Cannady v. State of Maryland ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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VINCENT CANNADY, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Case No. 1:19-cv-3822-RCL
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STATE OF MARYLAND, et al., )
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Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Vincent Cannady, a Missouri resident, brings this case pro se against defendants
the State of Maryland, the City of Baltimore, and Talbot County, Maryland as well as against
Judge Julie Annette Highley-Keutzer, a Missouri resident.
Maryland (ECF No. 13), Baltimore (ECF No. 17), and Talbot County (ECF No. 7) have
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process,
and failure to state a claim. Mr. Cannady has moved to strike portions of Baltimore’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 18). Upon consideration of the motions, the briefs filed in support thereof and
opposition thereto, and the complaint, by separate accompanying order the Court will grant the
motions to dismiss and deny the motion to strike.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Cannady alleges various violations of his statutory and constitutional rights occurring
between September 2018 and January 2019 in Maryland and Missouri. Compl. at 4 (ECF. No.
1). In September 2018, Mr. Cannady was involved in a car accident in Talbot County, Maryland
which he alleges led to a criminal firearm possession charge. Id. at 5. Mr. Cannady also alleges
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that Baltimore held him in “lock up” in December 2018. Id.
Mr. Cannady appears to assert one claim against all defendants: “refus[al] to grant . . . an
ADA Accommodation recommended by his doctors . . . [thus] violat[ing his rights under] the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments” to the Constitution. Id. at 4. Mr. Cannady
claims that the same conduct also violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1993 and Titles V and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 “due to his race of African
American and he is a Service Connected Disabled Veteran.” Id. at 3. The “ADA
Accommodation” Mr. Cannady sought were telephonic judicial proceedings, as recommended by
Baltimore-area health professionals, to minimize Mr. Cannady’s risk of panic attacks stemming
from his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis. Id. at 11–15. Furthermore, Mr.
Cannady alleged that the “[City of] Baltimore refused to give PTSD Medicine” and committed
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 4, 7. Mr. Cannady seeks $9,999,999 in
damages from each defendant. Id. at 5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a district court faces “a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue,” the court has
discretion to “turn[] directly to personal jurisdiction.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 588 (1999). Because the Court clearly lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
the Court need not address the claims of sovereign immunity or improper service as alternative
grounds for dismissal. And because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the defendants, it will not
rule on whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, (1998) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
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and dismissing the cause.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
A. Rule 12(b)(2) Standard
On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), a plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant. FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts.,
Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a
factual basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court resolves factual discrepancies in
favor of the plaintiff. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
While the court construes pro se complaints liberally, Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d
182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006), “[p]ro se plaintiffs are not freed from the requirement to plead an
adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims.” Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C.
2010).
When a defendant lacks “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum, courts
have personal jurisdiction over only specific claims arising out of the defendant’s contacts with
the forum. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80 (2017).
To establish specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in federal court, the
plaintiff “must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with the forum’s long-arm statute and
does not violate due process.” Brooks v. Harris, 808 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (D.D.C. 2011)
(quoting FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at 1094–95) (quotation mark and citation omitted). The
District of Columbia’s long-arm statute “provide[s] jurisdiction [over persons] to the full extent
allowed by the Due Process Clause.” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). But the statute does not permit courts to exercise jurisdiction over states, United
States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1995), or cities, Black v. City of Newark, 535 F.
Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D.D.C. 2008), because neither are “persons” over which the statute
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authorizes jurisdiction. Counties, however, are persons and may be sued in the District of
Columbia. See Jones v. Prince George’s Cty., 00-cv-2902-RWR, 2004 WL 5664071, at *3
(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2004).
B. Rule 12(f) Standard
Under Rule 12(f), a court may “order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
“[S]triking portions of pleadings is a drastic remedy and, accordingly, motions to strike are
generally disfavored.” NCB Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. FDIC, 843 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D.D.C. 2012).
While the moving party is not required to make a showing of prejudice, “courts view motions to
strike . . . with such disfavor that many courts will grant such a motion only if the portions
sought to be stricken as immaterial are also prejudicial or scandalous.” Makuch v. FBI, No. 99-
CV-1094 (RMU), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9487, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2000); see also Wiggins v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 457, 457 (D.D.C. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Maryland, Baltimore, and Talbot
County.
Mr. Cannady has not met his burden to establish personal jurisdiction.
First, in stating that “[t]he Plaintiff . . . provided the Nexus to the Litigation filed in the
District of Columbia,” Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n to Baltimore’s Mot. Dismiss 7 (ECF No. 19), Mr.
Cannady misconstrues the relevant party for the personal jurisdiction analysis. It is the
defendants’ contacts, not the plaintiff’s, which are germane to personal jurisdiction.
Second, Maryland and Baltimore are not persons that fall within the District of
Columbia’s long-arm statute. See Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 831; Black, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
Third, Mr. Cannady has failed to establish that the facts giving rise to his injuries arose
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out of defendants’ contacts with the District of Columbia. None of the actions described in the
complaint took place in the District. Mr. Cannady argues that personal jurisdiction is proper
because the defendants “all receive Federal Dollars (Grants and or Contracts) from US
Government Agencies that reside in the District of Columbia.” See, e.g., Opp’n to Talbot
County Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (ECF No. 10). Mr. Cannady does not, however, allege that federal
funding played any role this case. Moreover, government contracts alone cannot create personal
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Stevens v. Del. State Univ., 70 F. Supp. 3d 562, 565
(D.D.C. 2014).
Though not raised by Mr. Cannady, the only other possible relevant contact under the
long-arm statute could be “causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-
423(a)(3)-(4). But the injuries Mr. Cannady alleges all occurred in Maryland.
Cannady may be able to establish general or specific jurisdiction over Talbot County and
Baltimore in Maryland, where those governments are established and where the events he alleges
took place. But he has failed to meet his burden to establish personal jurisdiction in the District
of Columbia.
B. Mr. Cannady’s Motion to Strike is Without Merit.
Finally, Mr. Cannady has not presented any statements made by Baltimore which meet
the prejudice requirements under Rule 12(f). Through two different filings, Mr. Cannady objects
to two statements in Baltimore’s motion to dismiss:
• “[T]he City of Baltimore falsely claimed [that] Vincent Cannady was a Drug Dealer
and that he traveled to West Virginia to purchase drugs,” Mot. to Strike 2.
• “The Plaintiff did not file a suit against the Mayor of Baltimore as the Motion to
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Dismiss states.” Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n to Baltimore’s Mot. Dismiss 2.
Both claims lack merit because Mr. Cannady appears to have misread Baltimore’s motions. The
individual described as “sell[ing] drugs” and traveling to West Virginia was the plaintiff in a
case that Baltimore cited when discussing the inapplicability of the long-arm statute to this case.
Because the citation at most analogizes to Mr. Cannady’s case, allowing the passage to remain in
Baltimore’s motion is not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. Similarly,
Baltimore’s motion gives the city its full legal title. See Balt. City Charter, art. I, § 1 (“The
inhabitants of the City of Baltimore are a corporation, by the name of the ‘Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore,’ and by that name shall have perpetual succession, may sue and be
sued . . . .”). Baltimore never claimed that Mr. Cannady sued the mayor. See Clark v. O'Malley,
186 973 A.2d 821, 823 & n.1 (2009) (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (distinguishing between suit
against mayor and suit against “Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.”).
Because Baltimore’s motion does not contain material that is redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous, Mr. Cannady’s motion to strike must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, by separate accompanying order the Court will grant
Maryland, Baltimore, and Talbot County’s motions to dismiss and deny Mr. Cannady’s motion
to strike.
SIGNED this 8th day of June 2020.
/s/ Royce C. Lamberth
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Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge
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