Warner v. DSCYF ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    AMANDA WARNER,1                                §
    §       No. 154, 2016
    Respondent Below,                    §
    Appellant,                           §       Court Below—Family Court of
    §       the State of Delaware in and for
    v.                                   §       New Castle County
    §
    DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES                         §       File No. CN15-04-12TN
    FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND                        §       Pet. No. CN13-03235
    THEIR FAMILIES (DSCYF),                        §
    §
    Petitioner Below,                    §
    Appellee.                            §
    Submitted: August 24, 2016
    Decided:   October 25, 2016
    Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
    ORDER
    This 25th day of October 2016, it appears to the Court that:
    (1)    The appellant, Amanda Warner (“Mother”), has appealed the
    Family Court’s order dated February 26, 2016, terminating her parental
    rights in her two children (collectively, the “Children”).2             Mother’s counsel
    has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court
    Rule 26.1(c). Counsel asserts that he has made a conscientious review of the
    1
    By Order dated March 28, 2016, the Court assigned a pseudonym to the appellant. Del.
    Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).
    2
    The Family Court also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s father.
    record and the law and can find no arguable grounds for appeal. Mother has
    not submitted any issues for the Court’s consideration.                In response to
    Counsel’s submission, the appellee, the Division of Family Services
    (“DFS”), has moved to affirm the Family Court’s judgment. The Children’s
    Court Appointed Special Advocate has no objection to Counsel’s motion to
    withdraw and joins in DFS’ response.
    (2)        Termination of parental rights in Delaware is based on a two-
    step statutory analysis.3 In the first step, the Family Court must determine
    whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a statutory basis for
    termination.4 When the statutory basis for termination is an alleged failure
    to plan, as in this case, the court also must determine by clear and
    convincing evidence that there is proof of at least one of five additional
    statutory conditions5 and that DFS “made bona fide, reasonable efforts to
    reunite the family.”6 In the second step of the analysis, if the court finds a
    statutory basis for termination, the court must determine whether there is
    3
    13 Del. C. § 1103(a). Shepherd v. Clemens, 
    752 A.2d 533
    , 537 (Del. 2000).
    4
    § 1103(a).
    5
    § 1103(a)(5).
    6
    Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 
    963 A.2d 724
    , 737
    (Del. 2008) (quoting Newton v. Div. of Family Serv., 
    2006 WL 2852409
    , at *2 (Del.
    2006) citing In re Hanks, 
    553 A.2d 1171
    , 1179 (Del. 1989))).
    2
    clear and convincing evidence that severing parental rights is in the best
    interest of the child.7
    (3)     In this case, the Family Court granted the termination of
    parental rights petition after concluding there was clear and convincing
    evidence of Mother’s failure to plan.              In a thorough and well-reasoned
    decision, the court found that Mother had not completed any of the
    requirements of her case plan despite DFS’ efforts for reunification, and that
    the Children had been in the custody of DFS for over one year. After
    considering the best interest factors under 13 Del. C. § 722, the court made
    factual findings and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence
    that severing Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the
    Children. This appeal followed.
    (4)     This Court's review of a decision to terminate parental rights
    requires consideration of the facts and the law as well as the inferences and
    deductions made by the Family Court.8 To the extent rulings of law are
    implicated, our review is de novo.9 To the extent issues implicate rulings of
    fact, we conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the Family Court
    7
    See 13 Del. C. § 722(a)(1)-(8) (listing best interest factors). Powell v. Dep’t of Servs.
    for Children, Youth & Their Families, 
    963 A.2d 724
    , 731 (Del. 2008).
    8
    Wilson v. Div. of Family Serv., 
    988 A.2d 435
    , 439-40 (Del. 2010) (citing cases).
    9
    
    Id. at 440
    .
    3
    to assure they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly
    wrong.10 This Court will not disturb inferences and deductions that are
    supported by the record and the product of an orderly and logical deductive
    process.11 If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our review is
    limited to abuse of discretion.12
    (5)   Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions on appeal
    and the Family Court record, the Court concludes there is clear and
    convincing evidence supporting the Family Court’s termination of Mother’s
    parental rights. This Court can discern no abuse of discretion in the Family
    Court’s factual findings and no error in the court’s decision to terminate
    Mother’s rights.        There is ample evidence in the record supporting
    termination on the statutory basis that Mother failed to plan for the
    Children’s physical needs or mental and emotional health and development.
    Also, there is ample record evidence that it was in the Children’s best
    interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Family Court thoroughly
    considered the best interest factors and was guided by the factual findings it
    made as to each. We are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious effort
    10
    
    Id.
    11
    
    Id.
    12
    
    Id.
    4
    to examine the record and the law and properly determined that Mother
    could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
    Family Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.
    BY THE COURT:
    /s/ Karen L. Valihura
    Justice
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 154, 2016

Judges: Valihura J.

Filed Date: 10/25/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2016