Arp v. Superior Court of the State of Washington , 931 F. Supp. 2d 113 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEAN ARLO ARP, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 13-67 (JEB)
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiffs Dean Arp, Wanda Arp, and Charles Miller have filed this abstruse suit
against six named defendants: a Washington State Superior Court, two judges and a
commissioner of that court, and two attorneys who represented parties adverse to Plaintiffs in
prior proceedings in that court. Plaintiffs also sue 199 “John and Jane Doe[s].” See Compl., ¶
17. In two separate Motions to Dismiss, Defendants raise different grounds for jettisoning the
case. Although there are multiple reasons for doing so, the Court need look no further than lack
of personal jurisdiction.
I. Background
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is nearly incomprehensible, but seems to arise from unlawful-
detainer suits filed against the Arps in King County (Washington) Superior Court. 1 Plaintiffs
allege that Dean and Wanda Arp purchased one home in 2000 and another in 2005, both of
which were subject to mortgages. See Compl., ¶ 32. In 2008, the Arps “discovered through
public news that the BANK/FINANCE/MORTGAGE BUSINESS in not only Washington but
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Plaintiff Miller’s interest in the suit is unclear. The Complaint alleges that he is “Temporary Trustee” of Wanda
Arp’s estate and that he was Dean Arp’s tenant “holding property interest in [the Arps’] real and chattel
property . . . .” Compl., ¶ 8; see also id., ¶ 35 (“Plaintiff Miller became a tenant of the Arps in 2009 midyear.”).
across America had engaged in fraudulent practices in almost every facet of the mortgage
transactions” and “became convinced that . . . almost every alleged mortgage transaction was
incorporating some sort of fraud.” Id., ¶¶ 33, 38. They decided “that BADGES OF FRAUD,
massive evidence of appearance, suspicion upon the Arp’s alleged mortgage transactions called
for a clearing up and explanation!” Id., ¶ 38. Plaintiffs then “made a personal, legal, and moral
decision to not be associated with any type of fraudulent practice” and attempted to unilaterally
cancel their mortgage obligations on the basis that “[f]raud of any sort voids a contract.” Id., ¶¶
41-42, 46-48. According to court records provided by the King County Defendants, Plaintiffs’
homes entered foreclosure and were purchased by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and
Federal National Mortgage Association. See King County Mot., App. C (Judgment in Case No.
11-2-41312-8 KNT in King County); id., App. D (Judgment in Case No. 12-2-23496-5 KNT in
King County). When Plaintiffs refused to vacate the premises following the foreclosure sales,
these institutions retained attorneys (now named as Defendants) to represent them in unlawful-
detainer proceedings against Plaintiffs. See id., App. A (Parties’ filings in Case No. 11-2-41312-
8 KNT in King County); id., App. B (Parties’ filings in Case No. 12-2-23496-5 KNT in King
County). When judges (also named as Defendants) ruled in favor of the institutions, see
Judgment in Case No. 11-2-41312-8 KNT; Judgment in Case No. 12-2-23496-5 KNT, Plaintiffs
responded by filing the present suit.
Central to their numerous claims is Plaintiffs’ belief that the Defendant judges had a
financial interest in ruling for the financial institutions that now own the Arps’ houses, and that
the judges improperly based their rulings on this bias instead of the law. See Compl., ¶¶ 60, 70,
72-74. Plaintiffs argue that because the judges “participate[] in a benefit system that is minimum
60% invested in mortgage backed securities,” id., ¶ 60, these institutions “provid[ed] value to
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[the judges’] retirement and benefit system.” Id., ¶ 74. As Defendants “knew, should have
known, and had knowledge that each and every BANK/FINANCE/MORTGAGE/
FORCLOSURE issue before [them] was covered in Badges of Fraud,” id., ¶ 57, they were not
impartial. Id., ¶¶ 60, 65. Instead, they conspired with the other Defendants, including the
institutions’ lawyers, to deprive Plaintiffs of their property rights for mutual gain. Id., ¶¶ 70, 73-
74.
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit
if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction, FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir.
2008), and the requirements for personal jurisdiction “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a factual
basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court resolves factual discrepancies in favor
of the plaintiff. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When
personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the district judge has considerable procedural leeway in
choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2004). The court may rest on the allegations
in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even hold a hearing. See id.
III. Analysis
Defendants make a number of arguments in support of dismissal, but the Court need only
address the issue of personal jurisdiction, which Defendants correctly claim is lacking here. A
court may exercise two forms of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: general and
specific. General jurisdiction exists where a nonresident defendant maintains sufficiently
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systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts
gave rise to the claim in the particular case. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n.9 (1984). “[B]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the
events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test than for
specific jurisdiction.” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[u]nder the Due Process
Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is only permissible if the defendant’s
business contacts with the forum are continuous and systematic.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at
1091-92 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs make no
allegation (in either their Complaint or their Response to the Motions to Dismiss) that any of
these Defendants has had any contacts with this forum. This Court, therefore, cannot exercise
general jurisdiction over these Defendants.
Specific jurisdiction, conversely, exists where a claim arises out of the nonresident
defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also United
States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with
the forum’s long-arm statute and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at
1094-95 (citation and internal citation omitted). The long-arm statute of the District of Columbia
extends personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where a claim arises from the
defendant’s
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if [the defendant] regularly does or solicits
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business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the
District of Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of
Columbia;
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk,
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within
the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties
otherwise provide in writing; or
(7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia . . . .
D.C. Code § 13-423(a). In order to comport with due process, a nonresident defendant must
have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Those guarantees are
satisfied “if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum,”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)), and if “the litigation results from alleged injuries that
‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).
A brief look at the filings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either.
Again, Plaintiffs make no allegation in their Complaint or Response that Defendants had any
contacts – either related to this claim or otherwise – with the District of Columbia. They allege
only that the D.C. long-arm statute reaches “federal employees having business and receiving
benefit from the District,” Resp. to King County at 3, and that their “[s]ummons established
personal jurisdiction.” Id.; Resp. to Attorneys at 2. They are mistaken. First, the judges are
employees of the State of Washington, and the attorneys are privately employed. See Compl., ¶¶
12-16. Second, Plaintiffs provide no support for the notion that their summons alone confers
personal jurisdiction upon this Court. See Jennings v. Coutscoudis, 941 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (D.D.C.
1996) (holding that a summons does not confer personal jurisdiction upon defendants who have
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no connections with the District of Columbia). At the end of the day, Plaintiffs cannot prevail
where they point to no contacts between Defendants and the District of Columbia.
Undeterred, Plaintiffs have also filed copies of letters they sent to state and federal
officials in Washington State. The letters generally repeat the same opaque allegations that
Plaintiffs assert here and request various forms of relief. See First Civil Statement from
Plaintiffs (containing letters to Washington’s Governor, Secretary of State, and Director of the
Department of Licensing) (ECF No. 9); Second Civil Statement from Plaintiffs (containing
letters to the F.B.I. in Seattle, the King County Sheriff, the King County Prosecutor, and the U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of Washington) (ECF No. 10); Third Civil Statement from
Plaintiffs (containing letters to the King County Sheriff and Prosecutor, and the U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of Washington) (ECF No. 13). They do not, however, assist Plaintiffs in
establishing personal jurisdiction.
In addition, Plaintiffs’ Complaint named 199 John and Jane Does, five of whom were
subsequently named in Plaintiffs’ Notice of Intent to Name (ECF No. 8). They include three
additional King County judges and two King County prosecutors. In the event the Court were to
add these judges and prosecutors as Defendants, it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
them for the same reasons as set forth above: Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that these parties have
had any contacts with the District of Columbia.
While this Opinion simply holds that Plaintiffs brought suit in the wrong forum, the
Court cautions that they should think twice before filing their Complaint elsewhere. Because
“state judges are absolutely immune from liability for their judicial acts,” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 334 (1983), Plaintiffs’ central theory of liability appears to rest on a rotten foundation.
Persisting in this frivolous fight will waste everyone’s time.
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IV. Conclusion
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, their Motions to
Dismiss will be granted. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue
this date.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: March 20, 2013
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