Clark v. State ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DEVON P. CLARK, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 214, 2017
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 0806025325 (N)
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: February 23, 2018
Decided: April 24, 2018
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs1 and the record below, the Court
concludes that:
(1) The appellant, Devon P. Clark, filed this appeal from a Superior Court
order denying his motion to appoint conflict counsel to file an application for
sentence modification under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).2 The Superior Court held Clark
1
We have not considered the appellant’s untimely reply brief, which was filed more than thirty
days after the answering brief. See Supr. Ct. R. 15(a)(iii) (providing that reply brief must be filed
not later than fifteen days after service of the answering brief).
2
A notice to show cause directing Clark to show why this appeal should not be dismissed based
on this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear a criminal interlocutory appeal was discharged after
Clark and the State argued that the Superior Court order on appeal was a final order. The Superior
Court order on appeal left Clark without any further avenue to pursue relief under § 4214(f).
was ineligible for relief under § 4214(f) and denied his motion to appoint conflict
counsel. We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that, on April 9, 2009, Clark pled guilty to Robbery
in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation. The State filed a motion to
declare Clark a habitual offender under § 4214(a). The motion was based on the
following felony convictions: (i) Possession Within 1000 Feet of School committed
in January 2004; (ii) Possession with Intent to Deliver committed in March 1999;
(iii) Robbery in the First Degree committed in February 1990; (iv) Assault in the
Second Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a
Felony committed in March 1989; and (v) Robbery in the Second Degree committed
in March 1985.
(3) The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Clark a
habitual offender under § 4214(a). Clark was sentenced as follows: (i) for Robbery
in the Second Degree, as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. 4214(a), fifteen years
of Level V incarceration with credit for 148 days previously served; and (ii) for
Criminal Impersonation, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year
of Level III probation. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s
judgment.3
3
Clark v. State, 2009 WL 4688938 (Del. Dec. 9, 2009).
2
(4) On March 23, 2017, Clark asked the Superior Court for permission to
proceed pro se with a request to modify his habitual offender sentence under 11 Del.
C. § 4214(f). Under Superior Court Special Rule of Procedure 2017-1, which was
enacted by the Superior Court as directed by the General Assembly in 11 Del. C.
§ 4214(f), a request for certificate of eligibility under § 4214(f) may only be filed by
the petitioner’s attorney of record or the Office of Defense Services.4 The Superior
Court will not consider a pro se request under 4214(f) unless the petitioner is granted
permission to proceed pro se.5 The Superior Court denied Clark’s March 23, 2017
request without prejudice and forwarded Clark’s filing to his counsel at the time of
sentencing.
(5) The Office of Defense Services subsequently informed Clark he was
not eligible for relief under § 4214(f). On April 26, 2017, Clark filed a motion for
appointment of conflict counsel to represent him in his request for sentence
modification under § 4214(f). The Superior Court found Clark was not eligible for
relief under § 4214(f) and denied his motion to appoint conflict counsel. The
Superior Court did not grant Clark permission to proceed pro se. This appeal
followed.
4
Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(c)(2).
5
Id.
3
(6) On appeal, Clark argues that the Superior Court erred in finding he was
not eligible for relief under § 4214(f) and in denying his motion for appointment of
conflict counsel to file a certificate of eligibility under Superior Court Special Rule
of Procedure 2017-1(c)(2). Clark contends he was eligible for relief under § 4214(f)
and appointment of counsel because: (i) he was sentenced before July 19, 2016 for
a violent felony under § 4214(a); (ii) the sentence was not subject to suspension and
constituted a minimum mandatory sentence because the terms minimum, mandatory,
minimum mandatory, and mandatory minimum are synonymous under § 234; and
(iii) he has served the required minimum sentence. The State argues Clark was not
eligible for relief under § 4214(f) because the Superior Court exercised its discretion
to sentence Clark to more than the statutory maximum for Robbery in the Second
Degree and he was not entitled to appointment of counsel.
(7) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.6 “The goal of
statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” 7 If the
statute is determined to be unambiguous, “there is no need for judicial interpretation,
and the plain meaning of the statutory language controls.”8 “A statute is ambiguous
‘if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions or interpretations’ or ‘if a
literal reading of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result not
6
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 935 (Del. 2011).
7
Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999).
8
Id.
4
contemplated by the legislature.’”9 When a statute is ambiguous, a court may refer
to the legislative history to interpret the statute.10
(8) Effective July 19, 2016, the relevant provisions of § 4214(f) provided:
Notwithstanding any statute, court rule or regulation to the contrary,
beginning January 1, 2017, any person sentenced as an habitual
criminal prior to July 19, 2016, shall be eligible to petition the Superior
Court for sentence modification after the person has served a sentence
of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise
required by this section or the statutes describing said offense or
offenses, whichever is greater. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
the petitioner may only file 1 application for sentence modification
under this section. A Superior Court Judge upon consideration of a
petition filed pursuant to this subsection may modify, reduce or suspend
such petitioner’s sentence, excepting any minimum or mandatory
sentence required by this section or the statutes describing said offense
or offenses. If a Superior Court Judge modifies such petitioner’s
sentence, the Judge may impose a suspended sentence that includes a
probationary term. Nothing in this section, however, shall require the
Court to grant such a petitioner a sentence modification pursuant to this
section. For the purposes of this subsection, the “applicable mandatory
sentence” shall be calculated by reference to the penalties prescribed
for the relevant offense or offenses by this Code as of July 19, 2016,
unless said offense has been repealed, in which case the penalties
prescribed by this Code at the time of the act repealing said offense
shall be controlling.
(9) On April 13, 2017, these provisions were amended as reflected in bold
below:
Notwithstanding any statute, court rule or regulation to the contrary,
beginning January 1, 2017, any person sentenced as an habitual
criminal to a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory
9
LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 2007) (quoting Newtowne Vill. Serv.
Corp. v. Newtowne Rd. Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175 (Del. 2001)).
10
Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1287 (Del. 1994).
5
maximum penalty for a violent felony pursuant to 4214(a) of this
title, or a life sentence pursuant to 4214(b) of this title prior to July
19, 2016, shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court for sentence
modification after the person has served a sentence of incarceration
equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by this
section or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is
greater. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner may only
file 1 application for sentence modification under this section. A
Superior Court Judge upon consideration of a petition filed pursuant to
this subsection may modify, reduce or suspend such petitioner's
sentence, excepting any minimum or mandatory sentence required by
this section or the statutes describing said offense or offenses. If a
Superior Court Judge modifies such petitioner’s sentence, the Judge
may impose a suspended sentence that includes a probationary term.
Nothing in this section, however, shall require the Court to grant such
a petitioner a sentence modification pursuant to this section. For the
purposes of this subsection, the “applicable mandatory sentence” shall
be calculated by reference to the penalties prescribed for the relevant
offense or offenses by this Code as of July 19, 2016, unless said offense
has been repealed, in which case the penalties prescribed by this Code
at the time of the act repealing said offense shall be controlling.
(10) When Clark was sentenced for Robbery in the Second Degree as a
habitual offender, § 4214(a) provided a habitual offender could receive a sentence
of up to life imprisonment and would “receive a minimum sentence which shall not
be less than the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title for the
4th or subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the
person declared to be an habitual criminal except that this minimum provision shall
apply only when the 4th or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined
in § 4201(c) of this title.”11 The statutory maximum penalty for Robbery in the
11
11 Del. C.§ 4214(a) (2008).
6
Second Degree, the violent felony12 forming the basis of the State’s petition to
declare Clark an habitual offender, was five years of Level V incarceration.13 Clark
therefore faced a sentence between five years of Level V incarceration and life
imprisonment. The sentencing judge exercised his discretion to sentence Clark to
fifteen years of Level V incarceration, which exceeded the five-year maximum
statutory penalty for Robbery in the Second Degree under § 4214(a). Because the
sentencing judge exercised his discretion under § 4214(a) to sentence Clark to fifteen
years of Level V incarceration instead of five years of Level V incarceration, Clark
did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty
for a violent felony.”14
(11) Even if we accepted Clark’s interpretation of “a minimum sentence of
not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony” to include his
fifteen-year sentence as reasonable and deemed § 4214(f) ambiguous, the legislative
history does not support this interpretation. The General Assembly amended
§ 4214(f) in 2017 to clarify that the 2016 amendments were intended “to focus upon
the minimum mandatory sentences imposed by the habitual offender statute, as
opposed to those sentences where sentencing judges have complete discretion with
12
11 Del. C.§ 4201(c) (2008) (classifying Robbery in the Second Degree as a violent felony).
13
11 Del. C. § 831 (2008) (defining Robbery in the Second Degree as a Class E felony); 11 Del.
C. 4205(b)(5) (2008) (providing punishment for Class E felony is up to five years of Level V
incarceration).
14
11 Del. C. § 4214(f) (2017).
7
respect to sentencing.”15 The Superior Court exercised discretion in sentencing
Clark to fifteen years of Level V incarceration for Robbery in the Second Degree,
instead of the five-year minimum mandatory under § 4214. The Superior Court did
not err in holding Clark was not eligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). In
light of this holding, the Superior Court also did not err in denying Clark’s motion
for appointment of conflict counsel to file a certificate of eligibility under § 4214(f).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
15
81 Del. Laws ch. 6 (2017).
8