Han v. Financial Supervisory Service ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KAREN C. HAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 18-141
FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SERVICE, (EGS)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Ms. Karen C. Han (“Ms. Han” or “Plaintiff”), who proceeds
pro se, brought this action against Financial Supervisory
Service (“FSS” or “Defendant”), alleging that FSS interfered in
the contractual relationship between her now-defunct financial
services company, Peninsula Asset Management Ltd. (“Peninsula”),
and Hankook Tire Company, Ltd. (“Hankook”). See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1. 1 On July 5, 2022, the Court granted FSS’
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction in a final appealable order. See Han v. Fin.
Supervisory Serv., No. CV 18-141(EGS/GMH), 2022 WL 2438513, at
*9 (D.D.C. July 5, 2022).
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
1
Pending before the Court is Ms. Han’s Motion to Alter or
Amend the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Pl.’s Mot. Alter
or Amend Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e)., ECF No. 31. Upon careful consideration of the
motion, opposition, and reply thereto; the applicable law; and
the entire record herein, the Court hereby DENIES Ms. Han’s
Motion.
II. Background
A. Factual
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual
background of this case, as set forth in its July 5, 2022
Memorandum Opinion and Order. See Han, 2022 WL 2438513, at *1-5.
In short, Ms. Han previously owned Peninsula, a financial
services company that entered into an agreement to complete a
financial transaction for an alleged alter-ego of the South
Korean company Hankook (the “Peninsula/Ocean Agreement”). See
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 8, 19. She alleges that: (1) the
transaction violated South Korean financial laws and
regulations; (2) reports of Peninsula’s involvement damaged the
company’s business and reputation; and (3) Peninsula was forced
to close due to fears that it could be criminally liable for its
participation. See id. ¶¶ 2, 23, 25, 32. Peninsula demanded that
Hankook indemnify it for its losses pursuant to the
2
Peninsula/Ocean Agreement, but Hankook refused. See id. ¶¶ 48-
49.
Ms. Han and Peninsula thereafter sued Hankook and others in
the 153rd Judicial District Court of Tarran County, Texas for
breach of contract. See id. ¶ 49. That court dismissed the suit
for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. Ms. Han, her husband,
and Peninsula then sued the same defendants in the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the same claims. See
id. ¶ 50. That court dismissed their claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 69.
Ms. Han subsequently sued FSS in this Court. See generally
id. ¶¶ 83-93. She alleges that FSS assured Hankook that FSS
would not produce discovery in the Ohio litigation, thereby
encouraging Hankook to breach the indemnity provision of the
Peninsula/Ocean Agreement. See id. ¶¶ 3-4, 52, 88.
B. Procedural
Ms. Han filed this Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s
Previous Order on July 18, 2022. See Pl.’s Mot. Alter or Amend
Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e)., ECF No. 31; Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Alter or Amend
Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 31-1. FSS submitted its brief in
opposition on July 29, 2022, see Mem. Law Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.
Change Venue (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 32; and Ms. Han replied
3
on August 1, 2022, see Pl.’s Reply Def.’s Resp. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.
Alter or Amend Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“Pl.’s Reply”),
ECF No. 33. The motion is now ripe and ready for adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment
Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or
amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are
“discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court
finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law,
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76
F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). These motions are
“disfavored,” and the moving party bears the burden of
establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief
from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151
F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) does not provide a
vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry
of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C. Wright &
4
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.
1995)).
B. Pro Se Litigants
“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in
all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,
No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,
2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The
pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally
construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even
so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658
F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656
F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply
with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;
Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.
III. Analysis
Ms. Han submits this Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter the Court’s
Order dismissing the Complaint to seek a change in venue to the
District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 31-1 at 1-2. For the
reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Ms. Han’s Motion.
Ms. Han asserts that Section 1406(a) and Supreme Court
precedent require that the Court consider whether the “interest
5
of justice” requires a transfer rather than dismissal. See id.at 3-5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,
369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)). She contends that the “interest of
justice” requires transfer because her claims are subject to a
statute-of-limitations defense. See id. at 4-5. Ms. Han further
argues that the Court should transfer her suit because transfer
would “promote the expeditious adjudication of [her] claims” and
“allow[] . . . [her] and the transferee court to dispense with
waste of time and valuable resources.” Id. at 4-5.
FSS argues that Ms. Han’s Motion is procedurally deficient
because Ms. Han is raising an argument that she could have
presented in her earlier briefing but did not. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF
No. 32 at 5. The Court agrees that Ms. Han may not move for a
change of venue through this Rule 59(e) Motion. “[A]mendment of
a judgment is . . . an extraordinary measure” that the Court may
grant “under three circumstances only: (1) if there is an
‘intervening change of controlling law’; (2) if new evidence
becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be amended in
order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’”
Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Ms. Han does not
argue that any of these circumstances are present here. See
generally Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 31-1. Instead, she argues that the
Court should consider her motion to transfer venue, see id.;
6
“rais[ing] arguments that could have been raised prior to the
entry of” the Court’s July 5, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). 2 She has acted too late. See Ciralsky
v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)
(affirming district court’s denial of Rule 59(e) motion where
the movant “elected not to act until after a final order had
been entered”). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle for her to
raise the venue issue now. See Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron
Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Fox v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
Goldlawr does not change the Court’s conclusion. In that
case, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision transferring the
venue of an antitrust suit despite the petitioners’ argument
that the transferring court did not have personal jurisdiction
over them. See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 464, 467. The Supreme Court
explained that “[t]he language of § 1406(a) is amply broad
2 In her reply brief, Ms. Han concedes that she “did not make
such transfer argument as a fallback argument in her opposition
to FSS’s motion to dismiss.” Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 33 at 3 n.2.
The Court also notes she did not argue the Court should transfer
the venue of the action in her Objections to Magistrate Judge
Harvey’s R. & R. See generally Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s
Proposed Findings & Recommendations, ECF No. 26. She therefore
waived the argument. See N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found.,
Inc. v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, 800 F. Supp. 2d
239, 249 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F. Supp.
14, 19 (D.D.C. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)).
7
enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the
plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether
the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over
the defendants or not.” Id. at 466. However, Goldlawr does not
concern the standard the Court must apply to resolve Rule 59(e)
motions and therefore is not instructive to resolution of the
instant motion. See generally id. at 464-67.
Because Ms. Han has not met the exacting standard for Rule
59(e) motions, the Court DENIES her Motion to Alter or Amend the
July 5, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 3
IV. Conclusion and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Ms. Han’s Motion to Alter or Amend its
Dismissal of the Complaint, ECF No. 31, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
July 3, 2023
3 FSS also argues that Ms. Han’s Motion is substantively
deficient because Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R. “would
travel with the case” if the Court transferred venue. Def.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 32 at 6. FSS cites no authority—and the Court is
not aware of any authority—supporting this proposal. In
addition, FSS recommends that the Court “pass upon” the
sovereign immunity and statute of limitations issues. See id. at
6-7. As Ms. Han responds in her reply briefing, see Pl.’s Reply,
ECF No. 33 at 4; FSS should have filed its own Rule 59(e) motion
to have the Court reconsider or amend its judgment, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e).
8