United States v. Fields ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
UNITED STATES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 99-cr-0286 (KBJ)
)
GAVÁTA FIELDS, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 30, 1999, Defendant Gaváta Fields pled guilty to making
counterfeit securities in violation of section 513 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
Judge Ricardo M. Urbina sentenced her to prison time and restitution in the amount of
$32,572.51. (See Min. Order of Dec. 9, 1999.) Fields was released on July 9, 2001 (see
Def. s Mot. for Remission of Restitution ( Def. s Mot. ), ECF No. 25, at 1), and
according to the government, she began making intermittent payments in September of
2001 (Mem. in , ECF No. 27, at 4 n.1.) To date, a grand total of $13,924.74 has
been credited toward her restitution obligation. (See id.)
Before this Court is Fields pro se Motion for Remission of Restitution, which
she filed on April 17, 2019. The government opposes Fields This Court will
construe Fields
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), or a motion for waiver of her restitution interest under
18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). Because Fields fails to satisfy the burden of proof under either
construction of her request, this Court will DENY her motion.
I.
In her Motion for Remission of Restitution, Fields cites no authority that
authorizes this Court to grant the relief she is now seeking. In her motion, Fields
explains that, because of accruing interest, the restitution debt
Def. s Mot. at 1.) Fields
function as a single adult and be able to healthily pay my bi lls and continue to live a
Id.) Therefore, Fields
[.]
(Id.) In ascertaining the scope of its jurisdicti on, this
document filed pro se Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court
construes Fields motion as either (A) a motion for adjustment of her restitution
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), or (B) a motion for waiver of the restitution
interest under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3).
A.
In evaluating Fields requested relief, the Court first looks at the Mandatory
See 18 U.S.C.
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 543
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
restitution, the statute expressly authorizes discretion in fashioning how a defendant is
United States v. Armstrong, No. 09-cr-135, 2018 WL
5923913, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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To that end, a -
- nts at specified
intervals and in- 18 U.S.C. §
3664(f)(3)(A)-(B).
defendants required to pay restitution under this act will be indigent at the time of
sentencing . . . . [and that] many of these defendants may also be sentenced to prison
terms as well, making it unlikely that they will be able to make significant payments on
-179, at 21 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924. However, Congress also expressly asserted that
not obviate
and it made restitution mandatory nevertheless. Id. Indeed, the only
concession that Congress made to ease the financial burden was to [] the court
to order full restitution under a schedule of nominal payments in those instances where
the defendant cannot pay restitution . . . .
of material changes in economic circumstances. Id.
The MVRA further
corrected under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3742 of
chapter 235 of this title; (B) appealed and modified under section 3742; (C) amended
under subsection 18
U.S.C. § 3664(o)(1). And courts have generally interpreted section 3664(o)(1) as an
exclusive list. See, e.g., United States v. Wyss, 744 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014)
(reversing dist the amount of restitution owed by a defendant on
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the grounds that restitution may not be altered absent a showing of one of the
§ 3664(o)(1) factors).
Fields does not purport to contest her original sentence, nor does she argue that
the sentencing court erred in any way, thus neither section 3742 nor Rule 35 provides a
basis for correction or modification of her restitution order. Similarly, section
3664(d)(5) does not apply, because that provision pertains only to amendments to
restitution orders that result from a [some] losses in the
initial claim for restitutionary relief[.] Thus, section 3664(k) is the only potentially
applicable grounds for ing Field restitution sentence. Under this section,
Court is authorized
full, Id. § 3664(k).
direct[s] that the doors of the district court should remain open to the defendant, and
and its purpose is to
United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d
1022, 1032 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.), , 560 U.S. 605 (2010).
When seeking an adjustment under section 3664(k), [t]he petitioner bears the
burden of proving that [her] circumstances have changed enough to warrant such a
Hinton v. United States, No. 99-cv-211, 2003 WL 21854935, at *4
(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003). The D.C. Circuit has not addressed the precise contours of what
.
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objective comparison of a defend
United States v. Grant, 235 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding the material
was unfrozen after sentencing). The Eleventh Circuit describes
Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2003)
(finding a defedant ion inadequate because supported only by
documentation of restitution payments made).
Fields has not established a basis for modifying her restitution order under either
It is clear that this section is triggered only by
. . economic
id. § 3664(k), and Fields motion does not allege any change in her
financial conditions whatsoever. Rather, Fields makes conclusory allegations that it is
hard for her to pay off the debt. See, e.g., Def. s Mot.
and
single adult and be able to healthily pay [her] bills and continue to live a legitimate
. That is not enough. What is more, even if Fields had
demonstrated a material change in her ability to pay restitution, this Court is only
economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a
restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution
id. §
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3664(f)(3)(B). That is, the statute does not grant this Court the authority to order full
remission of the restitution sentence, as Fields requests.
B.
Another possible statutory basis of authority for this Court to consider Fields
request is 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3), which provides that ,
on a fine or restitution, it may
specific dollar amount; or (C) limit the length of the period during which interest
Liberally construed, Fields request might be deemed a motion to waive or
limit the total interest due on her restitution under section 3612(f)(3),
There has been some disagreement among federal courts as to whether section
3612(f)(3) authorizes a district court to modify interest payments after sent encing.
Compare United States v. Coleman (per curiam)
-judgment, to waive or
limit the payment of interest upon a finding that the defendant is unable to pa y
with United States v. Brumfield, 125 F. Supp. 3d 648, 651 (W.D. Mich. 2015)
However, even
assuming, in contrast with the government , that subsection 3612(f)(3)
permits post-judgement relief, 1 Fields request must be denied, because this statutory
1
As a purely textual matter, subsection 3612(f)(3) contains no temporal limitation on when a court may
all pertain to post-judgment collection matters. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3612(a) (notification of payments); id. at § 3612(d) (e) (delinquency and default). Moreover,
s provisions on
probation administration and release from incarceration. 18 U.S.C. Ch. 229.
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provision does not provide the Court with unlimited discretion to determine whether
interest should be waived or limited. Congress only authorized reconsideration where
18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). And Fields has made no claim that she does
not have the ability to pay interest, much less provided any evidence to that effect.
Therefore, the Court is unable to make any determination concerning ability to
pay.
II.
Because Fields has failed to meet her burden to show that her economic
circumstances have changed or that she is unable to make payments on her restitution , it
is hereby
ORDERED that Fields Motion for Remission of Restitution is DENIED.
DATE: December 23, 2019 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
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