Medina v. United States ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OMAR ALEJANDRO MEDINA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-0327 (TJK)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Omar Alejandro Medina, proceeding pro se, asserts that the United States of America
owes him “110M” for “[n]egligence” because he “[w]ent to hospital [sic] several times—almost
died.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2. He brought this action in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, and the United States removed it to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
ECF Nos. 1–2. For the below reasons, the Court dismisses Medina’s complaint without
prejudice, sua sponte, for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Although pro se plaintiffs are generally held to a less stringent standard, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must still comply with the Court’s procedural rules, “and
district courts have discretion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte for non-
compliance,” Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 102, 107 (D.D.C.
2014). Rule 8(a) states that, at a minimum, a complaint must provide “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and a “statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the Rule 8 standard is to give fair notice to the
defendant of the claims being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer and an adequate
defense, and to determine whether res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498
(D.D.C. 1977). The Court also “shall dismiss [a] case at any time” if it determines that the action
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter” for that claim to be “plausible,”
which requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The entirety of Medina’s threadbare complaint (1) alleges negligence and that he almost
died in the hospital, (2) recites certain GPS coordinates, and (3) seeks “a quick payment” of
“110M” “to get these losers off [his] back and [to] stop violating [his] privacy.” ECF No. 1-1 at
2–4, 7. But it does not say anything about how the United States was negligent or injured him.
That warrants dismissal. See Schultz v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 739 F.
App’x 654, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (district court may sua sponte dismiss a “case
without prejudice on the ground that the complaint did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)”); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Furthermore, Medina’s complaint suggests no reason why the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, which—as a court of limited jurisdiction—it “is obliged to address
. . . sua sponte.” Doe by Fein v. D.C., 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Medina
seeks money damages for a negligence claim against the United States. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. But
in general, sovereign immunity bars such suits. See Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103
(D.C. Cir. 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if
the court determines that” the action “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief”). Although he does not invoke it, Medina may seek to proceed under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671 et seq., which operates as a
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limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity. But even then, claimants must meet
the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency
before filing suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a), 2679(d)(5); Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808,
809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Such a[n administrative] claim is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite
to a[n FTCA] suit against the United States.”). Medina has not demonstrated that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies about whatever claim he may have, and therefore the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his complaint.
For all these reasons, the Court will dismiss the case without prejudice. A separate order
will issue.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: February 13, 2020
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