Matter of a Member ( 2016 )


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  • lN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN THE MATTER OF A § No. 50, 2016
    MEMBER OF THE BAR OF THE §
    SUPREME COURT OF § Board on Prof. Responsibility
    DELAWARE: § Case Nos. 111716-B; 111746-B;
    § 111785-B; 112295-B; 112296-B;
    MATTHEW M. CARUCCI, § 112311-B; 112313-B; 112314-B;
    § 112321-B; 112322-B; 112325-B
    Respondent. § and 112326-B
    Submitted: February 3, 2016
    Decided: February 8, 2016
    Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and VAL[HURA, Justices.
    0 R D E R
    This 8"‘ day of February 2016, it appears to the Court that:
    (1) This is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. On February 2, 2016,
    a panel of the Board on Professional Responsibility ("the Board") filed its
    Report with this Court, dated January 26, 2016, recommending that the
    respondent, MattheW M. Carucci, be suspended from the practice of law in
    DelaWare for a period of 18 months, retroactive to the date of Carucci’s
    transfer to disability inactive status on October 30, 2013. Neither the Office
    of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") nor Carucci has filed any objections to the
    Board’s report.
    (2) The Court has considered the matter carefully. Carucci
    substantially admitted the ethical violations alleged in the ODC’s petition
    against him. The Board carefully considered Carucci’s ethical violations,
    his knowing state of mind, the actual or potential injury caused by his
    misconduct, and all of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.
    Under the circumstances, we fmd the Board’s recommendation of an 18-
    month suspension to be appropriate. We therefore accept the Board’s
    findings and recommendation for discipline.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Board’s Report dated
    January 26, 2016 (attached hereto) is ACCEPTED. Matthew Carucci is
    hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law in Delaware for a period of
    18 months beginning October 30, 2013. Carucci shall pay the cost of the
    disciplinary proceedings. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel shall
    disseminate this Order in accordance with Rule 14 of the Delaware Lawyers’
    Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
    BY THE COURT:
    ustice
    "WlLL|AM STEWART “
    “30. |n 2013, Wi|liam Stewart (‘Stewart') retained Carucci DiLorenzo to prepare
    and file a bankruptcy petition and represent him in post-filing matters, including the 341
    Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted.”
    "31. Stewart paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $1306, which included
    the court filing fee and costs."
    “ANSWER: Admitted that Stewart paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at least
    $1,306 which included the court E|ing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that most,
    if not a||, of that fee was earned when paid."
    “32. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Stewart and did not
    attend the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    “ANSWER: Adm'rtted."
    Yet again, the petition was filed by Mr. Bi|lion, without charging any fee to Mr.
    Stewart. N0 refund has been made to Mr. Stewart by Respondent.z°
    “ROXANNE CARTER"
    “33. in 2013 Roxanne Carter (‘Carter’) retained Carucci DiLorenzo to prepare
    and file a bankruptcy petition and represent her in post-filing matters, including the 341
    Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted.”
    "34. Carter paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $1306, which included
    the court filing fee and costs."
    “ANSWER: Admitted that Carter paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at least
    20 Tr. 34.
    $1,306 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that most,
    if not a||, of that fee was eamed when paid.”
    “35. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Carter and did not attend
    the 341 Meeting of the Credltors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted.”
    Respondent did have Ms. Carter sign an engagement agreement which indicated
    that the attorney client relationship began when the agreement was signed which took
    place on September 2, 2013. The petition was filed by Mr. Billion again without charge
    to the ciient. The retainer of $1306 paid by Ms. Carter was deposited into Respondent's
    firrn's operating account on August 27, 2013 before the engagement letter was signed
    and before the attomey client relationship officially began as provided in the
    engagement letter.z‘ No refund of the retainer has ever been made to Ms. Carter.”
    “JENN|FER R|NEHOLT"
    "36. ln 2013, Jennifer Rineholt (‘Rineholt’) retained Carucci DiLorenzo to
    prepare and file a divorce petition.”
    “ANSWER: Admitted.”
    “37. Rineholt paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $910, which included
    the court filing fee and costs."
    “ANSWER: Admltted that Rineholt paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at least
    $910 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that most, if
    not a|l, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    "38. Respondent never filed a divorce petition for Rineholt."
    “ANSWER: Admitted.”
    Respondent retumed the retainer to Ms. Rinehoit'. The source of that check was
    not the client trust account. That refund was made following an investigation by the
    Lawyers' Fund for C|ient Protection.”
    The Petition alleges the following counts against the Respondent, who answers
    as indicated:
    “COUNT I: RESPONDENT FA|LED TO PROVlDE COMPETENT
    REPRESENTAT|ON |N V|OLAT|ON OF RULE 1.1"
    “39. Rule 1.1 states an attomey “shal| provide competent representation to a
    client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, ski|l, thoroughness and
    preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
    “ANSWER: No answer required."
    “40. By failing to file the inventory and Accounting for Grooms, failing to
    complete the Estate Planning Documents for Seward, failing to file the Adoption Petition
    for Peterson and Rodrlguez, failing to tile the divorce petition for Rineholt, and failing to
    prepare and/or file bankruptcy petitions for the Aposto|icos, Crothers, Huber,
    Thompson, Carbone, Stewart and Carter, Respondent failed to provide competent
    representation in violation of Rule 1.1.”
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent asserts that at the
    time he failed to provide competent representation, he was suffering from a serious
    medical disabllity."
    "COUNT l|: RESPONDENT FA|LED TO ACT W|TH REASONABLE
    D|LlGENCE lN VIOLAT|ON OF RULE 1.3"
    "41. Rule 1.3 states an attorney “sha|| act with reasonable diligence and
    promptness in representing a c|ient."
    “ANSWER: No answer required."
    “42. By failing to file the inventory and Accounting for Grooms, failing to
    complete the Estate P|anning Documents for Seward, failing to file the Adoption Petition
    for Peterson and Rodriguez, failing to file the divorce petition for Rineho|t, and failing to
    prepare and/or file bankruptcy petitions for the Apostolicos, Crothers, Huber,
    Thompson, Carbone, Stewart and Carter, Respondent failed to act with reasonable
    diligence in violation of Ru|e 1.3."
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent asserts that at the
    time he failed to provide diligent representation, he was suffering from personal and
    emotional issues as well as a serious medical disability."
    "COUNT |||: RESPONDENT FA|LED TO RETA|N UNEARNED ADVANCE
    FEES lN A TRUST ACCOUNT |N VIOLAT|ON OF RULE 1.5(f)"
    “43. Ru|e 1.5(f) states an attomey “may require the client to pay some or all of
    the fee in advance of" the representation provided “[a]ll uneamed fees shall be retained
    in the lawyer’s trust account ..."
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Comment [10] to Ru|e 1.5
    states as follows: “Some smaller fees - such as those less than $2,500 - may be
    considered eamed in whole upon some identified event, such as upon commencement
    of the attomey's work on that matter or the attomey's appearance on the record.
    However, a fee considered to be ‘eamed upon commencement of the attomey's work
    on the matter’ is not the same as a fee ‘earned upon receipt.' The former requires that
    the attomey actually begin work whereas the latter is dependent only upon payment by
    the client. in a criminal defense matter, for examp|e, a smaller fee - such as a fee
    under $2,500 - may be considered earned upon entry of the attorney’s appearance on
    the record or at the initial consultation at which substantive, confidential infonnation has
    been communicated which would preclude the attomey from representation of another
    potential client (e.g. a co-defendant). Nevertheless, all fees must be reasonable such
    that even a smaller fee might be refundab|e, in whole or in part, if it is not reasonable
    under the circumstances."
    "44. By failing to retain all uneamed advance fees in the attomey trust account
    for the Grooms, Seward, Peterson and Rodriguez, Rineholt, Apcstolico, Crothers.
    Huber, Thompson, Carbone, Stewart and Carter matters, Respondent violated Ru|e
    1.5(f)."
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent asserts that at the
    time he failed to retain all unearned fees in a trust account, he was suffering from
    personal and emotional issues as well as a serious medical disability. Respondent
    further asserts that he has refunded all uneamed fees when requested and that most if
    not all of the fee was eamed when paid."
    “COUNT lV: RESPONDENT FAlLED TO SAFEGUARD CLiENT FUNDS
    lN V|OLAT|ON OF RULE 1.15(3)"
    “45. Ru|e 1.15(a) states an attomey shall safeguard property of clients or third
    persons in his possession."
    “ANSWER: No answer required."
    “46. By failing to maintain advance fees in the attomey trust account in the
    Grooms, Seward, Peterson and Rodriguez, Rineholt. Apostolico, Crothers, Huber,
    Thompson, Carbone, Stewart and Carter matters, Respondent failed to safeguard client
    funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a).”
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent asserts that at the
    time he failed to safeguard client funds, he was suffering from personal and emotional
    issues as well as a serious medical disability. Respondent further asserts that he has
    refunded all uneamed fees when requested and that most 'rf not all of the fee was
    eamed when paid."
    “LFCP AUD|T”
    “47. On October 21, 2013, Master Sidlow Associates, P.A., auditor for the
    Lawyers' Fund for C|ient Protection (“LFCP"), attempted to conduct a compliance audit
    of Respondent’s law practice's books and records for the twelve month period ending
    September 30, 2013. Respondent was asked to provide documentation necessary for
    completion of the audit and could not do so. The audit was suspended when
    Respondent unexpectedly left the office. On December 18, 2013, the LFCP resumed
    the audit and prepared a report regarding its findings."
    “ANSWER: Admitted that on October 21, 2013. Master Sidlow Associates, P.A.,
    auditor for the Lawyers' Fund for C|ient Protection ("LFCP"), began a compliance audit
    of Respondent’s law practice's books and records for the twelve month period ending
    September 30, 2013. Admitted that Respondent was asked to provide documentation
    necessary for completion of the audit and could not immediately do so. Denied that the
    audit was suspended when Respondent unexpectedly left the off'rce."
    "By way of further answer, the auditors advised Respondent that they were
    leaving to get lunch. When they had not returned approximately two hours later,
    Respondent left to pick up his children from school. When he retumed from doing so,
    one of the auditors was meeting with Respondent's father, who is a CPA. When
    Respondent asked the auditor if anything else was required of Respondent, he was told
    that they did not need anything from him at that time and Respondent left.
    Subsequently, the LFCP auditors requested additional information from Respondent.
    Respondent provided that information to the Receiver. The Receiver was then advised
    by the LFCP auditors that the information was no longer needed ."
    “48. The audit revealed the following deficiencies in Respondent's books and
    records:"
    a. Respondent's cash receipts entries did not match deposit totals in
    any of the months in the time period reviewed;"
    “b. Respondent did not identify the client name in the cash
    disbursements joumal entries;”
    c. Respondent did not prepare proper bank reconciliations so it could
    not be determined whether there were any outstanding checks;"
    “d. The existence of a separate account for each client could not be
    determined due to the lack of complete client subsidiary ledgers;"
    “e. The auditor could not ascertain that all fiduciary transactions for
    cash receipts and cash disbursements were entered in the subsidiary ledger;”
    "f. Respondent's reconciled end of the month cash balances did not
    agree to total client funds held in any of the months during the time period
    reviewed; and”
    g. There were numerous instances of negative client funds in the time
    period reviewed."
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, these deficiencies were
    noted for the audited period of September 30, 2012, to September 30, 2013.
    Respondent suffered personal and emotional problems during the period in
    question and was also suffering from a serious medical disabi|ity."
    “49. The 2013 Certificate of Compliance accompanying Respondent’s Annual
    Registration Statement and filed with the Supreme Court includes misrepresentations
    regarding the status of Respondent’s law practice’s books and records. Respondent
    answered “YES” to questions 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 27, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.15 when he
    should have answered “NO.”
    “ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent’s 2013 Certificate
    inaccurately reported the status of his books and records for the three months of 2012
    covered by the LFCP audit. Respondent did not file a Certificate of Compliance in 2014
    or make any other representations as to the status of his books and records in 2013."
    "COUNT V: RESPONDENT FA|LED TO MA|NTA|N H|S LAW
    PRAcTicE's socks AND REcoRos iN vl0LATloN oF
    RuLE 1.15(¢1)"
    “50. Rule 1.15(d) sets forth detailed and specific requirements for the
    maintenance of a law practice’s books and records and handling of practice-related
    funds."
    "ANSWER: No answer required.”
    "51. By failing to abide by the requirements for maintaining his law practice's
    books and records, Respondent violated Ru|e 1.15(d).”
    "ANSWER: Admitted”
    "COUNT Vl: RESPONDENT ENGAGED lN CONDUCT |NVOLV|NG
    MISREPRESENTAT|ON |N VIOIAT|ON OF RULE 8.4(0)"
    “52. Ru|e 8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for an attomey to “engage
    in conduct involving  misrepresentation.""
    "ANSWER: No answer required."
    “53. By filing his 2013 Certificate of Comp|iance with the Supreme Court, which
    included misrepresentations relating to Respondent's maintenance of his law practice's
    books and records, Respondent engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation in
    violation of Ru|e 8.4(c)."
    "ANSWER: Admitted. By way of further answer, Respondent’s 2013 Certificate
    of Comp|iance inaccurately reflected the status of his books and records for the three
    months of 2012 covered by the LFCP audit. Respondent did not file a Certifrcate of
    Compliance in 2014 or make any other representations as to the status of his books and
    records in 2013. “
    "COUNT V|l: RESPONDENT ENGAGED |N CONDUCT PREJUD|C|AL TO THE
    ADM|N|STRATION OF JUST|CE lN VIOLAT|ON OF RULE 8.4(d)”
    "54. Ru|e 8.4(d) states it is professional misconduct for an attomey to “engage
    in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice."
    "ANSWER: No answer required."
    “55. The Supreme Court relies on attomey representations in Certil’lcates of
    Comp|iance in the administration of justice in connection with the practice of law in
    De|aware. “
    “ANSWER: No answer required."
    “56. By filing his 2013 Certiticate of Comp|iance with the Supreme Court, which
    included misrepresentations relating to Respondent’s maintenance of his law practice's
    books and records, Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
    justice in violation of Ru|e 8.4(d)."
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    Resgondent's Exglanation
    Respondent attributes his problems to mental health issues with his wife.
    Respondent and his wife were married in November of 2011. Mrs. Carucci suffered
    from a major depressive disorder and PTSD from childhood abuse.“ On December 6,
    2011, she suffered a break whereby she became verbally and physically abusive to
    Respondent and verbally abusive to Respondent's oldest son from his irst marriage.“
    According to Respondent. his wife's abusive conduct included,
    breaking things, throwing things, hitting me, attacking me, threatening me. And it just
    sort o;e went from zero to 60 after this one event in that December. And everything fell
    apart.
    Respondent continued, "By February, l was having panic attacks and just - l had
    never been through this before. l had always thought l suffered from depression and l
    thought that was what was being triggered. So l went and sought treatrnent."
    l started seeing a therapist at some point in early '12, doctors for prescription.
    They started prescribing antidepressants. Things got worse and worse between me
    and her. Just added onto her mental health issue, a miscarriage in - it was right around
    Christmas or before Christmas of '1‘l, maybe beginning of '12. And just things getting
    24 Tr. 63.
    25 Tr. 63.
    26 Tr. 63-84»
    EFiled: Feb 02 2o1e11:osA _ = ° `
    Finng lo 53501006
    Case Number 50,2016
    BOARD ON PROFESS|ONAL RESPONS|B|L|TY OF THE
    C
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE j g ;
    ~' 2
    |n the Matter of § §
    a Member of the Bar of CONFlDENTlAL . |_-‘g
    the Supreme Court of " ` §§
    the State of Delaware: Board Case Nos. 111716-B; 11§1»74 §
    111785-B; 112295-B; 112296-&;5 2
    112311-B; 112313-B; 112314-5';. §
    112321-8; 112322-B; 1 12325-3`? ?¢
    and 112326-8
    MATTHEW M. CARUCC|
    Respondent.
    §f`-I&I\I`-/§/§/`nf
    REPORT OF THE BOARD ON
    PET|TION FOR D|SC|PL|NE AND RECOMMENDED SANCT|ONS
    The Petition for Discipline in this matter was fried on October 8, 2015 (the
    “Petition") by the Offlce of Discip|inary Counse| (“ODC"). The ODC seeks sanctions
    against Matthew M. Carucci (“Carucci" or “Respondent") for (i) violating the rules
    governing ethical conduct of a lawyer who does not meet his obligations to eleven (11)
    different clients, (it) for making a misrepresentation to the Court and (iii) for not properly
    safeguarding funds of certain c|ients. A hearing was held on November 19, 2015, in the
    Supreme Court Hearing Room, 11th Floor, Carvel State Building, 820 North French
    Street, Wi|mington, De|aware ("the Hearing"). The members of the panel for the Board
    were Mr. Dennis Klima, John L. Reed, Esquire and Wayne J. Carey, Esquire who acted
    as Chair (the “Panel"). Kath|een M. Vavala, Esquire represented the ODC, and Mr.
    Charles Slanina, Esquire represented the Respondent
    AoMlT'rEo FAc'rs"
    The facts as alleged in the Petition are substantially admitted. For the sake of
    ease, we quote verbatim from the Petition and the Answer ti|ed October 27, 2015,
    1 Referenoes to the hearing transcript are cited as 'Tr._'. References to the Petition andlor Answer are either just
    quoted with paragraph number reference of citing as 'Petitlon § _' or 'Answer §_. Thanks to Mr. Slanlna for
    provided his lnterllneated Answer electronlcally.
    worse and worse between us. Her behavior and her inability to function becoming
    worse and worse and making my mental health issues going like this and just making
    each other worse and worse.
    We separated in Apri| of ’12. You would think maybe that would have solved
    some of it but it didn'r.=°
    Iiiiiiii***i*\
    Things actually got worse between us from there over the next several months.
    She would show up a lot and the same sort of violent outbursts would happen. A lot of
    phone harassment, a lot of harassing other people l know, friends. She lashed out at
    my law partner, who was a close friend who was in our wedding and other people l was
    friends with. My parents. Just sort of scorched, earth, l’m going to ruin everything for
    this man mentally."'°
    iiiiiiiiiiI******
    Mine was getting worse. My, like l said, what l thought was depressive disorder.
    More and more meditions over 2012. Every time l would change doctors and they
    would change to a different antidepressant or add more to it. Hey, it's not working, let's
    try a little more.a°
    And everything just kept getting - no matter what l tried, everything just kept
    getting worse. The panic attacks got more frequent and more severe. Physical illness.
    Just inability to even get out of bed sometimes. '
    According to Respondent's testimony, the anti-depressants were not he|ping.
    lnstead, they seemed to make his condition worse. This worsening condition created
    an inability to function, adversely affected his memory, his appetite and his energy,
    “Even the clarity of my thinking."”
    The depression had a serious effect on Respondent's ability to conduct his law
    practice. He tried to rely on attomeys in his finn to pick up the work load. However, it
    proved too difEcu|t for those attomeys to maintain both their own workload and
    Respondent's.” As a result, Respondent became a solo practitioner by the end of
    2012.
    27 Tr. 64.
    28 Tr. 64-65.
    29 Tr. 66.
    30 Tr. 68.
    31 Tr. 86.
    32 Tr. 67. 89
    33 Tr. 88.
    After more time with a variety of doctors, Respondent met Dr. K who, after
    evaluation, diagnosed Respondent not as depressive, but bi-po|ar, specifically Bipo|ar 2.
    His condition was exacerbated by the depression medicine he was given.“ Dr. K
    eventually got him on the right medication for his condition. Respondent used a letter
    from Dr. K in support of his petition for disability.” That petition was tiled on October
    23, 2013.3° The Order granting the petition for disability was entered on October 30,
    2013.°'
    When he went on disability, in addition to the bankruptcy cases that Mr. Bil|ion
    took over without charge to the c|ients“, Mr. Rahaim took over as receiver of
    Respondent's practice.
    Respondent readily admits that he should never have allowed the inattention to
    his practice to go on as long as it did.°° He realizes that he put his clients through
    unnecessary difficulties. He openly admits his remorse for his culpability.‘°
    The stay on disciplinary proceedings imposed by the Order granting disability
    was lifted upon applition of Respondent on November 7, 2014."
    FANEL‘S F|ND|NGS
    Respondent relies on Comment 10 to Rule 1.5 arguing that fees under $2500
    need not be deposited in trust accounts. Respondent cannot dodge the bullet of guilt by
    such an argument. Respondent's reliance on this argument obviously has no merit.
    34 Tr. 70-71 .
    35 Tr. 71 .
    36 Tr. 76.
    37 Tr. BO.
    38 Tr. 82.
    39 Tr. 74
    40 Tr. 75.
    41 Tr. 84, 87.
    20
    The Delaware Supreme Court dealt with this very issue in in the Matter of
    B_a_rLa_t,*Z where it held that the Comments to Rule 1.5 do not give blanket authorization
    to put all fees under $2500 in an operating account, bypassing the trust account. in the
    words of the Court, "By their plain |anguage, the Comments do not authorize an
    attomey to deposit any fee under $2500 automatically into his operating account....By
    the Comments' own terms, if an attomey receives an advance fee of less than
    $2500.00, of which he owns a portion upon commencing work, the uneamed portion of
    the advance fee must still be placed in a iiduciary account.”“
    Except for the reliance on that misinterpretation of Comment 10 Rule 1.5, each of
    the counts is admitted. We, therefore, find that the ODC has met its burden of showing
    by clear and convincing evidence that each of the seven (7) counts was violated as
    aiieged.“
    Vl. SANCTIONS
    A. Obiectives and Standards: for imposing Sanctions
    "'l`he objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system are to protect the pub|ic, to
    protect the administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and
    to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.""" lt is the duty of the Board to
    recommend a sanction that will promote those objectives, while remembering the
    Supreme Court's admonishment that sanctions are not to be punitive or penal."°
    in determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct. the Delaware
    Supreme Court follows the ABA Standards:
    42 
    99 A.3d 639
     (Dei. 2013).
    43 Ld.(emphasls in orlginal).
    44 in re. Nowak, 
    5 A.3d 631
     (Dei. 2010).
    45 ln re M¢:Cann, 894 A.2d at 1088: in re Founiain, 878 A.2d 1167. 1173 (Dei. 2005) (quollng In Ra Balley. 821 A.2d
    at 866); in re Doughiy, 
    832 A.2d 724
    , 735-736 (Dei. 2003).
    46 ln re Ka!z, 981 A.2d 1133. 1149 (Dei. 2009); In re Ganett, 
    835 A.2d 514
    , 515 (Dei. 2003).
    21
    The ABA framework consists of four key factors to be
    considered by the Court: (a) the ethical duty violated;
    (b) the |awyer's mental state; (c) the actual or
    potential injury caused by the |awyer's misconduct;
    and, (d) aggravating and mitigating factors""
    1. The Ethical Duties violated
    Based on his own admissions and the corresponding findings of the Panel, the
    ethical duties violated can be summarized in the chart below:
    Count Rule Content of Rule Factual Basis for Resolutions
    Wolated \/iolation
    An attomey shall provide (i) Failure to tile Admitted,
    competent representation
    which requires legal
    know|edge, skill,
    thoroughness and
    preparation
    inventory and qualified by
    Accounting for statement
    Grooms, (ii) failing of suffering
    An attomey shall act with
    reasonable diligence and
    promptness
    to complete estate a serious
    planning illness
    documents for
    Seward, (iii) failing
    to file adoption
    petition for
    Peterson and
    Rodriquez, (iv)
    and failing to
    prepare and file
    bankruptcy
    petitions for
    Apostolicos.
    Crothers, Huber,
    Thompson,
    Carbone, Stewart
    and Carter
    (i) Failure to tile
    inventory and qualified by
    Accounting for statement
    Grooms, (ii) failing of suffering
    to complete estate a serious
    planning illness and
    documents for ersonal
    Admitted
    47 In re Doughty, 832 A.2d at 736; ln ns Goldstaln, 990 Azd 404, 408 (Del. 2010); See also in Re McCann, 894 A.2d
    at 1088; In re Fountain, 878 A. 2d at 1173; in re Steinar, 817 A.2d at 793, 796 (Del. 2003).
    22
    V 1.15(d)
    LFCP
    Audit
    8-4(°)
    An attomey shall
    safeguard property of
    clients or third persons in
    his possession
    Attomey must maintain
    proper books and records
    Attomey must not engage
    in conduct involving...
    misrepresentation
    and
    emotional
    issues
    Seward, (iii) failing
    to file adoption
    petition for
    Peterson and
    Rodriquez. (iv) and
    failing to prepare
    and tile bankruptcy
    petitions for
    Apostolicos,
    Crothers. Huber,
    Thompson,
    Carbone, Stewart
    and Carter
    Failing to maintain
    advance fees in
    trust account in
    Grooms, Seward,
    Peterso_n and
    Rodriguez,
    Rineholt,
    Apostolico,
    Crothers. Huber, emotional
    Thompson, issues; A|so
    Carbone, Stewart qualified by
    and Carter matters saying all
    uneamed
    fees were
    retumed
    when
    requested
    and that
    most if not
    all of the
    fee was
    eamed
    when paid.
    Admitted
    qualified by
    statement
    of suffering
    a serious
    illness and
    personal
    and
    in adequacies
    enumerated in
    paragraph 48 of
    etition.
    included
    misrepresentations
    in 2013 Certiticate
    of Compliance
    Admitted
    that 2013
    Certificate
    inaccurately
    reflected
    status of
    books and
    records
    Admitted
    of Comp|ianoe
    violated this rule
    2. The Lagyer’s Mental State
    Respondent bases his entire defense on the problems with his marriage and his
    resulting mental state, ultimately diagnosed as bipolar disorder. We view these matters
    to be relevant to mitigation, which we understand is what Carucci intends.
    3. Actual or Potential ln|ug
    The Pane| finds that there is limited, if any, actual hann to any of Respondent's
    clients. Restitution in the fonn of refunds of retainers has been made to those clients
    who requested it. lndeed, the record reflects unrebutted testimony from Respondent
    that some of the refunds were paid out of the personal account he held with his wife and
    other refunds were paid from money borrowed from Respondent's father since Carucci
    was not working and did not have income from which to finance refunds of client
    retainers.‘°. Those refunds were paid in full regardless of whether or not some work
    had been actually done to earn some of the fees.
    Some retainers were eamed in whole or in part. For example, Respondent
    testified, that, particularly in personal bankruptcy petitions, he would get much of the
    petition preparation work done with the client during the client’s first visit to his office at
    the time retainers were paid.‘°
    We do recognize at least the potential for, or even likelihood of, damage to
    48 Tr. 44.
    49 Tr. 46.
    clients in the form of stress caused by the delay in Respondent taking action on the
    clients' matters. ODC argues for findings of potential harm, but again, there is nothing
    in the record from which we can conclude the existence of potential hann to clients.s°
    Either through the work of Mr. Bil|ion taking over bankruptcy cases at no charge and Mr.
    Rahaim, the receiver, the client matters were covered so that no client lost their legal
    rights."
    Again, we feel obliged to mention the role of Mr. Billion. As noted by ODC,
    without his stepping in at no charge to o|ients, injury could have been real and serious
    Aggravating and Mitlgating Clrcumstances
    After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
    circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanctions to impose.§z “Aggravation
    or aggravating circumstances are any consideration of factors that may justify an
    increase in the degree of discipline to be lmposed."s"'
    a) Aggregating Factors
    The Panel finds the there are three aggravating factors as set forth in ABA
    Standard 9.22: (1) a pattern of misconduct based on the number of clients affected,“
    (2) multiple offenses again based on the number of clients affected°s; and (3)
    substantial experience in the practice of law.s° Mr. Carucci was admitted to the
    Delaware Bar over ten (10) years ago in 2004.57
    b) Mltigating Factors
    50 Tr. 97-99; but see ABA Standard 1.3, Comment 3 referenced by ODC at Tr. 99.
    51 Tr. 100.
    52 In IB Balley. 
    821 A.2d 851
     (Del. 2003), Goldsl€ln, 990 A, 2d at 408.
    53 ABA Standard 9.21.
    54 ABA Standard 9.22 (c).
    55 ABA Standard 9.22 (d).
    56 ABA Standard 9.22(l).
    57 Tr. 14.
    Mitigating factors “are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in
    the degree of discipline to be imposed."s° We find that the mitigating factors are as
    fol|ows:
    (1) absence of prior disciplinary record.s° The ODC concedes that Mr.
    Carucci has not been disciplined before this case°°; (2) absence of dishonest or selfish
    motive;°‘ The existence of this factor is self-evident by Carucci's retuming retainers
    using his own personal funds and his borrowing money from his father to pay some of
    those refunds. in addition he sought and obtained the generous help of Mr. Billion with
    respect to bankruptcy matters; (3) personal or emotional prob|ems.°z Carucci testified
    about his emotional problems leading to a bipolar diagnosis brought on by marital
    problems resulting from his wife's own emotional issues and the abuse to which he was
    subjected at his wife's hands; (4) effort to make restitution or rectify consequence of
    misconduct.°“ This factor is evidenced by his use of personal funds and borrowed funds
    to reimburse clients their retainers. We believe that this factor is also supported by
    Respondent's voluntary filing of the Petition for Disability.°" (5) By all indication, Carucci
    was professional and cooperative throughout these proceedings;°s (6) character or
    reputation.°° The unrebutted testimony of Mr. Eichelberger was offered to establish this
    factor,°' (7) expression of remorse and cooperation°° .Not only has Mr. Camcci
    convincingly stated his remorse on the record, he has apologized to his c|ients. ln
    58 ABA standard 9.31.
    59 ABA standard 9.32(a).
    60 Tr. 112
    61 ABA standard 9.32(b).
    62 ABA standard 9.32(¢:).
    63 ABA standard 9.32(d).
    64 ABA standard 9.32(¢).
    65 Tr.137.
    66 ABA standard 9.32(9).
    87 Tr. 49-59.
    88 ABA standard 9.32(m); Tr. 75.
    addition, he has undertaken, on his own, to seek professional assistance through the
    Delaware Lawyers Assistance Program and by obtaining psychiatric help, H|ed for the
    0rder of Disability on his own volition and sought help on cases from Mr. Bil|ion. l
    The Board finds that the aggravating factors are significantly outweighed by the
    mitigating factors. Neverthe|ess, a public sanction is justified in order to satisfy the
    requirement of protecting the public.
    Vll. PANEL'S RECOMMENDED SANCT|ON.
    The Board’s recommendation of an appropriate sanction assists the Court, but it
    is not binding.°° The court “hee wide latitude in determining the form of dieoipiine, end
    [it] will review the recommended sanction to ensure that it is appropriate, fair and
    consistent with . . . prior disciplinary decisions.'”° According|y, the Board must carefully
    examine prior disciplinary precedent to the extent possible in recommending sanctions.
    The ODC cites to Respondent's multiple violations and recommends that Carucci
    be given a suspension of two years" but with retroactive effect to the date of his
    Disability Order"' To aid in our analysis we have reviewed the following decisions
    suggested by counsel or that we found on our own:
    1) In re Novak." Novak experienced marital troubles and struggled with
    bipo|ar disorder for over a decade. His situation was further
    destabi|ized by an adverse interaction between his bipo|ar medicine
    and a steroid prescribed for a rash. "Throughout 2008, Respondent's
    [Novak] practice declined and he lost most of his business and his
    69 in re McCann. 894 A.2d at 1088; ln re Bal|ey. 821 A.2d at 877.
    70 ld.; ln re Tonwe, 929 A.2d at 777. in re Stelner, 817 A.2d t 796.
    71 Tr. 121. 154
    72 Tr. 147.
    73 
    5 A.3d 631
     (Del. 2010)
    staff."" Novak tiled Annua| Registration statements for 2008 and 2009
    that were inaccurate. The Lawyers’ Fund for C|ient Protectlon ordered
    an audit of Novak's records. That audit revealed substantial non-
    compliance in Novak's trust account with balances that had not been
    reoonciled. A follow up audit showed little or no improvement, i.e..
    continued deficiencies in many areas. When his accounting staff
    asked for help with reconciling the books, Novak told them to take care
    t_75
    of i He was found to have violated all fve counts, specifically Rules
    (i) 1.15(a) (failing to safeguard client’s funds), (ii) 1.15(d) (failure to
    maintain books and records. The panel found Novak acted with
    know|edge, indeed significant indifferenoe, as to the condition of his
    books and records); (iii) 5.3 (failure to supervise those who maintained
    his books and records), (iv) 8.4(c) (making misrepresentations to the
    Court in his Certilites of Compliance) and (v) 8.4(d) (conduct
    prejudicial to the administrative of justice). Whi|e the panel found no
    proof of actual in.jury, the panel did find that Novak's total lack of
    financial control created “the potential for such injury"."'
    Aggravating factors found were: (i) pattem of misconduct; (ii)
    multiple offenses; and (iii) substantial experience in the practice of law.
    Mitigating factors found were: (i) absence of a dishonest motive, (ii)
    existence of personal or emotional problems, (iii) full and free
    disclosure and cooperation with disciplinary proceedings, and (iv)
    74 ]_d. at ‘2.
    75 l_d. al 3-5.
    76_l_d. at *7-8
    “1. Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of De|aware in
    2004.”
    “ANSWER: Admiued." 2
    Respondent is also admitted in Pennsylvania.“
    "2. At all times relevant to this Petition, Respondent was engaged in the
    private practice of law with primary responsibility for the books and record keeping of his
    tirm, Carucci DiLorenzo, LLC (‘Carucci DiLorenzo’).”
    “ANSWER: Admitted". The Carucci DiLorenzo partnership ended on December
    30, 2012.‘
    “3. 0n October 23, 2013 the De|aware Supreme Court transferred
    Respondent to disability inactive status and stayed all disciplinary proceedings against
    him.” The application for disability inactive status was actually filed by Carucci himse|f,
    who recognized the problems he was having and that he needed help."’
    “ANSWER: Admitted. “
    “4. The Chancery Court appointed Andrew D. Rahaim, Esquire as Receiver
    of the Respondent's law practice on October 30, 2013. On November 7, 2013, Mr.
    Rahaim assumed control over Respondent's Attorney Trust Account and Attomey
    Operating Account. The balance in Respondent's Attomey Trust Account was $2.50;
    the balance in his Attomey Operating Account was negative $381.73.”
    “ANSWER: As soon as he was notified by the Receiver of the negative
    operating account ba|ance, Respondent deposited sufficient funds to eliminate the
    negative ba|ance."
    2 Tr. 14.
    3 Tr. 61.
    4 Tr. 15.
    5 Tr. 76.
    remorse. The panel recommended that Novak receive a suspension of
    no less than one year. The one glaring difference between N_o\g< and
    the present case is that the present case had eleven instances of the
    lawyer not doing his duty to his client by not performing the tasks for
    which he was retained. No such issues were raised in Mga_lg.
    Therefore, a one year suspension to Carucci does not seem sufficient.
    2) In re Bailey." The issue was a managing partner‘s failure to
    supervise, resulting in books and records and tax obligations not
    complying with rules goveming their maintenance. The Respondent
    and the ODC stipulated to a public reprimand and a three year
    probation. The Board panel refused to accept the stipulated sanction,
    instead recommending a suspension of six months and one day. No
    claims of (i) failing to safeguard client funds or (ii) failing to represent
    clients properly were present in Bailey, where multiple counts have
    been found against Carucci.
    3) in the Matter of McDennott-Lundin."° The Board panel found the
    Respondent was in violation of not responding to clients or keeping
    them infon'ned on the status of their respective cases. The Board
    panel recommended a sanction of a one (1) year suspenslon,
    retroactive to the Court's interim Suspension Order. The Court's order
    accepted the pane|'s factual findings, but without comment or
    exp|anation, imposed a suspension of two years, retroactive to the
    77 
    821 A.2d 851
     (Del. 2003).
    78 
    956 A.2d 642
     (De|. 2001).
    4)
    entry of the interim Suspension Order. The Court’s action suggests it
    believes a two year suspension is an appropriate sanction for
    inattention to client matters. if so, a two year suspension would be
    called for in the present case, at least before consideration of
    aggravating and mitigating factors.
    In the Matter of Cannine."° Respondent was found to have committed
    violations of (i) neglecting clients' legal matters, (ii) failure to keep
    clients informed of the status of their cases; (iii) misrepresentations to
    clients on the status of their cases; (iv) failing to perfect an appeal; (v)
    failing to pursue negotiations or file suit; (vi) failure to prepare a
    stipulation for substitution of counsel; (vii) failure to surrender his tile to
    new counsel; and (vlii) failure to respond to lawful demand for
    information from ODC. The Court imposed a sanction of a two year
    suspension where respondent (i) was suffering from emotional
    problems, (ii) had sought to rehabilitate himself, (iii) had shown
    remorse for his misdeeds; (iv) and made restitution to one client to
    rectify financial damage caused by Respondent's misconduct. The
    Court stated, “We conclude that the serious nature of the
    transgressions established in these proceedings requires, inter alia,
    that Cannine be suspended from the Bar of the State of De|aware for a
    period of two years."°° Cannine confirms that the serious nature of the
    transgressions by Carucci with eleven (11) different clients, failure to
    79 
    559 A.2d 248
     (Del. |989)
    80]_¢1. at *|2.
    safeguard client funds and misrepresentation to the Court warrant a
    significant suspension.
    5) In the Matter of Higglns'°' The charges against Higgins related to six
    different client matters. The violations included (i) failure to file a name
    change petition and not informing the client that the petition had not
    been filed, (ii) failing to respond to Disciplinary Counsel, (iii) inaction in
    a matter on the Court of Chancery resulting in the matter being
    dismissed (a loss of a client's right to pursue his cause of action), (iv)
    failing to file an appeal in a Family Court order and then failing to
    cooperate with substituting counsel, (v) mishandling a matter such that
    default judgment was not vacated and a levy of sale was not quashed
    and failed to advise client of the result. and (vi) mishandling a conflict
    of interest in a real estate matter. The Court imposed a one year
    suspension. A shorter suspension from other cases was imposed due
    to the weight of mitigating circumstances. g teaches that
    mitigating factors n justify reduction of a sanction below the
    presumed sanction.
    The ODC argues that Carucci's actions or misconduct must be found to be
    knowing within the meaning of the ABA Standards°z. Under those ABA Standards,
    “Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or
    attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
    objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.
    Respondent did have the requisite state of mind as defined in that section.
    8l 565 A 2d 901 (Del. 1989).
    82 Tr. 95.
    Under ABA Standard 4.42, suspension is called for. Section 4.42 provides:
    Suspension is generally appropriate when:
    (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perfonn services for a client and
    causes injury or potential injury to a client, or
    (b) a lawyer engages in a pattem of neglect and causes injury or
    potential injury to a client.
    After careful study of the ABA Standards in conjunction with the facts presented,
    we believe “Knowledge” is the definition properly applied to Carucci’s misconduct. The
    common thread running through the cases seems to be that the more numerous or
    serious the neglect of client matters, where coupled with failure to safeguard client
    funds, the more severe the sanction should be. Based on the mses we reviewed in
    conjunction with the eleven (11) violations of client neglect, the failure to safeguard
    client funds (even though some of those funds were refunded), and the
    misrepresentation to the Court, a two year suspension is the presumptive sanction
    before application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
    As we have noted, we believe the mitigating factors significantly outweigh the
    aggravating factors, enough to warrant a reduction from the presumptive two year
    sanction. As such, and balancing the violations admitted and found by the Pane|, along
    with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances existing in Mr. Carucci’s situation, we
    believe an eighteen month suspension is the proper sanction to be imposed made
    retroactive to the date of the Disability Order. We realize that under the rules for
    reinstatement, since the sanction exceeds six months, Carucci will have to apply for
    readmission and carry a burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
    he is fit for readmission. We think it is important to the disciplinary process as applied to
    Respondent that he be required to make a showing that he is now able to maintain a
    busy law practice without detriment to his clients."“
    Conclusion and Signature Pages Fo|low
    33 There was some discussion at the Hearing about cond|tions. We believe conditions to his
    readmission should be recommended by the panel who hears Respondent's appiition for readmission.
    For the reasons stated herein, the Pane| recommends a suspension of eighteen
    months to be served retroactive to the date of the Disabi|ity Order, October 13, 2013.
    Since the eighteen month period has passed, Respondent, as we understand the
    readmission pr0cedure, can begin that process immediately upon entry of an order by
    the Court in connection with this Report.
    Wayne J. Carey
    John L. Reed
    Dennis L. K|ima
    January _, 2016
    For the reasons stated herein. the F'anel recommends a suspension of eighteen
    months to be served retroactive to the date ot the Disability Order. october 13, 2013,
    Sinee the eighteen month period has passedE'Respondent, as we understand the
    readmission pmcedure. can begin that process immediately upon entry of an order by
    the Court in connection with this Report.
    JanuaryééZMS
    __' .'..'.- - . ..._a.t . -=  ...-T_"a»€;‘;..'»..`~'.'».<.'~aa=.'.=.i~'-'»-_¢_...;_.».;_.=}_;....t.t...,_..:_Y;tILae}m;,-$..i.a....»»' _._;-.=.;_;.:.:_-_- _'
    __ _._¢.-._ ._1
    For the reasons stated hereln, the Panel recommends a suspension of eighteen
    months to be served retroactive to' the date of the Dlsabi||ty Order, October 13, 2013.
    Sinoe the eighteen month period has passed, Respondent. as we understand the
    -»-.. - ._...____-
    readmission procedure, can begin that process immediately upon entry of an order by
    the Court in connection with this Report.
    Wayne J. Carey
    Jo . ead
    Dennis L. Kiima
    January&, 2016
    t
    ii
    i
    ii
    “5. On November 7, 2014, the Court lifted the stay on Respondent's
    disciplinary proceedings, but continued him on disability inactive status."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    There are eleven separate client matters which are the subject of this proceeding
    whereby Carucci is accused of having neglected his duties as those clients' lawyer.
    “M|CHAEL AND EL|ZABETH APOSTOL|QQ"
    “6. in 2011 or 2012, Michaei and E|izabeth Apostolico (‘Aposto|icos') retained
    Carucci DiLorenzo to prepare and file a bankruptcy petition and represent them in post-
    filing matters, including the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    “7. The Apostolicos paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of at least $981,
    which included the court t'liing fee and costs."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that the Apostolicos paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at
    least $981 which included the court filing fees and costs.° Respondent maintains that
    most, if not ail, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “8. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for the Apostolicos and did
    not attend the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    The Apostolicos matter was taken over by Mr. Mark Bil|ion who represented the
    Apostolicos without charge"
    “JACQUELINE CROTHERS'
    “9. in 2011 or 2012, Jacque|ine Crothers ('Crothers') retained Carucci
    6Tr. 18
    7 Tr, 18. The panel notes that Mr. Bil|ion generously took over several other bankruptcy cases without charge to the
    clients of Mr. Caruoci. His generosity deserves some form of recognition from the Court.
    3
    DiLorenzo to prepare and tile a bankruptcy petition and represent her in post-filing
    matters, including the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    “10. Crothers paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of at least $1306, which
    included the court filing fee and costs."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that the Crothers paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at least
    ~ $1,306 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that most,
    if not a||, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “11. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Crothers and did not
    attend the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    Respondent refunded Ms. Crothers the full fee she had paid. The source of the
    funds for that refund was an account in the name of Respondent's wife, Lisa Ramirez,
    but was actually a joint account Respondent held with his wife.° Respondent's standard
    fee in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases was $1306, $1000 for his fee and $306 for the filing
    fee with the Bankruptcy Court.°
    “RONALD GROOMS “
    “12. in 2012 or 2013, Rona|d Grooms (‘Grooms’) retained Carucci DiLorenzo
    to prepare and tile an inventory and Accounting in connection with the estate of his late
    wife,
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    "13. Grooms paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $500."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that Ronald Grooms paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at
    least $500 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that
    most, if not a|l, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “14. Respondent never filed the inventory or Accounting for Grooms."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    To date Respondent has not refunded the fee to Grooms.‘°
    "ROMAYNE SEWARD “
    “15. in 2012, Romayne Seward (‘Seward') retained Carucci DiLorenzo to
    complete a V\fl|l, Testamentary Trust, Living \Mll and Power of Attomey ('Estate
    Planning Documents').”
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    “16. Seward paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $550."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that Romayne Seward paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at
    least $550 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that
    most, if not al|. of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “17. Respondent did not complete the Estate Planning Documents for
    Seward."
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    Respondent testified that they had gotten some drafting work done on the Estate
    Planning Documents, but those documents were never executed." Nevertheless,
    Respondent refunded the fees paid by Seward, but not from a client trust account.'z
    “BRIDGE! HUBER"
    “18. |n 2012, Bridget Huber (‘Huber') retained Carucci DiLorenzo to prepare
    and file a bankruptcy petition and represent her in post-filing matters, including the 341
    Meeting of the Creditors.”
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    "19. Huber paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of $1306, which included
    the court filing fee and costs."
    “ANSWER: Admitted that Bridget Huber paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at
    least $1,306 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that
    m0st, if not all, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “20. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Huber and did not attend
    the 341 Meeting of the Creditors.”
    “ANSWER: Admifted."
    Ms. Huber’s bankruptcy petition was i|ed by Mr. Bil|ion who agreed to take the
    matter on without charge to Ms. Huber.“ Fees paid by Ms. Huber to Respondent were
    never refunded.“
    “JOYCE THOMPSON"
    “21. |n 2012 or 2013, Joyce Thompson (‘Thompson') retained Carucci
    DiLorenzo to prepare and tile a bankruptcy petition and represent her in post-filing
    matters, including the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    12 Tr. 24.
    13 Tr. 28.
    14 Tr. 28.
    “22. Thompson paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of at least $1306,
    which included the court filing fee and costs."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that Joyce Thompson paid Carucci DiLorenzo a fee of at
    least $1,306 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent maintains that
    most, if not al|, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “23. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Thompson and did not
    attend the 341 Meeting of the Creditors.”
    "ANSWER: Admitted."
    Again, Mr. Bi||ion stepped up and took over Ms. Thomps0n’s case, filing the
    bankruptcy petition without charge to Ms. Thompson.‘s Respondent never refunded
    any of the fee to Ms. Thompson.'°
    "LAUR|E PETERSON AND CRYSTAL RODR|GUEZ"
    "24. in 2013, Laurie Peterson and Crystal Rodriguez (‘Peterson and
    Rodriguez’) retained Carucci DiLorenzo to prepare and file a Petition for Adoption and
    to Terminate Parenta| Rights (‘Adoption Petition').'
    "ANSWER: Admitted. “
    Peterson and Rodriquez are a same sex couple who conceived with a spenn
    donor. One partner wanted to adopt the birth mother’s child and terminate the parental
    rights of the spenn donor."
    “25. Peterson and Rodriguez paid Carucci DiLorenzo an advance fee of at
    least $1285, which included the court filing fee and costs."
    "ANSWER: Admitted that Peterson and Rodriguez paid Carucci DiLorenzo a
    15 Tl’. 29
    16 Tr. 30.
    17 Tr. 31
    fee of at least $1,285 which included the court filing fees and costs. Respondent
    maintains that most, if not all, of that fee was eamed when paid."
    “26. Respondent never filed the Adoption Petition for Peterson and Rodriguez."
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    However, Respondent did refund $1000 to Peterson and Rodriguez. The refund
    was paid by Robert Carucci, Respondent’s father, as a loan to his son.'°
    “DEBRA CARBONE"
    “27. in 2013, Debra Carbone (‘Carbone’) retained Carucci DiLorenzo to
    prepare and file a bankruptcy petition and represent her in post-filing matters, including
    the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    “28. Carbone paid Carucci DiLorenzo $950, which included the court filing fee
    and costs."
    “ANSWER: Admitted that Carbone paid Carucci DiLorenzo $950. Respondent
    is without sufficient information or belief to admit or deny that the fee included the court
    filing fee and other costs. Respondent maintains that most, if not a||, of that fee was
    eamed when paid."
    “29. Respondent never filed a bankruptcy petition for Carbone and did not
    attend the 341 Meeting of the Creditors."
    “ANSWER: Admitted."
    Respondent provided a refund to Ms. Carbone using a check from Carucci's
    personal account.'°