United States v. Johnson ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. ) Criminal No. 15-cr-125 (KBJ)
)
MORRIS GEMAL JOHNSON, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
With the First Step Act of 2018, Congress enacted “the most substantial change[]
in a generation to the tough-on-crime prison and sentencing laws that ballooned the
federal prison population and created a criminal justice system that many . . . view[ed]
as costly and unfair.” Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2018). 1 One key aspect of the legislation expands the authority of
federal sentencing courts to revisit, and reduce, a previously imposed term of
imprisonment—a power that is generally referred to as “compassionate release.” See
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (“Increasing
the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release”). Pursuant to section
3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the United States Code as amended, the court can reduce a
sentenced defendant’s term of imprisonment when the defendant requests this
modification (whereas, previously, a reduction was authorized solely “upon motion of
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, ch. 2, sec. 212, § 3582(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984)), but only if the court
1
The cited source has been archived at the time of this writing and may be accessed at:
https://nyti.ms/2Lmtruj.
finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[,]” and if the
reduction is consistent with both the court’s reassessment of the purposes of punishment
embodied in the statutory sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statements regarding the appropriate exercise of the court’s
compassionate-release authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The instant case fits squarely within the intended scope of the First Step Act’s
compassionate-release authorization. Defendant Morris Gemal Johnson is an honorably
discharged veteran with no prior criminal history who completed two tours in
Afghanistan and has since been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and other
mental and physical conditions. Johnson was convicted of various w eapons-related
offenses under federal and state law in April of 2019, at the conclusion of a seven -day
jury trial during which the prosecution ably demonstrated that Johnson had illegally
possessed two 37-millimeter shell casings into which flechettes and other shrapnel had
been inserted, and that Johnson had also engaged in multiple e -mail exchanges and
online transactions with a notorious Swedish arms dealer, seemingly arranging for the
unlawful shipment of machine gun parts and silencers into the United States. See
United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-125, 2019 WL 3842082, at *1 & n.1, *3 (D.D.C.
Aug. 15, 2019).
Johnson’s established conduct was undoubtedly unlawful, and, ultimately, this
Court upheld the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to the seven counts contained in the
latest superseding indictment. Id. at *5. Significantly for present purposes, however,
the Court had previously concluded that Johnson was not a flight risk or a danger to the
community despite the inherently dangerous nature of the charged offenses, and it had
therefore ordered his release during the pretrial period, over the government’s
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objection. (See Minute Entry of Dec. 8, 2016.) Moreover, and importantly, Johnson
maintained a generally good track record of compliance with his release conditions for
the nearly three-and-a-half-year period that it took to bring his case to trial. Thus,
when the jury rendered its guilty verdict and Johnson was taken into custody on April
25, 2019, he was physically restrained for the first time since his arrest in 2015, to
begin serving the 41-month prison sentence that this Court subsequently imposed based
upon the applicable Sentencing Guidelines and the Court’s evaluation of the sentencing
factors that Congress has set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Approximately 12 months later, on April 21, 2020, Johnson filed a motion for
emergency release, requesting a reduction of his term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) due to “his underlying health conditions” and “the deteriorating
conditions” inside the prison with respect to the spread of COVID-19. (Def.’s Mot. for
Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 209 at 1.) This Court first addressed
Johnson’s motion for compassionate release at the end of a hearing that the Court held
on April 27, 2020, at which time the Court issued an oral indicative ruling. (See Minute
Entry of Apr. 27, 2020.) As later reflected in the Court’s Order of April 29, 2020, the
Court concluded that a reduction of Johnson’s term of imprisonment pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) was warranted and, as a result, the Court GRANTED
Johnson’s motion for compassionate release. (See Order Granting Def.’s Mot., ECF
No. 219.)
The instant Memorandum Opinion lays out this Court’s understanding of the
sentence-reduction authority that section 3582(c)(1)(A) confers, as well as the
substantive requirements of that statute with respect to the evaluation of motions for
compassionate release. It also explains why the Court concluded that Johnson’s motion
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satisfies those standards. In short, this Court is of the view that, as a threshold matter,
it has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a sentence reduction that a defendant files
pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A) if the defendant either exhausts his administrative
remedies or if exhaustion would be futile, and that the Bureau of Prisons’s (“BOP’s”)
assertion that Johnson’s request for compassionate release was not eligible for agency
consideration because Johnson was not yet in BOP custody plainly satisfies the
compassionate release statute’s exhaustion-related, claim-processing prescriptions.
Moreover, with respect to the merits of any such motion, section 3582(c)(1)(A) appears
to require courts undertake a two-step analysis of a defendant’s compassionate release
request. The court must, first, find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction” of the previously imposed prison sentence, as that term has been
defined in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. And if those reasons exist,
the court must then proceed to evaluate whether the otherwise warranted reduction in
the defendant’s term of imprisonment should nevertheless be denied, either due to the
required revisiting of the factors that led to the court’s prior determination that the
original prison term was necessary to comply with the purposes of punishment under
section 3553(a), or because the warranted reduction of the defendant’s term of
imprisonment is inconsistent with the policy concerns expressed by the Sentencing
Commission.
Applying these standards to the circumstances presented here, this Court has
concluded that the prevalence of a novel and potentially deadly strain of coronavirus in
the facility where Johnson has been housed, coupled with the established fact that
Johnson has certain preexisting medical conditions that put him at a higher risk of being
harmed if he contracts COVID-19, qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason
4
that a reduction of his 41-month term of imprisonment is warranted. And the Court has
further determined that the none of the considerations concerning the purposes of
punishment in section 3553(a)—including the significant and substantial interest in
protecting public safety that is reflected in the Sentencing Commission’s compassionate
release-related policy statement—requires maintenance of the original prison term,
especially given the risks posed by the conditions of incarceration that presently exist in
D.C. Department of Corrections facilities.
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Motions For Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
1. The Court’s Jurisdiction To Entertain A Defendant’s Motion For
Compassionate Release
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed, but th[at] rule of finality is subject to a few
narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
3582(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code codifies one such exception: as
originally enacted, it empowers the Director of BOP to “petition the court for a
reduction in . . . sentence[,]” S. Rep. No. 98-223 at 118 (1983), and provides a court
with the authority to grant the Director’s petition and thereby modify a previously
imposed term of imprisonment, if the court finds “that the reduction [is] justified by
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons[,]’” id. As such, section 3582(c)(1)(A) is, at its
core, jurisdictional in nature, insofar as Congress has provided sentencing judges with
limited authority to reduce a previously imposed term of imprisonment, when, absent
such statutory authorization, courts would have not have that power.
5
As mentioned above, the First Step Act of 2018 expanded the circumstances
under which courts have sentence-reduction authority after a sentence has already been
imposed, insofar as it permits the court to reduce a previously imposed term of
imprisonment if the defendant files a motion for release directly with the court, separate
and apart from the aforementioned petition that may be filed by the BOP Director.
Notably, however, under the plain terms of the amended statute, the court may entertain
such a defense motion only “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a mot ion on the defendant’s
behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the
defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). And whether
or not this exhaustion requirement is itself jurisdiction al or is merely a non-
jurisdictional, claim-processing mandate is presently subject to debate. Compare
United States v. Russo, No. 16-cr-0441, 2020 WL 1862294, at *2–7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2020) with United States v. Ogarro, No. 18-cr-373, 2020 WL 1876300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 2020). This matters because non-jurisdictional statutory exhaustion
requirements can be excused or forfeited—e.g., for good cause, the court can proceed
even if the exhaustion requirements are not satisfied—whereas jurisdictional statutory
exhaustion requirements are binding. See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843,
1849 (2019); Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
In the District of Columbia, every court that has considered the jurisdiction al or
non-jurisdictional nature of the mandate that, prior to coming to court, a defendant
either exhaust administrative processes, on the one hand, or request relief from the BOP
and wait 30 days, on the other, has consistently concluded that section 3582 (c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and is thus subject to equitable waiver by
6
the court. 2 And this Court, too, reaches that same conclusion. Under established D.C.
Circuit precedent, in order for the exhaustion requirement to be deemed jurisdictional,
Congress has to state “in clear, unequivocal terms that the judiciary is barred from
hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to a decision ,” Avocados
Plus, 370 F.3d at 1248 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); otherwise,
“courts [must] treat the [exhaustion] restriction as nonjurisdictional in character[,]”
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (internal quotation marks,
alteration, and citation omitted). No such unequivocal language appears in section
3582(c)(1)(A).
Furthermore, the non-jurisdictional character of section 3582(c)(1)(A) is
especially evident when what Congress does say in that provision is carefully
considered in the context in which it appears, given the purposes that Congre ss intended
to achieve. That is, “[g]enerally, Congress imposes exhaustion requirements in order to
serve the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and prom oting
judicial efficiency[,]” but “the hybrid requirement in this statute —either exhaust or wait
30 days—substantially reduces the importance of the first purpose, as it allows a
defendant to come to court before the agency has rendered a final decision.” United
States v. Haney, No. 19-cr-541, 2020 WL 1821988, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020)
2
See, e.g., United States v. Malone, No. 13-cr-231, 2020 WL 1984261, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2020)
(denying a motion for compassionate release after declining to “dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or on
the ground that the requirement is not waivable”); United States v. Jennings, No. 18-cr-17, ECF No. 30
at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2020) (concluding that the compassionate release exhaustion requirement is non-
jurisdictional, and finding that waiver was appropriate “given the history of the compassionate release
statute and the urgency of the COVID -19 pandemic”); United States v. Ghorbani, No. 18-cr-255, ECF
No. 131 (D.D.C. April 3, 2020) (agreeing with the parties’ joint filing that a court can dispense with the
administrative exhaustion requirement under section 3582(c)(1)(A) where there are exceptional
circumstances of peculiar urgency or exhaustio n would be futile); United States v. Powell, No. 94-cr-
316, 2020 WL 1698194, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2020) (waiving the requirement because “requiring
defendant to first seek relief through the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative process would be futile”).
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(internal quotation marks, citation, and alternation omitted). Thus, it appears that
Congress did not intend for this exhaustion requirement to bar judicial review in the
absence of agency input and, as such, the requirement is reasonably construed as claim-
processing rule that is subject to waiver by the court or forfeiture by the government.
See United States v. Scparta, No. 18-cr-578, 2020 WL 1910481, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
20, 2020). Accordingly, consistent with the generally accepted standards that courts
have applied in similar circumstances, a court can excuse section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement where, among other things, “the agency will almost certainly
deny any relief either because it has a preconceived position on, or lack s jurisdiction
over, the matter.” Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F. 2d 90,
107 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Paese v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 435,
443 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a “claim-processing rule” is “subject to equitable
considerations such as waiver, estoppel[,] or futility”).
2. Substantive Standards For Review Of Compassionate Release
Motions
In addition to establishing the court’s authority to entertain a defense motion for
compassionate release, the amended section 3582(c)(1)(A) also prescribes specific
circumstances under which such a motion may be granted. As relevant here, pursuant
to that statutory provision, the court “may reduce [a previously imposed] term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also 28
U.S.C. § 994(t) (tasking the Sentencing Commission with “describ[ing] what should be
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considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the
criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples”).
For its part, at section 1B1.13 of the Guidelines Manual, the Sentencing
Commission has promulgated a policy statement that specifically addresses motions for
compassionate release brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In particular, section 1B1.13
identifies various scenarios in which “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the
reduction” of a term of imprisonment, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), including where the
defendant is either “suffering from a serious physical or medic al condition” or “from a
serious functional or cognitive impairment . . . that substantially diminishes the ability
of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility
and from which he or she is not expected to recover[ ,]” id. cmt. n.1(A)(ii). Section
1B1.13 also indicates that, before any reduction of a term of imprisonment under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c), the court should “determine[]” that “the defendant is not a danger to
the safety of any other person or to the communit y, as provided in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g).” 3
3
Given that Congress specifically directed the Sentencing Commission merely “to describe what should
be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be
applied and a list of specific examples,” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), the Commission’s authority to require a
separate assessment of defendant’s dangerousness where a compassionate release motion otherwise
establishes extraordinary and compelling reasons within the meaning of policy statement’s application
notes is not entirely clear. Moreover, given the specific reference to a dangerousness factor in the
second statutory category of compassionate release authority, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)
(pertaining to defendants who are at least 70 years old and have s erved at least 30 years in prison), it
appears that Congress intentionally decided not to require a specific dangerousness finding for motions
that, like Johnson’s, invoke extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, see id.§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)) . Nevertheless, to the extent that Congress also
mandates that a court consider the section 3553(a) factors prior to granting a motion for compassionate
release, the potential danger that a defendant’s release would pose to the community is addressed by the
court’s evaluation of “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant[,]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), such that, by analyzin g this particular sentencing factor
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When all of Congress’s directives and the Sentencing Commission’s
prescriptions are taken into account, it appears that section 3582(c)(1)(A) (i) requires a
court that is presented with a defendant’s motion for compassionate release to make two
essential determinations. First, the court must decide whether or not “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” to reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment exist, and that
determination must be made “consistent with” what th e Sentencing Commission has
said about the types of circumstances that meet that statutory requirement. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). If such reasons exist, then a reduction of the defendant’s term of
imprisonment is “warrant[ed]” per the language of section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But
whether or not a justified motion for compassionate release will be granted appears to
turn on Congress’s requirement that the court reassess the applicable section 3553(a)
factors, presumably with an eye toward whether it is necessary to maintain the prior
term of imprisonment despite the extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify the
defendant’s sentence in order to achieve the purposes of punishment that compelled the
court to impose the original term of imprisonment.
In other words, because the sentencing court initially considered the section
3553(a) factors to satisfy Congress’s mandate that it impose a sent ence that is
“sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes [of
punishment],” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and yet section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a
reconsideration of that same set of factors when deciding whether or not to modify the
original sentence when there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to do so,
Congress’s compassionate release standards appear to require the court to evaluate,
pursuant to Congress’s directive, a court is necessarily assessing a compassionate release motion
consistent with the dangerousness concerns expressed in the Commission’s policy statement.
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first, whether the requested modification is warranted—i.e., whether there are
extraordinary and compelling reasons for the reduction, as defined by the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statements—and, if so, whether the purposes of punishment that
the court previously assessed (including public safety) would be impacted by the
requested reduction—i.e., whether, despite the fact that a sentence reduction is
warranted, section 3553(a)’s purposes of punishment require maintenan ce of the
original prison term. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, No. 2:99-cr-00257-3, 2020 WL
1864906, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020) (“A sentence reduction, even if justified by
the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons, may only be grant ed if it would
be consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, to the extent they apply . . .
[and] [r]equiring Wade to serve the 50-plus years outstanding on her original sentence
would not . . . accomplish any of the objectives identified b y Congress in § 3553.”).
B. The Underlying Facts Of The Instant Case
On September 30, 2015, defendant Morris Gemal Johnson was indicted f or
possession of a single “37mm shell modified as an improvised explosive device” in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). (Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2.) Law enforcement
discovered the device buried in a box inside Johnson’s home after executing a search
warrant as part of a larger investigation into the activities of Raimo Huolman, a
notorious Swedish arms dealer. (See Trial Tr. at 201–11, Apr. 16, 2019, ECF No. 150.)
The prosecution superseded the original indictment on May 5, 2016, adding one count
of “possession of a weapon of mass destruction” in violation of 22 D.C. Code § 3154(a)
with respect to that same 37-millimiter modified shell; it also charged both Johnson and
Huolman with two counts of conspiracy to import various firearm parts in violation of
federal law, based on e-mail exchanges that federal authorities discovered after
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searching a hard drive that had been extracted from Huolman’s residence in Sweden.
(See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 14; see also Trial Tr. at 19–22, Apr. 15, 2019,
ECF No. 149.)
On January 1, 2018, the government brought additional charges related to
another doctored 37-millimeter shell that a law enforcement laboratory expert
discovered in September of 2017 at the bottom of one of the boxes that officers had
removed from Johnson’s home during the 2014 search. (See Mot. for Explosives Expert
To Submit Interim Voucher, ECF No. 62 at 1.) This second superseding indictment
contained a total of six federal and state charges relating to two counts of unlawful
receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm (namely, the two 37-millimiter
cartridges), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); two counts of unlawful making of such
firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f); two counts of possession of a weapon of
mass destruction (i.e., the same two 37-millimiter cartridges), in violation of 22 D.C.
Code § 3154(a); and one count of conspiracy to smuggle goods into the United States,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 70.)
Significantly for present purposes, Johnson remained out of jail throughout the
more than three-year period during which these charges were being incrementally meted
out. Specifically, although the prosecution sought to have him detained pretrial at a
detention hearing held in December of 2016, the Court evaluated the section 3142(g)
pretrial detention factors and determined that, on balance, they weighed in favor of
release. (See Minute Entry of Dec. 8, 2016.) In particular, the Court found that
Johnson’s charged offenses were serious and the evidence against him strong, but the
offense conduct did not involve violence, and Johnson had no prior convictions. (See
Hr’g Tr. at 10–12, Dec. 8, 2016.) In addition, the Court noted that Johnson is an
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honorably discharged Army veteran who has served two tours of duty in Afghanistan
and has strong ties to the District of Columbia, including m any supportive family
members. (Id. at 12–13) Johnson has also been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”) and had concomitant substance-abuse issues, so being on pretrial
release conditions afforded him the opportunity to participate in a series of in-patient
and out-patient treatment programs. (Id. at 13.) And throughout the lengthy pretrial
release period, Johnson did successfully participate in and complete various treatment
programs through the Veterans Administration, all while generally complying with the
conditions of his release and assisting his counsel to prepare for trial. (See, e.g., Hr’g
Tr. at 6, Jan. 29, 2016; Order Amending Conditions of Release, ECF No. 20.)
At the end of a seven-day trial that took place between April 15 and April 25,
2019, the jury deliberated for less than two hours with respect to the testimony of
sixteen witnesses and scores of exhibits—evidence that plainly demonstrated that
“Johnson [had] made and possessed [the] two improvised explosive devices . . . and
[had] conspired to smuggle machine guns, machine gun parts, and silencers into the
United States.” Johnson, 2019 WL 3842082, at *1. Johnson was convicted of seven
counts charging him with various violations of federal and District of Co lumbia firearm
laws on April 25, 2019, (see Verdict Form, ECF No. 143), and he was immediately
taken into custody (see Minute Entry of Apr. 25, 2019).
Seven months later, in November of 2019, this Court sentenced Johnson to a 41-
month term of imprisonment and a 60-month term of supervised release. (See
Judgment, ECF No. 183.) During the sentencing hearing, the Court calculated the
applicable guidelines range, and then evaluated the section 3553(a) sentencing factors.
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(See generally Sentencing Hr’g Tr., Nov. 19, 2019, ECF No. 189.) 4 With respect to the
section 3553(a) considerations, the Court took into account that Johnson had
“committed very serious and very dangerous crimes” and that the evidence against him
was “overwhelming[]” (id. at 45:21-23), but the Court also considered that Johnson had
no criminal history, enjoyed the support of many friends and family, struggled
“mentally and emotionally” following his active duty, and had been diagnosed with
PTSD (id. at 48–49, 50:2-6). Ultimately, the Court determined that a sentence of 41
months of imprisonment, which was at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range, followed by a substantial period of supervised release, was sufficient
but not greater than necessary to serve the purposes of just punishment and deterrence,
to protect the public, and to reflect the inherent dangerousness of Johnson’s crimes.
(Id. at 53.)
C. The Procedural History Of Johnson’s Compassionate Release Motion
Johnson was committed to the custody of the Attorney General on April 25,
2019, and has been housed at the D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”), which
is run by the D.C. Department of Corrections (“D.C. DOC”), since that date . Notably,
although Johnson is a federal detainee, he was detained at CTF for more than 12
4
To calculate the federal sentencing guideline range, the Court considered sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1 of
the Guidelines Manual, and determined that all of Johnson’s crimes of conviction, which were divided
into two groups, carried an offense level of 18. ( See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 7.) Because Count Group 2
involved at least 10 firearms, a four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) applied to that
count (see id. at 10–11), and because Johnson was convicted of multiple counts, a two-level
enhancement also applied to the greater of the offense levels—resulting in an adjusted offense level of
24. The Court further concluded that “military service, individually or in combination with other
offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from a t ypical one
covered by the guidelines[,]” and thus a two-level downward departure under section 5H1.11 was
appropriate. (Id. at 18:14-17.) Accordingly, the adjusted base offense level after departures was 22,
and given that Johnson’s had no criminal history, the applicable guideline range was 41 to 51 months of
imprisonment. (Id. at 18.)
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months—first, in anticipation of sentencing, and then, pending transfer a Bureau of
Prisons facility. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 2.)
Johnson filed a notice of appeal on December 3, 2019, asserting challenges to
both his conviction and sentence. (See Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 181; Criminal
Docketing Statement, United States v. Johnson, No. 19-3094 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2020).)
Johnson also sent a letter to BOP, on April 15, 2020, formally requesting that the
agency file a compassionate release motion on his behalf, pursuant to section
3582(c)(1)(A). (See Letter from Virginia Williamson to Zachary J. Kelton, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Apr. 15, 2020), Ex. B to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 209-2.)
Johnson’s letter noted that he “was housed in a unit with inmates who have tested
positive for COVID-19, and that he was “being held in quarantine due to his potential
exposure to the virus,” and the letter further stated that “[t]he novel coronavirus,
coupled with Mr. Johnson’s medical history and conditions at the D.C. jail, presents
circumstances warranting relief under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” ( Id. at 3.) On the
same day that Johnson’s request was received, the General Counsel’s Office of BOP
responded that the agency “will not be able to consider [Johnson] . . . for compassionate
release” because he is “not currently in BOP custody,” and therefore BOP “does not
anticipate bringing a motion for such relief on his behalf.” (E-mail from Zachary J.
Kelton, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to Virginia Williamson (Apr. 15,
2020), Ex. A to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 209-1 at 2.)
Johnson filed the instant opposed motion for compassionate release with thi s
Court on April 21, 2020. (See Def.’s Mot. at 1.) The parties briefed the motion on an
expedited basis, and then also promptly filed a consent motion to obtain Johnson’s
medical records from D.C. DOC (see Consent Motion for Order, ECF No. 211), which
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this Court granted (see Order, ECF No. 212). 5 The voluminous medical records that the
Court received (hereinafter “Medical Records”), demonstrate, among other things, that
Johnson has a documented history of high blood pressure and PTSD, for which he takes
almost a dozen medications each day, and that he is also just shy of the severe-obesity
threshold. (See Medical Records at 21–22, 27, 82–83, 169.)
On April 27, 2020, this Court held a telephonic hearing with respect to Johnson’s
compassionate release motion, during which the Court considered both parties’
arguments and ruled orally on Johnson’s release request. (See Minute Entry of Apr. 27,
2020.) 6 During its oral ruling, the Court first explained that, due to Johnson’s pending
appeal, the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant his motion to reduce the sentence and that,
before the Court could change its prior judgment, the D.C. Circuit would have to
remand the matter for that limited purpose, or Johnson would have to voluntarily
dismiss his appeal. (See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 45, Apr. 27, 2020, ECF No. 217.) 7 However,
5
Johnson’s D.C. DOC medical records were provided to the parties and the Court via e -mail on April
22, 2020. (See E-mail from Eric Glover, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, to Chambers of
Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson (Apr. 22, 2020).)
6
The hearing on Johnson’s motion for compassionate release was held telephonically due to the
physical closure of the Court’s building in light of COVID -19. See Standing Order In re: Use of Video
Teleconferencing and Teleconferencing for Certain Criminal and Juvenile Delinque ncy Proceedings,
No. 20-17 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/XHF3 -KEG6. During the motion hearing, defense
counsel confirmed that “Mr. Johnson is waiving his presence” (Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 2:21-25, Apr. 27, 2020,
ECF No. 217), and the Court found that it was “manifestly in the interest of justice[] to proceed
expeditiously with respect to this motion and coordinating video conference capabilities [to] include[]
Mr. Johnson would have resulted in additional delay” (id. at 3:10-13).
7
It is clear beyond cavil that a “notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance —it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those asp ects
involved in the appeal[.]” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co ., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). A
motion to modify a prison term pursuant to section 3582(c) is not one of the two established exceptions
to the divestiture of a district court’s jurisdiction over a matter pending appeal. See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(5) (stating that “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal under this Rule 4(b) does not divest a district
court of jurisdiction to correct a sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a)”); see also
United States v. Howard, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that, in the D.C. Circuit,
the district court retains “jurisdiction to reconsider its prior denial of defendant’s request for a new trial
so long as it is based on a claim of newly discovered evidence” (citing Smith v. Pollin, 194 F.2d 349,
350 (D.C. Cir. 1952))). Thus, courts have consistently held that district courts lack authority to grant
16
pursuant to its authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a), the Court
proceeded to issue an indicative ruling, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 37(a)(3) (“If a timely
motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal
that has been docketed and is pending, the court may . . . state either that it would grant
the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a
substantial issue”), and, after outlining its reasoning, the Court indicated that it would
be inclined to grant Johnson’s motion for compassionate release if it were to regain
jurisdiction over the case (see Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 29).
Following this Court’s indicative ruling, defense counsel “promptly notif[ied]
the circuit clerk” of this Court’s ruling in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, see Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(a); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 37(b), and
the D.C. Circuit “remanded [the case] to the district court to enable it to enter an order
granting defendant’s motion for compassionate release, in accordance with the
indicative ruling entered by the district court on April 27, 2020 ” (see Order, United
States v. Johnson, No. 19-3094 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 2020), ECF No. 218). (See also
Notice, ECF No. 216.) Thus, this Court regained jurisdiction to modify Johnson’s
sentence on April 29, 2020, and on that same day it entered an Order and Amended
Judgment, granting Johnson’s motion for compassionate release, reducing his term of
imprisonment to time served, and modifying his conditions of supervised release, for
the reasons discussed below. (See Order Granting Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 219 (granting
Johnson’s motion “for the reasons stated during [the Court’s] oral indicative ruling (and
motions for compassionate release pursuant to section 3582(c) while an appeal is pen ding. See, e.g.,
United States v. Maldonado-Rios, 790 F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 2015) (ruling concerning a motion pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)); United States v. Martin, No. 18-cr-834-7, 2020 WL 1819961 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 10, 2020) (motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)).
17
as will be further clarified in a forthcoming Memorandum Opinion) ”); see also
Amended Judgment, ECF No. 220.)
II. ANALYSIS
This Court has ordered Johnson’s release based on its conclusion that Johnson
has satisfied his “burden of showing that he is entitled to a sentence reduction” under
section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). United States v. Gamble, No. 3:18-cr-0022, 2020 WL
1955338, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2020) (internal citation omitted). Specifically, and
as explained fully below, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to reduce Johnson’s
previously imposed term of imprisonment pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A); that the
spread of COVID-19 inside D.C. DOC facilities and Johnson’s heightened risk of
serious complications are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant the
requested sentence reduction; and that the applicable section 3553(a) sentencing factors,
including the need to protect the public, do not compel Johnson’s continued
incarceration.
A. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Consider Johnson’s Motion For
Compassionate Release
The government’s brief in opposition to Johnson’s motion for compassionate
release states that the government “assume[s], without conceding the issue, that for
purposes of this motion the defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies .”
(Gov’t Opp’n at 4 n.2; see also Hr’g Tr. at 4:19-20, Apr. 27, 2020, ECF No. 217 (“Just
to make things move a little bit faster, I did want to just reiterate, I’m not challenging
the issue of exhaustion.”).) This Court interprets this statement as an expression of the
government’s belief that section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional such that it is subject to forfeiture, and counsel is providing notice that
18
the government is opting to forfeit the exhaustion issue in this case, without conceding
the question of whether Johnson has, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies.
But this does not avoid the issue, because the Court must address its own authority to
accept the government’s concession nevertheless. See Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) (“For the
federal courts, jurisdiction is not automatic and cannot be presumed.”) In other words,
notwithstanding the government’s expressed intention not to raise exhaustion as an
issue in this case, this Court must still determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to
consider Johnson’s compassionate motion for release, given what section 3582(c)(1)(A)
says about exhaustion.
Under the plain terms of the statute, this Court has the authority to reduce
Johnson’s term of imprisonment either “upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons” or “upon motion of the defendant[.]” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). And now that
the Court of Appeals has remanded the case to this Court for the purpose of entering its
“indicative ruling” as an order, the sole jurisdictional issue is whether the Court has the
power to entertain Johnson’s motion for compassionate release in light of section
3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement—a power that, as explained in Section I.A
above, can only be exercised “upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has
fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to
bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier[.]” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court has already concluded that this exhaustion mandate
is non-jurisdictional (see Section I.A), and Johnson’s motion argues that the exhaustion
19
requirement’s prescriptions are satisfied under the circumstances presented here (see
Def.’s Mot. at 7–8).
This Court agrees. First of all, there can be no doubt that Johnson’s April 15,
2020, letter to the BOP seeking an agency-sponsored motion for compassionate release
initiated the administrative process for the purpose of section 3582(c)(1)(A). And when
BOP’s general counsel responded that BOP “will not be able to consider [Johnson] . . .
for compassionate release” because he is “not currently in BOP custody” (E-mail from
Zachary J. Kelton, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to Virginia
Williamson (Apr. 15, 2020), Ex. A to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 209-1 at 2), Johnson
unquestionably exhausted all of the administrative remedies that were available to him,
as set forth in BOP’s own regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 571.63(b) (“When an inmate’s
request for consideration under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3582(c)(1)(A) is denied by the General
Counsel, . . . [t]his denial constitutes a final administrative decision.”). It is puzzling
that, by refusing to concede exhaustion under the circum stances presented here, the
government seeks to hold open the possibility of pressing an exhaustion of
administrative remedies issue with respect to a defendant whose request for BOP
assistance in the filing of a compassionate release motion is formally an d finally
rejected by the agency on the grounds that BOP’s administrative processes do not apply
to him. But, in any event, it is clear to this Court that a detainee who has received such
a letter of rejection from the agency has exhausted his administrat ive remedies within
the meaning of section 3582(c)(1)(A), and thus he can invoke section 3582(c)(1)(A) and
proceed to file his own motion for compassionate release.
For what it is worth, even if the government could credibly maintain that
Johnson has failed to exhaust “all administrative rights to appeal [the] failure of the
20
Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion [for compassionate release] on [his] behalf[,]” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Johnson’s failure to exhaust any such administrative remedies
would be justifiable and entirely excused on futility grounds under the circumstances
presented in this case. See Randolph-Sheppard Vendors, 795 F. 2d at 107 (allowing a
court to waive an exhaustion requirement where “the agency will almost certainly deny
any relief either because it has a preconceived position on, or lacks jurisdiction over,
the matter”); United States v. Powell, No. 1:94-cr-316, 2020 WL 1698194, at *1
(D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2020) (waiving the exhaustion requirement under section
3582(c)(1)(A) on futility grounds). The government cannot have it both ways, and it
has already told Johnson that BOP cannot file a compassionate release motion on behalf
of defendants who, like Johnson, are detained at the D.C. DOC facilities awaiting
transport to a BOP facility. (See Gov’t Mot. for Additional Time to Respond to Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 210, at 1–2.) Thus, the government cannot also insist that Johnson be
made to wait for the agency to render a final decision on his futile request for such
assistance, or that he wait thirty days after filing his summarily rejected request to BOP
before filing his own motion with the Court.
B. The Prevalence Of COVID-19 In D.C. DOC Facilities And Johnson’s
Preexisting Health Conditions, Taken Together, Provide
Extraordinary And Compelling Reasons For Reducing Johnson’s
Prison Term
Turning to the merits of Johnson’s motion, it is clear beyond cavil that the
present global health crisis is like no other in modern times, and this Court “fully
acknowledges the unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
extremely serious health risks that it presents for all of us, including, and perhaps
especially, those individuals who are unfortunately presently detained in federal
21
custody.” United States v. Wiggins, No. 19-cr-258, 2020 WL 1868891, at *8 (D.D.C.
Apr. 10, 2020). Indeed, “[w]ith no known effective treatment, and vaccines months (or
more) away, public health officials have been left to urge the public to practice ‘social
distancing,’ frequent (and thorough) hand washing, and avoidance of close contact with
others (in increasingly more restrictive terms)—all of which are extremely difficult to
implement in a detention facility.” United States v. Martin, No. 19-cr-140-13, 2020
WL 1274857, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2020). It can be hardly disputed that the novel
strain of the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 is much more easily transmitted in the
prison environment, and as a result numerous courts around the country, including this
one, have ordered the temporary release of inmates held in pretrial or presentencing
custody in recent weeks. See, e.g., United States v. Dabney, No. 20-cr-27, 2020 WL
1867750, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2020) (ordering the release of a pretrial detainee with a
diagnosis of asthma); United States v. McKenzie, No. 18-cr-834, 2020 WL 1503669, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (releasing a presentencing inmate with “a documented
respiratory condition”). In limited circumstances, courts have also authorized the
compassionate release of inmates serving federal sentences. See, e.g., United States v.
McCarthy, No. 3:17-cr-0230, 2020 WL 1698732, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2020)
(granting compassionate release to a detainee with various respiratory conditions) ; see
also United States v. Curtis, No. 03-cr-533, 2020 WL 1935543 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2020);
United States v. Hammond, No. 02-cr-294, 2020 WL 1891980 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2020).
The concerns about jail facilities’ general inability to protect detainees appear to
be especially warranted at the correctional facilities here in the District of Columbia,
where Johnson has been detained since his conviction in April of 2019. In the Banks
litigation, Judge Kollar-Kotelly appointed amici curiae to inspect the conditions of
22
incarceration at D.C. DOC facilities and, based on the ensuing report, she concluded
that “the infection rate in DOC facilities was over seven times the infection rate of the
District of Columbia at large[,]” and that social distancing regulations have not been
fully implemented due to severe understaffing of correctional officers and their
supervisors. Banks v. Booth, No. 20-cv-849, 2020 WL 1914896, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Apr.
19, 2020). 8 Finding specifically that detainees are not being properly screened and
quarantined, see id. at *8, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered a number of interim measures
to address the situation at D.C. DOC facilities, see id. at *13–15, but today’s record
does not include information about the implementation of those measures, and this
Court rejects the government’s suggestion that D.C. DOC’s prior press statement about
what it was doing to address the COVID-19 threat is sufficient to counteract the clear
conclusion that the conditions of incarceration that Johnson is facing, as they currently
exist, create extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in his sentence . (See
Gov’t Opp’n at 7–12.)
The compelling need for Johnson, in particular, to be released from D.C. DOC
custody relates primarily to Johnson’s heightened risk of having serious medical
complications if he were to contract COVID-19. The health records that this Court has
received and reviewed, both from D.C. DOC and defense counsel, plainly indicate that
Johnson suffers from serious preexisting conditions, including pulmonary hypertension
8
In Banks, detainees brought a constitutional challenge against the District of Columbia regarding the
conditions of their confinement in light of the spread of COVID -19 inside the D.C. DOC facilities. See
Banks, 2020 WL 1914896, at *1–2. Granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order,
Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that
jail officials “knew or should have known that the jail conditions posed an excessive risk to [plaintiffs’]
health,” and that “the jail conditions exposed [plaintiffs] to an unreasonable risk of serious damage ”
and that “Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in posing such a risk .” Id. at *6–11.
23
and obesity. (See Medical Records at 21–22, 27.) The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention has specifically stated that hypertension is “associated with increased illness
severity and adverse outcomes” in COVID-19 patients, see Interim Clinical Guidance
for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention (Apr. 3, 2020), and it has also indicated that “severe
obesity” can put people “at higher risk for complications from COVID -19[,]” see
Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (May
12, 2020). 9 (See also Def.’s Reply at 9–10.) Johnson is currently taking multiple
prescribed medications for his heart condition, which is indicative of the degree of his
medical needs, and, in light of the risks posed by COVID-19, this Court finds that this
serious and permanent medical condition is sufficient to “diminish[]” Johnson’s ability
“to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility” for purposes of
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, U.S.S.G. §1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(ii)
(2018), such that it provides an extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants
Johnson’s compassionate release, see United States v. Lacy, No. 15-cr-30038, 2020 WL
2093363, at *6 (C.D. Ill. May 1, 2020) (granting compassionate release to a defendant
with hypertension, obesity, and diabetes, on the grounds that “[a]ny one of these three
factors alone would increase the serious risks of COVID -19”).
But there is even more at stake with respect to the risks to Johnson’s health. The
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement also plainly indicates that a defendant’s
mental health needs may also be the basis for granting compassionate release, and this
Court further finds that Johnson’s diagnosed PTSD makes his release request especially
9
The cited sources have been archived at the time of this writing. The first may be accessed at
https://perma.cc/8QJQ-7NXJ, and the second may be accessed at https://perma.cc/5NYD-53ZQ.
24
compelling. To be sure, any inmate who is at a higher risk of serious illness or other
complications from COVID-19 faces challenges in caring for himself in prison when it
comes to protecting from this coronavirus or exercising self-care if he contracts
COVID-19. But one can only imagine that the challenges of self-care inside a prison
where COVID-19 is raging would be especially severe for someone who suffers from
PTSD in addition to his physical vulnerabilities. Cf. Doe v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02141,
2020 WL 1820667, at *4, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2020) (ordering the release of a
foreign national, detained in a county jail awaiting for his removal proceedings, in part
because he suffers from PTSD and “[g]rowing evidence demonstrates that PTSD,
anxiety/stress, and depression can lead to decreased immune response and increased
risk of infections” and thus “compound his susceptibility” to COVID-19). And this
Court agrees with defense counsel that, in Johnson’s case in particular, the m ental and
physical stress of being detained under the conditions of confinement that are described
in Banks, while dealing with established and serious physical and mental health issues,
almost certainly thwarts Johnson’s ability to provide the type of self-care within the
prison environment that is needed now more than ever. (See Def.’s Mot. at 13–14.) 10
All of this leads the Court to conclude that the current COVID -19-related
conditions in D.C. DOC facilities, along with Johnson’s particular mental and physical
10
The Banks opinion describes the harrowing conditions inside D.C. DOC correctional facilities, a nd
detainees’ fervent efforts to protect themselves from catching COVID -19, in vivid terms. “In some
units, cleaning supplies were depleted and, in other units, inmates c ould not access the supplies to clean
their cells[,]” and because “no inmates had facility-issued rags for cleaning their cells[,]” “many
inmates used ‘tattered and soiled’ rags that they made by tearing facility issued towels or t -shirts.”
Banks, 2020 WL 1914896, at *9 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, when it comes to personal
protective equipment, although “[i]nmates housed in quarantine units are [] required to wear masks
outside their cells[,]” “many of the masks did not fit and were soiled. ” Id. at *10 (internal citations
omitted). And, with respect to personal hygiene, “[t]hose in the isolation units are not permitted to
shower” and laundry services “have been limited with some inmates wearing the same soiled clothes for
the duration of their stay in isolation.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
25
health conditions, constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons [that] warrant [] a
reduction” in Johnson’s term of incarceration within the meaning of both section
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) of Title 18 of the United States Code and section 1B1.13 of the
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
C. The Purposes Of Punishment Set Forth In Section 3553(a), Including
Public Safety, Do Not Require Maintenance Of Johnson’s Original
Sentence
As explained above, even if there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to
reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment, the Court must reassess the sentencing
factors that Congress established at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent applicable,
including the need for the sentence imposed “to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and any such reduction must likewise be
consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s expressed policy concern about the
release of dangerous offenders, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2) (stating that, before granting a
motion for compassionate release, courts should make a findi ng that “the defendant is
not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community”). In this regard,
Johnson’s motion for compassionate release stresses that “Mr. Johnson was on pretrial
bail for three and a half years while his case was pending in this Court, suggestin g that
incarceration is not necessary to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant” (Def.’s Mot. at 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), and it
also argues that the Court’s prior assessment of the section 3553(a) factors that yielded
a 41-month prison term does not suggest that Johnson’s crimes “warrant a 41 -month
sentence served in conditions that expose Mr. Johnson to a highly contagious virus t hat
can cause serious illness or death” (id. at 9 (citations omitted)). For its part, the
government maintains that Johnson’s “crimes in this case were serious” and that “[t]he
26
evidence at trial . . . demonstrated his intense obsession with procuring thes e weapons
of war[.]” (Gov’t Opp’n at 12–13.)
This Court has reflected on the applicable statutory sentencing factors—
including “the nature and circumstances of the offense[,]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), “the
history and characteristics of the defendant[,]” id., and “the need for the sentence
imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” id.§ 3553(a)(2)(C)—and it is confident that none of these factors is an impediment to the
compassionate release reduction that the current extraordinary and compelling
circumstances warrant for several reasons. First and foremost, with respect to the
nature and circumstances of Johnson’s offenses of conviction, it is important to recall
that this case presented a peculiar situation, insofar as t he government superseded the
indictment several times over a period of years in the course of engaging in plea
negotiations with Johnson, all while Johnson was out of jail on pretrial release. (See
Indictment, ECF No. 1; Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 14; Superseding Indictment,
ECF No. 70.) Despite the intensifying pressure, Johnson never cooperated, and his co-
defendant—a notorious Swedish arms dealer who was under investigation prior to any
charges being brought against Johnson—was never brought to trial. And while multiple
serious charges that were ultimately brought against Johnson were certainly proven at
trial, see generally Johnson, 2019 WL 3842082, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2019)
(discussing Johnson’s conviction on two counts of unlawful receipt or possession of an
unregistered firearm, two counts of unlawful making of a firearm, two counts of
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and one count of conspiracy to smuggle
machine guns and silencers into the United States ), on their face, and given the
evidence presented, the offenses of conviction overstate the seriousness of Johnson’s
27
offense conduct.
With respect to Johnson’s possession of two 37-millimiter modified shell
casings, law enforcement officers found both items buried in a box that had been stored
in the basement of the home in which Johnson was residing. “T he federal statutory
definition of destructive device is quite similar to the definition of weapon of mass
destruction in the D.C. Code” in that both definitions “include[] a nonfunctional device
or a combination of parts that can quickly and easily be converted into a functional
destructive device.” Johnson, 2019 WL 3842082, at *3 (citations omitted). Thus, the
seized items qualified under the applicable laws, but the circumstances of Johnson’s
possession of them and their discovery mitigate concerns that the shells were part of
some dangerous plot on Johnson’s part.
More troubling was the evidence concerning Johnson’s apparen t fascination with
weapons and his history of communications with the Raimo Huolman, who appears to
have been the true target of the federal law enforcement effort: the search history on
Johnson’s personal computer revealed a number of inquiries concerning explosive
devices, and there was a trove of e-mail traffic that suggested that Johnson had, in fact,
purchased silencers and other machine-gun-related equipment from Huolman in
Sweden. See id. at *1 n.1. But no machine guns or illegal weapons parts were ever
found in Johnson’s possession. And the various weapons parts at issue did not appear
to be dangerous standing alone; in fact, they only technically satisfied the definition of
a machine gun insofar as “a collection of parts designed and intended to convert a
weapon into a machine gun [are] the functional equivalent of a machine gun” under
federal law. United States v. Syverson, 90 F.3d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted). (See also Trial Tr. at 806–810, Apr. 23, 2019, ECF No. 152
28
(including an expert’s testimony explaining that a particular “piece of metal” was
considered a “machine gun” under the National Firearms Act because it “converts a
semiautomatic weapon into a machine gun”).)
Thus, while it is clear that Johnson was rightly convicted of inherently dangerous
offenses, the evidence did not suggest that Johnson himself was a danger to the
community, nor was there necessarily a “need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). This is
largely why the Court based Johnson’s sentence primarily on just punishment and
deterrence, and also why it released him pretrial pursuant to section 3142(g). In short,
the evidence with respect to the explosive devices was simply that Johnson, who had
lots of lawful hobbyist materials in his basement, had once made the two improvised
37-millimiter shells at some point in the past, and the evidence admitted at trial does
not support a reasonable inference that he had any specific plan to use these two
devices to cause harm to anyone. And with respect to the conspiracy to smuggle
machine guns and silencers into this country, the evidence was damning, but it was also
entirely circumstantial—i.e., it consisted solely of e-mails and website invoices.
Despite multiple searches of Johnson’s residence, none of the materials were ever
recovered, and the government presented no evidence of the ultimate disposition of
these items, even assuming that Johnson was actually able to bring the materials for
which he was bargaining into the United States. Moreover, given the fact that Johnson
had no criminal history prior to the events at issue in this case, and also that there is no
indication that Johnson committed any other weapons -related crimes at any point during
the lengthy period of his pretrial supervision, this Court concludes that the trial
evidence alone does not support a reasonable inference that Johnson needs to be
29
incarcerated in order to protect the public from his future crimes.
Johnson’s history and characteristics are another key reason why the Court
believes that Johnson has now served a sufficient period of incarceration to promote the
purposes of punishment. As noted earlier, Johnson is a military veteran who was
honorably discharged after serving his country during two tours in Afghanistan, and he
now suffers from PTSD. (See Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t Mot. for Pretrial Detention, ECF
No. 27 at 3–6.) Johnson has no criminal history, significant physical and mental health
needs, and strong ties to the District of Columbia, including the emotional support of
his mother (with whom he lived) and other family members. (Id. at 6.)
The bottom line is this: the Court initially sentenced Johnson to 41 months of
imprisonment—the bottom of the applicable guideline range after a departure for
military service and PTSD—largely due to the fact that, although his offenses were
serious, his personal history and characteristics strongly suggested that any term of
imprisonment longer than the low-end of the applicable guideline range would have
been greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of punishment. Today, in the
age of COVID-19, the Court’s concerns about Johnson’s mental and physical health,
and the absence of any indication that he poses an actual danger to the community,
suggest that the purposes of punishment are satisfied by the term of imprisonment that
he has already served (approximately 14 months), plus a period of supervised release
that includes home incarceration as well as conditions that require Johnson to continue
mental health and substance abuse treatment and that restrict his ability to use a
computer to engage in any illegal weapons-related transactions. 11
11
Notably, although Johnson’s motion asks this Court to “order[] that Mr. Johnson serve the balance of
his sentence in home confinement” (Def.’s Reply at 14), it is this Court’s view that section 3582(c)
30
III. CONCLUSION
The sentence that this Court previously imposed on Morris Johnson was
consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines and the Court’s evaluation of the applicable
section 3553(a) factors, but it did not, and could not, envision requiring Johnson to
serve the sentence while “incurring a great and unforeseen risk of severe illness or
death brought on by a global pandemic.” United States v. Zukerman, No. 16-cr-194,
2020 WL 1659880, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). For the reasons explained above, Johnson has now demonstrated th at the
COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with his serious preexisting underlying medical
conditions, presents an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce the previously
imposed 41-month term of imprisonment. Moreover, under the circumstances presented
in this case, it is clear to the Court that continued detention would now be greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes of punishment, based on the Court’s
reexamination of the section 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Commission’s stated
policy concerns about the release of dangerous offenders. Accordingly, in its Order
does not provide authority to order such a relief. Indeed, per the plain terms of that provision, the only
relief that this Court may provide to a defendant who qualifies for compassionate release is to “reduce
the term of imprisonment” and, if appropriate, “impose a term of probation or supervised release with
or without conditions[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). However, there is no doubt that section
3583(e)(2) authorizes this Court to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at
any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2), and it appears that, in the compassionate release context, the length of any modification
to a term of supervised release may not “exceed the unserved portion of the or iginal term of
imprisonment[,]” id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Therefore, because the purposes of punishment would be
satisfied by releasing Johnson at this time and placing him on a period of location monitoring and
computer monitoring, the Court’s order reduced Johnson’s prison term to a sentence of time served
pursuant to section 3582(c)(1), and then further modified the previously imposed 60-month term of
supervised release, pursuant to the Court’s authority under section 3583(e)(2), to include a condition of
home incarceration with location monitoring, for the maximum practical period recommended by the
U.S. Probation Office, and 22 months of computer monitoring (a period that equaled the remaining
unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment ). (See Order Granting Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 219
at 1–3.)
31
dated April 29, 2020, this Court granted Johnson’s emergency motion for release
pursuant to its authority under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and it amended its prior
judgment to reflect a sentence of time served to be followed by a 60-month period of
supervised release, including a 6-month period of home incarceration and a 22-month
period of computer monitoring.
DATE: May 16, 2020 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
32