National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Devos ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
    ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
    et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    No. 20-cv-1996 (DLF)
    v.
    ELISABETH D. DEVOS, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In March of 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
    Act (CARES Act). Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified as 20 U.S.C.
    § 3401 note). As part of its comprehensive relief effort, the CARES Act appropriated billions of
    dollars in funding for elementary and secondary schools across the nation. See CARES Act
    § 18001. A few months later, the Department of Education interpreted those funding provisions
    in an Interim Final Rule. 85 Fed. Reg. 39,479 (July 1, 2020). This suit soon followed. Before
    the Court is the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, summary
    judgment, Dkt. 36, which the Court considers as an expedited motion for summary judgment
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Court will
    grant the motion.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    A.      Statutory Framework
    In response to the ongoing global pandemic of 2020, Congress passed a comprehensive
    relief effort known as the CARES Act. Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). The CARES
    Act appropriated billions of dollars to aid schools through the challenges of the pandemic. See
    CARES Act § 18001. The Act did so through three sub-funds, two of which are relevant here.
    The first, the Governors’ Emergency Education Relief Fund (GEER), provides governors with
    discretion to distribute funding to the Local Education Agencies (LEAs) that need it most.
    Id. § 18002. The
    second, the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER),
    directs the Department of Education to disburse funds to each state. Each state then disburses
    funds to its LEAs, which pass on funding to schools pursuant to a specific formula.
    Id. § 18003. Unlike
    the GEER fund (and other CARES Act sub-funds), the ESSER fund leaves no
    room for discretion as to which LEAs or schools receive funding. Rather, it dictates that the
    funds “shall be allocated by the Secretary to each State in the same proportion as each State
    received under part A of title I of the [Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)] of
    1965 in the most recent fiscal year.”
    Id. (emphasis added). The
    Act also dictates how certain private schools may receive GEER and ESSER
    funding. It states that any “local educational agency receiving funds . . . shall provide equitable
    services in the same manner as provided under § 1117 of the ESEA of 1965 to students and
    teachers in non-public schools, as determined in consultation with representatives of non-public
    schools.”
    Id. § 18005. Thus,
    the Act incorporates by reference a different statute, which in turn
    describes, among other things, the formula for how funds should be divided between public and
    private schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(4)(A)(i) (§ 1117 of the ESEA). The referenced
    provision states: “Expenditures for educational services and other benefits to eligible private
    school children shall be equal to the proportion of funds allocated to participating school
    attendance areas based on the number of children from low-income families who attend private
    schools.”
    Id. These provisions are
    the subject of this litigation.
    2
    B.      Regulatory Background
    In April 2020, the Department of Education issued guidance about CARES Act funding
    for private schools. Providing Equitable Services to Students and Teachers in Non-Public
    Schools Under the CARES Act Programs, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/06/Providing-Equitable-
    Services-under-the-CARES-Act-Programs-Update-6-25-2020.pdf (Apr. 30, 2020). The
    Department advised that the GEER and ESSER funds should be used to “serve all non-public
    school students and teachers without regard to family income, residency, or eligibility based on
    low achievement.”
    Id. at 3
    (emphasis added).
    The Department made this position binding in July 2020, when it issued an interim final
    rule to the same effect. See 85 Fed. Reg. 39,479. In its explanation, the Department reasoned
    that the relevant text of the CARES Act was ambiguous and that its interpretation was reasonable
    in light of the text, structure, and purpose of the CARES Act. It ultimately announced: “We have
    concluded the phrase ‘in the same manner as provided under section 1117’ does not simply mean
    ‘as provided under section 1117.’”
    Id. In other words,
    the Department does not read the CARES Act to require that funds be
    disbursed pursuant to the formula outlined in § 1117 of the ESEA. Rather, it contends that all
    private schools are entitled to equal relief funding as public schools, regardless of low-income
    student population.
    Id. The Department thus
    declared that LEAs have “two options” under the
    Act. See 85 Fed. Reg. 39,482. They can either disburse funds equally between all public schools
    and all private schools or disburse funds based on low-income student population for both public
    and private schools.
    Id. Either way, the
    Department interprets the CARES Act to forbid
    differentiation between public and private schools. See
    id. 3
           Although the Department engaged in rulemaking to issue its interim final rule, the
    CARES Act does not vest the Department with rulemaking authority. See generally CARES Act
    §§ 18001–18005. The Department thus rested its authority to issue the interim final rule on its
    general rulemaking powers to administer programs under its purview. See 85 Fed. Reg. 39,481.
    Further, the Department issued the interim final rule without engaging in notice and
    comment rulemaking. See 85 Fed. Reg. 39,484 (“Waiver of Proposed Rulemaking”). Instead,
    the Department opened a post-issuance comment period of thirty days.
    Id. To justify foregoing
    the usual rulemaking process, the Department cited the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
    exception for good cause, finding that notice and comment was “impracticable, unnecessary, or
    contrary to the public interest,” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), given the exigencies of the global
    pandemic.
    Id. C.
          Procedural History
    The plaintiffs—advocacy groups, public school districts, and parents of children who
    attend public schools—brought this suit on July 22, 2020. 1 Dkt. 1. On August 11, 2020, the
    plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, summary judgment. Dkt. 36.
    After providing notice and considering the parties’ respective positions during a status hearing,
    the Court consolidated the preliminary injunction motion into an expedited motion for summary
    1 At the time of this writing, two other federal district courts have granted preliminary
    injunctions enjoining the Department’s interim final rule. See Michigan v. DeVos, No. 3:20-cv-
    04478, ECF No. 82 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (“The Department went well beyond its
    statutory authority by trying to replace the share formula mandated by Congress in Section
    18005(a) with one of its own choosing.”); Washington v. DeVos, No. 2:20-cv-1119, 
    2020 WL 4922256
    (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2020) (holding that “Congress neither explicitly, nor implicitly
    by ambiguity, granted the Department the authority to promulgate the Interim Final Rule”).
    4
    judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).2 See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 
    451 U.S. 390
    , 395 (1981) (“[T]he parties should normally receive clear and unambiguous notice [of
    the court’s intent to consolidate] either before the hearing commences or at a time which will still
    afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases.”).
    In this expedited motion, the plaintiffs assert four claims, each of which presents a pure
    question of law: first, whether the Department’s actions are ultra vires, in violation of the
    separation of powers; second, whether the Department’s interim final rule violates the Spending
    Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; and third and fourth, whether the Department’s actions violate the
    APA as an agency action not in accordance with law or in excess of statutory authority, 5 U.S.C.
    § 706(2)(A), (C). In short, plaintiffs primarily contend that (1) the Department did not have
    authority to issue the interim final rule, and (2) the interim final rule the Department did issue
    was contrary to the CARES Act.
    II.    LEGAL STANDARD
    Summary judgment is proper if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute
    as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247–48 (1986). A fact is
    “material” if it has the potential to change the substantive outcome of the litigation. See
    id. at 248;
    Holcomb v. Powell, 
    433 F.3d 889
    , 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). And a dispute is “genuine” if a
    reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party.
    See 
    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
    ; 
    Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895
    .
    2 Although the plaintiffs styled their reply brief as a motion for partial summary judgment, see
    Pl’s Reply, Dkt. 64, the Court treats the motion as a motion for summary judgment because a
    ruling on the claims addressed in the motion resolves the case.
    5
    In a case reviewing agency action, summary judgment “serves as the mechanism for
    deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record
    and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.
    Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). “[T]he entire case . . . is a question of law” and the district court
    “sits as an appellate tribunal.” Am. Biosci., Inc. v. Thompson, 
    269 F.3d 1077
    , 1083 (D.C. Cir.
    2001) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    The APA instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is in excess
    of statutory authority or “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). Plaintiffs
    contend that the Department’s interim final rule violates the APA on both grounds and should be
    “set aside” accordingly.
    Id. The Court agrees.
    The interim final rule is contrary to the unambiguous mandate of the
    Act. And the Act provides neither express rulemaking authority nor any ambiguity for the
    agency to clarify. For these reasons, the rule must be “set aside.”
    Id. A. The Department’s
    Interim Final Rule
    When an agency’s interpretation of a statute is at issue, the two-step Chevron test applies.
    See Holland v. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 
    309 F.3d 808
    , 815 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Chevron v. Nat.
    Res. Def. Council, 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984)). First, the Court determines whether the statute is
    ambiguous. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    n.9. “If a court, employing traditional tools of
    statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
    that intention is the law and must be given effect.”
    Id. That means that
    if the text of the statute
    is clear, the inquiry finds its end. If the statute is ambiguous, on the other hand, the question
    6
    becomes whether the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one. Holland 
    Mining, 309 F.3d at 815
    . If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it is entitled to deference.
    Id. A court’s “task
    is to construe what Congress has enacted. [A court] begin[s], as always,
    with the language of the statute.” Duncan v. Walker, 
    533 U.S. 167
    , 172 (2001). The statute
    states: “A local educational agency receiving funds under sections 18002 or 18003 of this title
    shall provide equitable services in the same manner as provided under section 1117 of the ESEA
    of 1965 to students and teachers in non-public schools, as determined in consultation with
    representatives of non-public schools.” CARES Act § 18005 (emphasis added).
    In some statutory interpretation cases, courts must make sense of vague terms,
    contradictory provisions, or “inartful drafting.” King v. Burwell, 
    576 U.S. 473
    , 491 (2015). This
    is not one of those cases. In describing the funding mechanism for the GEER and ESSER sub-
    funds, Congress spoke with clarity and precision. It used mandatory language, cross-referenced
    a statutory provision by section number, and left no term up to interpretation.
    The statute commands that the LEAs shall distribute funds in the manner specified.
    CARES Act § 18005. And it specifies that manner by cross-referencing § 1117 of the ESEA by
    name.
    Id. “[A] statute that
    refers to another statute by specific title or section number in effect
    cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted.” Jam
    v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 
    139 S. Ct. 759
    , 769 (2019). Section 1117 of the ESEA likewise clearly
    describes a particular formula for providing equitable services to private schools—one based on
    the number of children from low-income families. See 20 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(4)(A)(i).
    Throughout these provisions, Congress used ordinary language in its ordinary sense. “In
    the same manner” means “to use the same methodology and procedures.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
    Bus. v. Sebelius, 
    567 U.S. 519
    , 545–46 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
    7
    providing equitable services “in the same manner” as § 1117 means to use the same
    methodology and procedures described in § 1117—the formula that accounts for the number of
    children from low-income families.
    Section 8501, another provision of the ESEA, confirms as much. It provides equal
    funding to private and public schools without accounting for income. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7881(a)–
    (b). Had Congress intended to permit the equal-funding formula the Department adopted in its
    interim final rule, it could have easily done so by referencing § 8501 in the CARES Act. Instead,
    however, Congress chose to reference § 1117. In doing so, Congress expressed a clear and
    unambiguous preference for apportioning funding to private schools based on the number of
    children from low-income families, even though the Department’s chosen alternative of equal
    funding was readily available at the time of drafting. In the end, it is difficult to imagine how
    Congress could have been clearer.
    The Department’s arguments to the contrary do not change this straightforward
    conclusion. The Department first contends that the term “equitable services” is ambiguous and
    that its interpretation is reasonable. In isolation, it might be true that “equitable” is an ambiguous
    term. But the Act does not use the term in isolation. It does not say that funds should be
    disbursed in an equitable manner without further explanation. Quite the opposite, the Act directs
    a specific formula for providing “equitable services”—the one described in § 1117 of the ESEA.
    Nonetheless, the Department found the provision ambiguous and substituted its own
    “expert judgment” for the kind of policy it deemed equitable. Defs.’ Opp’n at 11, Dkt. 46; see
    id. (“The Department determined
    that it is inequitable to apportion expenditures for private
    schools on the basis of low-income students residing in Title I-A school attendance areas when
    public school districts may use their share of CARES Act funds to benefit all schools and
    8
    students.”). Although some might agree with the Department’s position as a matter of policy,
    “[a]n agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting
    unambiguous statutory terms.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 
    573 U.S. 302
    , 325 (2014).
    In its interim final rule, the Department also argued that § 18005(a) as a whole is
    “facially ambiguous.” 85 Fed. Reg. 39,481. It noted that “Congress did not need to add the
    words ‘in the same manner’ if it simply intended to incorporate ‘section 1117 of the ESEA of
    1965’ by reference in the CARES Act. The unqualified phrase ‘as provided in’ alone would
    have been sufficient.”
    Id. But simply because
    Congress could have been clearer, that alone does
    not render an unambiguous text ambiguous. In any case, it is not at all obvious how the
    Department’s proposed revision of “as provided in” is any clearer than Congress’s chosen words
    of “in the same manner as provided under.” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
    Bus., 567 U.S. at 545
    –46
    (interpreting “in the same manner” to mean “the same methodology and procedures.”).
    The Department also relies on purposive arguments. It posits that the purpose of the
    CARES Act is “to provide emergency relief to all students and schools,” Opp’n at 9 (emphasis
    added), while the purpose of Title I-A is “to provide services to low-achieving students.”
    Id. Because these purposes
    are “disparate,” the Department reasons, it cannot be the case that
    Congress intended to incorporate § 1117’s formula for providing equitable services.
    Id. But even if
    purposive arguments could overcome the plain text of the statute, which they cannot, the
    purpose of the CARES Act is not so clear-cut. Indeed, the text of the CARES Act itself calls for
    “[a]ctivities to address the unique needs of low-income children or students.” CARES Act
    § 18003(d)(4).
    Finally, the Department makes an argument based on the statute’s structure. It argues
    that “section 1117—and the ESEA more broadly—cannot be imported into the CARES Act
    9
    scheme in ‘mechanistic’ fashion.” Opp’n at 8. The Department’s principal support for this point
    is that certain provisions in § 1117 of the ESEA (other than the formula for how to provide
    equitable services) are superfluous with other sections of the CARES Act. See Opp’n at 9
    (noting that “two of § 18005’s provisions are substantively identical to two provisions in §
    1117”). For example, § 1117 of the ESEA includes a provision requiring public schools to
    consult with private schools about equitable services, much like the CARES Act. Compare
    CARES Act § 18005(a), with 20 U.S.C. § 6320(b). So too, both statutes contain language about
    public schools retaining control over funds. Compare CARES Act § 18005(b), with 20 U.S.C. §
    6320(d). The Department reasons that “[i]f the CARES Act’s use of the phrase ‘in the same
    manner’ incorporated every jot and tittle of section 1117, both the consultation and the public-
    control provisions of § 18005 would be superfluous.” Opp’n at 9.
    While it is true that courts generally avoid giving a statute a meaning that would render
    parts of the text superfluous, “the rule against giving a portion of text an interpretation which
    renders it superfluous does not prescribe that a passage which could have been more terse does
    not mean what it says.” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 
    562 U.S. 223
    , 236 (2011). “Redundancy is
    not a silver bullet. . . . Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some
    redundancy.” Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 
    139 S. Ct. 873
    , 881 (2019). And the plain
    reading of § 18005 is that it incorporates the formula described in § 1117 for distributing
    equitable services by the number of children from low-income families.
    B.      Plaintiffs’ Remaining Arguments
    Plaintiffs raise one additional statutory argument. They contend that the Department
    exceeded its delegated authority by promulgating the interim final rule.
    10
    Although Congress explicitly granted other agencies rulemaking authority in the text of
    the CARES Act, see, e.g., CARES Act §§ 1114, 3513(f), 12003(c), there is no question that
    Congress did not vest the Department with express rulemaking authority, see
    id. §§ 18001– 18005;
    Opp’n at 10 & n.4. Thus, the Department based its authority on its general rulemaking
    powers, see 85 Fed. Reg. 39,481: first, the power to make rules “governing the applicable
    programs administered by[] the department,” 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3; and second, the power to
    make rules “as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the
    functions of the Secretary or the Department.” 20 U.S.C. § 3474.
    Of course, “[a]n agency’s general rulemaking authority does not mean that the specific
    rule the agency promulgates is a valid exercise of that authority.” Colo. River Indian Tribes v.
    Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 
    466 F.3d 134
    , 139 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “Agencies are . . . bound,
    not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it has deemed
    appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.”
    Id. And neither of
    the general
    rulemaking authority provisions provides support for the Department’s actions here. As
    discussed above, § 1117 is not ambiguous. It left no gaps for the agency to fill and thus
    delegated no implicit authority to the Department.
    After all, the GEER and ESSER sub-funds are not “programs” administered by the
    Department. See 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3. The sub-funds, in contrast to other CARES Act
    provisions, provide the Secretary with no discretion as to disbursement or any other
    programmatic decisionmaking. Rather, they simply direct that the Secretary shall allocate funds
    in the same proportion and in the same manner as the cross-referenced ESEA statute. CARES
    Act §§ 18003, 18005. By contrast, other provisions of the CARES Act (which are not at issue in
    this case) do provide the Secretary with discretion. In the sub-fund for higher education
    11
    (HEER), for example, Congress appropriated 2.5% of the funds for the institutions that the
    Secretary determines have the greatest unmet needs. See
    id. § 18004(a)(3). Congress
    knew how
    to delegate programmatic authority to the Secretary when it wanted to and chose not to do so
    here.
    Further, the rulemaking was neither “necessary” nor “appropriate” to “manage the
    functions of the Secretary or the Department,” 20 U.S.C. § 3474. The interim final rule was not
    “necessary” to accomplish the statute’s unambiguous directive—indeed, it went far beyond that
    directive by interpreting the statute to require a different formula. The Department “cannot rely
    on its general authority to make rules necessary to carry out its functions when a specific
    statutory directive defines the relevant functions . . . in a particular area.” Am. Petrol. Inst. v.
    EPA, 
    52 F.3d 1113
    , 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Because the Act is not ambiguous and did not
    otherwise delegate rulemaking authority, the Department acted beyond its authority in
    promulgating the interim final rule.
    In addition to the statutory arguments discussed above, Plaintiffs raise two constitutional
    arguments. They contend that the interim final rule violates the Spending Clause and the
    separation of powers. See Pl.’s Mem. at 14, 22, Dkt. 36-1. Because plaintiffs’ statutory claims
    fully resolve this motion, the Court need not reach these constitutional questions. The plaintiffs
    also bring two additional APA claims in their amended complaint: an arbitrary and capricious
    challenge and a challenge to the Department’s invocation of the “good cause” exception to
    notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–23, Dkt. 35. Because these claims do
    not present pure questions of law and the Department has not yet produced an administrative
    record, they were not consolidated into the expedited motion for summary judgment. See Pl’s
    Reply at 2. The remaining APA claims will be moot following this grant of summary judgment.
    12
    See Unofficial Transcript at 4:3–7 (plaintiffs acknowledging that none of their remaining claims
    would survive if the rule were vacated).
    ***
    In enacting the education funding provisions of the CARES Act, Congress spoke with a
    clear voice. It declared that relief funding shall be provided to private schools “in the same
    manner as provided under section 1117.” CARES Act § 18005. Contrary to the Department’s
    interim final rule, that cannot mean the opposite of what it says.
    “The authority to issue regulations is not the power to make law, and a regulation
    contrary to a statute is void.” Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v. Salazar, 
    553 F.3d 697
    , 703 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009). It is long-settled that “[a] regulation which . . . operates to create a rule out of
    harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.” Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal
    Revenue, 
    297 U.S. 129
    , 134 (1936). Thus, the Department’s interim final rule, which conflicts
    with the unambiguous text of the statute, is void. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); see Nat’l Min.
    Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
    145 F.3d 1399
    , 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen a
    reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the
    rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted. A
    separate order consistent with this decision accompanies the memorandum opinion.
    ________________________
    DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
    United States District Judge
    September 4, 2020
    13