Beaulieu v. Holder ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YVETTE B. BEAULIEU,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 15-896 (TJK)
MERRICK B. GARLAND,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Yvette B. Beaulieu is a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
employee who sued over 60 government officials for various forms of employment
discrimination. The Court dismissed all but one claim against the sole remaining defendant—the
Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice—for retaliation under Title VII.
Beaulieu’s theory is that the FBI fired her in November 2010 because she had filed an
administrative complaint alleging discrimination in March of that year. The parties have cross-
moved for summary judgment on this remaining count. ECF Nos. 51, 53. For the reasons
explained below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and deny Beaulieu’s.
I. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriately
granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing
all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.”
Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir.
2016). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Courts “are not to make credibility determinations
or weigh the evidence.” Lopez, 826 F.3d at 496 (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). But the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement
is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)). If the evidence “is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations
omitted).
“The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.” Montgomery v. Risen, 875 F.3d 709, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “In response, the
nonmovant must identify specific facts in the record to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue.” Id. And for claims where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, as here, she
must make an evidentiary showing “sufficient to establish the existence of [each] essential
element to [her] case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”
and therefore entitles the moving party to “judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323.
“Importantly, while summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in
discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by
affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pollard v.
Quest Diagnostics, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up).
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II. Analysis
Title VII bans retaliation against an employee because that employee “‘opposed any
practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a
Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
56 (2006) (quoting § 2000e–3(a)). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,
the plaintiff must show that “[he] engaged in a statutorily protected activity, the employer treated
the plaintiff adversely, and a causal connection existed between the two.” Winston v. Clough,
712 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir.
2007)). If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 901. If the employer
provides a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its conduct, “the burden-shifting framework
disappears” and the question becomes “whether a reasonable jury could infer . . . retaliation from
all the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff
offers to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action and other evidence of
retaliation.” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for firing Beaulieu: her
extensive and well-documented history of poor job performance. Between 2006 and 2010,
Beaulieu was referred to a counseling program and put on a 90-day performance improvement
plan three times. ECF No. 51-1 (Def.’s SOF) ¶¶ 15, 17–18, 32. She failed all three, and in one
instance was demoted. Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 36. After the third—during which she “failed to produce
two acceptable work products and to complete a training assignment”—the FBI fired her for
unacceptable performance in November 2010. Id. ¶¶ 38, 49. Over the years, the FBI
documented significant problems with her performance, such as behavior that was “aggressive,
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domineering, and dismissive of others,” id. ¶ 15, difficulty communicating respectfully, id.
¶¶ 21–22, assignments that did not meet minimum standards, id. ¶¶ 33, 38, and a pattern of “poor
writing skills, an inability to follow supervisory direction, and improper use of classification
designations,” id. ¶ 46.
On the record here, no reasonable jury could find that Beaulieu was the victim of
retaliation. She has pointed to no evidence that Defendant’s reason for firing her was pretextual,
or that her termination was otherwise retaliatory. Beaulieu does not dispute that the FBI found
her performance unacceptable in the ways that it documented over the years. Rather, she offers
only her own opinion—with no citations to the record—that her work was in fact satisfactory.
See, e.g., ECF No. 53 at 14, 17–18, 20, 34. But “a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment by
relying solely on her personal opinion that her job performance was adequate, particularly when
the overwhelming evidence in the record indicates that the defendant honestly believed that it
was not.” Robinson v. Red Coats, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 3d 201, 214 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Vatel v.
Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). That is precisely the case
here. Moreover, the FBI documented Beaulieu’s poor performance (and put her on performance
improvement plans) well before she filed her administrative complaint, Def.’s SOF ¶ 10, and the
person who ultimately approved her termination did not know about her complaint when he did
so, Def.’s SOF ¶ 48.
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III. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and deny Beaulieu’s. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: August 16, 2021
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