Nelson v. District of Columbia , 967 F. Supp. 2d 360 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
MARCUS NELSON, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1594 (RCL)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is plaintiff Koryn Rubin’s Motion for attorney’s fees and litigation
costs. Dkt. No. 63. Ms. Rubin seeks $43,957.50 in fees for 92.5 hours of work, and $1,289.80 in
costs. Defendant District of Columbia concedes the costs, Dkt. No. 73-1, but requests a
reduction of the attorney’s fees sought to $8,792.50, or 20%, then an additional five percent
reduction of that number for quarter-hour billing, Dkt. No. 73. For the reasons given below, the
Court awards Ms. Rubin $21,978.75 in attorney’s fees, or 50% of the amount sought, in addition
to the $1,289.80 in costs.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute over attorney’s fees arose from facts surrounding two plaintiffs, Marcus
Nelson and Koryn Rubin. The alleged underlying facts are as follows: After stopping and
searching Mr. Nelson’s automobile, D.C. police officers arrested him for possession of an illegal
handgun. See Dkt. No. 22 at 2, 4. Mr. Nelson spent several days in jail following the arrest. Id.
at 3. While he was there, officers obtained a warrant and searched Mr. Nelson’s home while Ms.
Rubin was there. Id. at 2–3. During the search, the police detained and threatened Ms. Rubin.
Id. at 3.
The plaintiffs brought two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: First, that “the defendant
officers wrongfully and unlawfully stopped, arrested, detained and incarcerated, plaintiff
Nelson.” Dkt. No. 3 at 3. Second, that the officers “commenced an illegal search” of a home
and “threatened, handcuffed and detained plaintiff Rubin in her own home without any
justification whatsoever.” 1 Id. at 4. Mr. Nelson’s claim resulted in a hung jury; Ms. Rubin’s, a
$12,500 judgment in her favor. Dkt. No. 45 at 2–3.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Attorneys’ Fees
In a § 1983 suit, a court may award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party.”
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). When, as here, some claims are successful and others are not, it is crucial
that the court engage in this two-step inquiry: First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that
were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of
success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Under the first prong, unless the successful and
unsuccessful claims are interrelated, “a court must confine fee awards to work done on the
successful claims.” George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir.
1992). The claims are interrelated if they “share a common core of facts or are based on related
legal theories.” Id. at 1537 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35). The second prong requires
reasonableness, for which “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley,
1
Both Mr. Nelson and Ms. Rubin alleged an illegal search of the home, so any work done on this issue benefitted
both plaintiffs. For purposes of Ms. Rubin’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, the Court will treat the home-
search issue as part of Ms. Rubin’s claim.
2
461 U.S. at 436. To determine whether the fees sought are reasonable, the Supreme Court noted
that “[t]here is no precise rule or formula.” Id. As such, even when a § 1983 plaintiff’s recovery
pales in comparison with the amount sought, the court need not necessarily reduce attorney’s
fees proportionately. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Indeed, in Rivera the Supreme Court affirmed an award of $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees when
the plaintiffs recovered only $33,350 in damages. Id. at 564–67. And though Rivera was a
plurality opinion, the D.C. Circuit relied on it in rejecting a “rule of proportionality” with respect
to the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act. Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors
Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
a. Ms. Rubin’s claim is distinct from Mr. Nelson’s.
While the first Henley prong opens the door wide for discretion short of abuse, D.C.
Circuit cases provide guidance for how to apply it. When claims share neither a common core of
facts nor legal theories, they are unrelated. For example, in Brooks, the plaintiff sought recovery
from his employer after a toe injury for total disability, and though that claim was unsuccessful,
the administrative law judge on his own motion awarded him compensation for partial disability.
963 F.2d at 1534. Addressing attorney’s fees on appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the
unsuccessful total-disability claim and successful partial-disability claim were unrelated as a
matter of law. Id. at 1539–40. They were based on different factual theories because “[t]he facts
needed to demonstrate total disability . . . go well beyond the simple medical reports needed to
establish a partially dysfunctional foot.” Id. at 1539. And that they were based on different legal
theories was evidenced by the fact that Brooks never sought recovery based on partial disability;
the ALJ had to bring it up himself. Id.3
By contrast, if claims share either a common core of facts or common legal theories, they
are interrelated. In Goos v. National Ass’n of Realators, the D.C. Circuit remanded a 30%
reduction in attorney’s fees because the district court focused on the distinct legal theories to the
exclusion of the common core of facts. 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In the underlying
wrongful dismissal case, Goos brought two claims: the claim alleging violation of the District of
Columbia Human Rights Act was successful, while the claim alleging breach of contract based
on the employee handbook was unsuccessful. Id. at 1567. Though based on distinct legal
theories, “both claims focused on a single, necessary factual issue: whether the NAR had
dismissed Ms. Goos in retaliation . . . .” Id. at 1569.
Here, the claims are distinct (with one exception discussed infra Part III.c & n.4). On the
facts, these claims are more like those in Brooks than those in Goos. The facts needed to show
an unlawful automobile stop and unlawful arrest of Mr. Nelson have little overlap with the facts
needed to show an unlawful search of a home and unlawful detention during that search of Ms.
Rubin. The incidents took place at a different time, at a different place, in a different setting, and
with different plaintiffs. The facts of these claims are thus even more unrelated than those in
Brooks: in Brooks, at least the claims were based on injuries to the same person.
With respect to the legal theories, these are also distinct. While both claims stem from
the Fourth Amendment, an automobile stop and false arrest are different events with different
jurisprudence than the search of a home and detention of a person during that search. Hensley
contemplated a more specific commonality. Indeed, the purpose of the relatedness inquiry is “to
prevent claimant from ‘piggybacking’ fees incurred for work done on losing claims onto
unrelated winning issues.” Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1537. That purpose would not be achieved here
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if this Court were to award fees to Ms. Rubin for work done on Mr. Nelson’s claim based on
their broad Fourth Amendment commonality.
b. Ms. Rubin’s attorney’s fees should not be reduced further because of the
limited success on her claim.
Although Ms. Rubin sought $2.5 million and the jury awarded her only $12,500, this
Court will not reduce her fees on that ground. Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent make
it clear that proportionality is not required. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574; Williams, 225 F.3d at
747. After all, in Rivera, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of attorney’s fees that was more
than seven times the plaintiff’s damages. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 564–67. Here, the amount this
Court will award after accounting for the distinct claims is less than double the damages. And
given the disturbing facts underlying Ms. Rubin’s claim, a damage award that exceeded the
attorney’s fees sought would have been appropriate anyway. See Dkt. No. 62 at 81–90.
c. A 50% reduction of the attorney’s fees sought is fair.
In light of Ms. Rubin’s claim of illegal search and detention being distinct from Mr.
Nelson’s claim of illegal stop and false arrest, this Court must now decide how the distinction
affects the award of attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Gregory Lattimer, wrote that the
defendant “has not and cannot identify a single hour of billable time that would not have been
incurred had plaintiff Rubin’s claim been litigated separate and apart from the claims of plaintiff
Nelson.” Pls.’ Reply 2. This Court is happy to take up the challenge. 2 For starters, Mr. Lattimer
logged a total of 27 hours for trial. Dkt. No. 63-2. Because he did not specify how much time he
spent focused on Mr. Nelson’s claim and how much on Ms. Rubin’s, it is up to this Court to
make its best guess as to the division of labor. This Court finds that a 50/50 split is a fair guess
2
“The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the
award to account for the limited success.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.
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and so reduces the time logged for trial by half. After trial, Mr. Lattimer logged 2.5 hours for
mediation. Id. These hours are hereby eliminated for calculating Ms. Rubin’s fees award:
because Ms. Rubin’s claim succeeded at trial and Mr. Nelson’s ended in a hung jury, it is safe to
assume—no information having been presented to the contrary—that all of that time was
dedicated to mediating Mr. Nelson’s claim. Finally, Mr. Lattimer logged 6.25 hours relating to
the plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Id. That motion dealt
entirely with Mr. Nelson’s claim for illegal detention and strip searches following a false arrest.
See Dkt. No. 34-1. So this Court may eliminate those hours, too.
To be sure, some hours logged should be awarded in full because it is likely that
separating the claims would not have reduced time spent. For example, D.C.’s Motion to
Compel Discovery raises identical issues with respect to both plaintiffs. See Dkt. No. 16. So
Ms. Rubin should get fees for the full time Mr. Lattimer took to review the motion. As another
example, the plaintiffs’ pretrial statement included some facts particular to each plaintiff but
mostly included proposed voir dire and jury instructions applicable to both. See Dkt. No. 22.
This Court will award fees for the full time logged in drafting it.
After taking into account hours that should be eliminated, hours that should remain in
full, and hours that should be split in half, and hours that should otherwise be reduced, 3 this
Court finds the total to be a little less than half of the hours logged. However, because there is a
slight overlap between the plaintiffs’ claims, 4 the Court will raise the percentage to one half.
3
The parties dispute whether quarter-hour billing instead of tenth-hour billing is acceptable. Compare Defs’ Opp’n
7–8, with Pls’ Reply 3–4. At least two cases in this district warn against quarter-hour billing. A.C. ex rel. Clark v.
District of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2009); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d
37, 44 n.5 (D.D.C. 1999). This Court explicitly holds that tenth-hour billing is required. As such, in estimating the
percentage of fees to award, this Court has reduced certain de minimus tasks from .25 to .10 hours, e.g., “Review of
Motion for Ext. Of Time Filed by DC” and “Review of Court’s Sched. Order.” Dkt. No. 63-2.
4
From the Pretrial Order: “If the jury returns a verdict that plaintiff Nelson did not consent to the search of his
automobile, they jury shall be instructed that the search warrant authorizing the search of plaintiff Nelson’s
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Ms.
Rubin’s motion for attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Specifically, the Court will award Ms.
Rubin $21,978.75 for attorney’s fees and $1,289.80 for costs for a total of $23,268.55.
A separate Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue on this date.
Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, U.S. District Judge, on September 25, 2013.
apartment was illegally obtained and that plaintiffs are thereby entitled to damages for the illegal search of their
apartment.” Dkt. No. 33 at 2. Even though the jury hung on this issue, Dkt. No. 45 at 2, the legality of the
apartment search is related Ms. Rubin’s successful search and seizure claim, and therefore this narrow issue of
consent to search the automobile is also related to the successful claim.
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