Brennan v. Solis , 934 F. Supp. 2d 297 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
THOMAS BRENNAN, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No. 11-1448(EGS)
v. )
)
HILDA L. SOLIS, )
Secretary of Labor, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Thomas Brennan and Charles Rightnowar filed this
action against the Secretary of Labor under Section 481 of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1981. In their Complaint, plaintiffs request an
Order requiring the Secretary to file suit to set aside the
December 15, 2010 officer election in the National Division of
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET) or,
in the alternative, for a supplemental Statement of Reasons as
to why the Secretary failed to file suit. Upon consideration of
the motions, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable
law, the administrative record, and for the reasons set forth
herein, defendant’s motion is GRANTED and plaintiffs’ cross-
motion is DENIED as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
a. Factual Background
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful candidates for union officer
positions in the December 15, 2010 BLET election. Compl. ¶¶ 7-
9. Brennan was a candidate for the office of President in
BLET’s National Division. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff Rightnowar was a
candidate for the office of Secretary Treasurer of BLET’s
National Division. Id. ¶ 3. Incumbent President Dennis R.
Pierce and incumbent Secretary Treasurer William C. Walpert were
among the other opposing candidates in the election, and were
re-elected. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. Incumbent officers Pierce and Walpert
were part of what was called the “Unity Slate.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
In addition to Pierce and Walpert, the Unity Slate included
several additional candidates, two of whom were running opposed
and several who were running unopposed. Id. ¶ 13.
The December 15, 2010 election was the first “rank and
file” election for the National Division; previously, positions
had been filled through a delegate convention. Id. ¶ 16.
Plaintiffs allege that prior to the election, the incumbent
officers 1 set up a “Get Out the Vote” drive (“GOTV Drive”). Id.
¶ 19. Plaintiffs allege that the GOTV drive was “allegedly
1
Plaintiffs’ allegation on this point makes an unclear reference
to “they.” See Compl. ¶ 19. It is unclear whether “they”
refers to the incumbent officers, the Unity Slate, or some
combination of the two.
2
neutral” but “consisted of persons opposed to the use of the
rank and file election and in favor of the delegate convention.”
Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs further allege that after the efforts to
change back to a delegate convention were rejected, the GOTV
Drive was continued for the upcoming election. Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiffs allege that although the “official position” of
the incumbent officer candidates was that the BLET National
Division was sponsoring a neutral effort to increase voter
turnout, plaintiffs state that there were several improprieties
in connection with the administration of the GOTV Drive.
Plaintiffs allege that “[t]wo union officers headed the GOTV
Drive and worked on a full time basis throughout the campaign
period leading up to the December 15, 2010 period and were
possibly paid by two railroad companies.” Compl. ¶ 21.
Plaintiffs further allege that the “Unity Slate web site stated
that the GOTV [Drive] was an activity of the Unity Slate
campaign.” Id. ¶ 23. Specifically, the website, a copy of
which is attached to the Complaint as an exhibit, told members
that “if they wished to support the Unity Slate, they should
become active in the ‘BLET Unity’s Slate Get Out the Vote
Drive.” Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs further allege that BLET officers
“were permitted on union time to make phone calls and contact
various members—allegedly just to urge them to vote.” Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs aver that “no one knows to whom such calls were made,
3
and there is no documentation as to all members who may have
received such calls.” Id. ¶ 27.
b. Plaintiffs’ Pre-Election Protests
Prior to the election, plaintiff Rightnowar filed several
pre-election protests on behalf of himself and Thomas Brennan. 2
In protest number ND-2010-17, filed November 8, 2010, Rightnowar
raised several issues with the then-upcoming election. R. 56.
Rightnowar asserted
(1) alleged violations of portions of the [LMRDA], the
IBT Constitution, BLET By-laws and the BLET Election
Rules; (2) the use of Union resources ‘to “construct”
a nation-wide canvassing to get out the vote from the
persons most likely to vote for the incumbent National
Division officers’; (3) request for [National
Secretary-Treasurer] Walpert’s replacement as
‘Election Officer’ with such appointment to be
made/approved by ‘the IRB and President Hoffa’; (4) a
‘complete accounting’ of the alleged misuse of Union
resources and; (5) ‘A ballot form that is fair and
neutral and not skewed to favor the Unity Slate.
R. 56. The Election Protest Committee determined that
Rightnowar did not meet his burden “to provide a preponderance
of reliable evidence that any members of the National Division
Advisory Board or any members of the Unity Slate are in
2
Intervenor BLET suggests in a footnote that only the claims of
plaintiff Rightnowar are properly before the Court because
Brennan did not personally file any pre-election protests and
did not sign Rightnowar’s protests. BLET Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. for
Summ. J. at 3 n.2. In reply, the Secretary states that it does
not seek dismissal of Brennan as a plaintiff “because Rightnowar
is properly before the Court and dismissal of Brennan would not
alter the claims necessary for the court to decide.” Def.’s
Reply at 2 n.1.
4
violation of the Election Rules in any respect.” R. 64. A
second pre-election protest, ND-2010-18, filed by letters dated
November 15 and 16, 2010, alleged substantially similar
violations. R. 65. The Election Protest Committee determined
that the second protest was not timely filed and declined to
consider it. R. 67-68. The Committee noted that it had
considered the identical issues in ND-2010-17. R. 68.
On December 8, 2010, Rightnowar filed an appeal of the
Election Protest Committee’s decision in ND-2010-17. R. 78.
Rightnowar asserted that union funds had been improperly used in
connection with the activities of the Mobilization Network and
the GOTV Drive. R. 79. Rightnowar also alleged that Unity
Slate supporters were traveling on union time to engage in
election activities. R. 79. Rightnowar also challenged the
Election Protest Committee’s determination that George Faulkner,
rather than Walpert, was serving as Election Officer. R. 79.
Finally, Rightnowar alleged that the current ballot was in
violation of BLET By-laws. R. 79. On December 15, 2010, the
BLET Advisory Board issued a Decision on Appeal on Rightnowar’s
pre-election protests ND-2010-17 and ND-2010-18. R. 82. The
Advisory Board concluded that the Election Protest Committee’s
decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious under the
applicable rules and affirmed the decision. R. 85-86.
5
After the election, on January 12, 2011, plaintiffs filed a
complaint with the Secretary asking that the election results be
set aside. R. 409. (“Agency Complaint”). The Agency Complaint,
which stated that it was based on pre-election protests ND-2010-
17 and ND-2010-18, alleged several violations of the LMRDA. R.
51. Plaintiffs alleged that “National Division officers running
for election used union funds to ‘get out the vote’ in the
officer election.” R. 51. Plaintiffs also alleged that union
funds were used to create a so-called Mobilization Network
during the election period, which had a bias toward the Unity
Slate. R. 52. Plaintiffs also alleged that railroad carrier
funds were also used in setting up the Mobilization Network. R.
52. Plaintiffs further alleged that the incumbent candidates
increased their official travel during the time they were
running for office and were essentially campaigning on union
funds, which was a misuse of union funds in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 481(g). R. 53. Plaintiffs also contended that a
defunct publication, the Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
Journal was revived during the time period of the election
solely for the purpose of supporting the incumbent officers. R.
54. Finally, plaintiffs argued that “the very form of the
ballot was an ‘advertisement’ on behalf of the candidacy of the
Unity Slate” because the ballot listed the names of the members
of the Unity Slate, of whom all but four had already been
6
elected. R. 54. Plaintiffs contended that the only purpose of
listing all of the names was making clear that the four
candidates had the support of the BLET establishment and that,
by comparison, plaintiffs “were marginal candidates unable to
form a full slate.” R. 54.
On May 25, 2011, the Secretary issued a Statement of
Reasons denying the relief requested in the Agency Complaint,
finding that no violations of Title IV, as alleged by plaintiff,
had occurred. Statement of Reasons (“SOR”), Compl. Ex. B. The
Secretary explained that plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the
incumbent officers’ improper use of union funds and resources
for the GOTV Drive were not substantiated by the evidence. SOR
at 1. Similarly, plaintiffs’ allegations that the incumbent
BLET National Division officers improperly campaigned while they
were being compensated by the union also were not substantiated
by the evidence. Id. The Secretary explained that the use of
the Mobilization Network was in accordance with Section 7(h) of
BLET’s 2006 Bylaws, despite the fact that this was the first
time the Mobilization Network had been used for officer
elections. Id. The Secretary further explained that the
investigation found that union members “received consistently
clear communications that the Mobilization Network’s purpose was
to increase voter turnout and not to direct members to vote for
specific candidates or slates.” SOR at 2. The Secretary noted
7
that plaintiffs themselves “were asked to be part of [the] Get-
Out-the-Vote-Drive for the election.” Id. The Secretary
further concluded that BLET National Secretary-Treasurer Walpert
had not improperly served as an Election Officer while being a
candidate in the election, and that Walpert’s actions were
permitted within the 2006 Bylaws. 3 The Secretary also concluded
that there was no evidence of any discrimination in favor of or
against any candidate, or that “anything improper or irregular
occurred during the election.” SOR at 2. Finally, the
Secretary found that the candidates’ names were listed in the
election ballot in the “order specified in Article I of the
election rules.” Id. Thus, the Secretary concluded that there
was no violation of the Act. 4
c. Proceedings Before This Court
On August 8, 2011, plaintiffs filed this action, alleging a
violation of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 557. Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary’s
Statement of Reasons was arbitrary and capricious. Compl. ¶ 38.
Plaintiffs argue that the GOTV Drive violated the regulations
3
This allegation is not mentioned specifically in the Agency
Complaint but had been alleged earlier in the union protest
process, and was addressed by the Secretary nonetheless.
4
The Secretary rejected plaintiffs’ remaining claims as not
having been raised properly through the union’s internal protest
procedure. SOR at 2. The Secretary concluded that the
remaining issues had not been properly exhausted and declined to
reach those issues.
8
regarding the use of union funds in union-officer election
campaigns. Plaintiffs further challenge the Secretary’s
conclusion that there was no evidence to support plaintiffs’
claims in view of a statement on the Unity Slate campaign
website urging supporters to join the GOTV Drive.
In the Complaint, plaintiffs also make various allegations
regarding what the Secretary allegedly did not properly
determine in the Statement of Reasons. Plaintiffs allege that
the Secretary “has failed to explain why the use of union funds
in a Get Out the Vote drive of this particular kind is a
permitted use of union funds when it is not a permitted use in
the Secretary’s own regulations.” Compl. ¶ 43. Plaintiffs
further allege that “the Secretary fails to state whether the
officer election was conducted with adequate safeguards.” Id. ¶
47. Plaintiffs further contend that the Statement of Reasons
“fails to address whether safeguards were in place to prevent
the misuse of union funds in a Get Out the Vote drive.” Id. ¶
50. In addition, plaintiffs argue, the “Statement of Reasons
fails to even mention 401(c) or discuss the adequacy and
transparency of safeguards that plaintiffs and members of the
opposition to the Unity Slate could observe.” Id. ¶ 51.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Secretary impermissibly required
plaintiffs to “prove” misuse of union funds, and thus the
decision was both arbitrary and capricious and in violation of
9
Section 401(c) of the LMRDA. Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiffs conclude
that “[w]here a union has engaged in a new and novel use of
union funds in an election campaign in a manner not covered by
existing regulations, and where the union has put no adequate
safeguards in place, and where the Secretary has not provided
any discussion or meaningful discussion as to what such
safeguards must be if such an unprecedented use of union
treasury funds is upheld, the Secretary should either bring suit
or provide an adequate Statement of Reasons why the Secretary
has failed to do so.” Id. ¶ 55.
In their Complaint, plaintiffs request that the Court (1)
declare the Statement of Reasons to be inadequate for failure to
determine whether adequate safeguards were in place under the
standard of Section 401(c) of the LMRDA; (2) declare that the
Statement of Reasons is arbitrary and capricious and in conflict
with the law, specifically Section 401 of the LMRDA; (3) direct
the Secretary to either file suit to invalidate the December 15,
2010 election or provide a legally sufficient Statement of
Reasons as to why the Secretary has failed to do so.
On November 1, 2011, the Secretary moved to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 9. The
Secretary argued that several of plaintiffs’ claims were not
raised before the Secretary and are outside of the scope of
judicial review. As to the issues that were properly raised,
10
the Secretary argues that her decision was supported by the
evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. ECF No. 14.
Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary failed to determine whether
the union officer election was conducted lawfully, that the
Secretary impermissibly disregarded evidence from a website, and
that the Secretary departed from applicable regulations and
enforcement policy. On January 18, 2012, Intervenor BLET filed
a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs’ cross-motion for
summary judgment and in support of defendants’ motion to dismiss
or in the alternative for summary judgment. ECF No. 18. BLET
argues that the Secretary’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
capricious and that plaintiffs’ arguments are based on mere
speculation and innuendo. Also on January 18, 2012, the
Secretary filed a reply in further support of her motion and in
opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 19. The Secretary
argued again that plaintiffs’ election protests that were before
the Secretary did not allege that monitoring of campaign
expenditures is required under the LMRDA, and that plaintiffs
misconstrue the Secretary’s authority. The Secretary also
argues that plaintiffs’ arguments are based on a
misrepresentation of the facts and speculation. On November 19,
2012, plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum of law, to
11
which defendants responded, contending that a recent decision in
the case of Corner v. Solis, No. 11-8652, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75742 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 1, 2012), required a finding in this case
that the Secretary’s Statement of Reasons was arbitrary and
capricious.
The motions are ripe for the Court’s decision.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
a. Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment
The Secretary has moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), and alternatively moves for
summary judgment under Rule 56. Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f,
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). If the motion is considered under
Rule 56, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”
Id. Here, because both parties have presented materials outside
the pleadings for the Court to consider in adjudicating their
motions, the Court deems it appropriate to treat both
submissions as motions for summary judgment. See Marshall Cnty.
Health Care. Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 & n. 5 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court considering a Rule
12
12(b)(6) motion “can consult the [administrative] record to
answer the legal question[s] before the court,” but that “[i]t
is probably the better practice for a district court always to
convert to summary judgment”); Mortgage Bankers Ass'n v. Solis,
864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 201-02 (D.D.C. 2012) (in APA case,
converting motion to dismiss, or in the alterative, for summary
judgment into a motion for summary judgment). 5
“Summary judgment is the proper mechanism for deciding, as
a matter of law, whether an agency action is supported by the
administrative record and consistent with the APA standard of
review.” Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 684 F. Supp. 2d
42, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Stuttering Found. of Am. v.
Springer, 498 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007)). However, due
to the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative
record, the typical summary judgment standards set forth in Rule
56(c) are not applicable. Stuttering, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 207(citation omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the APA, it is the role of
the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision
that is supported by the administrative record, whereas ‘the
function of the district court is to determine whether or not as
a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record
5
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds it
unnecessary to look beyond the Secretary’s Statement of Reasons
and the documents reflecting plaintiffs’ prior union protests;
nonetheless, the Court has converted this motion to one for
summary judgment.
13
permitted the agency to make the decision it did.’ ” Id.(quoting Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769–70 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
A reviewing court will “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.” Ludlow v. Mabus, 793 F. Supp. 2d 352,
354 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). In Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court explained the
“arbitrary and capricious” review by noting that “an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.” 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). However, the standard of
review is a narrow one and “[t]he court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789
F.2d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1986). “[T]he party challenging an
agency's action as arbitrary and capricious bears the burden of
proof,” id., and the APA directs a reviewing court to “review
14
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party” in
making this assessment, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
b. The LMRDA
Title IV of the LMRDA governs union elections. Under 29
U.S.C. § 481, union members are guaranteed free and democratic
elections. See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n,
389 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1968). Under Section 401(a) of the LMRDA,
“[e]very national or international labor organization, except a
federation of national or international labor organizations,
shall elect its officers not less often than once every five
years by secret ballot among the members in good standing or at
a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot.” 29 U.S.C. §
481(a). Section 401(c) of the LMRDA also provides that
“[a]dequate safeguards to insure a fair election shall be
provided, including the right of any candidate to have an
observer at the polls and at the counting of the ballots.” Id.§ 481(c).
The LMRDA provides that any union member may challenge an
election believed to be held in violation of the statute's fair
election procedures by filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor after exhausting internal union remedies. See 29 U.S.C. §
482(a). The Secretary may file suit in federal district court
to invalidate the election if she determines that probable cause
exists to believe that that both (1) a violation of the Act has
15
occurred that has not been remedied; and (2) the violation may
have affected the election’s outcome. Dunlap v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 569-71 (1975); 29 U.S.C. § 482(b); 29 C.F.R. §
452.136. The requirement that there be probable cause to
believe that the violation may have affected the outcome serves
to “free unions from the disruptive effect of a voided election
unless there is a meaningful relation between a violation of the
Act and results of a particular election.” Wirtz v. Hotel,
Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 507
(1968); see 29 C.F.R. § 452.5 (“[T]he Secretary as a matter of
policy will not file suit to enforce the election provisions
unless the violations found are such that the outcome may have
been affected.”). If the Court finds that there was a violation
of Section 401 of the LMRDA that “may have affected the outcome
of an election, the court shall declare the election . . . to be
void and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision
of the Secretary and, so far as lawful and practicable, in
conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor
organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 482(c).
The Secretary of Labor holds exclusive authority to bring
suit to set aside union elections that violate Title IV. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 482, 483. Title IV precludes private action by a
union member to contest a completed election. See Local No. 82,
Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Drivers, Helpers,
16
Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 544, 549
(1984). “The legislative history shows that Congress weighed
how best to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections
without departing needlessly from its long-standing policy
against governmental intrusion into internal union affairs.”
Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. at 470-71.
If the Secretary does not find probable cause to believe
that there were any violations of the Act that may have affected
the outcome of the election, the Secretary may not commence
legal action. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). Under such circumstances, a
union member is entitled to a statement of the Secretary’s
reasons for declining to sue. If dissatisfied, the union member
may obtain judicial review of the Statement of Reasons to
determine whether the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. See Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 566, 571-
73; 29 C.F.R. § 458.64(b). The Statement of Reasons is “to
cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies.” Id. at
572. The Statement of Reasons must permit the Court “to
determine with some measure of confidence whether or not the
discretion, which still remains with the Secretary, has been
exercised in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious.”
Id. at 571. The Secretary is not required to provide detailed
17
reasons nor address every issue raised by Plaintiff in order for
her decision to be upheld. Id. at 573.
Judicial review of the Statement of Reasons is exceedingly
narrow. Id. at 591 (Burger, J., concurring); see id. at 571-73.
“[S]ince the statute relies on the special knowledge and
discretion of the Secretary for the determination of both the
probable violation and the probable effect, clearly the
reviewing court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for
the decision of the Secretary not to bring suit.” Id. at 571.
Review is to be confined to the four corners of the Statement of
Reasons, id. at 572, and the Court may not consider “challenges
to the factual bases for the Secretary’s conclusion either that
no violations occurred or that they did not affect the outcome
of the election.” Id. at 573. The Court must defer to the
Secretary’s factual findings. Id.Finally, the remedies available to Plaintiff in the
district court are limited. Should the Court determine that the
Secretary's Statement of Reasons fails to provide an adequate
account of her decision, the Court may not order a new election.
The Secretary retains the “exclusive authority to challenge and,
if successful, to supervise union elections.” See Local No. 82
v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 548 n.22 (1984). If the Court
determines that the Secretary's decision was arbitrary and
capricious, the Secretary may be ordered to reopen consideration
18
of Plaintiff's former complaint and to supplement her Statement.
See Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 574—75. When the district court
determines that the Secretary's statement of reasons adequately
demonstrates that the decision not to sue is not contrary to
law, the complaining union member's suit fails and should be
dismissed. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 574.
III. DISCUSSION
a. Claims Properly Before the Court
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish
between the issues that were actually before the Secretary and
those that were not. The Secretary may only consider issues
that are properly exhausted and raised in a complaint. 29
U.S.C. § 482(a)(1); Hodgson v. Local Union 6799, United
Steelworkers of Am., AFL CIO, 403 U.S. 333, 336 (1971). 6
6
None of the parties squarely address whether the claims brought
by Thomas Brennan were properly exhausted. Intervenor BLET
suggests in a footnote that only the claims of plaintiff
Rightnowar are properly before the Court because Brennan did not
file any pre-election protests and did not sign Rightnowar’s
protests. BLET Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 n.2. In
reply, the Secretary states in a footnote that it does not seek
dismissal of Brennan as a plaintiff “because Rightnowar is
properly before the Court and dismissal of Brennan would not
alter the claims necessary for the court to decide.” Def.’s
Reply at 2 n.1. Because the Court finds that exhaustion is not
jurisdictional under the LMRDA, see Solis v. Communications
Workers of America, 766 F. Supp. 2d 84, 97 (D.D.C. 2011), and
because plaintiffs’ claim will be dismissed for other reasons
discussed herein, the Court declines to reach the question of
whether Brennan exhausted his administrative remedies.
19
In the Agency Complaint, plaintiffs alleged several
violations in connection with the December 15, 2010 election.
Plaintiffs alleged that “National Division officers running for
election used union funds to ‘get out the vote’ in the officer
election.” R. 51. Plaintiffs also alleged that union funds
were used to create a so-called Mobilization Network during the
election period, which had a bias toward the Unity Slate. R.
52. Plaintiffs also alleged that railroad carrier funds were
also used in setting up the Mobilization Network. R. 52.
Plaintiffs further alleged that the incumbent candidates
increased their official travel during the time they were
running for office and were essentially campaigning on union
funds, which was a misuse of union funds in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 481(g). R. 53. Plaintiffs also contended that a
defunct publication, the Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
Journal was revived during the time period of the election
solely for the purpose of supporting the incumbent officers. R.
54. Finally, plaintiffs argued that “the very form of the
ballot was an ‘advertisement’ on behalf of the candidacy of the
Unity Slate” because the ballot listed the names of the members
of the Unity Slate, of whom all but four had already been
elected. R. 54. Plaintiffs alleged that the Agency Complaint
was based on Rightnowar’s pre-election protests numbered ND-
2010-17 and ND-2010-18. R. 51.
20
In the Statement of Reasons, the Secretary addressed
several of these issues. The Secretary first addressed
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding improper use of union funds in
connection with the Mobilization Network, the GOTV Drive, and
travel for campaigning. SOR at 1. The Secretary then addressed
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the appearance of the ballots.
Id. at 2. Finally, the Secretary addressed an allegation
regarding whether Secretary-Treasurer Walpert was serving as an
Election Officer, which had been raised in the union protest
process, even though this allegation was not specifically
addressed in plaintiffs’ Agency Complaint. Id. The Secretary
declined to address the remaining issues raised by plaintiffs,
finding that they were not properly exhausted under the union’s
internal protest procedure. These allegations included that
railroad carrier funds were used in setting up the Mobilization
Network and that a journal was revived for the purpose of
supporting incumbent candidates. Id. In the Complaint and in
the parties’ subsequent briefing, plaintiffs do not challenge
the Secretary’s decision in the Statement of Reasons that these
remaining issues were not exhausted.
Accordingly, the issues that were properly raised before
the Secretary by plaintiffs are: (1) the improper use of union
funds in connection with the December 15, 2010 election,
specifically in the GOTV Drive, the Mobilization Network, and
21
travel for campaigning; (2) the appearance of the ballots; and
(3) whether Secretary-Treasurer Walpert was improperly serving
as Election Officer.
b. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding What the Secretary
Failed to Decide
In opposition to the Secretary’s motion and in support of
plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argue
that the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious
because it failed to address the issue of whether adequate
safeguards were in place to ensure that union funds were not
misused in violation of Section 401(c). Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for
Summ. J. at 5. Plaintiffs contend that in a December 17, 2010
post-election protest, they challenged the lack of adequate
safeguards. Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 5. Plaintiffs
also contend that the Agency Complaint put the Secretary on
notice of their allegation that adequate safeguards were not in
place by alleging that plaintiffs were unable to track and
monitor the GOTV Drive. Id. at 6.
There are several problems with plaintiffs’ argument.
First, plaintiffs did not make an “adequate safeguards” argument
in the Agency Complaint. As the Secretary explains, plaintiffs
only raised allegations regarding misuse of union funds, not
that there were inadequate safeguards to prevent misuse of union
funds, and thus the Secretary’s failure to address adequate
22
safeguards is not arbitrary or capricious. Plaintiffs’
allegations, at most, put the Secretary on notice that
plaintiffs were unable to determine how the union funds were
being used. Plaintiffs did not allege that the union failed to
have adequate safeguards in place to track the use of union
funds. This is not a case where the Secretary overlooked entire
arguments. See, e.g., Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177
(D.C. Cir. 1997). The Secretary is not obligated to investigate
what is, at most, a tangential inference arising from
plaintiffs’ actual allegations. Plaintiffs argue that Hodgson
v. Local Union 6799 requires the Court to liberally construe
plaintiffs’ allegations because “union members may use broad and
imprecise language in framing their internal union protests.”
403 U.S. 333, 340 (1971). Hodgson concluded, however, that
union members are required to meet the exhaustion requirement by
indicating “in some discernible fashion” the alleged election
violation. Id. at 341. Here, the issue is not whether
plaintiffs were unable to articulate theories of election
violations; indeed, plaintiffs’ allegations have been
articulately and precisely made. Rather, plaintiffs did not
include among their various allegations of wrongdoing any
allegation that BLET failed to provide adequate safeguards to
insure a fair election in violation of Section 401(c).
23
In addition, even if plaintiffs had included their
“adequate safeguards” argument in their Agency Complaint, they
failed to exhaust their remedies in the union protest
proceedings. See 29 U.S.C. § 482. Plaintiffs allege that they
raised the “adequate safeguards” argument in a December 17, 2010
post-election protest. See R. 467. Assuming that is true, the
December 17 protest was not incorporated into the Agency
Complaint, which specifically stated that it was based on the
November 8, 15 and 16 pre-election protests, for which
plaintiffs received a final decision on December 21, 2010. In
addition, at the time Rightnowar filed his Agency Complaint,
Rightnowar had not yet received a final decision on his December
21, 2010 post-election protest. The final decision on appeal
was not issued until January 21, 2011, nine days after the
filing of the Agency Complaint. R. 486. 7 Accordingly, the
“adequate safeguards” issue was not properly exhausted and the
Secretary’s failure to address it is neither arbitrary nor
capricious. See 29 U.S.C. § 482.
In their opposition to defendants’ motion and in their
cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs do not appear to
raise any other arguments regarding allegations the Secretary
7
The January 21, 2011 Decision on Appeal does not appear to
discuss an “adequate safeguards” violation.
24
failed to address in the Statement of Reasons. Accordingly,
plaintiffs’ arguments on those points are deemed conceded.
c. Plaintiffs Allege that the Secretary’s Finding of “No
Evidence” was Arbitrary and Capricious
Plaintiffs next turn to the Secretary’s decision that the
investigation did not substantiate plaintiffs’ allegations that
union funds were used improperly. Section 401(g) of the Act
prohibits the use of employer or union funds to promote a
candidate for union office as follows:
No moneys received by any labor organization . . .
shall be contributed to promote the candidacy of any
person in any election subject to the provisions of
this subchapter. Such moneys of a labor organization
may be utilized for notices, factual statements of
issues not involving candidates, and other expenses
necessary for the holding of an election.
29 U.S.C. § 481(g). The Act prohibits promotion of candidates,
as emphasized by the related regulation, which states that “the
Act does not prohibit impartial publication of election
information.” Id.In the Statement of Reasons, the Secretary concluded that
the use of union funds in the December 15, 2010 election did not
violate the Act. The Secretary further explained that the
Mobilization Network was permitted under Section 7(h) of the
BLET By-laws. SOR at 1. The Secretary found that union members
had received “consistently clear communications” regarding the
purpose of the Mobilization Network and about efforts to
25
increase voter turnout. The Secretary noted that even
Rightnowar was asked to participate in the GOTV Drive. The
Secretary concluded that
[t]he investigation found no evidence that the
Mobilization Network was used to promote the candidacy
of the incumbent slate, or that the Mobilization
Network directed its efforts toward supports of the
incumbent slate. The investigation also found no
evidence that anyone working for the Mobilization
Network campaigned for the incumbent slate while being
paid by the union or at times when activities were to
be devoted to Mobilization Network activities. There
was no violation of the Act.
SOR at 2. Plaintiffs first argue a number of theories regarding
the motivation of various union members and also argue that the
“lack of adequate safeguards” caused there to be no evidence.
In addition, plaintiffs cite a piece of evidence—a website—that
they contend establishes “the Unity Slate’s use of the GOTV for
campaign purposes.” Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 9 (citing Compl.
Ex. A). Specifically, the Unity Slate’s website stated:
Volunteer to participate in the BLET Unity Slate get
out the vote campaign in the historical one man one
vote election following our National Convention in
October. It is imperative that all members exercise
our right to vote in this election and we need your
help to encourage everyone to vote.
Compl. Ex. A. Plaintiffs acknowledge that this evidence was
before the Secretary. 8 Plaintiffs also admit that the Secretary
8
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Secretary requested evidence
regarding whether the union officers who worked on the “Get Out
The Vote Drive” picked their own supporters to call or engage in
the drive to help the Unity Slate. Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiffs
also acknowledge that plaintiff’s counsel spoke with
26
is not required to address in the Statement of Reasons every
piece of evidence submitted. Plaintiffs argue, however, that
the Secretary’s statement that there was “no evidence” of misuse
of union funds suggests that the Secretary did not consider the
website evidence at all, rendering the Statement of Reasons
arbitrary and capricious.
The Secretary argues that the statement on the Unity
Slate’s website is not evidence that the GOTV Drive was used to
promote particular candidates on the incumbent slate. In this
respect, the Secretary contends that plaintiffs misunderstand
the applicable statutory standard. Specifically, the Secretary
argues that Section 401(g) prohibits the “promotion” of a
particular candidate, and it was under the standard that
plaintiffs’ allegations were evaluated. The Secretary contends
that plaintiffs’ arguments focus instead on an alleged
subjective purpose of the GOTV Drive to support the incumbent
slate.
The Court agrees with the Secretary. As an initial matter,
and as plaintiffs concede, the Secretary is not required to
address in the Statement of Reasons every piece of evidence
representatives of the Department of Labor during the
Department’s investigation of plaintiffs’ allegations and
provided the Department with evidence that purported to support
plaintiffs’ allegations; in particular, the contents of the
website. Compl. ¶ 30.
27
before her. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 573. In addition, the Court
finds that the statement on the website is does not, by itself,
establish probable cause that union funds were misused, and that
the misuse of union funds affected the outcome of the election.
See 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). At most, it evidences the unknown
writer’s belief that the Unity Slate had organized the GOTV
Drive. The Court notes that the statement is otherwise neutral
on its face, encouraging everyone to vote. And, as the
Secretary noted, plaintiff Rightnowar was asked to be a part of
the Mobilization Network. SOR at 2. In view of all of these
factors, the Secretary’s finding that there was “no evidence” of
the misuse of union funds is not arbitrary or capricious. 9
9
The case submitted by plaintiffs with a notice of supplemental
authority also does not provide support for plaintiffs’
arguments. See Corner v. Solis, No. 11-8652, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75742 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 1, 2012). In Corner, the district
court remanded a narrow issue to the Secretary for a
supplemental statement of reasons. Specifically, the court
found that the Secretary’s decision not to challenge the
election eligibility of a union member was not sufficiently
explained in the Statement of Reasons. The Secretary had
appeared to conclude that probable cause existed to believe that
a violation had occurred, but the Secretary then cited to an
inapplicable statutory provision in stating that suit would not
be brought. Corner thus stands for the unremarkable proposition
that a court may remand an issue to the Secretary in the
appropriate case where the Secretary’s reasoning is unclear or
contradictory. This is not such a case. Because plaintiffs
failed to raise the “adequate safeguards” issue properly, the
Secretary’s failure to address it does not require remand.
28
The Court has considered plaintiffs’ other arguments and
finds that they lack merit. 10 When the district court determines
that the Secretary's statement of reasons adequately
demonstrates that the decision not to sue is not contrary to
law, the complaining union member's suit fails and should be
dismissed. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 574.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED as moot.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 31, 2013
10
Plaintiffs’ final argument is that the Secretary’s decision
not to bring suit was arbitrary and capricious because it is
allegedly inconsistent with the Secretary’s own regulations.
Here, plaintiffs are essentially repeating their allegation that
union funds were used in violation of Section 401(g), which
prohibits the use of union funds to “promote” certain
candidates. Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that union funds were
used to promote certain candidates despite the Secretary’s
conclusion that no violation of the Act occurred. For the
reasons stated above, the Court finds that the Secretary’s
decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
29