Rindahl v. Robertson ( 2020 )


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  • iF it eI iD
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    RANDY LEE RINDAHL, )
    Plaintiff,
    ) Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-03322 (UNA)
    JACQUELINE ROBERTSON, ef al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff's pro se complaint, affidavit
    and brief in support of the complaint, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, The
    court will grant the in forma pauperis application and dismiss the case. Plaintiff has also filed a
    motion for TRO and a motion to appoint judge.
    Plaintiff, a state prisoner designated to the South Dakota State Penitentiary, located in
    Sioux Falls, has filed a complaint and affidavit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and
    monetary damages. He alleges that the State of South Dakota Department of Corrections
    (“SDDC”) and its health care subcontractors have conspired to engage in wide-ranging fraud and
    misconduct. As a result, plaintiff alleges that he has suffered physically and emotionally. He sues
    the United States Department of Justice, the United States Attorney General, a United States
    Department of Justice Program Analyst, and “any and all unknown personnel working for and
    behalf of the United States within their official and unofficial capacity.” Plaintiff's claims against
    these defendants are wholly based in his discontent with their alleged failure to investigate and/or
    prosecute the alleged conspiracy within the SDDC.
    The decision of whether or not to prosecute, and for what offense, rests with the
    prosecution. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
    434 U.S. 357
    , 364 (1978). “[I]n American
    jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
    nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
    410 U.S. 614
    , 619 (1973); see also Sargeant
    v, Dixon, 
    130 F.3d 1067
    , 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Powell v. Katzenbach, 
    359 F.2d 234
    , 234-35
    (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that the judiciary “will not lie to control the exercise” of
    Attorney General's discretion to decide whether or when to institute criminal prosecution), cert.
    denied, 
    384 U.S. 906
     (1966); Sattler v. Johnson, 
    857 F.2d 224
    , 227 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
    recognize constitutional right “as a member of the public at large and as a victim to have the
    defendants criminally prosecuted”); Sibley v. Obama, 
    866 F. Supp. 2d 17
    , 22 (D.D.C, 2012)
    (holding same).
    Similarly, plaintiff cannot compel a criminal investigation by any law enforcement agency
    by filing a complaint. See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 
    832 F.2d 141
    , 141-42 (11th Cir. 1987)
    (per curiam); see also Jafree v. Barber, 
    689 F.2d 640
    , 643 (7th Cir. 1982). The Executive Branch
    has absolute discretion to decide whether to conduct an investigation or prosecute a case and such
    decisions are not subject to judicial review. United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 693 (1974); see
    also Powell, 359 F.2d at 234-35; Shoshone—Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1480-81. “[A]n agency's
    decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
    generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 US. 821, 831
    (1985).
    To the extent that plaintiff alleges constitutional violations against the SDDC, venue here
    is improper. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides,
    if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a
    2
    substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part
    of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant
    may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (b); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 1406
    (a). Courts in this jurisdiction must examine personal
    jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture
    venue in the District of Columbia. See Cameron v. Thornburgh, 
    983 F.2d 253
    , 256 (D.C. Cir.
    1993). By naming a federal agency as a defendant, a plaintiff could attempt to bring a suit in the
    District of Columbia that should properly be pursued elsewhere. See 
    id.
     Here, no connection is
    established between the alleged constitutional violations within plaintiff's state prison and the
    federal defendants. Therefore, these claims shall be dismissed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1406
    (a).
    For all of these reasons, this case will be dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this
    Memorandum Opinion.
    pate: VL- 90, ro (4