Ramirez-Martinez v. Barr ( 2019 )


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  •     17-1721
    Ramirez-Martinez v. Barr
    BIA
    Christensen, IJ
    A206 781 781/782
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 1st day of May, two thousand nineteen.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    Chief Judge,
    REENA RAGGI,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    ANA ALICIA RAMIREZ-MARTINEZ,
    DAVID ALEXANDER REYES-RAMIREZ,
    Petitioners,
    v.                                         17-1721
    NAC
    WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.*
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONERS:                      H. Raymond Fasano, Esq., Youman,
    Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, NY.
    * Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    43(c)(2), Attorney General William P. Barr is automatically
    substituted for former Acting Attorney General Matthew G.
    Whitaker.
    FOR RESPONDENT:              Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Civil Division;
    Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation
    Counsel, Office of Immigration
    Litigation; Lisa Morinelli, Trial
    Attorney, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, United States
    Department of Justice, Washington,
    DC.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Ana Alicia Ramirez-Martinez, and her son,
    David   Alexander   Reyes-Ramirez,     natives   and   citizens    of
    Honduras,    seek   review   of   a   BIA   decision   affirming   an
    Immigration   Judge’s   (“IJ”)    denial    of   Ramirez-Martinez’s
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ana Alicia
    Ramirez-Martinez, David Alexander Reyes-Ramirez, Nos. A 206
    781 781/782 (B.I.A. May 1, 2017), aff’g No. A 206 781 781/782
    (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 16, 2016). We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
    2
    We review factual findings under the substantial evidence
    standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable
    adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Paloka v. Holder, 
    762 F.3d 191
    , 195 (2d Cir. 2014). We review questions of law de novo.
    
    Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195
    .
    Ramirez-Martinez        claimed    asylum   and    withholding     of
    removal based on her membership in a particular social group,
    which she defined as “Honduran single mothers who are small
    business owners.”1 In order to demonstrate her eligibility
    for asylum and withholding of removal, Ramirez-Martinez had
    to “establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in
    a particular social group, or political opinion was or w[ould]
    be at least one central reason for” her persecution. 8 U.S.C.
    §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I.
    & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010). In order for her group to
    constitute   a    particular     social    group,      it   had   to    be
    “(1) composed    of    members   who    share   a     common   immutable
    characteristic,       (2)   defined     with    particularity,         and
    (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter
    1 Ramirez-Martinez also sought relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because she only
    cursorily challenges the denial of that claim, she has
    waived that issue on appeal. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
    
    426 F.3d 540
    , 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
    3
    of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also
    
    Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196
    .
    Even assuming arguendo that single mothers who are small
    business owners comprise a cognizable group,2 the BIA did not
    err   in   denying   Ramirez-Martinez’s   claims   for   asylum   and
    withholding of removal because she failed to establish that
    a protected ground was a central reason for her past harm or
    fear of future harm. She did not assert that the gang members
    who threatened her mentioned her status as a woman, single
    mother, or small business owner. Rather, Ramirez-Martinez’s
    application stated that she feared “crime and delinquency
    2
    We need not decide whether the Board and the IJ provided
    adequate reasoning for their conclusion that petitioner’s
    proposed social group is not cognizable, because, in any
    event, “we can state with confidence that the IJ would adhere
    to his decision were the petition remanded.” Xiao Ji Chen v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    434 F.3d 144
    , 15861 (2d Cir. 2006).
    Ramirez-Martinez failed to demonstrate that her proposed
    group was socially distinct in Honduran society. Ramirez-
    Martinez argues that the fact that women who own small
    businesses are targets for violence evinces that they are
    recognized as a social group in Honduras. Although
    persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in
    determining the visibility of a group, when, as here, “the
    harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the
    incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to
    persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering
    those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning
    of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” Ucelo-Gomez v.
    Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 70
    , 73 (2d Cir. 2007). Ramirez-Martinez
    also argues that national policies recognize women who own
    small businesses, but points only to national policies that
    generally   “promote   women’s   economic    development   and
    empowerment.” CAR 291.
    4
    that is prevalent” throughout Honduras, and which was “on the
    rise because of . . . poverty.” CAR 472. She stated that
    “[c]riminals extort law abiding citizens for their money,
    which they earn through their hard work.” 
    Id. In addition,
    record evidence indicates that gang extortion is common in
    Honduras and affects “all sectors of the economy.” CAR 264.
    Therefore, there is no evidence that Ramirez-Martinez was
    targeted because of her membership in the purported social
    group as opposed to her resources. Because a fear of “general
    crime conditions” is not a ground for asylum, the BIA did not
    err in denying her application. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 
    191 F.3d 307
    , 314 (2d Cir. 1999); see also In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I.
    & N. Dec. at 249-51 (“The national community may struggle
    with significant societal problems resulting from gangs, but
    not all societal problems are bases for asylum.”).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5