Nichols v. DSCYF/DFS Sampson v. DSCYF/DFS ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KELLY NICHOLS,1 §
§ No. 332, 2017
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File Nos. CN11-01936
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § 16-05-11TN
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR §
FAMILIES/DIVISION OF FAMILY § Petition Nos. 15-15104
SERVICES (DSCYF/DFS), § 16-15113
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §
RONALD SAMPSON, §
§ No. 339, 2017
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File Nos. CN11-01936
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § 16-05-11TN
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR §
FAMILIES/DIVISION OF FAMILY § Petition Nos. 15-15104
SERVICES (DSCYF/DFS), § 16-15113
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: April 11, 2018
Decided: April 25, 2018
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellants under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
ORDER
This 25th day of April 2018, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the
record below,2 it appears to the Court that:
(1) The respondent-appellant, Kelly Nichols (“the Mother”), filed an
appeal from the Family Court’s decision, dated July 20, 2017, terminating her
parental rights to her son (“the Son”), who was born in 2007, and her daughter (“the
Daughter”), who was born in 2008 (collectively “the Children”). The respondent-
appellant, Ronald Sampson (“the Father”), also filed an appeal from the Family
Court’s July 20, 2017 decision terminating his parental rights to the Children.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no error or abuse of the discretion in
the Family Court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(2) The Children first came into the care of DSCYF/DFS in March 2011.
After the Mother and the Father completed their respective case plans, the Children
were returned to them in August 2011. On May 29, 2015, DSCYF/DFS filed a
petition for an emergency ex parte order granting custody of the Children to
DSCYF/DFS. The petition was based on the Mother’s substance abuse issues and
domestic violence perpetrated by the Father against the Mother. The Family Court
2
Because both appeals arise from the same Family Court order and involve similar questions of
law and fact, we have consolidated them sua sponte for decision.
2
granted the petition, scheduled a preliminary protective hearing, and appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the children.
(3) At the preliminary protective hearing on June 3, 2015, the Family Court
appointed counsel to represent the Mother and the Father. The Mother stipulated to
probable cause of dependency for the Children due to her lack of stable housing and
substance abuse issues. At that time, the Father was subject to a criminal no contact
order with the Mother and the Children. The Family Court found probable cause to
believe the Children were dependent. The Family Court also found that there was
currently no appropriate placement for the Children with relatives. The Mother was
awarded supervised visitation with the Children, but the Father was not awarded
visitation due to the no contact order.
(4) On July 14, 2015, the Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing. The
Family Court found that the Children were dependent based on the parents’
stipulations regarding a lack of appropriate housing. The Father was awarded
supervised visitation because the criminal charges against him were dropped and the
no contact order was lifted. The State advised that the Children were doing well in
the home of a foster mother (“the Foster Mother”). The Family Court also found
that DSCYF/DFS was making reasonable efforts at reunification.
(5) On August 11, 2015, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing. The
Family Court continued to find the Children to be dependent and that DSCYF/DFS
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was making reasonable efforts at reunification. Case plans were entered for the
Mother and the Father.
(6) On November 17, 2015, the Family Court held a review hearing. The
Family Court continued to find the Children to be dependent and that DSCYF/DFS
was making reasonable efforts at reunification. The Mother and the Father were
living together again, but their housing was unstable. They were making progress
on their case plans. At the review hearing, it was noted that the Daughter, who has
Down Syndrome, was receiving treatment for diabetes. Concerns were also
expressed regarding the Daughter’s sexualized behaviors. The Daughter was
scheduled for an interview with the Child Advocacy Center.
(7) On March 11, 2016, the Family Court held a review hearing. The
Family Court continued to find the Children to be dependent and that DSCYF/DFS
was making reasonable efforts at reunification. DSCYF/DFS noted that the
Daughter continued to act out sexually and was recently diagnosed with celiac
disorder.
(8) On April 26, 2016, DSCYF/DFS filed a petition to change the goal from
reunification to termination of parental rights. The guardian ad litem had no
objection to the motion, but the Mother and the Father opposed the motion. On May
23, 2016, DSCYF/DFS filed a petition for termination and transfer of parents rights.
The petition alleged that the parents’ rights should be terminated under 13 Del. C. §
4
1103(a)(5) because they were not able or had failed to plan adequately for the
Children’s physical needs or mental health and development. The parties later
stipulated that there would be concurrent goals of termination of parental
rights/adoption and reunification. They also stipulated that the Child Advocacy
Center interviews with the Children would be submitted to the Family Court.
(9) The Family Court held a permanency hearing on November 4, 2016.
The Family Court interviewed the Son on December 6, 2016. The Family Court
subsequently held that concurrent goals of termination of parental rights/adoption
and reunification were appropriate. A termination of parental rights hearing was
originally scheduled for January 24, 2017, January 27, 2017, and February 7, 2017,
but was rescheduled for June 26, 2017 and June 27, 2017 due to the Family Court
judge’s medical leave.
(10) At the June 2017 hearing, the Family Court heard testimony from a
psychologist who did psychological evaluations of the Mother and the Father, a
therapist who did a caregiver assessment of the parents, a psychologist called on
behalf of the parents, the Mother’s family interventionist, a Children’s Choice case
worker, a DSCYF/DFS treatment worker and a DSCYF/DFS supervisor who had
been involved in the 2011 case as a treatment worker, the Mother’s Connections
therapist, the Father’s family interventionist, the Mother’s Child, Inc. therapist, the
Father’s Child Inc. therapist, a friend of the parents, the Foster Mother, and a
5
DSCYF/DFS permanency/adoption worker. The Family Court also considered a
substantiation of the Father for sexual abuse of the Daughter and a transcript of the
substantiation hearing.3
(11) On July 20, 2017, the Family Court issued a decision terminating the
parental rights of the Father and the Mother. The Family Court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the Father and the Mother had failed to plan adequately for
the Children’s needs under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). Although the Father had
completed the services required by his case plan, he had failed to adequately plan
for the Children’s needs based on his inappropriate behavior with the Children
during visitation, his refusal to follow the Daughter’s diabetes regimen, his sexual
abuse of the Daughter, and his inappropriate behavior with professionals, including
the professionals treating the Daughter’s medical conditions. As to the Mother, the
Family Court found that she had made significant progress on her case plan, but
failed to adequately plan for the Children’s needs because she denied that the Father
had sexually abused the Daughter, was unable to do the calculations for the
Daughter’s diabetes regimen, was unable to protect the Daughter from sexual abuse
by the Father, and was unable to protect the Son from the Father’s overly aggressive
behavior.
3
This Court affirmed the substantiation order on appeal. Sampson v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children
Youth and Their Families (DSCYF), 2017 WL 4857317 (Del. Oct. 25, 2017).
6
(12) The Family Court next found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
DSYCF/DFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Finally, the Family
Court considered the best interest factors under 13 Del. C. § 722 and found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the best interests
of the Children.4 The Family Court recognized that the Children’s wishes
(specifically the Son’s expressed desire for reunification) weighed against
termination of parental rights, but gave this factor less weight because there was
testimony that most children express a desire for reunification. After weighing all
of the § 722 factors, the Family Court found that termination was in the best interests
of the Children. These appeals followed.
(13) On appeal, the Mother’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief and a
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c). The Mother’s counsel
asserts that she has reviewed the record and has determined that no arguable claim
for appeal exists. By letter, the Mother’s counsel informed her of the provisions of
4
The best interest factors include: (i) the wishes of the parents regarding the child’s custody and
residential arrangements; (ii) the wishes of the child regarding her custodians and residential
arrangements; (iii) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with her parents, grandparents,
siblings, persons cohabitating in the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the child,
and any other residents of the household or persons who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests; (iv) the child's adjustment to her home, school, and community; (v) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved; (vi) past and present compliance by both parents with
their rights and responsibilities to the child under 13 Del. C. § 701; (vii) evidence of domestic
violence; and (viii) the criminal history of any party or any resident of the household. 13 Del. C. §
722.
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Rule 26.1(c) and provided her with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the
accompanying brief. The Mother provided points for the Court to consider on
appeal. In her points, the Mother argues that she completed her case plan, she and
the Father adequately planned for the Children’s needs, DSYCF/DFS did not try to
reunify the family, and the Father did not sexually abuse the Daughter. DSYCF/DFS
filed a response to the Rule 26.1(c) brief and moved to affirm the Family Court’s
judgment. The guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the Children
filed a response, as requested by the Court, in support of affirmance of the Family
Court’s judgment.
(14) As to the Father’s appeal, the Father’s counsel filed an opening brief
and the State filed an answering brief. The Father argues that DSYCF/DFS did not
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of his parental rights
was in the Children’s best interests.
(15) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.5 We will not disturb the
Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the
record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the product of an orderly
and logical reasoning process.6 We review legal rulings de novo.7 If the Family
5
Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012).
6
In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995).
7
Id.
8
Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is abuse of discretion.8
On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
trier of fact.9
(16) The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires two
separate inquires.10 First, the Family Court must determine whether the evidence
presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.11 Second, the Family
Court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of
the child.12 Both of these requirements must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.13
(17) After careful consideration of the parties’ positions and the record on
appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed on
the basis of, and for the reasons, stated in the Family Court’s thorough and well-
reasoned decision dated July 20, 2017. We find no error in the Family Court’s
application of the law to the facts. The Family Court found clear and convincing
evidence that the Mother and the Father had failed to plan adequately for the
Children’s needs, that DSYCF/DFS had made reasonable reunification efforts, and
8
CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 2003).
9
Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).
10
Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
11
13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights).
12
13 Del. C. § 722(a).
13
Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).
9
termination of the Mother’s and the Father’s parental rights was in the best interests
of the Children. Those conclusions are well-supported by the record. Thus, we
affirm.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
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