Morris v. Carter Goble Lee, Inc. , 113 F. Supp. 3d 289 ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TIMOTHY C. MORRIS,
Plaintiff
v. Civil Action No. 12-1800 (CKK)
CARTER GOBLE LEE, INC.,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(July 10, 2015)
Plaintiff Timothy C. Morris brings this action pro se against Defendant Carter Goble Lee,
Inc., asserting a variety of claims arising out of the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with
Defendant. Previously, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims other than his discrimination
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31
(D.D.C. 2013). Presently before the Court is Defendant’s [45] Motion for Summary Judgment
with respect to the remaining claim under Section 1981. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1
the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s [45]
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concludes Plaintiff has not provided evidence that
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The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents:
• Pl.’s Verified Amended Compl. for Violation of Civil and Human Rights, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, False Accusations Plaintiff, Fraud, and Wrongful
Firing, ECF No. 10 (“Am. Compl.”);
• Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 45 (“Def.’s Mot.”);
• Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51 (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”); and
• Def.’s Reply, ECF No. [52] (“Def.’s Reply”).
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would
not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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would allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendant intentionally discriminated against him on
the basis of race. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this case in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 2
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a cell inspector at the District of Columbia Jail.
Deposition of Timothy Morris (“Pl.’s Dep.”) 41:21-22, Oct. 10, 2014, ECF No. 45-2; ECF No.
52-1. Despite his title, Plaintiff mainly worked as a plumber for the duration of his employment.
Id. at 41:2-42:12. One of his additional duties was to inspect the heating system. Id. at 43:4-44:6.
On February 23, 2009, Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was terminated. Declaration of
William R. Kinsley (“Kinsley Decl.”) ¶ 11, November 25, 2014, ECF No. 45-3.
Plaintiff arrived to work at approximately 3:00 a.m. on February 23, 2009 to inspect the
heating system at the D.C. Jail. Pl.’s Dep. at 56:6-7. To access the mechanical room that houses
the heating system, Plaintiff needed to sign out the keys. Id. at 49:1-10. According to a report
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The Court strictly adheres to the text of Local Civil Rule 7(h) when resolving motions for
summary judgment. See Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding district
courts must invoke the local rule before applying it to the case). The Court has advised the
parties that it strictly adheres to Rule 7(h) and has stated that it “may assume that facts identified
by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such facts are
controverted in the statement filed in opposition to the motion.” Scheduling and Procedures
Order (November 5, 2014), ECF No. 44, at 3. In this case, Defendants filed a Statement of
Material Facts in compliance with the Local Rules and this Court’s prior orders. Plaintiff,
meanwhile, included a “Statement of Disputed Material Facts” section in his opposition, but this
section does not explicitly controvert any of the facts identified in Defendant’s Statement and
instead sets forth an opposing factual narrative. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-3. Moreover, only several of
the facts in this statement include citations to evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court
could simply deem the uncontroverted facts in Defendant’s Statement conceded. Nonetheless,
because Plaintiff is representing himself pro se, the Court will not deem those facts conceded and
will instead look to evidence in the record provided by the parties in resolving the pending
motion for summary judgment. See Blocker-Burnette v. D.C., 842 F. Supp. 2d 329, 336 (D.D.C.
2012) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
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documenting key access provided by the Defendant, Plaintiff was the only person to sign out the
keys that morning. Audit Key Transactions Report, Feb. 23, 2009, ECF No. 45-5. The heating
system was working fine when Plaintiff entered the mechanical room. Pl.’s Dep. at 56:5-16;
58:12-15. Defendant states that at approximately 7:30 a.m., Facility Manager William Kinsley
and employee Mustafa Ambrocon entered the mechanical room and discovered the steam valves
controlling the heating system turned off. Kinsley Decl. at ¶ 7. Defendant further contends that
the Warden of the D.C. Jail directed Defendant to fire Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff disputes that he
turned the heating system off or adjusted the steam valves. Pl.’s Dep. at 57:9-10; 58:12-15. He
further states that the heating system was in disrepair and that, while Defendant knew of this fact,
Defendant made no effort to repair or upgrade the system. Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 5-7.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant on May 29, 2012 in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia alleging wrongful termination and violation of his civil rights. See Notice of
Removal, ECF No. 1. Defendant timely removed this matter to this Court on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction. Id. On the same day, Defendant filed its [3] Rule 12(e) Motion for More
Definite Statement, which the Court granted on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Superior Court
Complaint lacked any discussion of the legal basis for his claims. See Order of Feb. 18, 2013,
ECF No. 9. Pursuant to this Court’s Order, on March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed his [10] Amended
Complaint, which presented five claims against Defendant: (1) Violation of Civil and Human
Rights; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) False Accusations; (4) Fraud; and (5)
Wrongful Firing. Defendant then filed its [12] Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, contending that
Plaintiff’s allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court granted
that motion with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims other than his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1981. See Morris, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 31. The Court found that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged
“that he is a member of a racial minority who was discriminated against on the basis of his race
with respect to an action covered by § 1981 – the termination of his employment contract.” Id. at
12. Following discovery, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary that is now before the Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar
summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on just any disagreement as to
the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient
admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id.In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to
specific parts of the record – including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or
declarations, or other competent evidence – in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the
materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis
in the record cannot create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Ass’n
of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Moreover, where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
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another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for
purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. If material facts are genuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are
susceptible to divergent yet justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moore v.
Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the end, the district court’s task is to determine
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 251-52. In this regard, the non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50(internal citations omitted).
Importantly, “[w]hile summary judgment must be approached with special caution in
discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by
affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Morgan v.
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 328 F.3d 647 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); see also Marshall v. James, 276 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D.D.C. 2003) (special caution
“does not eliminate the use of summary judgment in discrimination cases”) (citing cases).
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III. DISCUSSION
Section 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, prohibits racial discrimination
in the “making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 302 (1994) (“§ 1981’s prohibition against
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts applies to all phases and
incidents of the contractual relationship....”). Discrimination claims pursuant to Section 1981 are
analyzed under the same standards as claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Under this well-established
framework, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions
taken by the Defendant were “more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors” such as race, ethnicity, or national origin. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing, “the plaintiff
may prove his claim with direct evidence, and absent direct evidence, he may indirectly prove
discrimination” under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Brady v. Livingood, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Direct evidence is sufficient alone to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (“The McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”); see also Ayissi–
Etoh, 712 F.3d at 576-77. Here, however, Plaintiff proffers no direct evidence that Defendant
discriminated against him on the basis of race, religion, or national origin, and, in fact,
acknowledges that he has no such evidence. See Pl.’s Dep. at 124:22-125:21.
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In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination based on race, national origin, or
religion, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies. Pursuant to that framework, the plaintiff
has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 252-53. For a claim alleging
disparate-treatment discrimination with respect to employment, a plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination. Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir.
2008). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse action].’ ” Burdine, 450
U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant is successful,
then “the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappear[s],
and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, the D.C. Circuit simplified the analysis for
disparate treatment suits. 520 F.3d at 494. Under Brady, once an employer has proffered a non-
discriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework disappears, and the
court must simply determine whether the plaintiff has put forward enough evidence to defeat the
defendant’s proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason and support a finding of
discrimination. See id. (“[W]here an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and
an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district
court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas.”) (emphasis in original). Ultimately, “[f]or purposes of
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summary judgment, the operative question under Section 1981—as under the Title VII anti-
discrimination framework—is whether ‘the employee produced sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that ... the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on
the basis of race.’” Ayissi-Etoh, 712 F.3d at 576 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494). In other words,
once a defendant has stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action, the question “becomes whether, based on the totality of the parties’ evidence, a
reasonable jury could determine that the defendant’s proffered explanation was pretext for
discrimination.” Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, No. 1:12-CV-01718 (CRC), 2015 WL 106956, at *3, ---
F. Supp. 3d --- (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2015) (citing Brady, 520 F.3d at 494-95).
Defendant argues in its motion for summary judgment that the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for firing Plaintiff was that Defendant believed that Plaintiff turned off the
heat in the mechanical room at the D.C. Jail during the early morning hours of February 23,
2009. See Def.’s Mot. at 5-6. Specifically, Defendant relies on deposition testimony that other
employees found the steam valves in the mechanical room turned off that morning and on a key
log that shows that Morris was the only person with the key to the mechanical room between
3:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. that morning. See id. at 5 (citing Pl.’s Dep. at 68:7-14; 69:5-13; 83:21-
84:19; 85:13-17; Ex. 4, Audit Key Transactions). Defendant also relies on the fact that it was
directed by the Warden of the D.C. Jail to remove Plaintiff from its contract with the D.C. Jail as
a result of the events of that morning. Id. at 5-6 (citing Pl.’s Dep. at 77:1- 78:2; 78:18- 80:3;
92:11-19). The Court concludes that Defendant has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for firing Plaintiff.
Given that Defendant has stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that a reasonable jury could
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conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for
firing Plaintiff was pretextual. Plaintiff attempts to satisfy this burden in three ways.
First, Plaintiff argues that he did not actually turn off the heating system. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2;
4-5. However, Plaintiff mistakes the inquiry in which the Court must engage. “The question is
not whether the underlying [conduct] occurred; rather the issue is whether the employer honestly
and reasonably believed that the underlying [conduct] occurred.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496(emphasis in original); see also Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action … the
issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer
honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
Although Plaintiff asserts that he did not touch the heating valves, he has not produced any
evidence to show the conclusion Defendant reached by viewing the key log was unreasonable.
Plaintiff himself agrees that it is not unreasonable to conclude that he was the person with the
key to the mechanical room when the heat was allegedly turned off. Pl.’s Dep. at 68:7-14; 69:5-
13. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could use to call into
question the conclusion that Defendant honestly and legitimately believed that Plaintiff turned
off the heat to the D.C. Jail.
Second, Plaintiff suggests that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s reason
for terminating him was pretextual on the basis of a discrimination complaint that a fellow
employee filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Specifically, Plaintiff
points to a complaint filed by a former coworker, Linwood Hughes, against Defendant and
against supervisor William Kinsley. See Pl.’s Dep. at 93:6-94:17. However, Plaintiff has never
submitted Hughes’ complaint itself as evidence, and Plaintiff does not provide further detail
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about the substance of Hughes’s complaint or the outcome of Hughes filing this complaint.
Plaintiff does state in his deposition, however, that Hughes was not fired and that he quit his job
because of abuse from inmates. See Pl.’s Dep. at 99:1-13. Without further details about the
content or the outcome of the complaint by Plaintiff’s co-worker, the mere fact of such a
complaint cannot be used to establish Defendant’s discriminatory intent in firing Plaintiff. See
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We are not persuaded that the
mere filing of two informal discrimination complaints against [the supervisor], where nothing
more is known about the nature, merit, or outcome of those complaints, can be used as a proxy to
establish [the supervisor’s] discriminatory animus in the present case.”).
Third, Plaintiff suggests that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s reason for
terminating him was pretextual because a white co-worker was not disciplined for his “offensive
behavior.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Plaintiff points to the circumstances of a white co-worker, Chris
Lyons, a cell locksmith at the D.C. Jail. See Pl.’s Dep. at 93:15-94:1. Plaintiff claims that Lyons
would delay doing work such that it would be passed on to the person holding the next shift, but
that he was not reprimanded. See id. Plaintiff recounts one occasion, in particular, when Lyons
ignored the calls of employees locked in a pharmacy room for over three hours while he “sat at
the computer and played solitaire.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff believes that Lyons received
“preferential treatment” and was not disciplined because he is white. Pl.’s Dep. at 94:2-17;
97:14-20. A plaintiff may establish pretext by demonstrating that the employer treated similarly
situated persons who are not in the protected class more favorably. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. In
order to show that an employee is similarly situated, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that all of the
relevant aspects of [his] employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to that of the employee.”
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “[T]he co-
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workers must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and
have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Childs-Pierce v. Util.
Workers Union of Am., 383 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 (D.D.C. 2005) (quotation marks and citation
omitted), aff’d, 187 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The evidence Plaintiff has presented does not
meet this standard. Plaintiff has not shown that he and Lyons were similarly situated. Lyons’ job
title was cell locksmith and his duties, inasmuch as Plaintiff has described them, include
responding to lock malfunctions at the D.C. Jail. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff does not claim to
perform this function, nor has he presented evidence that Lyons works as a plumber or as a cell
inspector—like Plaintiff—or performs any of the tasks that Plaintiff performed as part of his job.
Moreover, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he and Lyons share a supervisor. Had Plaintiff
met his burden of establishing that he and Lyons were similarly situated, Plaintiff would further
be required to show that the alleged offenses—his tampering with the heating valves and Lyons’
unresponsiveness to locked-in employees—were of “similar seriousness.” See Childs-Pierce, 383
F. Supp. 2d at 69-70. Plaintiff has also presented no such evidence. Because Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that he and Lyons were similarly situated, the evidence regarding Lyons does not
provide a basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Defendant’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for firing Plaintiff was pretextual.
In sum, Plaintiff has not “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that ...
the employer intentionally discriminated against [him] on the basis of race.” Brady, 520 F.3d at
494. Plaintiff has not provided direct evidence of discrimination by Defendant. Nor has he
provided evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason asserted by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff—Defendant’s conclusion
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that Plaintiff turned off the heating system at the D.C. Jail early one morning—was pretextual.
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant lacked an honest and reasonable belief that the Plaintiff
had turned off the heating system. In addition, the other evidence that Plaintiff provided is not
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the reasonable, nondiscriminatory reason
proffered by Defendant for Plaintiff’s firing was pretextual. Specifically, the evidence Plaintiff
provided regarding a discrimination complaint filed by another employee fails because of the
lack of further details regarding the content or resolution of that complaint. The evidence
Plaintiff provided regarding a white employee that he claims was not disciplined for certain
alleged infractions fails because Plaintiff has not shown that he was similarly situated to that
employee. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could conclude,
based on the evidence provided, that Defendant Carter Goble Lee intentionally discriminated
against Plaintiff on the basis of race when it terminated his employment. Accordingly,
Defendant’s [45] Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: July 10, 2015
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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