevailing party in
    this litigation. Instead, the government argues that its position was “substantially justified.” See
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(1)(A). The Commission argues that Plaintiffs waived the argument that the
    FEC’s prelitigation position was not justified because Plaintiffs failed to cite EMILY’s List in
    their request for an advisory opinion.9 The Commission points out that in cases where a plaintiff
    complains about an administrative action, issues not raised before the agency are deemed waived.
    Opp. [Dkt. 30] at 9 n.3 (citing Boivil v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 
    446 F.3d 148
     (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
    Failure to raise an issue, however, is not the same as failure to cite a specific case. Plaintiff did
    not fail to make an argument. They argued to the FEC that limits on soft money contributions
    used for independent expenditures are unconstitutional. Further, the FEC is supposed to be an
    expert on federal election law and its attorneys are required to know the current status of election
    law, especially Supreme Court and Circuit law. The FEC was responsible for knowing about the
    opinion of the D.C. Circuit in EMILY’s List, as indeed it did.10
    FEC also erroneously contends that two of its commissioners were reasonable in
    believing the Circuit opinion in EMILY’s List was not binding on the agency. To the contrary,
    EMILY’s List is binding precedent in this Circuit,11 which is where Plaintiffs sought an advisory
    9
    The Commission does not contend that NDPAC failed to cite EMILY’s List in this
    litigation, as the case is cited in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 13.
    10
    Draft B of the advisory opinion cites EMILY’s List. See Compl., Ex. C.
    11
    See Industrial Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 
    115 F.3d 248
    , 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (agencies
    must abide by the law of a Circuit within the jurisdiction of that court).
    -9-
    opinion; the FEC ignored EMILY’s List, and this litigation ensued. Moreover, when EMILY’s
    List struck down the regulations at issue there, the Circuit necessarily adjudicated the
    applicability of the statutory provisions from which the regulations derived. The D.C. Circuit
    held that “a non profit that makes expenditures and makes contributions to candidates” is
    “entitled to make their expenditures . . . out of a[n] account that is not subject to source and
    amount limitations.” 
    581 F.3d at 12
    . EMILY’s List is a non-affiliated organization just like
    NDPAC. The opinion is determinative of this case. Because the Commission has failed to show
    that its position was substantially justified in the face of this directly-applicable and binding
    decision, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under EAJA.
    B. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees
    Plaintiffs seek $141,253.03 in fees for the work of four attorneys: Dan Backer,
    Stephen Hoersting, Benjamin Barr, and Allen Dickerson. Mr. Dickerson billed 30.5 hours, at the
    rate of $181.37 per hour. Mr. Backer billed 304.75 hours through the time of filing the fee
    petition, plus 15.5 for the reply in support of the fee petition, at the same rate, $181.37 per hour.
    Mr. Barr billed 99.5 hours, plus 14.75 hours for the reply, at the rate of $200 per hour. Mr.
    Hoersting billed 204.5 hours, plus 13.25 for the reply, at the rate of $250 per hour.
    The FEC contends that the full amount of fees sought – $141,253.03 – is
    excessive because the case only proceeded through preliminary injunction, not through trial. The
    FEC ignores the fact that NDPAC should not have had to file this suit at all. Plaintiffs sought an
    advisory opinion in line with the ruling in EMILY’s List and when the FEC failed to provide one,
    this case ensued. In addition to filing the complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
    injunction and a motion to stay discovery. The motions were contested; Plaintiffs prevailed on
    -10-
    both. Plaintiffs have now filed a fee petition, which has been opposed. The number of attorney
    hours billed was reasonable for the work that this case required.
    The Commission also contends that emails and conferences among counsel for
    NDPAC should not be billed. But Plaintiffs’ counsel were justified in coordinating arguments
    and litigation strategy. The FEC assails Plaintiffs’ lawyers for allegedly not exercising “billing
    judgment.” Having reviewed the affidavits and billing records, the Court disagrees and finds the
    hours billed to be reasonable.
    C. Hourly Rate
    The hourly rate at which attorneys’ fees can be recovered under § 2412(d)(1)(A) is
    $125 unless a court determines that “an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as
    the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved, justifies a higher fee.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(2)(A). Because the statutory cap was set years ago, in 1996, courts routinely
    approve cost-of-living adjustments. Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 
    353 F.3d 962
    , 969 (D.C.
    Cir. 2004). As adjusted for cost of living, the standard $125 rate is now $181.37 per hour. The
    Commission does not contest this rate. See Opp. at 21 n.6. Thus, the Plaintiffs counsel shall be
    compensated at the rate of $181.37 per hour.
    Plaintiffs assert that Messrs. Barr ($200/hour) and Hoersting ($250/hour) should
    be compensated at even higher rates under the “special factor” language of § 2412(d)(2)(A).
    Plaintiffs base their request on these lawyers’ special expertise in election and campaign finance
    law. But the D.C. Circuit has rejected the claim that campaign finance and election law
    experience qualifies counsel for an enhanced fee under EAJA. See In re Sealed Case, 
    254 F.3d 233
    , 235-36 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (denying request for enhanced fee in election law case). In order to
    -11-
    qualify for a higher fee under EAJA, counsel must show “an identifiable practice specialty such
    as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language.” 
    Id. at 235
    . The Circuit noted that
    “[a]lthough federal election law ‘involves a complex statutory and regulatory framework, the
    field is not beyond the grasp of a competent practicing attorney with access to a law library and
    the other accoutrements of modern legal practice.’” 
    Id. at 236
     (quoting Chynoweth v. Sullivan,
    
    920 F.2d 648
    , 650 (10th Cir. 1990)). Counsel is not entitled to enhanced rates under the special
    factor exception “based solely on expertise the lawyer acquired through practice in a specific area
    of administrative law.” Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 
    400 F.3d 939
    , 950-51 (D.C. Cir.
    2005). Attorneys who practice administrative law develop an expertise in a particular regulated
    industry, and they ordinarily gain the expertise from practice and not from training. 
    Id.
     Because
    nothing in the EAJA suggests that Congress intended to make all counsel who practice
    administrative law in a technical field eligible for a fee enhancement, expertise acquired through
    practice is not deemed to be a special factor warranting fee enhancement. 
    Id.
     (citing F.J. Vollmer
    Co. v. Magaw, 
    102 F.3d 591
    , 598-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
    Plaintiffs contend that enhanced rates are now justified due to new complexity in
    election law — that the recent changes in the law have made the field obscure and difficult to
    master. See Reply [Dkt. 33] at 19. Plaintiffs argue that the specialized practice bar for election
    and campaign finance law requires more than an expertise in administrative law and an
    understanding of the regulations. They contend:
    [P]ractitioners must be grounded in an obscure and relatively
    unpracticed area of constitutional law; they must understand the
    complicated maze of federal administrative law; and they must
    share a working knowledge of the incredibly intricate operation of
    campaign finance as it applies on-the-ground to political parties,
    -12-
    speakers, grassroots organizations, and policy groups.
    Id. at 18-19. This may be so, but the Court is not convinced that election and campaign finance
    law has changed so dramatically that binding Circuit precedent can be ignored. Accordingly, the
    request for enhanced hourly rates will be denied.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs’
    motion for attorneys’ fees and costs [Dkt. # 29]. Costs will be awarded in the amount of $350.
    Attorneys’ fees may be recovered at the rate of $181.37 per hour. No later than June 4, 2012,
    Plaintiffs shall file a revised affidavit of fees, together with a proposed order awarding fees, in
    accordance with this Opinion. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    DATE: May 22, 2012                                            /s/
    ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
    United States District Judge
    -13-