Shepeard v. State ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHE RON SHEPEARD, §
§ No. 348, 2015
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1310014773
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: February 10, 2016
Decided: February 18, 2016
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 18th day of February, 2016, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On October 23, 2013, with permission from his supervisor, probation
officer Daniel Collins executed an administrative search of probationer Che Ron
Shepeard’s house. Officer Collins found Shepeard in possession of crack cocaine
and wearing a fixed blade knife around his neck. Before trial, Shepeard moved to
suppress the evidence discovered during the search on the ground that the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to search his home. The Superior Court denied the
motion, ruling that the information Officer Collins received from a confidential
informant created reasonable suspicion to search the premises. After a non-jury
trial, the court found Shepeard guilty of drug dealing and various weapons crimes.
(2) Shepeard argues on appeal that there was no reasonable suspicion for
the search because Officer Collins failed to independently assess the reliability of
the informant or to corroborate the tip the informant provided. After a careful
review of the record, we find that Officer Collins correctly followed the mandates
of Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 and had reasonable suspicion to search
Shepeard’s home. Therefore, we affirm.
(3) A confidential informant contacted probation officer Daniel Collins
with a tip about probationer Che Ron Shepeard. The informant told Officer
Collins that he had been in “Che Ball’s” home two weeks prior and that Che Ball
was actively dealing crack cocaine and had an AK-47 rifle underneath his bed.
The informant described the internal layout of the home and Shepeard’s bedroom,
the accuracy of which was later confirmed. Officer Collins knew Che Ball to be
Shepeard. He showed a photograph of Shepeard to the informant, and the
informant confirmed that Che Ball was Shepeard. Additionally, while riding in
Officer Collins’ vehicle, the informant correctly identified Shepeard’s house and
car.
(4) Officer Collins contacted his supervisor for permission to perform an
administrative search of the house. The two reviewed the probation search
checklist and determined that the information provided by the tip, in combination
with Shepeard’s history, provided an adequate basis for an administrative search.
2
Officer Collins characterized the informant as “past proven” because he had
worked with him before.1 The informant had also contacted Officer Collins of his
own volition rather than in an attempt to work off a charge. Officer Collins had
“inadvertently helped [the informant] out of a jam, and [the informant] took it upon
[himself] to help [Officer Collins] with some information.”2 With assistance of
other officers, Officer Collins conducted a search. The officers found Shepeard
with crack cocaine and wearing a fixed blade knife around his neck.
(5) Shepeard filed a motion to suppress, which the Superior Court denied.
The Superior Court held a non-jury trial where the parties submitted a stipulation
of facts to the court. The court found Shepeard guilty of drug dealing (cocaine),3
possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, 4 possession of a
deadly weapon by a person prohibited,5 and carrying a concealed deadly weapon.6
The court sentenced Shepeard as a habitual offender solely for the offense of drug
dealing to three years at level V supervision. He was also sentenced to two years
at level V for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony
and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and two years of
1
App to Opening Br. at 27-28 (Supp. Hr’g Test. of Officer Collins).
2
Id.
3
16 Del. C. § 4752.
4
11 Del. C. § 1447.
5
11 Del. C. § 1448.
6
11 Del .C. § 1442.
3
probation for the carrying a concealed deadly weapon count. This appeal
followed.
(6) Shepeard argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to suppress because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
search his home. He argues Officer Collins did not corroborate the information the
confidential informant provided him, and did not assess the confidential
informant’s reliability. We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to
suppress following an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion, 7 and review
questions of law de novo. 8
(7) In Griffin v. Wisconsin,9 the United States Supreme Court held that a
state’s operation of a probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal
law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-
cause requirements” for searches under the Fourth Amendment.10 Those special
needs do not, however, allow suspicionless searches of probationer or parolee
7
Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008).
8
Id.
9
483 U.S. 868 (1987); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856-57 (2006) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit suspicionless searches of parolees if the search is not
“arbitrary, capricious or harassing”).
10
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74; see also Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del. 2006) (“The
special nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant and
probable cause requirements for searches, but a search of a probationer’s home must be
reasonable.”).
4
residences.11 A warrantless search of a probationer’s residence requires
“reasonable grounds” or “reasonable suspicion” for the search.12
(8) The Delaware Code, 11 Del. C. § 4321, grants probation and parole
officers statutory authority to effect searches of the individuals they supervise.
Under § 4321, the Department of Corrections has adopted regulations governing
warrantless searches of probationers. Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19
requires “probation officers [to] rationally assess the facts made known to them
before reaching the critical conclusion that there is a reasonable basis to search a
probationer’s dwelling.” 13
(9) In addition to these requirements, probation officers must assess the
reliability of their informants.14 Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 requires the
officer to assess whether the information the informant supplied was detailed and
consistent, whether the informant was reliable in the past, and to consider the
reason why the informant is supplying information. 15 An informant is “past proven
reliable,” if the informant has given reliable information in the past.16
11
Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 829 (Del. 2008).
12
Id. at 828.
13
Culver, 956 A.2d at 11.
14
Id.
15
Id. (citing Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19(VI)(E)(3)(b)).
16
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 8 A.3d 1195, 1198 (Del. 2010) (reasonable suspicion for Terry stop
found when information was provided from a reliable informant); State v. Jones, 2002 WL
31814516, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 25, 2002) (informant past proven reliable because he had
previously given accurate information in the past); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146-47 (1972) (relying on four factors to show that the officer had acted on reasonable suspicion
5
(10) Shepeard primarily challenges Officer Collins’s reliability assessment.
He cites Culver v. State17 and Sierra v. State 18 to argue that there were insufficient
facts relayed by the informant to Officer Collins to create the necessary reasonable
suspicion for the administrative search of his home.
(11) In Culver, the police received an anonymous tip from an unknown
caller with no past proven reliability. 19 The “tip” offered was the informant’s
speculation that the defendant dealt drugs, which was based on the volume of cars
that would come to the defendant’s residence and leave within minutes. This
Court held that the tip was insufficient because the anonymous tipster had no first-
hand knowledge or contact with the defendant that would support his conclusion.
The “tip” was merely a conclusory opinion based on facts observable from the
street.
(12) In Sierra, a probation officer received information from an
unidentified employee of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) that the defendant had
drugs in his home.20 The DOJ employee received the information from a
confidential informant. The probation officer did not have information about the
because the tip contained sufficient indicia of reliability: (1) the officer knew the informant, (2)
the informant had provided the officer information in the past, (3) the informant came forward
personally and gave information that was verifiable immediately at the scene, and (4) the
informant may have been subject to arrest if the tip proved to be incorrect).
17
956 A.2d 5 (Del. 2008).
18
958 A.2d 825 (Del. 2008).
19
Culver, 956 A.2d at 8.
20
Sierra, 958 A.2d at 827.
6
informant’s reliability or basis of knowledge. Instead, he simply accepted the DOJ
employee’s word that the informant was credible. This Court held that the
information the probation officer relied on was insufficient. We explained that it
was error for the probation officer to simply accept the DOJ employee’s vouching
for the anonymous caller. Instead, the probation officer must have enough
information to “independently and objectively assess the reasonableness of the
inferences to be drawn from the caller’s tip.” 21
(13) Shepeard’s case is distinguishable from Culver and Sierra. First, and
most critically, the informants in Culver and Sierra were anonymous and
completely unknown to the probation officer who executed the search. Here,
Officer Collins knew the informant from past dealings. This is not the situation
where another police officer or probation officer was vouching for an anonymous
informant’s reliability. Officer Collins himself knew the informant to be reliable in
the past.
(14) The information was also sufficiently detailed and consistent. The
informant not only knew where Shepeard lived, but had been inside the house and
was able to describe its internal layout. Although Shepeard contends that all the
houses on the block looked the same inside, the informant correctly identified
Shepeard’s bedroom. This information was later corroborated. The informant also
21
Id. at 832 (citing Culver, 956 A.2d at 13).
7
described Shepeard’s bedroom and said he saw a rifle under the bed, and that
Shepeard was actively selling crack cocaine. Though no rifle was found, crack
cocaine was. Further, the informant identified Shepeard by his street name “Che
Ball” and correctly identified his photo.
(15) Finally, there was no particularized motive for the informant to lie.
The informant was not obligated to help the officer and was not trying to work off
a charge. Instead, the informant contacted the officer of his own volition and
provided information because he wanted to help the officer.
(16) Officer Collins fully complied with Probation and Parole Procedure
7.19. The informant supplied detailed first-hand knowledge about Shepeard that
Officer Collins corroborated. Officer Collins knew the informant to be past proven
reliable and found that the informant had no motive to lie. These facts, along with
the account of criminal activity, gave Officer Collins reasonable suspicion to
search Shepeard’s home, which Officer Collins’s supervisor approved.
Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shepeard’s
motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of Shepeard’s home.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
8