Peterson v. Transport Workers Union of America, Afl-Cio , 75 F. Supp. 3d 131 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    GARY PETERSON, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.                          Case No. 1:13-cv-00170 (CRC)
    TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF
    AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This putative class action is the latest skirmish in a long-running dispute among
    mechanics at American Airlines over which union should represent them. Following American’s
    bankruptcy in November 2011, its mechanics narrowly ratified a collective bargaining agreement
    between the airline and the Transportation Workers Union (“TWU”). A group of American
    mechanics who would prefer to be represented by another union—the American Mechanics
    Fraternal Association (“AMFA”)—has filed suit over the process that led to the ratification of
    that agreement. They contend that in negotiating the agreement with the airline, TWU leadership
    favored mechanics who work at American’s principal maintenance base in Tulsa, Oklahoma at
    the expense of Plaintiffs and others who work elsewhere. This preferential treatment, they
    allege, breached the union’s duty of fair representation and violated their voting rights under the
    Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
    Plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages or the invalidation of the collective bargaining
    agreement. They request instead a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction requiring the
    TWU to refrain from the alleged unfair practices in future contract negotiations. Because
    Plaintiffs have not identified any impending injury that could be prevented by the relief they
    seek, the Court concludes that they lack standing to bring this suit. For similar reasons, the Court
    also concludes the suit is unripe. The Court therefore will grant the TWU’s motion to dismiss
    the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    I.     Background
    Plaintiffs and their proposed class members are part of a “craft or class” of mechanics
    and related employees at American Airlines.1 They and workers in six other employee
    classifications are represented by the TWU. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 18 (“SAC”).
    Roughly half of the mechanics and related employees perform heavy maintenance and overhaul
    aircraft at American’s primary maintenance base in Tulsa, Oklahoma. SAC ¶ 24. The others
    work at other maintenance bases in Fort Worth or Dallas, Texas, or perform lighter “line” service
    at airports served by American throughout the country. SAC ¶¶ 22–23.
    Soon after filing for bankruptcy protection in November 2011, American took steps to
    reject its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the TWU and renegotiate a modified
    agreement. American’s first “last best offer” during the negotiations proposed to eliminate
    almost 4,000 line and maintenance base jobs. SAC ¶ 57. This offer failed a ratification vote.
    SAC ¶ 58. After further negotiations, American’s second “last best offer” proposed to save
    1,439 jobs at the Tulsa maintenance base from the 2,358 that would have been eliminated under
    the prior offer. SAC ¶ 60. Non-Tulsa maintenance base workers and line mechanics, however,
    saw their job losses increase slightly from the first to the second offer. SAC ¶ 62. Largely on
    the support of employees at the Tulsa maintenance base, a CBA reflecting American’s second
    offer was ratified by the narrowest of margins: 50.25% to 49.75%. SAC ¶ 78. The CBA went
    1
    A “craft or class” under the Railway Labor Act, 
    45 U.S.C. § 151
     et seq., which governs
    American’s relationship with its mechanics, is similar to a bargaining unit under the National
    Labor Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 141
     et seq.
    2
    into effect in the fall of 2012 following bankruptcy court approval. SAC ¶ 80. The agreement
    runs through September 2018 and will not be subject to renegotiation until September 2016.
    Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex 12.
    The CBA negotiations described above followed a history of sparring between the TWU
    and AMFA. In 1998, 2003, and earlier in 2012, AMFA had organized campaigns to replace
    TWU as the collective bargaining representative of American’s mechanics and related
    employees. SAC ¶¶ 26, 33. See Opinion and Order, Schalk v. Transp. Workers Union, No. 03-
    804, 
    2007 WL 1310171
    , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2007) (describing a bitter rivalry between
    AMFA and TWU over representation of American mechanics). Each of those drives failed,
    according to Plaintiffs, because the Tulsa mechanics consistently opposed any switch to AMFA.
    SAC ¶¶ 24, 33. Several TWU members have been removed from leadership positions in the
    union due to their public support of AMFA. SAC ¶¶ 30–32.
    Against that historical backdrop, Plaintiffs allege the TWU engaged in a number of unfair
    practices during the 2012 CBA negotiations to protect its supporters in Tulsa and inflict
    disproportionate losses on what it viewed as troublesome dissenters. They claim TWU
    leadership was “openly hostile” during the negotiations to the presidents of the non-Tulsa local
    unions, whom it considered to be loyal to AMFA. SAC ¶ 42. Plaintiffs also contend that the
    TWU allowed the Tulsa local to negotiate directly with American bargaining representatives,
    resulting in reduced job losses and improved working conditions, while other locals were denied
    this access. SAC ¶¶ 49, 64. When it came time for ratification, Plaintiffs maintain the TWU
    refused to hold meetings outside the Tulsa base to educate members about the proposed offer.
    SAC ¶ 77. The TWU’s “fail[ure] to devote time and effort” on behalf of the line mechanics and
    non-Tulsa maintenance workers, according to Plaintiffs, resulted in a contract with inferior work
    3
    rules in areas such as overtime and vacation days, loss of seniority, and increased job losses for
    those whom TWU leadership perceived were supporting AMFA. SAC ¶¶ 73, 74, 85.
    Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2013. After an interim amendment, they filed a second
    amended complaint in August 2013 alleging the TWU’s actions breached the union’s duty of fair
    representation to them and other putative class members. See Vaca v. Sipes, 
    386 U.S. 171
    , 177
    (1967) (unions have a duty “to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
    discrimination towards any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and
    to avoid arbitrary conduct”). Plaintiffs also allege that the TWU’s conduct during the CBA
    ratification process violated their right under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
    Act (“LMRDA”) to have a “meaningful” vote in union elections. See Bunz v. Moving Picture
    Mach. Operators’ Protective Union Local 224, 
    567 F.2d 1117
    , 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
    Soon after Plaintiffs filed suit, American announced a proposed merger with US Airways.
    The merger was consummated in December 2013. Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Second Mot. Leave to
    File Supplement Ex. A, at *1. In the wake of the merger, the TWU entered into an association
    with the International Association of Machinists (“IAM”), which represents mechanics and other
    workers at US Airways. 
    Id. at *2
    . The two unions petitioned the National Mediation Board on
    August 6, 2014 for a finding that the merged airline is operating as a single carrier. 
    Id. at *1
    .
    This finding is a first step to certifying a TWU-IAM joint council as the exclusive bargaining
    representative of the combined airline’s mechanics.
    The TWU has moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). At the threshold, the union contends that the Court lacks
    subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact
    requirement of Article III standing in light of the numerous contingencies and uncertainties
    4
    surrounding the timing of any future bargaining with the merged airline and the role of the TWU
    in that bargaining. The union points out that there are currently no planned system-wide contract
    negotiations between the TWU and American and, due to the uncertainty over who will be
    representing the combined carrier going forward, there may never be. It also asserts that the
    TWU has installed new leadership since the last round of collective bargaining that could take a
    different negotiating position from prior leadership. The TWU thus argues the Plaintiffs have
    failed to allege a substantial likelihood of future harm as required to establish standing. It
    asserts, in a similar vein, that the action is unripe. As for the merits, TWU contends that
    Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that would support a finding that the union breached its duty
    of fair representation or violated their voting rights under the LMRDA. Because the Court will
    dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of standing, it does not address the union’s
    arguments that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
    II.     Analysis
    A.      Standing
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of
    establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992). The Court must accept all factual allegations as true, and plaintiffs
    receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the alleged facts. Little v.
    Fenty, 
    689 F. Supp. 2d 163
    , 167 (D.D.C. 2010). But a court scrutinizes factual allegations more
    closely in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
    
    Id.
     A court may also examine evidence outside the complaint to decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
    to dismiss. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 
    402 F.3d 1249
    , 1253 (D.C.
    Cir. 2005).
    5
    To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and
    particularized” and “actual or imminent,” (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
    offensive conduct, and (3) likely redressability. Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 561
    . In cases seeking an
    injunction or other prospective relief, a plaintiff must identify a threatened injury that is
    “certainly impending” and not simply “possible.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    133 S. Ct. 1138
    , 1147 (2013).2 “Certainly impending” does not mean that the injury must be certain to
    occur. 
    Id.
     at 1150 n.5 (“Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is
    literally certain that the harms they identify will come about.”). But there must be a “substantial
    risk” that the alleged injury will occur. 
    Id.
     The threatened injury must also be “imminent” in the
    temporal sense. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
    540 U.S. 93
    , 226 (2003) (holding that a
    political candidate’s alleged injury was “too remote” to satisfy Article III standing because it
    would not occur until his reelection campaign, if at all). A court may reasonably infer future
    injury when a party is openly committed to the action challenged by the plaintiff. E.g.,
    Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
    561 U.S. 139
    , 152–53 (2010); Sierra Club v. Jewell, 
    764 F.3d 1
    , 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But an alleged injury cannot support standing if it is based primarily
    on conjecture about future actions and responses. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
    547 U.S. 332
    , 344 (2006).
    Plaintiffs have identified three alleged future injuries from which they seek relief. The
    first, which Plaintiffs outline in the prayer for relief section of the second amended complaint, is
    discriminatory conduct during future negotiations between the TWU and American (or its
    2
    Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment does not relieve them from pleading impending
    injury. The Declaratory Judgment Act widens the range of remedies a federal court may order,
    but does not enlarge federal jurisdiction. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft,
    
    185 F. Supp. 2d 9
    , 15 n.4 (D.D.C. 2001). Therefore a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment
    must still present a “substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality” in order to
    have standing. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 
    67 F.3d 961
    , 964 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
    6
    successor) concerning a new CBA or amendments to the present agreement. SAC ¶ D. The
    second is unfair treatment during negotiations over a new CBA between a potential TWU-IAM
    joint council and the now-merged airline. Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 16. And the third, which
    Plaintiffs raise for the first time in their opposition papers, is bias against them in connection
    with day-to-day implementation of the existing CBA. 
    Id.
     at 13–16. The Court will apply the
    standing principles discussed above to each of these alleged future injuries.
    i.      System-Wide CBA Negotiations Between the TWU and American
    The crux of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the TWU favored Tulsa-based mechanics in its
    negotiations with American over the current CBA. They therefore seek to prevent the TWU
    from engaging in similar favoritism in future system-wide negotiations.3 These allegations,
    however, do not describe a substantially likely future injury for two reasons. First, as noted
    above, the TWU and IAM have petitioned the National Mediation Board to find that the merged
    American/US Airways is operating as a single carrier. Should the Board make that finding—and
    Plaintiffs do not suggest it will not—the TWU and IAM have indicated they will form a joint
    council to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the combined airline’s mechanics.4 The
    3
    The Plaintiffs’ primary focus on injuries stemming from further system-wide bargaining is
    evident from the prayer for relief in the second amended complaint. Plaintiffs request a
    permanent injunction requiring the TWU to “[r]efrain from participating in secret bargaining
    sessions with the company that are undisclosed to, or unauthorized by, any full negotiating
    committee[; and] . . . [r]efrain from negotiating with the company with less than the full
    complement of any constitutionally designated negotiating committee.” SAC ¶ D. The
    injunction would also require the TWU to “[p]rovide reasonable advance notice to all designated
    members of the full or any sub negotiating committees, of any bargaining sessions[; and] . . .
    hold meetings at all stations, line or base, if any meetings are held at any station, for the purpose
    of educating members about the contents of a proposed contract or amendment in advance of a
    ratification vote.” 
    Id.
     All of these requirements relate only to future system-wide bargaining.
    4
    Although Plaintiffs do not dispute the merged airline is operating as a single carrier, they are
    contesting before the National Mediation Board whether the joint council may be listed as the
    incumbent on a single carrier union election ballot, an advantage they describe as “virtually
    insuperable.” Pls.’ Second Mot. Leave to File Supplement Ex. 9. Plaintiffs’ challenge before the
    7
    TWU itself would no longer serve that role and, therefore, could not engage in the types of unfair
    practices that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin.
    Second, the current CBA will not expire until September 2018, and the union cannot seek
    to amend it before September 2016. As a result, even if the TWU remained the exclusive
    bargaining representative of the combined airline’s mechanics, the potential for system-wide
    unfair negotiating practices will not arise until sometime after 2016. Plaintiffs have not alleged
    when the TWU or the airline intends to reopen negotiations, what the bargaining position of the
    TWU will be, or how that position will harm the Plaintiffs’ interests. The alleged injury is
    therefore not sufficiently “imminent” or “impending” to confer standing. McConnell, 
    540 U.S. at 226
    .
    Given the distinct possibility that the TWU will not be the exclusive bargaining
    representative in negotiations over the next CBA, and the lack of information regarding when
    and how negotiations can be expected to unfold, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial
    risk that TWU’s alleged favoritism towards the Tulsa mechanics in the last round of system-wide
    bargaining will reoccur. This source of alleged future injury is therefore insufficient to establish
    standing.
    ii.     System-Wide CBA Negotiations Between a Joint Council and the Airline
    In response to the TWU’s argument that any risk of future injury would be reduced by the
    formation of a joint council, Plaintiffs contend that the TWU, as a member of the joint council,
    would nevertheless be in a position to influence future system-wide negotiations to Plaintiffs’
    detriment. Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 19–20. The distribution of powers in and composition of
    any joint council have yet to be determined, however. Plaintiffs have not alleged who the TWU
    Board only heightens the uncertainty regarding what entity will represent mechanics at the
    merged airline going forward.
    8
    representatives on the joint council will be; how the TWU’s stance might be adverse to the
    Plaintiffs’ interests; or, even if it proves to be adverse, whether the TWU representatives would
    be in a position to compel the joint council to engage in the types of unfair practices alleged in
    the second amended complaint. Given these uncertainties, the possibility that the TWU might
    harm the Plaintiffs via its influence over any future joint council is too speculative to satisfy
    Article III standing requirements.5
    iii.    “Day-to-Day” Negotiations over Implementation of the Current CBA
    Finally, Plaintiffs oppose the union’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the relief they
    seek is necessary to protect them from unfair treatment in the administration of the current CBA.
    Emphasizing the general principle that collective bargaining is an ongoing, day-to-day process,
    e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 46 (1957), Plaintiffs assert that continuing negotiations
    between the TWU and American “on a variety of subjects” expose them to harm. Pls.’ Opp’n
    Mot. Dismiss at 13. Yet the second amended complaint fails even to mention any specific day-
    to-day negotiations, let alone allege injuries stemming from them. Although the Court may
    examine evidence outside the complaint to decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, see Jerome
    Stevens Pharmaceuticals, 
    402 F.3d at 1253
    , Plaintiffs still have not meet their burden to allege
    likely injury arising from day-to-day representation.
    In support of their allegations of day-to-day harm, Plaintiffs quote excerpts from several
    “letters of memorandum” concerning issues the parties apparently left open for further discussion
    during the 2012 CBA negotiations. As the TWU points out, however, the portions of the letters
    quoted by Plaintiffs reveal that the covered topics may never be the subject of negotiations.
    Def.’s Reply Mot. Dismiss at 4 n.16 (Letter 9 (“referring to a Committee that may ‘recommend
    5
    The Court notes that the requested declaratory judgment and injunction against the TWU
    would not bind any future joint council, which would be a different entity.
    9
    possible changes’) . . . ; Letter 15 (recognizing need for negotiations ‘if the Company designs a
    schedule that consists of more than an eight (8) hour workday’) . . . ; Letter 18 (stating that the
    parties ‘may revisit [certain] practices if necessary’”)) (emphasis added).6 Plaintiffs do not allege
    that either side intends to open negotiations over the topics covered by these letters, or, if it did,
    when those negotiations might occur or what their outcome might be.
    The TWU also contends that any day-to-day negotiations on topics left open in the CBA
    would be conducted by TWU locals, which are not hostile to Plaintiffs. Indeed, two of the
    Plaintiffs are presidents of local unions. 
    Id.
     at 4–5; Drummond Decl. ¶ 3, Jan. 15, 2014.
    Plaintiffs counter that the national union would nonetheless have veto power over local
    decisions. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite a June 2014 letter from TWU International
    to two union locals ordering them to cease negotiations with the merged airline. Pls.’ Opp’n
    Mot. Dismiss Ex. 6. Plaintiffs argued at the hearing that this letter demonstrates that TWU
    refuses to let union locals conduct negotiations. The letter, however, concerned bargaining over
    a new general contract, not local work arrangements. 
    Id.
     It therefore does not rebut the union’s
    argument that authority over day-to-day CBA implementation lies with the locals. Given the
    uncertainty regarding the likelihood of future discussions under the letters of memorandum and
    the degree of local control over such day-to-day contract administration, Plaintiffs have not
    established that the letters of memorandum give rise to a “substantial risk” of future injury.
    Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    133 S. Ct. 1138
    , 1150 n.5 (2013). In sum, because none of the
    Plaintiffs’ alleged future injuries is “certainly impending,” they have not met their burden to
    establish standing.
    6
    Aside from Letter of Memorandum 8, Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 8, which merely lists local
    letters of agreement that are no longer in force, Plaintiffs did not include these letters of
    memorandum as exhibits to their opposition brief, so the complete letters are not a part of the
    record before the Court.
    10
    B.      Ripeness
    This case is also unripe. Article III prohibits “courts from issuing advisory opinions on
    speculative claims.” Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 
    738 F.3d 387
    , 396 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, the Court may not entertain a claim unless it is constitutionally
    ripe. Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 
    457 F.3d 78
    , 83 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The ripeness doctrine
    requires the Court to examine “the ‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the ‘hardship to
    the parties of withholding court consideration.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 149 (1967)).
    Here, the ripeness analysis overlaps substantially with the standing inquiry discussed
    above; the lack of an impending injury means this Court does not have jurisdiction under Article
    III. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a similar case due to lack of ripeness.
    Addington v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 
    606 F.3d 1174
     (9th Cir. 2010). In that matter, the union
    was “constitutionally committed” to a bargaining position in upcoming CBA negotiations that
    the plaintiffs considered adverse to their interests. 
    Id. at 1177
    . The Ninth Circuit nevertheless
    found that multiple contingencies—concerning what proposal would be acceptable to the airline
    and whether members would ratify it—made the claims unduly speculative. 
    Id.
     at 1179–80.
    Here, system-wide negotiations may not reoccur as alleged, or at all, and there are no concrete
    effects or actions to evaluate against the union’s obligations. The second amended complaint is
    therefore unripe for adjudication.
    11
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the TWU’s Motion to Dismiss the
    complaint. The TWU’s motions to supplement the record also will be granted. Plaintiffs’
    motion to certify the class will be denied as moot. The Court will issue a separate Order
    consistent with this Opinion.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date: December 1, 2014
    12