Bassett v. Walsh ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CONRAD BASSETT,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-2408 (JEB)
MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Labor,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Conrad Bassett is an employee at the Department of Labor. In this suit against
Labor Secretary Martin J. Walsh, he alleges that the Department violated the Rehabilitation Act
by refusing him reasonable accommodations, discriminating against him based on his disability,
and retaliating against him. Defendant now moves to partially dismiss, contending that many of
Plaintiff’s claims are unexhausted, unavailable under the Rehabilitation Act, or unsubstantiated.
The Court agrees that none of the challenged claims may proceed and will accordingly grant the
Motion.
I. Background
The Court at this stage sets forth the facts as pled in the Complaint, assuming them to be
true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Bassett has
worked at the Department since 1994 and now works as a Government Information Specialist in
the Wage and Hour Division. See ECF No. 16 (Second Am. Compl.), ¶¶ 8–9. “At all times
relevant to the Complaint,” Genise Coleman and Patrice Rachel Torres were his first-line and
second-line supervisors, respectively. Id., ¶¶ 10–11. Bassett suffers from congenital cataracts
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and glaucoma, which affect “his daily life activities like seeing, working, reading and driving.”
Id., ¶ 16. The Department is aware of Plaintiff’s disability and granted him a reasonable
accommodation in 2014; it also approved him for a computer program called ZoomText in 2019.
Id., ¶¶ 45, 47 n.3.
The events that eventually led to this suit began on August 28, 2019, when Bassett
requested and was denied leave to take a month off from October 1 to November 1, 2019. Id., ¶¶
24–27. In a subsequent discussion regarding his leave request that took place on September 19,
Coleman told him that she could “only approve his leave if he changed it to a leave request
pursuant to the Family [and] Medical Leave Act (FMLA).” Id., ¶ 28. Then, on October 2,
Coleman again denied Plaintiff’s leave request as not submitted pursuant to the FMLA. Id., ¶
29.
Later, on October 11, Bassett and Coleman met to discuss his 2018/2019 Performance
Evaluation. At this time, Plaintiff was unable to respond to his evaluation because it was
delivered “in a format he could not read due to his disability.” Id., ¶ 33. He accordingly
requested his evaluation, as well as the materials Coleman relied on, in a legible format. Id., ¶
34. Five days later, Coleman provided him “the entire record” in such a format. Id., ¶ 38.
Unhappy about this delay and believing that his initial evaluation was inaccurate, Plaintiff
through his counsel requested additional time to review the materials he had been given and to
respond to his performance evaluation. Id., ¶ 39. After some disputes about when this review
period began, Torres provided a new deadline of October 22. Id. In addition, despite Plaintiff’s
response, Coleman did not revise the “Minimally Satisfactory” rating she had initially given him.
Id., ¶¶ 43-44.
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What turned out to be the last nail in the coffin occurred on October 18, when Bassett
was supplied with ZoomText, which the Court assumes makes it easier to read and work on a
computer screen. He alleges that he informed his supervisors that the computer he was using at
the time could not support this program. Id., ¶ 45, 52. This, along with other issues Plaintiff had
with using Adobe and accessing a department database, made it difficult for him to meet
assigned deadlines. See ECF No. 19 (Pl. Opp. to MTD) at 5. Bassett alleges that the
Department nevertheless continued to give him deadlines that were “completely unattainable”
and assigned him to “more complex” work. Id. “To this day,” Plaintiff states, his
accommodations request “has not been met.” Second Am. Compl., ¶ 55.
Having failed to secure his desired relief, Bassett filed a formal Equal Employment
Opportunity complaint against the agency on December 28, 2019. See ECF No. 17 (Def. MTD),
Exh. 1 (Formal EEO Compl.) at 3. This complaint alleged discrimination and retaliation based
on the denial of his leave request, the denial of his reasonable-accommodation requests, the
format in which he was given his 2018/2019 performance evaluation, the time he was given to
respond to this evaluation, and the rating he received. Id. at 3-5. On April 29, 2020, the
Department issued a letter notifying Plaintiff that it was accepting some, but not all, of his claims
for investigation. See Def. MTD, Exh. 3 (April 29, 2020, Letter) at 2. Bassett objected to the
Department’s decision to reject some of his claims, and the agency responded by reformulating
the claims it would accept for investigation. See Def. MTD, Exhs. 4, 5 (May 14, 2020, Letter;
November 13, 2020, Letter). The Department accepted Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile work environment based on the events described above. See November
13, 2020, Letter at 2-3. Ultimately, however, it denied relief for all claims in a Final Agency
Decision issued on May 16, 2022. See Def. MTD, Exh. 6 (Final Agency Decision) at 17.
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Dissatisfied with this result, Plaintiff brought this action on August 14, 2022. His initial
Complaint contained two counts of discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act
and one count of hostile work environment based on disability, for which he mistakenly invoked
Title VII. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 44–67. Shortly thereafter, he filed an Amended
Complaint, which the Department moved to dismiss. See ECF No. 4 (Am. Compl.); No. 12
(Initial Def. MTD). Plaintiff then obtained leave to amend his Complaint for the second time.
See ECF No. 15 (Minute Order dated April 28, 2023). In the Second Amended Complaint,
which is the operative pleading here, Bassett again brings two counts of discrimination and
retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act but now drops his Title VII cause of action. See Second
Am. Compl., ¶¶ 56–71. Defendant now moves to dismiss in part under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to “state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not
necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotations marks and citation omitted). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court “must treat the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant [the] plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111,
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1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979))
(internal citations omitted). It need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation” or an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau
v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)).
Rule 12(b)(1), conversely, permits dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. In general, courts must first address jurisdictional arguments before turning to the
merits. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007). A
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her
claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A court has an “affirmative obligation to
ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Grand Lodge of the
Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For this reason,
“‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a
12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 13–14
(quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1350 (2d ed.
1987)).
III. Analysis
In seeking dismissal, Labor raises three arguments: 1) Plaintiff has not exhausted two of
his Rehabilitation Act claims, 2) His failure-to-accommodate allegations cannot be fashioned as
separate discrimination or retaliation claims, and 3) He has not adequately pled certain other
causes of action. Bassett challenges some of these contentions and concedes others, as will be
detailed below.
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A quick clarification on what is not at issue here. Defendant does not seek dismissal of
Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims relating to his August 2019 denial of leave, the
assignment of tight deadlines, and the rating he received in his 2018/2019 performance
evaluation. Nor does Labor assail his failure-to-accommodate claims based on his varied
troubles with technology and computer software.
With these preliminaries out of the way, the Court examines Defendant’s assertions in
turn.
A. Exhaustion
Before filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must first exhaust his
administrative remedies. Huang v. Wheeler, 215 F. Supp. 3d 100, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2016). To do
so, he must “initiate contact with” an EEO Counselor “within 45 days of the date of the matter
alleged to be discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). The employee, moreover, must
“exhaust the administrative process for each discrete act for which he seeks to bring a claim.”
Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 158, 171 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113–14 (2002)). In determining whether a plaintiff has successfully
exhausted his claims, courts will often look to the agency’s Notice of Acceptance. See Bozgoz
v. James, No. 19-239, 2020 WL 4732085, at *7 (D.D.C. 2020). Where an agency “reasonably
fails to identify” a claim for investigation and the plaintiff does not object to this refusal to
investigate, “the plaintiff cannot show that he has exhausted administrative remedies as to this
claim.” Dick v. Holder, 80 F. Supp. 3d 103, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2015); McKeithan v. Boarman, 803
F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that plaintiff’s failure to object to agency’s
decision to reject claim “supports a finding that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to” said claim) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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Labor maintains that Bassett has not met these requirements for any claims that relate to
his 2019/2020 performance evaluation or the assignment of complex work. See Def. MTD at 7;
ECF No. 20 (Reply) at 5. Plaintiff, for his part, retorts only that he has exhausted his claims
related to the latter. See Pl. Opp. at 6–8. As neither his Complaint nor his Opposition addresses
the former, that issue has thus been conceded. Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion and therein addresses only some of
the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as conceded.”).
Moving to the exhaustion argument that he did address, Plaintiff does not dispute that his
formal EEO complaint and subsequent amendments never explicitly allege that he was assigned
more complex work than his co-workers. See Formal EEO Compl. at 4–5; Pl. Opp. at 6. And
Bassett similarly does not dispute that the Department never accepted any claims for
investigation relating to the assignment of complex work, or that he never objected to this refusal
to investigate. See Nov. 13, 2020, Letter at 1-2. Plaintiff nonetheless posits that his complex-
work allegations have been exhausted because they are “reasonably related” to the assignment-
of-deadlines allegations that the agency did accept for investigation. See Pl. Opp. at 8 (citing
Haynes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 924 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
To begin, it is unclear whether the “reasonably related” exhaustion exception even
remains good law. See Webster v. Del Toro, 49 F.4th 562, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (reserving
question whether this doctrine survives Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113-
14). Indeed, “most courts in this district have interpreted Morgan to require exhaustion for all
discrete acts of [discrimination and] retaliation . . . regardless of any relationship that exists
between those discrete claims and any others.” Hicklin v. McDonald, 110 F. Supp. 3d 16, 19
(D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Bassett, in any event, cannot succeed even under this relatedness standard. For an
unexhausted claim to be sufficiently related to an exhausted claim, it must “[a]t a minimum . . .
arise from the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge
of discrimination.” Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Park v. Howard
Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff never hinted at this kind of connection
during the administrative process. In his amendments to his formal EEO complaint — which,
again, make no mention of complex work — he complained that the deadlines assigned to him
were unreasonable because the Department “failed to provide [Bassett] with a working
computer.” Def. MTD, Exh. 2 (Email Amending EEO Compl.); id. (“Mr. Bassett’s supervisor . .
. continues to give Mr. Bassett deadlines while he is using a broken computer.”). Yet Bassett
never discussed there what, if anything, this has to do with the assignment of more complex
work. Nor would an investigator reasonably make such a connection. Plaintiff’s last-minute
attempt to link these disparate issues falls short of establishing that they “are factually similar
such that they would be discovered during the agency’s investigation,” Mount v. Johnson, 36 F.
Supp. 3d 74, 86 (D.D.C. 2014); the Court will, consequently, dismiss such claims for failure to
exhaust.
B. Sufficiency of Remaining Claims
Defendant next takes aim at two sets of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. The first covers
discrimination and retaliation causes of action based on Labor’s alleged failure to accommodate
his disability and its refusal to provide him sufficient time and means to review his 2018/2019
performance appraisal. The second comprises all his failure-to-accommodate claims save those
based on his malfunctioning technology and computer software. The Court will address each
separately.
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1. Discrimination and Retaliation
Defendant first contends that certain claims must be dismissed because failure-to-
accommodate allegations cannot be the basis for stand-alone discrimination or retaliation claims
under the Rehabilitation Act. See Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308, 334 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[I]f
the denial of a request for accommodation could itself support a claim of retaliation based on the
request, then every failure-to-accommodate claim would be doubled.”). Plaintiff once again
neglects to address this contention in his Opposition, so he has conceded the issue. See Pl. Opp.
at 8–10; Wannall, 775 F.3d at 428.
Labor next asserts that, as to his allegations that it delayed in giving him his performance
evaluation in an accessible format and did not provide him sufficient time to respond, Plaintiff
has not alleged an adverse action. To establish unlawful discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act, a plaintiff must show that he has “suffered an adverse employment action solely because of
[his] disability.” Butler v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 275 F. Supp. 3d 70, 81 (D.D.C.
2017). Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870(D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc), a plaintiff need show only that he was discriminated against with
respect to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to meet this requirement. Id. at
874–75; cf. Bain v. Off. of Att’y Gen., No. 21-1751, 2022 WL 17904236, at *19 (D.D.C. Dec.
23, 2022) (applying Chambers to Rehabilitation Act). Despite expanding the range of conduct
that can give rise to a discrimination action, the Chambers court was careful to stress that “not
everything that happens at the workplace affects an employee’s ‘terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.’” 35 F.4th at 874.
A plaintiff must also allege an adverse action to make out a retaliation claim under the
Act. See Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Such an adverse action
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is “any harm that well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Not every action, however, will meet this threshold either; “petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” will not suffice to show an adverse
action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
Plaintiff maintains that he has met his burden because his Complaint alleges that “the
opportunity to present a thorough and detailed response to Mr. Bassett’s performance evaluation
could have resulted in a change in his rating which in turn would have resulted in a yearly bonus
or annual leave award.” Pl. Opp. at 9–10. Defendant retorts that this chain of reasoning is too
speculative to show that its actions were adverse. See Reply at 6–7.
Labor has the better of the argument. Plaintiff is certainly correct that an action can be
adverse if it has a negative impact on the employee’s career advancement. See Ortiz-Diaz v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 867 F.3d 70, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Yet Bassett acknowledges
that the Department was delayed by only five additional days — only two of which were
business days — in providing him his 2018/2019 appraisal in an accessible format. See Reply at
6; Def. MTD at 12. And Plaintiff admits that Labor did provide him an extension to review and
respond to his performance appraisal. See Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 39–42.
Bassett’s argument is reduced to this: had the Department not waited a couple more days
to provide him the proper means to review his 2018/2019 performance appraisal, and had it
given Plaintiff more days than it did when it granted him an extension, he may have written a
response convincing enough to change his rating. See Pl. Opp. at 9–10. This in turn may have
resulted in employment benefits. Id. Even at this early stage, this line of reasoning is too
speculative and fails to show that the Department’s delay satisfies either adverse-action standard.
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See Pauling v. D.C., 286 F. Supp. 3d 179, 203 (D.D.C. 2017) (to be adverse, an action must have
“a discernible, as opposed to a speculative, effect”) (internal citation omitted). The Court will
accordingly grant the Motion as to these claims, too.
2. Failure to Accommodate
Defendant’s final challenge focuses on all of Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims,
except those based on its alleged refusal to address his computer-software and database-access
issues. See Def. MTD at 14–17. To establish a failure-to-accommodate cause of action under
the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she had a qualifying disability within the
meaning of the statute, (2) her employer had notice of the disability, (3) with reasonable
accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of the position, and (4) she requested
an accommodation but the employer denied her request.” Doak v. Johnson, 19 F. Supp. 3d 259,
273 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Labor asserts that Bassett never
alleges that he made a request for a reasonable accommodation of leave, additional time to
respond to his performance appraisal, or reasonable deadlines. See Def. MTD at 14. And even
if Plaintiff did make a request for additional time, Labor maintains, he has not alleged a failure to
accommodate. Id. at 15–16. Labor makes the same point as to Plaintiff’s claims based on the
format in which he received his evaluation. Id.Once again, Bassett addresses only some of these arguments. Specifically, he neglects to
respond to Defendant’s contention that he never made a reasonable-accommodation request
related to leave or reasonable deadlines. See Pl. Opp. at 10–12. These points are thus conceded.
See Wannall, 775 F.3d at 428.
Plaintiff does respond to Labor’s other arguments. In doing so, however, he improperly
attempts to supplement his Second Amended Complaint with an excerpt from an Investigative
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Report that appears for the first time in his Opposition. See Pl. Opp. at 10; id., Exh. 1
(Investigative Report). Because “a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to
a motion to dismiss,” the Court will not consider this material. Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A.
de C.V. v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2003).
Turning to what is properly before the Court, Plaintiff seems to argue that he did not need
to make a request for more time to review his performance appraisal because the Department
was already aware of his disability and the reasonable accommodation he was previously
approved for. See Pl. Opp. at 11 (“Whether Mr. Bassett asked for additional time to respond to
the evaluation is irrelevant . . . .”). The Department failed to accommodate him, Plaintiff
maintains, the moment it provided him his 2018/2019 performance appraisal. Id. at 10–11. This
argument comes up short. For one, Bassett all but admits that he did not request a reasonable
accommodation of more time to review his appraisal. His only allegation is that his attorney
requested an extension because of a disagreement with Torres over when the period for review
began, not because he needed more time due to his disability. See Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 37–
39; Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 313 (D.D.C. 2015) (request for
reasonable accommodation “must make clear that the employee wants assistance with his or her
disability so that he or she may return, or continue, to work.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, “[n]otice of a disability does not ordinarily satisfy the . . .
request requirement, which performs the independent function of informing an employer of the .
. . accommodation needed to remedy” an employee’s disability. Waggel v. George Washington
Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2020). This is so even if the Department previously
approved Plaintiff for a different accommodation. Cf. Brackett v. Mayorkas, No. 17-988, 2021
WL 5711936, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2021). Because Plaintiff does not allege that his request for
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an extension was related to his disability and because notice of his disability does not make up
for the otherwise missing request for a reasonable accommodation, the Court agrees with
Defendant and will dismiss this failure-to-accommodate claim.
The last remaining dispute concerns whether the Department reasonably accommodated
Bassett’s request for an accessible method to review his performance appraisal. Plaintiff
believes that it did not, though his contention is based on the idea — just rejected by the Court —
that notice of his disability suffices to show that he had made a request to receive the specific
accommodation of an alternative format for reviewing his appraisal. See Pl. Opp. at 11. He
indeed made a request for this accommodation, but not until he was provided his appraisal on
October 11, 2019. See Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 33–34. The Department did grant Plaintiff a
reasonable accommodation, providing “some of the documents” three days later and “the entire
record” two days after that. Id., ¶¶ 35, 38.
Plaintiff is left to argue that his request was not accommodated, not because he was not
provided his evaluation in a legible format, but because the Department’s delay in doing so was
so lengthy as to be unreasonable. See Pl. Opp. at 10–12; Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d
1162, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]here are certainly circumstances in which a ‘long-delayed
accommodation could be considered’ unreasonable.”) (quoting Mayers v. Laborers’ Health &
Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016)).
“In determining whether a delay is reasonable, the inquiry hinges on factors such as the
length of the delay” and “the reasons for the delay.” Weatherspoon v. Azar, 380 F. Supp. 3d 65,
71 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1262–63 (10th Cir.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the length, this five-day delay is far shorter than
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other delays this Court has found reasonable in determining whether a reasonable-
accommodation request has been denied. See Weatherspoon, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73 (holding
that six-month delay was reasonable in part because of its “short length”); Matos v. DeVos, 317
F. Supp. 3d 489, 499 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that nearly two-year delay was reasonable).
The Department, moreover, had a good reason for this brief delay: Plaintiff made his request on a
Friday and the following Monday was the Columbus Day holiday. See Def. MTD at 12;
Weatherspoon, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73 (finding delay reasonable when it was partly caused by
events “out of the [defendant’s] control”). When taken together, these reasons convince the
Court that the delay here was reasonable, so it will dismiss this failure-to-accommodate claim as
well.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Motion and dismiss all claims except
1) Plaintiff’s discrete discrimination and retaliation claims relating to his August 2019 denial of
leave, the assignment of deadlines, and the rating he received in his 2018/2019 performance
evaluation, and 2) Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims based on his varied troubles with
technology and computer software. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will issue this
day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: August 4, 2023
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