Vasquez v. District of Columbia ( 2023 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    _________________________________________
    )
    JOSE T. VASQUEZ,                          )
    )
    Plaintiff,                          )
    )
    v.                           )                   Civil No. 17-cv-02194 (APM)
    )
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,             )
    )
    Defendants.                         )
    _________________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    Plaintiff Jose T. Vasquez has the misfortune of sharing the same name, date of birth, and
    physical description as a Jose T. Vasquez wanted for murder in Will County, Illinois. As a result
    of administrative errors, Plaintiff has been arrested and detained multiple times on a warrant issued
    for the other Jose T. Vasquez. Two of those arrests occurred in the District of Columbia. One of
    those arrests—an overnight detention that occurred on March 3–4, 2017—was the subject of a
    two-day trial on claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff prevailed on
    the former claim but not the latter, and the jury awarded him $100,000 in damages.
    Defendant District of Columbia brings the instant motion seeking judgment as a matter of
    law, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
    District was liable for false imprisonment. Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Judg. as a Matter of L. or,
    Alternatively, for a New Trial or for Remittitur, ECF No. 126 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]. In the
    alternative, the District moves for a new trial or remittitur. Id. For the reasons that follow, the
    court grants the District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the court
    would grant the District’s motion for remittitur.
    II.     BACKGROUND
    A.      Trial Evidence
    The trial evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, showed as follows.
    March 3, 2017. On the morning of March 3, 2017, U.S. Secret Service Officer Joseph
    Sanford arrested Plaintiff in the District of Columbia following a traffic stop. Jury Trial Tr. (draft),
    May 9, 2022 [hereinafter May 9 Tr.], at 154–55; Def.’s Mot., Ex. B, ECF No. 126-3
    [hereinafter Arrest Packet], at 2 (listing “Joseph Sanford” as “arresting officer”); Def.’s Mot,
    Ex. C, ECF No. 126-4 [hereinafter Offense Rep.], at 6 (listing time as 9:10 a.m.). Officer Sanford
    informed Plaintiff that there was an active murder warrant for his arrest in Will County. He then
    transported Plaintiff to George Washington University Hospital to treat injuries sustained during
    his arrest, before bringing him to the Metropolitan Police Department’s (“MPD”) Second District
    precinct for booking. May 9 Tr. at 179; Offense Rep. at 6. Plaintiff claimed his innocence
    throughout, both to Officer Sanford and the MPD officers at the Second District. May 9 Tr. at
    158–59. The MPD officers called him a “liar.” Id. at 159. Plaintiff was booked around 5:00 p.m.
    at the MPD’s Second District. Offense Rep. at 2, 18. Officer Sanford then took Plaintiff to the
    Central Cell Block located under MPD headquarters, Jury Trial Tr. (draft), May 10, 2022
    [hereinafter May 10 Tr.], at 408, where Plaintiff was detained overnight, May 9 Tr. at 162.
    March 4, 2017. Sometime the next morning, Plaintiff was brought from the Central Cell
    Block to the U.S. Marshals’ cell block under the D.C. Superior Court, where he waited to be
    arraigned before a magistrate judge. Id. at 185–86; May 10 Tr. at 413. Around 10:00 a.m., Officer
    Leroy Rollins of MPD’s Fugitive Unit received the day’s “lockup list,” which showed that Plaintiff
    2
    was arrested as a fugitive from justice. May 10 Tr. at 344–45, 349. Around 11:40 a.m., Officer
    Rollins processed the charge by running Plaintiff’s name, date of birth, and sex identifier (male)
    through the NCIC database “to see if [Plaintiff], in fact, ha[d] a warrant that the agency had charged
    him with.” Id. at 349–50, 356–57. NCIC reports provide an arrestee’s name, date of birth, physical
    description, the criminal charge, date of warrant, and warrant number. Id. at 357. Officer Rollins
    testified that the NCIC Report that he received, which was based on information input by Will
    County into the NCIC database, showed that “the subject that was in custody was wanted on a
    failure to appear, homicide, willful kill charge from Will County Sheriff’s Office,” id. at 360, and
    that Plaintiff’s “name, date of birth, and physical description” matched the information in the
    NCIC Report, id. at 358. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. D, ECF No. 126-5 [hereinafter NCIC Rep.], at 2.
    Officer Rollins then reviewed Plaintiff’s arrest packet, which included Officer Sanford’s
    description of the arrest. May 10 Tr. at 351–52. Officer Sanford had written that there was a
    “felony warrant out of Illinois” for Plaintiff, “[t]he Joint Operations Center confirmed the warrant
    out of Will County, Illinois,” and “[t]he Will County Sheriff’s Department provided a photograph
    which matched” Plaintiff. Arrest Packet at 3. Officer Rollins testified that, based on the arrest
    packet, he understood “[t]hat the Will County Sheriff’s office confirmed a warrant[,] they provided
    a photograph of the [fugitive] which matched [Plaintiff Vasquez],” and the photograph
    “confirm[ed] the identity of the wanted subject.” May 10 Tr. at 356. Officer Rollins said that he
    relied on the Secret Service’s investigation which concluded that Plaintiff was the person wanted
    by the Will County warrant. Id. at 393.
    The sole identifying difference between Plaintiff Vasquez and the Jose T. Vasquez wanted
    by Will County was their Social Security numbers. The NCIC Report showed that “the person
    wanted by Will County ha[d] a Social Security number [ending in] 7680,” whereas the arrest
    3
    packet showed that Plaintiff’s Social Security number ended in 8472. Id. at 293–94; see NCIC
    Rep. at 2; Arrest Packet at 2.
    Officer Rollins testified that the different Social Security numbers did not raise a “red flag”
    for him about Plaintiff’s identity. May 10 Tr. at 294–95. He did not follow up on the difference
    because he had “use[d] other avenues to confirm” that Plaintiff was the person wanted by Will
    County. Id. at 296. In his experience, he gave “very minimal” weight to Social Security numbers
    as an identifier. Id. at 362–63. “Subjects try to hide their identity [from] law enforcement,” he
    explained, so it was not unusual for a suspect to give a different Social Security number than their
    actual one. Id. at 363. In his view, “[n]o way” was the mismatch in Social Security numbers
    exonerating. Id. He also said that he had never, in his experience, “sent a question to any
    jurisdiction pertaining to a Social Security number.” Id. at 298.
    After reviewing Plaintiff’s arrest packet, Officer Rollins sent a teletype request to
    Will County at 12:21 p.m., id. at 302, to “confirm that the warrant was active and that [Will County
    would] extradite,” id. at 364. The purpose of sending the teletype was not to verify Plaintiff’s
    identity. Id. After not receiving a response, the teletype unit followed up with a second message.
    Id. at 304. Will County then “confirmed that the warrant was still active and they [would] extradite
    [Plaintiff] from the District of Columbia.” Id. at 356; see Def.’s Mot., Ex. F, ECF No. 126-7, at 2.
    Sometime after 2:30 p.m., Officer Rollins signed an affidavit and presented it to the
    U.S. Attorney’s Office. May 10 Tr. at 366–67. An Assistant U.S. Attorney and a Superior Court
    clerk also signed the affidavit. See Def.’s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot., ECF No. 130
    [hereinafter Def.’s Reply], Ex. L, ECF No. 130-1 [hereinafter Rollins Affidavit]. At that point,
    Officer Rollins’s role in the case largely ended. May 10 Tr. at 368. Later that day, for reasons not
    specified at trial, a Superior Court magistrate judge dismissed Plaintiff’s case. May 9 Tr. at 163–
    4
    64. The time of Plaintiff’s release was not definitively established at trial but likely occurred
    sometime in the late afternoon. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot, ECF No 128 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n],
    at 14.
    Prior Arrest in the District. Plaintiff’s arrest and detention on May 3, 2017, was not his
    first in the District of Columbia on the Will County warrant—Plaintiff was arrested and detained
    on October 23, 2016, by an MPD officer following a traffic stop. May 9 Tr. at 155–56, 167, 211.
    Five days later, on October 28, 2016, MPD sent Plaintiff’s photograph and fingerprints to the Will
    County Sheriff’s Office in order to confirm that he was the Jose Vasquez wanted by the warrant.
    Id. at 210–11. The Will County Sherriff’s Office responded that day, telling MPD to “release any
    holds” on Plaintiff because “[t]he person [MPD was] holding is not the same person [Will County
    was] looking for.” Id. at 205, 212; see Def.’s Mot, Ex. A, ECF No. 126-2. The fugitive case
    against Plaintiff was ultimately dismissed on November 3, 2016, id. at 214, around six days after
    Will County notified MPD that Plaintiff was not the Jose Vasquez wanted by the warrant. 1
    Officer Rollins testified that, on May 4, 2017, he was not aware that Plaintiff had previously
    been wrongfully detained in the District on the Will County warrant. May 9 Tr. at 301. He did
    not check a computer database known as JUSTIS to inquire about any prior extradition matters
    against Plaintiff, and he did not know that there was an existing file in the Fugitive Unit about
    Plaintiff’s prior arrest. Id. at 300–01.
    1
    Plaintiff had brought claims against the District regarding the October 2016 wrongful detention, but the court
    disposed of those prior to trial. The court permitted some limited testimony about the October 2016 events to establish
    Plaintiff’s particular vulnerability for emotional distress during the wrongful arrest contested at trial. Jury Trial Tr.
    (draft), May 2, 2022, at 50–51. The court only permitted Plaintiff to elicit limited testimony about the October 2016
    arrest and detention until the District, through its cross-examination, opened the door to greater detail about those
    events. May 9 Tr. at 167–74.
    5
    B.      Jury Instructions
    At summary judgment, the court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on only a “duty to release”
    theory of false imprisonment for the March 3–4, 2017 detention, because there was no contention
    that MPD had improperly detained Plaintiff at the outset. See Vasquez v. Cnty. of Will, Illinois,
    No. 17-cv-02194 (APM), 
    2021 WL 4476766
    , at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021). Secret Service had
    executed the arrest, presented Plaintiff to the Second District, and transported him to the Central
    Cell Block. It was only from that point forward that MPD could be held liable for false
    imprisonment. Such liability therefore had to be predicated, if at all, on the theory that MPD had
    a duty to release Plaintiff but failed to do so. See 
    id.
    Accordingly, the court instructed the jury that, to prove false imprisonment, Plaintiff had
    to establish two elements: (1) “MPD officers detained Mr. Vasquez against his will” and (2) “the
    detention was unlawful.” Jury Instructions, ECF No. 124 [hereafter Jury Instructions], at 8. The
    court further instructed that, “[w]ith respect to the second element—that the detention was
    unlawful—false imprisonment can occur even if the confinement began lawfully but has become
    unlawful over time.” 
    Id.
     The instruction continued:
    False imprisonment occurs when a defendant is under a duty to
    release the plaintiff but does not do so. If the defendant is under a
    duty to release a plaintiff from confinement, the defendant’s refusal
    to do so with the intention of confining the plaintiff is a sufficient
    act of confinement to make the defendant liable for false
    imprisonment.
    
    Id.
     The instructions defined the circumstances that would give rise to a “duty to release”:
    Whether MPD had a duty to release Mr. Vasquez depends upon the
    belief of its officers that Mr. Vasquez was the person named or
    otherwise described in the Will County warrant with such
    sufficiency as to justify their belief that he was the person wanted
    by Will County. If officers of the MPD later learned that
    Mr. Vasquez was undoubtedly not the person wanted by the
    6
    Will County warrant, MPD was required to release Mr. Vasquez
    unless he objected to his release.
    
    Id.
     at 8–9 (emphasis added).
    III.    LEGAL STANDARD
    Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. A court may grant judgment as a matter of law
    “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable
    jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”
    FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). Courts “do not, however, lightly disturb a jury verdict.” McGill v.
    Munoz, 
    203 F.3d 843
    , 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judgment as a
    matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
    therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached a verdict in
    plaintiff’s favor.” 
    Id.
     (internal citation omitted). “[I]f a party moved for judgment as a matter of
    law during a jury trial and the court declined to grant the motion, the party may file a renewed
    motion after trial reasserting his request for an entry of judgment in his favor.” Amobi v. Brown,
    No. 08-cv-1501 (KBJ), 
    2021 WL 3722710
    , at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2021). The District moved for
    judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case, May 10 Tr. at 315–17, and
    renewed the motion at the close of the District’s case, 
    id.
     at 467–69. The District now renews its
    motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).
    Motion for Remittitur. “Federal trial courts may review jury awards of damages for
    excessiveness and may order remittitur or a new trial where damages are found excessive.” Jean-
    Baptiste v. District of Columbia, 
    931 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 12 (D.D.C. 2013). “Courts may not set aside
    a jury verdict merely deemed generous; rather, the verdict must be so unreasonably high as to
    result in a miscarriage of justice.” Langevine v. District of Columbia, 
    106 F.3d 1018
    , 1024
    (D.C. Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit “allows remittitur of jury verdicts only if the reduction
    7
    ‘permit[s] recovery of the highest amount the jury tolerably could have awarded.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Carter v. District of Columbia, 
    795 F.2d 116
    , 135 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). “A court must be
    especially hesitant to disturb a jury’s determination of damages in cases involving intangible and
    non-economic injuries.” 
    Id.
     When a court grants a remittitur, the plaintiff has a right to either
    accept the reduced award or have a new trial. Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., 
    523 U.S. 208
    , 210
    (1998).
    IV.        MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
    A.       Sufficiency Based on Mismatched Social Security Numbers
    The District asks the court to grant judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s false
    imprisonment claim “because the evidence presented at trial did not establish when—if ever—
    members of the Metropolitan Police Department were ‘undoubtedly’ aware that Plaintiff was not
    the man wanted on a fugitive from justice warrant issued by Will County, Illinois.” Def.’s Mot.
    at 1. 2 “As the Court’s instruction provided, MPD was required to release Plaintiff only if it learned
    he was undoubtedly not the person wanted by the warrant,” the District argues, and “[t]here is no
    evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that MPD Officer Rollins learned that Plaintiff
    undoubtably [sic] was not the person wanted by the warrant.” Id. at 20. Because “it was not
    [Officer Rollins’s] duty to verify the identity of the suspect” and “the U.S. Secret Service had
    already verified Plaintiff’s identity through a photograph as noted in the arrest packet,” the District
    continues, “Officer Rollins had no reason to doubt the reliability of this positive identification,”
    and he was “entitled to rely on the representations made by the U.S. Secret Service officer.” Id. at
    21. “Based on [the] jury instruction and Officer Rollins’s testimony—a reasonable jury would not
    2
    The court uses ECF pagination for this motion.
    8
    have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Plaintiff on the false imprisonment claim
    and, therefore, the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 20.
    Plaintiff’s defense of the verdict centers on the fact that Plaintiff Jose T. Vasquez and the
    Jose T. Vasquez sought by the Will County warrant had different Social Security numbers.
    Pl.’s Opp’n at 1–3. 3 “Officer Rollins reviewed the warrant and specifically read that the warrant
    sought a person named ‘Jose Vasquez’ with a Social Security number ending in 7680,” whereas
    the arrest packet for Plaintiff, which Officer Rollins also reviewed, showed that Plaintiff had Social
    Security number ending on 8472. Id. at 1–2 4; see May 10 Tr. at 293–94. Thus, according to
    Plaintiff, when “Officer Rollins learned that Plaintiff Vasquez had a different Social Security
    number than the ‘Jose Vasquez’ sought in the Will County warrant,” he necessarily “learned that
    Plaintiff Vasquez undoubtedly was not the person sought.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.
    “[T]he question before [this court] is whether reasonable persons could have concluded on
    the basis of the evidence presented at the trial” that Officer Rollins undoubtedly knew that Plaintiff
    was not the Jose Vasquez wanted by the Will County warrant. Murphy v. United States, 
    653 F.2d 637
    , 640 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court finds that, on this record, no reasonable jury could have
    concluded that a mere difference in Social Security numbers meant that Officer Rollins
    undoubtedly knew that Plaintiff was not the Jose T. Vasquez described in the Will County warrant
    and thus had a duty to release him.
    3
    Plaintiff further contends that MPD Officer Rollins “prepared and signed a sworn affidavit attesting not only that he
    had verified that the Will County warrant was still active, but also that he had verified that plaintiff Vasquez was the
    person sought in the warrant.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. The District argues that “[t]here is nothing in the affidavit or record
    to support this argument.” Def.’s Reply at 2. The court agrees that the affidavit does not state that Officer Rollins
    verified that Plaintiff was the person sought in the warrant. It merely states: “On 03/04/2017 the warrant was verified”
    by Officer Rollins “through NCIC/WALES check, advising that the warrant is active and they will extradite.” Rollins
    Affidavit.
    4
    Plaintiff’s opposition states that “the arrest packet for Plaintiff Vasquez . . . showed that the person sought by Will
    County had a Social Security number ending in 8472.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (emphasis added). The court believes this is
    a typographic error, as Officer Rollins’s testimony confirmed that Plaintiff Jose Vasquez has a Social Security number
    ending in 8472. See May 10 Tr. at 294.
    9
    Officer Rollins explained why he believed Plaintiff was the person wanted by Will County.
    He initially relied on the Secret Service Officer’s arrest and investigation. The paperwork the
    Secret Service prepared, and that Officer Rollins reviewed, stated that the “Joint Operations Center
    confirmed the warrant out of Will County, Illinois” and the “Will County’s Sheriff’s Department
    provided a photograph which matched [Plaintiff].” Arrest Packet at 3. Plaintiff presented no
    evidence to undermine the reasonableness of Officer Rollins’s reliance on the Secret Service’s
    confirmation of Plaintiff as the person wanted by Will County. In fact, the head of the Fugitive
    Unit, Sergeant Craig Mack, testified that it was “common practice” to rely on information in arrest
    packets. May 10 Tr. at 397, 410.
    Next, Officer Rollins verified that Plaintiff’s name, date of birth, and description matched
    the suspect described in the warrant. Sergeant Mack testified that it was exceedingly rare for a
    person whose name and date of birth matched those associated with a fugitive warrant not to be
    the wanted individual. Id. at 419. To be sure, Officer Rollins did admit to noticing the difference
    in Social Security numbers, but he said he gave that factor “minimal” weight because, in his
    experience, arrestees use different names and Social Security numbers “to hide their identity
    [from] law enforcement.” Id. at 362–63. When asked if “a Social Security number mismatch
    would be exonerating,” he responded, “[n]o way.” Id. at 363. Officer Rollins further testified that:
    (1) he never “had a suspect with the same exact date of birth [and] with the same name and have
    it not be the suspect that’s wanted”; (2) that it was not his “job to verify the identity of the suspect”;
    and (3) that he had no “reason to doubt” that Plaintiff Vasquez was the suspect wanted by the
    warrant. Id. at 393. Again, Plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict this testimony. He did not,
    for example, produce an MPD policy that required Officer Rollins to reconcile the Social Security
    number discrepancy. Additionally, no witness testified that a mere mismatch in Social Security
    10
    numbers required release of a suspect. The closest Plaintiff came was to elicit from Sergeant Mack
    that a difference in Social Security numbers was something that “can be looked into.” May 10 Tr.
    at 447. But Sergeant Mack also said that such a difference was not “an automatic disqualifier.”
    Id.
    The court did not define “undoubtedly” for the jury but the Restatement of Torts section
    from which the court derived the instruction provides an example of the kind of certitude of
    misidentification that an officer must have before a duty to release arises. Comment f of the
    Restatement of Torts (Second) § 134 is titled “Actor’s duty to release other.” RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF TORTS § 134 cmt. f. It provides that:
    [T]he privilege to arrest under a warrant depends upon the actor’s
    belief that the person arrested is the person named or otherwise
    described in the warrant with such sufficiency as to justify the actor
    in believing him to be the person intended. If, therefore, the actor
    subsequently learns that the other is undoubtedly not the person
    intended, he must release the other unless the other objects.
    Id. (emphasis added). The Restatement then provides the following illustration:
    A, a peace officer, arrests B, reasonably believing that C has been
    murdered and that B has committed the murder. While A has B in
    custody, he meets C, who is alive and well. A is not privileged to
    keep B in custody, unless B, on being offered his release, desires to
    be taken before a magistrate.
    Id. The evidence presented in this case falls well short in comparison.
    Here, Officer Rollins knew only that Plaintiff’s Social Security number was different than
    that of the Jose T. Vasquez wanted by Will County. But every other indicia of identification—
    name, date of birth, and description—matched. And he believed that Secret Service had secured
    11
    a photographic match. That evidence is a far cry from the degree of exactitude required to give
    rise to a duty to release. 5
    The court’s conclusion about the insufficiency of the evidence is buttressed by the fact that
    the jury found for the District on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution charge. The jury instructions
    for the malicious prosecution charge required the jury to find that Officer Rollins “lacked probable
    cause to institute the criminal proceeding against Mr. Vasquez” and “acted with malice,” which
    the court defined as “wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.” See Jury
    Instructions at 9–10. The jury evidently concluded that Officer Rollins did have probable cause
    to initiate Plaintiff’s prosecution, or that he did not act recklessly, or both. Yet, the same jury
    concluded that Officer Rollins “undoubtedly” knew Plaintiff was not the person wanted by Will
    County before he completed the affidavit that initiated the fugitive case. 6 Those two conclusions
    cannot be reconciled on this record.
    B.       Sufficiency Based on Other Evidence
    Plaintiff’s remaining sufficiency arguments cannot save the verdict. Plaintiff argues that,
    even if the different Social Security numbers were insufficient to show that Officer Rollins
    undoubtedly knew Plaintiff “was not the person wanted by Will County, District of Columbia law
    does not allow Officer Rollins’s indifference toward the differing Social Security numbers to bar
    liability for false imprisonment.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff cites to Sanders v. United States in
    support of the proposition that, “[s]hould doubt as to the correct identity of the subject of warrant
    arise, the arresting officer obviously should make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm or deny
    5
    Further demonstrating the high degree of certainty required before a duty to release arises is the Restatement’s
    description of that duty in the context of a warrantless arrest. In that case, an arresting officer is no longer privileged
    to keep a person in custody if he “has ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspicion upon which the
    privilege to arrest is based is unfounded.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 134, cmt. f. Here, the suspicion upon
    which Plaintiff was arrested was not dispelled “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    6
    There was no evidence presented that Office Rollins learned anything new about Plaintiff after he submitted and
    signed the affidavit.
    12
    the applicability of the warrant to the detained individual.” 
    339 A.2d 373
    , 379 (D.C. 1975). He
    argues that the different Social Security numbers provide “[c]lear evidence” that Plaintiff was not
    the person wanted by the Will County warrant, and that “[t]he District cannot escape liability
    merely because Officer Rollins turned a blind eye to the exonerating information.” Pl.’s Opp’n
    at 3.
    Sanders is analogous to the instant case in one sense: the defendant in Sanders, like
    Plaintiff, was arrested pursuant to a “warrant [that] actually was for the arrest of another man.”
    
    339 A.2d at 375
    . But that is where the similarities end. Sanders is not a false imprisonment case
    but a criminal case regarding whether evidence must be suppressed if gathered pursuant to a valid
    warrant that called for the arrest of a person other than the defendant. 
    Id.
     The D.C. Court of
    Appeals held that, with a constitutionally valid warrant, “the seizure of an individual other than
    the one against whom the warrant is outstanding is valid if the arresting officer (1) acts in good
    faith, and (2) has reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended
    arrestee.” 
    Id. at 379
    . “Should doubt as to the correct identity of the subject of [the] warrant arise,
    the arresting officer obviously should make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm or deny the
    applicability of the warrant to the detained individual,” the Court of Appeals continued, and if “the
    officer reasonably and in good faith believes that the suspect is the one against whom the warrant
    is outstanding, a protective frisk pursuant to the arrest of that person is not in contravention of the
    Fourth Amendment” and any “evidence seized incident to the arrest [is] properly [] admitted into
    evidence.” 
    Id.
     The language in Sanders upon which Plaintiff relies plainly does not apply to the
    tort of false imprisonment.
    Finally, Plaintiff argues that “the Metropolitan Police Department had extensive
    information establishing that Plaintiff Vasquez was not the person wanted in the warrant.” Pl.’s
    13
    Opp’n at 3–5. He points to United States v. Valez, 
    796 F.2d 24
    , 28 (2d Cir. 1986), in support of
    the proposition that, under the collective knowledge doctrine, “a failure of law enforcement
    officers to communicate exonerating information can render an arrest unreasonable, depending on
    the circumstances.” 
    Id.
     But Valez does not help Plaintiff. Like Sanders, Valez is a criminal case
    assessing the reasonableness of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment.              It is not a false
    imprisonment case. It does not hold that exonerating information not known to an officer, but
    known by others, can be imputed to the officer to trigger a duty to release.
    The duty-to-release inquiry is intensely subjective. It provides that an officer who is
    otherwise privileged to detain a person based on an arrest warrant loses that privilege only if he
    “undoubtedly” learns that the person described in the warrant is not the person in custody. Based
    on the evidence presented, and viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no
    reasonable jury could have concluded that Officer Rollins “undoubtedly” knew Plaintiff was not
    the Jose T. Vasquez wanted by Will County, so as to trigger a duty to release. Accordingly, the
    District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted.
    V.     MOTION FOR REMITTITUR
    In the alternative, the court would grant the District’s motion for remittitur. Remittitur is
    appropriate “when (1) the verdict is beyond all reason, so as to shock the conscience, or (2) the
    verdict is so inordinately large as to obviously exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range
    within which the jury may properly operate.” Peyton v. DiMario, 
    287 F.3d 1121
    , 1126 (D.C. Cir.
    2002). “[J]ury verdicts must strike a balance between ensuring that important personal rights are
    not lightly disregarded, and avoiding extravagant awards that bear little or no relation to the actual
    injury involved.” Phillips v. District of Columbia, 
    458 A.2d 722
    , 726 (D.C. 1983). In the
    D.C. Circuit, remittitur is permitted “only if the reduction ‘permit[s] recovery of the highest
    14
    amount the jury tolerably could have awarded.’” Langevine, 
    106 F.3d at 1024
     (quoting Carter,
    
    795 F.2d at
    135 n.13). “In attempting to strike such a balance in false arrest cases, the length of
    confinement is an appropriate factor for the jury to consider.” Phillips, 
    458 A.2d at 726
    .
    In this case, the court instructed the jury regarding damages as follows:
    The District of Columbia is liable to pay damages only for the harm
    that its conduct caused Mr. Vasquez on March 3 and 4, 2017, and
    the ensuing days. . . . You may not award Mr. Vasquez any damages
    from any harm that arose prior to the handling of his case by the
    MPD Fugitive Unit. . . . You shall not award any damages to Mr.
    Vasquez for [any] prior arrests and/or detentions and you may not
    award any damages to Mr. Vasquez for any permanent or long-term
    harm caused by those prior events. However, you may consider how
    his prior arrest and detention in 2016 by MPD affected Mr. Vasquez
    on March 3 and 4, 2017.
    Jury Instructions at 10–11. The jury awarded Plaintiff $100,000 in damages.
    The District argues that the award was excessive because the jury was prohibited from
    “award[ing] damages to Plaintiff for any period of incarceration that occurred before Officer
    Rollins began processing Plaintiff’s fugitive from justice charge on March 4, 2017.” Def.’s Mot.
    at 42. 7 “Even offering Plaintiff a generous inference that the duty to release him was triggered
    when Officer Rollins ran the NCIC search [and saw the mismatched Social Security numbers] at
    11:40 a.m. . . . Plaintiff can only establish with any certainty that he was in custody for roughly
    three additional hours when Officer Rollins presented the complaint to the prosecutor.” Id. at 43.
    An award of $100,000 for three (or at most four) hours of incarceration, in the District’s view,
    “breaks down to an astonishing award of over $33,000 [or $25,000] for each hour” of unlawful
    detention. Id.
    7
    The court did not permit the jury to award damages for any injury prior to the MPD Fugitive Unit’s involvement in
    the case, because there was no evidentiary basis on which to find that MPD had a duty to release Plaintiff until his
    case landed in the hands of the MPD Fugitive Unit. Jury Instructions at 11.
    15
    Plaintiff responds that his “situation is unique, and not at all analogous to other false
    imprisonment cases.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Plaintiff’s prior arrests and detentions, coupled with the
    fact that he was accused of “lying” and called “a murderer” by MPD officers when he presented
    exonerating evidence, “added a particularly frightening Kafkaesque element to his detention.” Id.
    Plaintiff further contends that the District mischaracterizes the record. In Plaintiff’s view, the
    unlawful detention clock started at 10:00 a.m. when Officer Rollins received the lock-up list and
    ran until “sometime in the late afternoon” when Plaintiff had his court appearance. Id. Plaintiff
    notes that the jury was permitted to consider damages in the subsequent days because, as the court
    itself had suggested during trial, Plaintiff’s “damages didn’t simply vanish the moment he was
    released from [MPD] custody—they would have continued for some time thereafter.” Id. 8 See,
    e.g., Williams v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 
    924 A.2d 1000
    , 1003 (D.C. 2007) (holding that the testimony of a plaintiff who had not designated an expert
    could support damages for “pain and suffering that she experienced over a period of hours, not
    longer”).
    Based on the trial record, the court finds that the earliest Officer Rollins could have been
    made aware of the Social Security number mismatch, and thus the earliest the duty to release could
    have been triggered, would have been when he ran the NCIC Report at 11:40 a.m. on March 4.
    See NCIC Rep. at 2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, assuming that
    Plaintiff was released at the latest at 5:00 p.m. on March 4, he was unlawfully detained for, at
    most, approximately five hours. The jury was permitted to award damages for the harm caused in
    “the ensuing days” and to “consider how his prior arrest and detention in 2016 by MPD affected
    8
    Plaintiff was not permitted to recover damages for any claimed long-term injury because he did not offer expert
    testimony to support the element of causation.
    16
    Mr. Vasquez.” Jury Instructions at 11. Thus, the jury was only permitted to award damages for
    the up-to-five hours of unlawful detention and the ensuring three to four days.
    The D.C. Circuit has noted that, “[b]ecause of the unique circumstances of each case as
    well as the adjustments which would necessarily have to be made for inflation, it is awkward to
    discuss the size of an award through comparison with past decisions.” Peyton, 
    287 F.3d at 1127
    (quoting Mariner v. Marsden, 
    610 P.2d 6
    , 16 (Wyo. 1980)). “[A]lthough the Court is cognizant
    of the limitations of case comparisons, it does not equate the D.C. Circuit’s caution in this area
    with a prohibition.” Jean-Baptiste, 
    931 F. Supp. 2d at 14
    . The court “will consider, at least in
    part, similar cases to determine the appropriate award for damages.” 
    Id.
    The court has considered the following cases identified by the District in determining what
    damages award is appropriate in the this case: Pitt v. District of Columbia, 
    404 F. Supp. 2d 351
    ,
    356 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded on other grounds, 
    491 F.3d 494
     (D.C.
    Cir. 2007) (awarding $100,000 for 10 days of unlawful detention); Wright v. United States, No.
    95-cv-0274 (LFO), 
    1997 WL 335790
    , at *2 (D.D.C. June 4, 1997) (awarding $1,000 for an
    unlawful overnight detention); Koroma v. United States, 
    628 F. Supp. 949
    , 951, 953 (D.D.C. 1986)
    (awarding $1,500 for unlawful overnight detention). Wright and Korama offer a particularly
    helpful guide, as each involved limited periods of wrongful detention. In addition, District of
    Columbia courts have awarded less than $2,000 per day in cases involving wrongful convictions
    and decades-long sentences. See Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-ca-003237-B, 
    2016 WL 927078
    , at *25 (D.C. Super. Feb. 26, 2016) (awarding $13,234,527 for 25 years of wrongful
    incarceration, approximately $1,450 per day); Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-ca-3239,
    
    2015 WL 13754573
    , at *5 (D.C. Super. July 22, 2015) (awarding $9,654,500 for approximately
    22 years of wrongful incarceration, approximately $1,200 per day).         Although the per-day
    17
    compensatory amount in those cases is naturally lower because of the length of incarceration, the
    pain and suffering experienced by those plaintiffs cannot be compared to what Plaintiff
    experienced during a limited period of unjustified detention. Notably, Plaintiff did not identify
    any comparable case to support the jury’s award. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16–18.
    Taking into account the length of unlawful confinement in the instant case (at most five-
    hours); additional emotional injury incurred in the ensuing four days; inflation; and Plaintiff’s
    particular vulnerability due to his past wrongful arrests, the court finds that $6,000 is “the highest
    amount the jury tolerably could have awarded.” Carter, 
    795 F.2d at
    135 n. 13. The court reaches
    that amount by an award of $2,000 for the unlawful five-hour detention and $1,000 in damages for
    each of the next four days. Because “reduction of a compensatory damage award may not be made
    without offering plaintiff the option of a new trial,” Plaintiff has the option of rejecting the reduced
    award in favor of a new trial, if the factual sufficiency of the jury’s verdict were to be sustained on
    appeal. Jean-Baptiste, 
    931 F. Supp. 2d at 12
    ; see Carter, 
    795 F.2d at 135
     (“[T]he appropriate
    procedure [for remittitur] is to pose to plaintiffs the choice between consent to the reduction and a
    new trial.”).
    VI.     CONCLUSION
    For the stated reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, ECF No. 126,
    is granted. Alternatively, the court would grant Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur and reduce the
    damages award to $6,000. In light of the court’s rulings, it does not reach the District’s arguments
    for a new trial. A final, appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    Dated: March 29, 2023                                          Amit P. Mehta
    United States District Judge
    18