Pearson v. Hollingsworth ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PRESTON PEARSON,
Petitioner,
v. Civil Action No. 16-879 (RDM)
J. HOLLINGSWORTH,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Preston Pearson, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on April 4, 2016. Dkt. 1. In a previous opinion, this Court dismissed most of his
claims for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt. 5 at 1, 3. The matter is now before the Court on Petitioner’s
only remaining claim: ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Court concludes that it
need not reach the merits of this claim because the petition is untimely under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court will,
accordingly, deny the petition and dismiss this case.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2009, a District of Columbia Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of
“voluntary manslaughter while armed in connection with the stabbing death of John Whicker.”
Dkt. 26 at 13. Petitioner was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and five years of
supervised release. Id. at 3. He appealed the conviction, and, while his direct appeal was
pending, sought collateral relief under D.C. Code § 23-110, claiming “actual innocence,
miscarriage of justice, ineffective assistance, exculpatory evidence, prosecutorial misconduct,
etc.” Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 5 at 1. The District of Columbia Superior Court rejected both his direct
and collateral challenges to the conviction, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed those judgments on December 7, 2012, in a consolidated appeal. Id. Petitioner then
filed a motion to vacate the mandate on January 22, 2013. Dkt. 26 at 4. This, too, was denied on
April 26, 2013. Id.
More than three years later, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. 1. His petition raised the following claims: (1) denial of counsel
of choice at the beginning of trial; (2) denial of an impartial jury; (3) prosecutorial misconduct;
(4) suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial and on direct appeal. Dkt. 5 at 2. In an opinion dated May 20, 2016, this Court dismissed
all of Petitioner’s claims for lack of jurisdiction except his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. See Dkt. 5 at 2–4 (explaining that D.C. Code § 23-110(g) bars federal courts
from considering habeas petitions that assert claims that can also be brought under § 23-110(a)).
The Court then informed Petitioner that it was construing his “petition as arising under [28
U.S.C.] § 2254,” and held proceedings in abeyance while he “consider[ed] the consequences that
may result from this characterization” and decided whether “to withdraw or to amend his
motion.” Dkt. 15 at 1. Petitioner eventually indicated that he “wanted to move forward with the
motion.” Dkt. 20. Thereafter, Respondent filed an opposition to the petition on March 13, 2018.
Dkt. 26. Although the Court twice notified Petitioner of the importance of responding to the
government’s filing, see Minute Order (Mar. 14, 2018); Minute Order (May 3, 2018), and has
provided him with many months to do so, Petitioner has failed to file anything in this matter
since August 2017.
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II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is
time-barred. See Dkt. 26 at 7–10. The Court agrees. AEDPA sets forth a one-year statute of
limitations for prisoners, like Petitioner, to file federal habeas petitions. 1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
According to the statute, the limitation period begins to run “from the latest of” four dates, only
one of which is relevant here: “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review, or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The
limitations period is tolled while the prisoner pursues state collateral review. Id. § 2244(d)(2).
The Supreme Court has also held that, under “extraordinary circumstances,” courts may apply
equitable tolling if the prisoner was prevented from filing a timely petition by circumstances
beyond her control and she demonstrated due diligence in pursuing her claim. Lawrence v.
Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007).
Here, Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
on December 7, 2012, and became final on March 7, 2013, upon “the expiration of the time for
seeking” a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522,
527 (2003) (noting that a conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court “affirms [the]
conviction on the merits on direct appeal or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the
time for filing a certiorari petition expires”). Nevertheless, Petitioner did not file the instant
habeas petition until April 4, 2016—more than three years later. See Dkt. 1. Even accounting
for the time tolled during collateral proceedings between January 22, 2013, when Petitioner filed
his motion to recall the mandate on his § 23-110 petition, and April 26, 2013, when that motion
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Although Petitioner has now been released from the Federal Correctional Center in Fort Dix,
he is still serving his term of supervised release, and, is therefore in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons. Dkt. 12 at 2 n.2.
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was denied, Dkt. 26 at 9, it is plain that “more than one year passed between the final conviction
date and the habeas filing date,” Davis v. Cross, 825 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202 (D.D.C. 2011). Nor is
there any basis for this Court to conclude that equitable tolling is warranted. Petitioner never
explains why he waited to file his habeas petition. And although the Court twice ordered
Petitioner to reply to Respondent’s opposition, see Minute Order (Mar. 14, 2018); Minute Order
(May 3, 2018), he declined to do so. Accordingly, the Court will decide the matter without the
benefit of Plaintiff’s reply and concludes that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
CONCLUSION
Because Petitioner’s habeas petition is time-barred, the Court will DENY the petition and
DISMISS this case.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: January 3, 2019
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