Campbell v. State ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JEFFREY CAMPBELL, §
§ No. 247, 2021
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below–Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID Nos. 1906003541A (N)
§ 1906003541B (N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 27, 2021
Decided: March 8, 2022
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
After careful consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court
Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the State’s response, and the record
on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On January 22, 2020, the appellant, Jeffrey Campbell, resolved two
criminal cases and two violations of probation in an unrelated case (the “Sussex
case”) by pleading guilty to one count of unlawful sexual contact by a sex offender
against a child and three counts of dealing in child pornography. In exchange, the
State (i) nolle prosequied seven charges of dealing in child pornography and one
count of sexual solicitation of a child and (ii) agreed to cap its sentencing
recommendation to fifteen years of unsuspended Level V incarceration. The
Superior Court ordered a presentence investigation and deferred sentencing.
Sentencing, initially scheduled for July 10, 2020, was continued several times
because in-person proceedings were temporarily suspended because of COVID-19
safety concerns and Campbell preferred to be sentenced in person. On July 9, 2021,
the Superior Court sentenced Campbell to a total of sixteen years of unsuspended
Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision, and discharged
Campbell as unimproved from probation in the Sussex case. This is Campbell’s
direct appeal.
(2) Campbell’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that he has made a conscientious
examination of the record and the law and has concluded that the appeal is wholly
without merit. Campbell’s attorney informed Campbell of the provisions of Rule
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying
brief. Counsel also informed Campbell of his right to supplement his attorney’s
presentation. Campbell has submitted points for this Court’s consideration. The
State has responded to Campbell’s arguments and has moved to affirm the Superior
Court’s judgment.
(3) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold. First,
the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious
2
examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably be raised on
appeal. 1 Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it
can be decided without an adversary presentation.2
(4) In his points, Campbell: (i) complains that his sentence exceeds the
State’s recommendation; (ii) challenges the number of times he had been found in
violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex case; (ii) alleges that the Superior
Court unduly emphasized his use of a “secret” phone—the use of which gave rise to
the convictions at issue in this appeal—because he only possessed it for six weeks;
(iv) complains that he has been disproportionately punished because he was unable
to participate in Department of Correction programs and earn good-time credit
because he agreed to postpone his sentencing until in-person court proceedings
resumed.
(5) As this Court has held repeatedly, “a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of any alleged errors or defects [that occurred] prior to the entry of the plea.”3
Campbell complains that certain facts—the number of times he had been found in
violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex case and the length of time he
1
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442
(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
2
Penson, 488 U.S. at 81-82.
3
Benner v. State, 2007 WL 4215005, at *1 (Del. Nov. 30, 2017).
3
possessed a secret phone—were misrepresented at sentencing hearing. Notably,
Campbell does not challenge the voluntariness of his decision to plead guilty or his
actual guilt. In any event, the sentencing transcript reflects that (i) counsel clarified
for the court that Campbell had only been found in violation of the terms of his
probation in the Sussex case on eight prior occasions and (ii) Campbell, himself, told
the sentencing judge that he had possessed the hidden phone for somewhere between
six weeks and two months.
(6) To the extent that Campbell complains that the Superior Court
sentenced him in excess of the State’s recommendation, our review of a sentence is
“limited to whether the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the
General Assembly and whether it is based on factual predicates [that] are false,
impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed
mind.”4 As Campbell acknowledged at the plea colloquy, he is guilty of the crimes
to which he pleaded guilty. And, as Campbell candidly admits on appeal, his
sentence falls within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature. Finally, we
have reviewed the sentencing transcript carefully and find no evidence that the court
sentenced him with a closed mind.
(7) Campbell’s claims regarding good-time credit also lack merit. The
awarding and calculation of good time credit is left to DOC’s discretion, subject to
4
Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).
4
its rules and regulations.5 “Good time does not exist as a matter of constitutional
right.”6 To the extent that Campbell argues he was not permitted to participate in
DOC programs during the time he was incarcerated and awaiting sentencing, this
inability was Campbell’s own doing: he chose to postpone his sentencing in order to
appear in court in person.
(8) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
Campbell’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that Campbell’s counsel has made a conscientious effort
to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Campbell could
not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
5
Morgan v. State, 2015 WL 4066768, at *1 (Del. July 1, 2015).
6
Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 242 (Del. 1998).
5