Price v. Division of Family Services ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SAMANTHA PRICE,1 §
§ No. 378, 2021
Petitioner Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. CS16-02041
DIVISION OF FAMILY § Petition No. 20-21667
SERVICES, §
§
Respondent, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: August 12, 2022
Decided: October 18, 2022
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
Having considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The petitioner below-appellant, Samantha Price, filed this appeal from
the Family Court’s order, dated April 19, 2022, denying her petition for guardianship
of her niece born in 2009 (“the Child”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court
affirms the Family Court judgment.
1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
(2) On October 7, 2020, Price filed a petition for guardianship of the Child.2
Price previously had guardianship of the Child between 2009 and 2016. In June
2016, the Family Court granted DFS emergency custody of the Child. In September
2016, the Family Court granted DFS’ petition to rescind Price’s guardianship of the
Child. The Family Court found, among other things, that Price had physically
abused the Child and had not obtained appropriate medical care for the Child. This
Court affirmed the Family Court’s judgment.3 In June 2018 and November 2019,
the Family Court denied Price’s petitions for guardianship of the Child.
(3) In August 2018, the Family Court terminated the parental rights of the
Child’s biological parents. This Court affirmed the Family Court’s termination of
parental rights.4
(4) In her October 2020 petition for guardianship, Price alleged that the
Child was dependent because her foster care placements had changed multiple times
and she was suffering from depression and other mental challenges. DFS and the
Child’s attorney opposed Price’s petition for guardianship but disagreed as to the
legal standard the Family Court should apply to a guardianship petition filed against
2
Price originally sought guardianship of the Child’s older sister as well but did not object to the
Division of Family Services’ (“DFS”) motion to dismiss based on the adoption of the older sister
in September 2020.
3
Price v. Div. of Family Servs., 2017 WL 4479493 (Del. Oct. 6, 2017).
4
Mathis v. Dept. of Servs. for Youth & Their Families, 2019 WL 1410751 (Del. Mar. 28, 2019).
2
DFS after the termination and transfer of parental rights to DFS. DFS argued that
the Family Court should apply 13 Del. C. § 2330(a), which provides:
Prior to granting an order for guardianship under this chapter, the Court
shall find for each parent the following:
(1) The parent voluntarily consents to the guardianship;
notwithstanding the consent, if the child is in DSCYF custody,
the Court shall also determine whether guardianship is the
appropriate permanency plan for the child and whether it is in the
best interest of the child for the guardianship to be granted; or
(2) After a hearing on the merits, by a preponderance of the
evidence that petitioner has established:
a. The child is dependent, neglected or abused and the reasons
therefor; and
b. It is in the best interests of the child for the guardianship to
be granted.
Under this standard, Price would have to show that DFS consented to the
guardianship petition or that the Child was dependent, neglected or abused in DFS’
custody and that it was in the best interests of the Child for the guardianship petition
to be granted.
(5) The Child’s attorney argued that the Family Court should apply 13 Del.
C. § 2330(c), which provides:
When a guardianship petition is filed against a current guardian, and
the elements of subsection (a) of this section are met regarding the
parents, the Court shall determine whether the petition shall be granted
based upon the best interests of the child.
The Child’s Attorney further argued that the Family Court should limit its analysis
to the best interests of the Child and not consider whether Section 2330(a) was
satisfied as to the Child’s parents. Under this standard, Price would have to show
3
that it was in the best interests of the Child for the guardianship petition to be granted
but would not have to show the Child was dependent, neglected, or abused. Price
did not submit any written arguments regarding the applicable standard.
(6) On July 2, 2021, the Family Court issued an order deciding the
appropriate legal standard. The Family Court found that Sections 2330(a) and (c)
were ambiguous as to the appropriate legal standard when a petitioner filed a
guardianship petition against DFS after the termination and transfer of parental
rights to DFS. After reviewing the relevant statutory language and the arguments of
DFS and the Child’s attorney, the Family Court concluded that Section 2330(c)
should apply to Price’s petition. The Family Court held that its previous dependency
rulings against the Child’s parents satisfied the Section 2330(c) requirement that the
elements of Section 2330(a) be met as to the parents. The Family Court also stated
that it would be reasonable to interpret Section 2330(c) as proposed by the Child’s
attorney. Under either interpretation of Section 2330, the only remaining inquiry
was whether granting Price’s petition was in the best interests of the Child.
(7) On July 8, 2021, the Family Court held a hearing on Price’s petition.
The Family Court heard testimony from Price, four of Price’s friends and relatives,
the DFS worker overseeing the Child’s case, and the Child’s foster mother. At the
end of the hearing, the Family Court advised that it would be interviewing the Child.
4
The Family Court directed the parties to submit any proposed questions for the
interview by July 23, 2021.
(8) Price, the Child’s counsel, and DFS submitted proposed questions for
the Family Court. In addition to proposed questions, Price submitted documents,
emails, pictures, and videos. The Child’s counsel, with the support of DFS, moved
to strike the additional materials Price had submitted because she could have
submitted those materials at the July 8, 2021 hearing. Price claimed that most of the
materials related to her proposed questions for the Child. The Family Court granted
the motion to strike but stated that it would consider the questions proposed by the
parties. The Family Court interviewed the Child on August 12, 2021.
(9) On November 15, 2021, the Family Court issued a decision denying
Price’s petition for guardianship. The Family Court found that the Child was
previously determined to be dependent as to her biological parents and that the best-
interest factors under 13 Del. C. § 722 weighed in favor of denying Price’s petition.
This appeal followed.
(10) On appeal, Price argues that the Family Court erred by: (i) failing to
apply the standard set forth in Section 2330(c) and find the Child dependent or
neglected in DFS’ custody; (ii) failing to use the questions and materials Price
submitted for the interview of the Child and relying on the Child’s inadmissible
hearsay statements during the interview; and (iii) finding that the best interest-factors
5
weighed against the guardianship petition by relying upon hearsay and previous
rulings.5
(11) To the extent the issues on appeal implicate rulings of law, we conduct
a de novo review.6 If the Family Court correctly applied the law, our review is
limited to abuse of discretion.7 We will not disturb the Family Court’s rulings on
appeal if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the record and its explanations,
deductions, and inferences are the product of an orderly and logical reasoning
process.8 On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trier of fact.9
(12) In arguing that the Family Court failed to apply standard set forth in
Section 2330(c) and find the Child dependent or neglected in DFS’ custody,10 Price
seems to believe (as DFS argued below but does not argue on appeal) that DFS
should be considered a parent of the Child for purposes of Section 2330(a). The
Family Court rejected this argument, finding it contrary to legislative intent and
Section 1113(a), which provides that the custody and guardianship transferred to a
5
Charles v. Div. of Family Servs., 2012 WL 1434992, at *1 (Del. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing In re
Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995)).
6
Heller, 669 A.2d at 29.
7
Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186–87 (Del. 1991).
8
Heller, 669 A.2d at 29.
9
Wife (J. F. V.), v. Husband (O. W. V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).
10
As both DFS and the Child’s counsel point out, the Family Court’s interpretation of the
guardianship statute benefitted Price because it relieved her of the burden of showing the Child
was dependent, neglected, or abused in the custody of DFS.
6
person or organization to whom parental rights are transferred terminates
automatically upon another order transferring parental rights or an order of adoption.
It is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue as granting Price’s guardianship petition
also had to be in the Child’s best interests, which the Family Court correctly
determined it was not.11
(13) Price next challenges the Family Court’s interview of the Child.
Contrary to Price’s contentions, the Family Court was not required to ask the
questions or use the materials submitted by Price. It was within the Family Court’s
discretion to interview the Child and to determine which, if any, of the questions
submitted by the parties to ask.12 The November 2021 order reflects that the Family
Court covered many of the topics suggested by Price’s questions, including whether
the Child missed her cousins, friends and school and whether Price took care of the
Child during the previous guardianship. There is no indication that the Family Court
abused its discretion in its interview of the Child.
11
See infra ¶¶ 15-17. We share the Family Court’s view that Section 2330 was not drafted in
anticipation of a situation like this one where a guardianship petition is filed against DFS after the
termination transfer of parental rights to DFS. We also agree with the Family Court that Section
2330 is ambiguous as to the required findings for parents in this situation. Under these
circumstances, we believe amendment of Section 2330 to clarify the legal standard applicable to
this situation would be beneficial.
12
13 Del. C. § 724(a) (“The Court may interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child’s
wishes as to his or her custodian and may permit counsel to be present at the interview.”); Maureen
F.G. v. George W.G., 445 A.2d 934, 936 (Del. 1982) (describing this statute as permissive and not
mandatory).
7
(14) As to Price’s contention that the Child’s statements during the interview
were inadmissible hearsay, she is mistaken. The Child’s statements—which
included that if she eventually did visit Price she would prefer visits to be supervised
so she would feel safer and that she did not want the Family Court to grant the
guardianship petition—were based on her personal experiences with Price. Those
statements were not hearsay.13
(15) Finally, Price argues that the Family Court erred in finding that the best-
interest factors weighed against her guardianship petition. This argument is not
persuasive. The Family Court addressed each of the best-interest factors under
Section 722 and made detailed findings as to each factor. The Family Court’s
conclusion that the best-interest factors weighed against Price’s guardianship
petition was supported by the record and the product of an orderly and logical
deductive process.
(16) Contrary to Price’s contentions, the Family Court could consider the
DFS worker’s testimony regarding the Child’s statements that she did not want to
live with Price and wanted a supervised visit so she could tell Price that what she
13
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 2015 WL 2169288, at *3 (Del. May 8, 2015) (testimony limited to
police officer’s personal experiences and firsthand observations was not hearsay); Jenkins v.
State, 8 A.3d 1147, 1153 (Del. 2010) (police officer’s testimony based on his firsthand
observations of which he had personal knowledge was not hearsay).
8
had done to her was wrong. As required by Section 724(d), DFS gave notice of its
intent to offer the out-of-court statement and the Family Court interviewed the Child.
(17) Price also argues that the Family Court could not consider its prior
rulings concerning Price and the Child. A court may take judicial notice of the
“records of the court in which the action is pending.”14 Price tries to relitigate the
factual findings in the Family Court’s earlier decision to rescind her guardianship of
the Child, but she already had the opportunity to raise those claims in her
unsuccessful appeal of that decision. She was not entitled to relitigate those claims
again in this proceeding.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the judgment of the
Family Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
14
D.R.E. 202(d)(1)(C).
9