Perez v. State ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RYAN PEREZ, §
§ No. 239, 2019
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1704019609 (N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 4, 2019
Decided: December 18, 2019
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
This 18th day of December, 2019, having considered the briefs and the record
below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In November 2017, police arrested Ryan Perez and charged him with
numerous drug and firearm-related crimes. Several days before trial, Perez pled
guilty to two of the charges. Six weeks later, Perez moved to withdraw his plea
because he claimed his former counsel failed to investigate the admissibility of
important evidence and discuss it with Perez. The Superior Court held a hearing,
heard from Perez’s former counsel, and denied the motion.
(2) On appeal, Perez argues that the Superior Court’s denial does not offer
adequate reasoning to review whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by
denying the motion. Perez seeks a remand for the Court to explain its decision. We
find, however, that the Superior Court’s reasons appear obvious from the record and
it provided some basis for its decision. Thus, we affirm the Superior Court’s
judgment.
(3) A police officer stopped Perez while driving and learned that Perez had
a suspended license. He also had multiple outstanding capiases. Perez denied
having any contraband in his car and consented to a search of the car. The police
found heroin, gave Perez a Miranda warning, and Perez agreed to speak. Perez told
the officer that the heroin was his and explained the details of his recent purchase.1
The police towed his car and later found a stolen gun inside. Police took Perez to
the police station, and the parties dispute whether he was re-Mirandized. After the
disputed re-Miranda rights were given, Perez confessed to the possession of the
firearm. A grand jury indicted Perez for multiple drug and firearm charges.2
(4) Several days before his scheduled trial, Perez pled guilty to possession
of a firearm by a person prohibited and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. In
1
App. to Opening Br. at A017.
2
The charges were Drug Dealing, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Possession of
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia, Driving with a Suspended License, and Disregarding a Red Light.
2
return, the State dropped the remaining charges. 3 Perez knew that the firearm
offense carried a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. 4 Perez’s trial attorney
stated at the sentencing hearing that he had a significant discussion with Perez about
the plea agreement and reviewed the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with
him.5 The court questioned Perez extensively about his mental state, whether he was
coerced, whether he discussed his rights with counsel, and whether he understood
what he was doing by pleading guilty.6 Perez answered in the affirmative to each of
the questions including that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.7
(5) Six weeks later, Perez moved to withdraw his guilty plea, pro se,
claiming that his counsel did not adequately investigate the facts of the arrest and
did not explain to him that police illegally seized evidence, which would not be
admissible against him at trial. Perez argued that his consent to a vehicle search was
involuntary because the officer threatened to arrest his girlfriend. Perez’s counsel
moved to withdraw and the Superior Court appointed new counsel. The parties
submitted briefs and the Superior Court held a hearing.
(6) At the hearing, the parties argued the admissibility of Perez’s
incriminating statements and whether Perez’s former counsel had sufficiently
3
The State also agreed to not pursue habitual offender sentencing.
4
App. to Opening Br. at A025.
5
Id. at A025-26, A035.
6
Id. at A027-32.
7
Id.
3
considered their admissibility before advising Perez to take the plea offer.8 The
court requested that Perez’s trial attorney complete a questionnaire regarding his
representation of Perez. In response, Perez’s trial attorney stated that he considered
the consequences of filing a motion to suppress evidence and discussed the decision
with Perez.9 But, ultimately, trial counsel determined that it was in Perez’s best
interest not to present them to the court.10
(7) The Superior Court denied the motion after it “reviewed [Perez’s trial
counsel’s] answers to the Court’s questions,” and found “that the defendant has
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating any ‘fair and just reason’ to warrant
withdrawal.” 11 On appeal, Perez argues that he cannot determine whether the
Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion because the court did
not provide adequate reasoning and failed to “refer to any factual evidence in the
record or any legal principles.”12 We review a decision to grant or deny a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea on appeal for abuse of discretion.13
8
Id. at A060-96.
9
Id. at A101-03.
10
Id. Trial counsel admittedly missed the possible argument that Perez’s invocation of Miranda
rights at some point invalidated prior warnings. Id. at A102. But, he believed that “all the evidence
necessary for conviction was obtained prior to [Perez’s] statement, so suppressing the statement
would have had no real effect.” Id.
11
Opening Br. Ex. C (quoting Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234 (Del. 1996)).
12
Id. at 13.
13
Anderson v. State, 99 A.3d 226, 2014 WL 3511717, at *2 (Del. July 14, 2014) (TABLE).
4
(8) Generally, the Superior Court must make “factual determinations and
supply a legal rationale for a judicial decision as a matter of law.”14 The “[f]ailure
to do so may be an abuse of discretion.”15 But, this Court “can affirm the decision
as being within the fact finding or discretionary power of the trial judge, if, upon a
reading of the record in relation to the order, the reasons appear obvious.”16
(9) Here, the Superior Court order states that the court reviewed the record
and the supplements (trial counsel’s responses), and it determined that Perez failed
to meet the proper standard under Patterson v. State.17 Although a more detailed
explanation would provide a better understanding of the court’s analysis, the lack of
a more detailed reasoning does not require reversal in this appeal because the reasons
for denial appear obvious. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides that if a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after the court has accepted the plea but
prior to imposition of sentencing, “the court may permit the withdrawal of the plea
upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.”18 The court should
grant a plea withdrawal in this situation if the plea was involuntary or the defendant
14
Holden v. State, 23 A.3d 843, 846 (Del. 2011).
15
Id.
16
Husband M v. Wife D, 399 A.2d 847, 848 (Del. 1979); see also Johnson v. Taylor, 901 A.2d
120, 2006 WL 1650802, at *1 (Del. June 13, 2006).
17
684 A.2d 1234 (Del. 1996).
18
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d).
5
entered the plea because of a misconception of the defendant’s rights.19 The factors
that the court uses to determine whether a plea withdrawal will be granted are:
i. Whether there was a procedural defect in taking the plea;
ii. Whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented
to the plea agreement;
iii. Whether the defendant has an adequate basis to assert his
legal innocence;
iv. Whether the defendant had adequate legal counsel throughout
the proceedings; and
v. Whether granting the motion will prejudice the State or
unduly inconvenience the trial court.20
(10) Even though Perez does not directly claim that the Superior Court
abused its discretion, he does explain the reasons underlying the motion to
withdraw.21 Perez argued that his trial counsel did not adequately investigate the
factual circumstances of his arrest and did not explain that police had illegally seized
the evidence that would be used against him at trial.22 Perez also argued that he
invoked his Miranda rights before making incriminating statements, but his trial
counsel never discussed the possibility of challenging the admissibility of his
confessions.23
19
Anderson, 2014 WL at *2.
20
Patterson, 684 A.2d at 1238 (holding that the factors “do not lend themselves to a balancing
act,” but “[c]ertain of the factors, standing alone, will themselves justify relief”).
21
These are the same reasons considered at the hearing below.
22
Opening Br. at 4. Perez argued that his consent to search the vehicle was involuntary because
police threatened to arrest his girlfriend if he did not consent.
23
Id. at 5.
6
(11) Considering the first factor, there was no procedural defect in
administering Perez’s plea. The State and Perez’s trial counsel discussed a
sentencing agreement recommendation, acknowledging that it was not binding on
the court.24 The court questioned Perez thoroughly to determine whether his plea
was knowing and voluntary.25 The court specifically questioned Perez whether he
discussed his rights with his attorney and whether he was voluntarily waiving those
rights.26 The court went through each charge and its possible sentence, and then
questioned Perez as to his understanding of the charges and sentence requirements.27
Perez stated that he understood all of the rights and was voluntarily waiving them.28
Perez also signed a Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.29
(12) Perez only claimed, essentially, that he was ineffectively represented,
not that he had a basis to assert his legal innocence.30 Perez argued that his trial
counsel did not protect his constitutional rights because counsel did not investigate
the facts or file a motion to suppress.31 Perez, however, stated that he was satisfied
with his trial counsel’s representation during the proceeding.32 In the questionnaire
24
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e).
25
App. to Opening Br. at A027-32.
26
Id. at A029.
27
Id. at A029-32.
28
Id. at A027-32.
29
Id. at A035.
30
Opening Br. at 5.
31
App. to Opening Br. at A038-41.
32
Id. at A031-32.
7
returned to the court, Perez’s trial counsel stated that he discussed with Perez
whether to file a motion to suppress regarding the search, but counsel thought that
filing such a motion was a risk to a favorable plea.33 Trial counsel made the strategic
decision not to seek suppression.34 Although trial counsel did not discuss with Perez
the legal issues surrounding Perez’s Miranda rights, trial counsel thought that, even
if some statements were made after Perez invoked his Miranda rights, Perez had
already admitted to possession of narcotics before invoking his rights.35
(13) As to the final factor, the State does not claim that it would be
prejudiced or inconvenienced should the court grant Perez’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, so this factor is neutral.36
(14) Based on these findings, the Superior Court carefully and thoroughly
questioned Perez regarding his plea37 and took the extra step of requesting answers
from Perez’s former attorney about his representation of Perez and the tactical
decisions he made.38 While the Superior Court’s order provided a minimal basis for
its decision, it does not require reversal when the court’s reasons appear obvious.
Thus, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw a plea.
33
Id. at A101-02.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Answering Br. at 16.
37
App. to Opening Br. at A027-32.
38
Id. at A100-03.
8
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
9