Godwin v. State ( 2015 )


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  • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    SEANNE GODWIN, §
    § No. 135, 2014
    Defendant Below- §
    Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
    § of the State of Delaware in and
    V. § for Kent County
    §
    STATE OF DELAWARE, § No. 1210011265
    §
    Plaintiff Below- §
    Appellee. §
    Submitted: June 17, 2015
    Decided: June 30, 2015
    Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
    0 R D E K
    On this 30lh day of June 2015, it appears to the Court that:
    (1) Defendant-Below/Appellant Seanne Godwin appeals fi'om a Superior Court
    jury verdict finding him guilty of Drug Dealing and Conspiracy Second Degree.
    Godwin raises four claims on appeal. First, Godwin argues that his trial counsel was
    ineffective by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a theory of an
    improper search and seizure. Second, Godwin contends that the trial court erred
    when it denied his motion for a mistrial due to an improper comment made by the
    State in its opening argument. Third, Godwin claims that his trial counsel was
    ineffective by failing to move for a mistrial after the State introduced testimony
    regarding his history of drug dealing. Fourth, Godwin contends that his trial counsel
    was ineffective by failing to question a State witness regarding his plea agreement.
    We find no merit to Godwin’s appeal and affirm.
    (2) On October 16, 2012, Godwin called Tyere Joyner and requested to meet
    him in Dover, Delaware in order to obtain marijuana that he could resell. Godwin
    and Joyner met at a Dover hotel where Joyner gave Godwin $500 worth of marijuana
    so that Godwin, acting as middle man, could sell the drugs for Joyner. Godwin then
    rode in J oyner’s car to Clairfield where he was to meet an intended purchaser of the
    marijuana. Once the men arrived, Godwin approached the purchaser and attempted
    to sell him the marijuana. When the purchaser was unable to produce the money to
    buy the drugs, Godwin lefi. Soon thereafter, the purchaser called Godwin and
    claimed that he now had the money and wanted to set up a meeting at Mapleton
    Square. Godwin agreed, and he and Joyner drove to Mapleton Square. Once there,
    Godwin left Joyner’s car and got into the purchaser’s adjacent vehicle. Godwin gave
    the purchaser 2 ounces of marijuana, but instead of paying for the drugs, the
    purchaser robbed Godwin at gunpoint of the marijuana and $535 cash. He then
    forced Godwin out of his car and drove away. When Godwin returned to J oyner’s car
    he informed him that he had been robbed. After picking up two other people, Godwin
    and Joyner began to search for the robber.
    (3) The men Spotted the robber, now on foot, in the area of the Autumn Run
    Apartments. The robber ran to the front of the apartments and approached Delaware
    State Trooper Nicholas Ciglinsky and Corporal Alexander Argo, who were on patrol
    in an unmarked Tahoe SUV. The robber informed them that he was being followed
    by a blue Mitsubishi Lancer. Based on this information, the officers began following
    the vehicle. After the vehicle failed to stop at a stop sign, the officers attempted to
    initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle sped up despite the officers’ attempt to stop the
    vehicle. Eventually the vehicle stopped, and the front seat passenger fled. The
    fleeing occupant was apprehended by Officer Ci glinsky, and subsequently identified
    as Kendrick Foreman. The driver was identified as Joyner and the other passengers
    were identified as Godwin and Kelvin Davis.
    (4) Once the occupants of the vehicle were secured, the officers conducted a
    search of the vehicle and found marijuana in the trunk as well as a handgun under the
    front passenger seat. After being arrested, Godwin provided a statement to the police
    admitting that he and Joyner had attempted to sell marijuana that day, and that he had
    been robbed by the potential purchaser. He also admitted that they were searching
    for the robber when the police attempted to stop the vehicle. He denied any
    knowledge of the handgun found in the vehicle. Godwin was indicted on charges of
    Drug Dealing and Conspiracy Second Degree.
    (5) Godwin was tried in December 2013. In its opening statement, the State
    mentioned that a handgun was found under Foreman’s seat. Godwin’s counsel
    objected and requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied. In order to clarify the
    alleged improper statement, the State explained that the handgun belonged to
    Foreman and that Godwin was unaware that it was in the car. Joyner, Officer
    Ciglinsky, and Corporal Argo testified for the State. The State also introduced
    Godwin’s recorded statement as evidence. Godwin declined to testify. The jury
    returned a verdict finding Godwin guilty of both charged offenses. Due to Godwin’s
    status as a habitual offender under 
    11 Del. C
    . §4214(b), he was sentenced to life in
    prison.
    (6) Godwin’s counsel filed a brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme
    Court Rule 26(0) on June 9, 2014. Counsel claimed that, after a careful and complete
    examination of the record, he found no arguably appealable issues. On October 9,
    2014, we granted counsel’s motion to withdraw but appointed new counsel to
    consider any appealable issues.
    (7) “Generally, we do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
    in a direct appeal.”' “The reason for that practice, in part, is to develop a record on
    that issue in a Superior Court Rule 61 post-conviction proceeding.”2 This Court may
    ' Cooke v. State, 
    977 A.2d 803
    , 848 (Del. 2009).
    2 1d.
    consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when “the
    actions of trial counsel are not disputed and are clearly reflected” in the proceedings
    below.3
    (8) The narrow exception to the rule that would allow us to consider Godwin’s
    claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal is inapplicable here. The
    alleged ineffective assistance of Godwin’s counsel is far from “clearly reflected in the
    Superior Court proceedings.”4
    We find that these allegations would be better
    considered in a Superior Court Rule 61 post-conviction proceeding. Accordingly, we
    deny Godwin’s request to consider the merit of these claims.
    (9) Godwin also claims that the trial court erred by denying his application for
    a mistrial. “This Court reviews the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of
    discretion.”5 “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest
    necessity’ or the ‘ends of public justice would be otherwise defeated.’”6
    (10) Godwin contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
    motion for a mistrial after the State prosecutor mentioned the handgun found under
    the front passenger seat in his opening statement. This claim lacks merit. After
    3 
    Id. Conversely, direct
    appeal is not appropriate if counsel’s actions are disputed or the record on
    appeal is not sufficiently complete. 10’. (citing State v. Carter, 
    14 P.3d 1138
    , 1144 (Kan. 2000);
    United States v. Swanson, 
    943 F.2d 1070
    , 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1991)).
    " 
    Cooke, 977 A.2d at 848
    .
    5 Hendricks v. State, 
    871 A.2d 1118
    , 1122 (Del. 2005).
    6 Steekel v. State, 71 
    1 A.2d 5
    , 1 1 (Del. 1998) (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 
    320 A.2d 343
    ,
    345 (Del. 1974)).
    Godwin’s counsel objected, the prosecutor informed the court that the purpose of
    mentioning the gun was to explain why the men fled fi'om police. The trial court
    cautioned the prosecutor but allowed him to clarify the remark to the jury. The
    prosecutor went on to explain to the jury that the handgun belonged to Foreman and
    that Godwin was unaware of its existence. This explanation cured any prejudice the
    State’s initial comment may have caused. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
    denying Godwin’s motion for a mistrial.
    NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
    Court is AFFIRMED.
    fY THE COURT:
    l