Mary L. Rinnier, Administratrix v.Gracelawn Memorial Park Inc. ( 2015 )


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  •                                        COURT OF CHANCERY
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    ABIGAIL M. LEGROW
    MASTER IN CHANCERY                                                        NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
    500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
    WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734
    Submitted: August 12, 2015
    Final Report: November 24, 2015
    Ms. Mary L. Rinnier
    301 Feryn Farms Drive
    New Castle, DE 19720
    Somers S. Price, Jr., Esquire
    Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
    1313 N. Market Street, 6th Floor
    P.O. Box 951
    Wilmington, DE 19899
    Suzanne I. Seubert, Esquire
    Suzanne I. Seubert, P.A.
    1328 King Street
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Re:   Mary L. Rinnier, Administratrix v.
    Gracelawn Memorial Park Inc., et al.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    Dear Counsel and Ms. Rinnier:
    The petitioner filed this action seeking disinterment of the corpse of her
    daughter, who passed away and was buried more than seven years ago. Although
    an autopsy was performed by the Florida medical examiner a day after her
    daughter‘s death, the petitioner believes that her daughter‘s death was not the result
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 2
    of an accident or suicide, but rather a murder committed by the respondent, who
    was married to the petitioner‘s daughter. The petitioner hopes a second autopsy on
    her daughter‘s remains will reveal how her daughter died.
    This case is difficult for many reasons, not the least of which is the
    petitioner‘s understandable grief, and even suspicion, which alone are enough to
    prompt my sincere sympathies. It would be tempting to grant the petitioner the
    relief she seeks on the off chance it will bring her clarity and closure.
    Unfortunately, but for good reason, there is a high standard a party must meet
    before this Court will order exhumation of a corpse so an autopsy may be
    performed. I do not believe the petitioner has come close to meeting that standard.
    I therefore recommend that the Court deny the petition to remove the corpse. This
    is my final report.
    BACKGROUND
    These are the facts as I find them after trial. The petitioner, Mary L. Rinnier
    (―Ms. Rinnier‖), is the mother of Laura Bowdoin (―Mrs. Bowdoin‖).               Mrs.
    Bowdoin, who was married to the respondent, George Bowdoin (―Mr. Bowdoin‖),
    died in Pasco County, Florida on June 19, 2008. Mr. and Mrs. Bowdoin had one
    daughter, B., who was twelve at the time this case was tried. B. resides with her
    father, Mr. Bowdoin.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 3
    At the time of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death, she was estranged from her husband,
    having filed for divorce on May 12, 2008.              Mrs. Bowdoin allegedly was
    developing a relationship with another man and was looking forward to pursuing a
    new life. Unfortunately, and unexpectedly, Mr. Bowdoin found Mrs. Bowdoin
    dead in the marital home on the morning of June 19, 2008. No suicide note was
    found, and the cause of death was not immediately apparent.
    Ms. Rinnier argues that the police did not immediately investigate the
    circumstances of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death or examine the scene.                 Ms. Rinnier
    suggests, in fact, that the police never adequately investigated this case.           An
    autopsy, however, was performed on June 20, 2008, by the District Six Medical
    Examiner for Pasco and Pinnellas Counties, Florida.1             The Pinnellas County
    Forensic Laboratory also analyzed blood and tissue samples taken during the
    autopsy.2 The autopsy findings were (1) pulmonary edema and congestion, and (2)
    post-mortem toxicology, finding 930 ng/ml Zolpidem in the blood and negative for
    ethylene glycol in the blood.3 The medical examiner concluded that the cause of
    Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death was ―Zolpidem toxicity.‖4 Zolpidem is marketed under a
    1
    Respondent‘s Trial Exhibit (―RX‖) 2.
    2
    RX 3
    3
    RX 2. Ethylene glycol is the primary ingredient in automotive antifreeze. See ―Ethylene
    Glycol: Systemic Agent‖ available at
    http://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/ershdb/EmergencyResponseCard_29750031.html (last visited Nov.
    20, 2015).
    4
    RX 2 at 1.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 4
    number of different brand names, including Ambien.                The medical examiner
    concluded the manner of death was ―Undetermined.‖                   That is, the medical
    examiner could not conclude from the autopsy whether the death was accidental or
    intentional.5
    Concerning the exterior of the body, the medical examiner found no visible
    scar or injury on the neck and no visible injury to the chest.6 Mrs. Bowdoin‘s chest
    cavity was normal, with the ribs, clavicles, and sternum intact.7 The pleural (lung)
    and abdominal cavities were normal, with no excess blood, fluid, or exudate.8 The
    pericardium (membrane enclosing the heart) was intact and contained a minimal
    amount of yellow serous fluid.9         Concerning Mrs. Bowdoin‘s neck, her strap
    muscles were free of injury, and the thyroid cartilage and hyoid bone were intact.10
    There was nothing notable reported about the liver.11 The right and left lungs were
    570 and 510 grams, respectively.12 The parenchyma of the lungs was congested.13
    The bronchi were intact.14        The pulmonary arteries were intact and free of
    5
    See e.g., Trial Transcript (hereinafter ―Tr.‖) Vol. II at 5-6 (Dr. Manion) (explaining the
    difference between ―manner of death‖ and ―cause of death‖).
    6
    RX 2 at 2.
    7
    Id.
    8
    Id.
    9
    Id.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Id.
    12
    RX 2 at 3.
    13
    Id.
    14
    Id.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 5
    thromboemboli (blood clots).15 The skull, brain, and spinal cord appeared normal
    and free of injury, with no hemorrhage.16
    After the autopsy, Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body was embalmed and interred at
    Gracelawn Memorial Park Cemetery (―Gracelawn‖) in New Castle, Delaware on
    June 27, 2008. The results of the autopsy and laboratory results were not available
    to Ms. Rinnier before Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body was buried. Even before she received
    the autopsy results, however, Ms. Rinnier suspected that Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death
    was not accidental, claiming that statements Mr. Bowdoin made – particularly after
    the divorce filing – suggested that he was jealous and angry about the divorce and
    Mrs. Bowdoin‘s interest in pursuing a relationship with another man. Ms. Rinnier
    also believed the Pasco County Sheriff‘s Office, which investigated Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s death, did not conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation, in part
    because they did not immediately treat Mrs. Bowdoin‘s house as a possible crime
    scene. Ms. Rinnier also was suspicious of Mr. Bowdoin because he was the
    beneficiary of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s $1.2 million life insurance policy, as well as her
    retirement account and other property. Finally, Ms. Rinnier was surprised by, and
    suspicious of, the fact that Zolpidem was found in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s system,
    15
    Id.
    16
    Id.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 6
    because she did not have a prescription for that medication, although Mr. Bowdoin
    had been prescribed Ambien.
    Ms. Rinnier initiated this action on May 11, 2011 with a Petition for
    Removal of a Corpse (the ―Petition‖). Although Gracelawn was named as a
    defendant in the Petition, the parties stipulated to Gracelawn‘s dismissal on the
    condition that Gracelawn agree to abide by any decision of the Court regarding the
    disposition of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains.17 Upon Mr. Bowdoin‘s request, the Court
    appointed a guardian ad litem to represent B.‘s interests in this action.
    This case then proceeded, slowly, through discovery. Until approximately
    August 2013, Ms. Rinnier was represented by counsel. Her counsel was permitted
    to withdraw, however, and she has proceeded without counsel since that time. Ms.
    Rinnier did not vigorously prosecute this case, either when she was represented by
    counsel, or thereafter. In fairness, however, she was not sitting idly by while this
    case sat unattended. Rather, Ms. Rinnier undertook a number of efforts in Florida
    to find answers about her daughter‘s death. Among other things, Ms. Rinnier hired
    a private investigator, Michael Peasley, to assist in her efforts to uncover the
    manner of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. With Mr. Peasley‘s help, Ms. Rinnier contacted
    various Florida authorities, including the sheriff‘s office and the state attorney. 18
    17
    Stipulation of Dismissal, Jun. 30, 2011.
    18
    Tr. Vol. I at 47-48 (Peasley).
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 7
    Ms. Rinnier also filed a petition in Florida to be appointed personal representative
    of her daughter‘s estate, which was granted in June 2010,19 as well as a wrongful
    death action against Mr. Bowdoin.
    This case finally proceeded to trial in March 2015. Over the course of the
    two-day trial, both sides presented expert testimony regarding the key issue in the
    case: whether a second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body, performed several years
    after her death, was likely to produce any new information about the cause or
    manner of her death. Ms. Rinnier‘s expert, Dr. William Manion, is a medical
    examiner in New Jersey. In Dr. Manion‘s view, the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s system was above the therapeutic dose, but was not a level typically
    considered lethal. For that reason, Dr. Manion opined that the Zolpidem in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s body did not completely explain her death, and it was possible she was
    suffocated in a manner that did not leave any significant marks on her body. 20
    Although he could not say so with absolute certainty, Dr. Manion believes it is
    possible that a second autopsy might reveal additional information regarding the
    cause of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death.
    19
    Ms. Rinnier later was removed as personal representative of the estate, a decision that the
    Florida Court of Appeal affirmed on December 5, 2014. Although Mr. Bowdoin points to this
    fact and concludes that Ms. Rinnier only is acting ―for herself‖ in this action, he does not directly
    argue Ms. Rinnier lacks standing to pursue exhumation or a second autopsy.
    20
    Tr. Vol. II at 7-8.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 8
    Dr. Manion testified there are two types of additional testing that he would
    like to perform on the body, both of which tests he believes still could be effective
    81 months after the body originally was buried. First, Dr. Manion said that he
    would like to pursue further toxicology to see if Ambien was taken chronically by
    the decedent or if this was a one-time acute overdose.21 Second, Dr. Manion
    testified that he would like to take an x-ray of the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage
    to see if there is a hairline fracture, which the medical examiner could have
    missed.22 Dr. Manion suggested that, as the Ambien was not prescribed to Mrs.
    Bowdoin, if toxicology were to reveal chronic ingestion, this could suggest that the
    decedent was being chronically fed the drug in food or drink without her
    knowledge.23 Similarly, damage to the hyoid bone or thyroid cartilage could reveal
    suffocation or strangling. Dr. Manion admitted, however, that if the decedent was
    greatly impaired, it may have been possible to gently suffocate her with a pillow,
    which would not damage these structures.24
    In his testimony, Dr. Manion drew several inferences from the report of the
    initial autopsy as support for his conclusion that a second autopsy might reveal
    additional information regarding Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. For example, Dr. Manion
    21
    Id. at 6.
    22
    Id. at 8.
    23
    Id. at 7.
    24
    Id. at 8.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 9
    concluded that, because the medical examiner found the manner of death to be
    ―undetermined,‖ the medical examiner likely believed that investigation of the
    scene, as well as other police work, was necessary to reach a conclusion regarding
    the manner of death.25 Dr. Manion also noted that the autopsy report did not
    specifically indicate whether the hyoid bone was removed, and testified that, if the
    hyoid bone was not removed, an examination of it and the surrounding areas might
    reveal Mrs. Bowdoin was murdered.
    Dr. Manion described what he viewed as several suspicious circumstances
    surrounding Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. First, Ambien was not prescribed to Mrs.
    Bowdoin.26 Second, there were no pills in her stomach as would indicate a sudden,
    massive overdose.27 Third, while Dr. Manion agreed that the Zolpidem level was
    ―high‖ and ―certainly above the therapeutic level,‖ he opined that it was much
    lower than what usually is seen when a person dies from Zolpidem overdose.28 He
    further testified that even where Zolpidem is lethal, there is usually alcohol or a
    secondary drug present in the system. 29       He explained that Zolpidem is a
    respiratory depressant (as is alcohol, for example), and what typically is seen is
    another respiratory depressant acting synergistically with the Zolpidem to cause
    25
    Id. at 6.
    26
    Tr. Vol. II at 7.
    27
    Id. at 7.
    28
    Id.
    29
    Id.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 10
    respiratory system failure.30 Given these circumstances, Dr. Manion suggested
    someone caused Mrs. Bowdoin to unknowingly ingest the Ambien, which
    weakened her to the point that she could be suffocated without the perpetrator
    having to exert much force.31
    Dr. Manion further testified that, even though Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body had
    been interred for 81 months, he still could collect this information from her
    remains. He testified that he had examined bodies exhumed five to seven years
    after burial, and that those remains still could be analyzed because of the fixative
    properties of embalming fluid.32 Dr. Manion could not say, however, whether
    these bodies previously had been autopsied before the burial.33 When pressed on
    cross-examination, Dr. Manion acknowledged that, after the first autopsy, Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s organs would have been combined in one bag and replaced in her
    body.34      He nevertheless opined that he would be able to glean valuable
    information from the organs, in part because the funeral director will have put
    embalming fluid and a sawdust-like absorbent material inside the bag.35
    Dr. Manion conceded on cross-examination that several of the findings of
    the autopsy were consistent with the Respondent‘s theory of death by suicide or
    30
    Id. at 8.
    31
    Id. at 8.
    32
    Tr. Vol. II at 13.
    33
    Id. at 30-32.
    34
    Id. at 14.
    35
    Id. at 14-15.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 11
    accidental overdose due to Ambien. For example, the lungs were swollen with
    fluid, indicating heart failure, which Dr. Manion confirmed is ―a telltale sign of
    drug overdose.‖36 Dr. Manion pointed out, however, that there also usually is froth
    in the trachea and around the mouth in cases of overdose, and no froth was
    observed in the instant case.37 Similarly, Dr. Manion confirmed that there was no
    petechial hemorrhaging as would be consistent with a quick death due to
    suffocation.38 Dr. Manion argued that this evidence still is consistent with his
    theory that the decedent was suffocated gently after already being in a
    compromised state due to the Ambien.39 Dr. Manion suggested that Mrs. Bowdoin
    may very well have been in a state of overdose, ―but not necessarily lethal
    overdose,‖ when someone caused her death by suffocation.40
    Dr. Manion‘s conclusions regarding the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s body, and whether she ingested a lethal dose, were based upon a report
    authored by Dr. O‘Malley, a toxicologist with whom Ms. Rinnier corresponded
    after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death, as well as on Dr. Manion‘s internet research.41 From
    that information, Dr. Manion concluded that the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
    36
    Id. at 16-17.
    37
    Id. at 17-18.
    38
    Tr. Vol. II at 18.
    39
    Id. at 18-19.
    40
    Id.
    41
    Tr. Vol. I at 45, 65-66 (Peasley); Tr. Vol. II at 24-25 (Manion).
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 12
    Bowdoin‘s body was ―consistent with overdose‖ but ―not consistent with lethal
    overdose.‖42
    In response to Dr. Manion‘s testimony, Mr. Bowdoin offered the testimony
    and an affidavit43 of Dr. William R. Anderson, a Florida physician who, among
    other things, performs private autopsies. Dr. Anderson disputed the bulk of Dr.
    Manion‘s conclusions, particularly regarding whether (1) the Zolpidem in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s system was a lethal dose, (2) there was any evidence to suggest that
    additional testing of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body might reveal that she was strangled or
    suffocated, and (3) an exhumation and second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body
    was likely to reveal any additional information about the cause or manner of her
    death, given the time that had elapsed since her death.
    Specifically, as to the level of Zolpidem in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s system, Dr.
    Anderson disputed Dr. Manion‘s conclusion that the level was not consistent with
    what typically is a lethal dose. Dr. Anderson cited a recent FDA report that found
    that Zolpidem has a greater effect on women than on men.44 He also testified that
    the level of Zolpidem in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s bloodstream was three times the
    42
    Tr. Vol. II at 26.
    43
    I allowed Mr. Bowdoin to submit a post-trial affidavit from Dr. Anderson, responding to
    opinions offered by Dr. Manion, because Dr. Manion unexpectedly was not available to testify
    on the first day of trial and had not offered a written report, so Dr. Anderson could not
    adequately respond to Dr. Manion‘s opinions during trial. Tr. Vol. I at 26-27.
    44
    Tr. Vol. I at 110.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 13
    therapeutic level.45 Concerning metabolites of a particular drug, Dr. Anderson
    confirmed that these can be detected in the blood as well as in liver tissue; he also
    testified, however, that the deterioration of the tissue several years after burial
    ―would tend to make results of a liver analysis questionable at this point.‖ 46 Dr.
    Anderson argued that the absence of pills in the stomach tends to suggest that Mrs.
    Bowdoin had ingested the pills over several hours, suggesting accidental death
    rather than suicide.47 Dr. Anderson concluded that the findings ―are consistent
    with an accidental intoxication from Zolpidem at levels now recognized to be
    potentially dangerous in a female patient‖ and that ―it is highly unlikely that any
    further information would be elicited by further examination of the body.‖ 48
    Dr. Anderson further disputed any notion that Mrs. Bowdoin was strangled
    or suffocated, testifying that the first autopsy showed that her lungs were swollen
    with fluid, indicating that death took place over time, ―15, 20 minutes or more,
    maybe even several hours,‖ rather than suddenly.49 Dr. Anderson testified that
    there would not be edema in the case of strangulation or suffocation because death
    would be almost instantaneous, which would not allow time for the lungs to fill
    45
    Id. at 112.
    46
    Anderson Aff., Resp‘t‘s Answering Post-Tr. Br. Ex C.
    47
    Id.
    48
    Id.
    49
    Tr. Vol. I. at 114.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 14
    with fluid.50 He further pointed to the lack of petechial hemorrhaging in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s case as evidence she was not strangled or suffocated, although he
    conceded that petechial hemorrhaging does not occur in all such cases.51 In light
    of all the evidence obtained through the first autopsy, including the absence of any
    trauma to Mrs. Bowdoin‘s neck, lips, or nose, Dr. Anderson stressed that the ―full
    picture‖ did not suggest strangulation or suffocation of Mrs. Bowdoin.52 On cross-
    examination, Dr. Anderson again explained that Mrs. Bowdoin would not have
    died if a blanket or pillow were simply placed over her face. According to Dr.
    Anderson, a suffocation death would have required positive pressure being applied
    to obstruct the airway, which would have caused death over a matter of minutes, or
    less, and which would not have resulted in the pulmonary edema observed in Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s body during the first autopsy.53
    Dr. Anderson opined that there would be ―no advantage‖54 to conducting a
    second autopsy, both because a complete autopsy previously was performed and
    because of the amount of time that had elapsed since Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. When
    asked if the first autopsy was complete, Dr. Anderson alternately called it ―very
    50
    Id. at 114-15; 126.
    51
    Id. at 116.
    52
    Id. at 116-17.
    53
    Id. at 124-25.
    54
    Id. at 121-22.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 15
    complete‖ and ―reasonably complete.‖55 Dr. Anderson‘s only small criticism of
    the autopsy was that he might have taken microscopic sections of some of the
    tissues, which might have revealed, for example, mild hemorrhaging or signs of
    pneumonia—the latter of which would have provided an alternative explanation
    for the swelling of the decedent‘s lungs.56 Dr. Anderson, however, made clear that
    he did not think that a failure to take additional microscopic sections rendered the
    autopsy incomplete and added that it would not be unusual for a forensic
    pathologist not to do these additional tests.57
    When asked about the possibility of x-raying the hyoid bone, Dr. Anderson
    testified that it would not be necessary because relevant damage would be apparent
    from removing the bone and visually examining it, which Dr. Anderson concluded
    must have been done by the medical examiner.58 When pressed by Ms. Rinnier to
    explain how he knows from the report that the hyoid bone actually was removed,
    Dr. Anderson pointed to the statement in the report that ―the thyroid cartilage
    bones are intact‖ and concluded that the only way that the pathologist could know
    55
    Tr. Vol. I. at 118.
    56
    Id. at 118; 141.
    57
    Id. at 118 (―I would have liked to have seen them take some micros, but I‘m a surgical
    pathologist as well. And so some of the forensic pathologists don‘t take microscopic sections‖).
    Regarding the thoroughness of the autopsy, there was testimony at trial from Mr. Pellan (director
    of investigations at the district medical examiner‘s office where the autopsy on the decedent was
    performed) that even if foul play had been suspected there would not have been anything that
    they would have done differently, with the possible exception of saving an additional tube of
    blood for DNA analysis by law enforcement. Tr. Vol. I at 97-98.
    58
    Tr. Vol. I. at 126-27.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 16
    this is if she performed a full dissection, which would, as a matter of course,
    include a visual inspection of the removed hyoid.59 In his post-trial affidavit, Dr.
    Anderson further clarified that it is clear from the autopsy report that no trauma to
    the head or neck was identified after a complete dissection of the area, ―including
    the laryngeal cartilages as well as the epiglottis—which can only be visualized
    upon removal of these organs from the body.‖ 60 Dr. Anderson therefore disagreed
    with Ms. Rinnier‘s suggestion that the neck structures were not removed but only
    felt during the autopsy.61
    Dr. Anderson testified that he has autopsied a number of exhumed bodies.62
    When questioned about the usefulness of a second autopsy several years after
    burial, Dr. Anderson testified that he could see ―no advantage‖ to doing a second
    autopsy under the circumstances.63 He opined that the bag of organs would be
    decomposed to the point of not being helpful, and the hyoid bone might not even
    still be with the body, as it sometimes is removed and kept by the medical
    examiner.64      Dr. Anderson testified that the only thing that might still be
    determined from a body this long after death is whether there was some sort of
    59
    Id. at 128-29.
    60
    Anderson Post-Trial Aff. at 1.
    61
    Id.
    62
    Tr. Vol. I. at 122.
    63
    Id. at 121.
    64
    Id. at 122.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 17
    trauma.65 In Dr. Anderson‘s opinion, however, it would not be reasonable to look
    for trauma at this stage as (1) the body already had been subjected to a thorough
    autopsy that should have revealed trauma significant enough to cause death, and
    (2) death by trauma would have been sudden, which is not consistent with the signs
    of slow death observed in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body.66
    At the conclusion of trial, the parties and the guardian ad litem submitted
    post-trial briefing. Much of Ms. Rinnier‘s post-trial submissions strayed into areas
    I previously concluded were not relevant to the questions before the Court and
    which I therefore excluded from trial. Mr. Bowdoin moved to strike those portions
    of Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs and associated attachments. This post-trial report addresses
    the motions to strike, as well as Mr. Bowdoin‘s laches defense and Ms. Rinnier‘s
    entitlement to the relief she seeks.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Ms. Rinnier’s petition is not barred by the doctrine of laches.
    Mr. Bowdoin first argues that Ms. Rinnier‘s petition to exhume Mrs.
    Bowdoin‘s body in order to perform a second autopsy is barred by the doctrine of
    laches, both because she delayed unreasonably before filing this action and
    because she failed to prosecute this action vigorously even after it was filed. In
    65
    Id. at 121.
    66
    Id. at 121, 124.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 18
    response, Ms. Rinnier argues that her delay in filing this action is attributable to
    miscommunication or misunderstandings she had with various authorities in
    Florida, who caused Ms. Rinnier to believe for a period of time that she did not
    need a court order to exhume Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body. Ms. Rinnier also explains that
    the delay in prosecuting this action was partially a result of her status as a self-
    represented litigant.
    The defense of laches arises from the equitable maxim that ―equity aids the
    vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.‖67 Laches is similar to, but distinct
    from, the statutes of limitation that bar legal claims; although statutes of limitation
    do not strictly apply to equitable claims, an action in equity ordinarily is not barred
    by laches before the analogous statute of limitations has run, but typically will be
    barred after that time.68 Despite the similarities, a court of equity presented with a
    laches defense considers, in addition to the analogous limitations period, whether a
    party has acted with conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.69 A party
    asserting a defense of laches must establish three things: (1) the claimant had
    67
    Reid v. Spazio, 
    970 A.2d 176
    , 182 (Del. 2009) (quoting 2 Pomeroy‘s Equity Jurisprudence §§
    418, 419 (5th ed. 1941)).
    68
    Wright v. Scotton, 
    121 A. 69
    , 72-73 (Del. 1923).
    69
    Reid, 
    970 A.2d at 183
    .
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 19
    knowledge of the claim, (2) the claimant delayed unreasonably in pursuing the
    claim, and (3) the delay caused prejudice to the defendant.70
    Mr. Bowdoin does not directly address the first two elements of laches,
    except to argue that Ms. Rinnier had knowledge of the alleged need for a second
    autopsy no later than December 2008 or January 2009, but delayed filing this
    action until May 2011 and then did not seek expedited relief or diligently prosecute
    her claims. The facts of record, however, indicate Ms. Rinnier was advised,
    incorrectly, by various Florida officials, that she would be able to obtain a second
    autopsy if she were appointed personal representative of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s estate.
    When she discovered that was not accurate, she retained counsel and pursued this
    action. Mr. Bowdoin has not shown Ms. Rinnier delayed unreasonably in filing
    this claim. Although this case ideally would have been resolved much more
    promptly, I cannot conclude that Ms. Rinnier delayed unreasonably.                    The
    difficulties she faced, including pursuing much of this action without counsel, must
    be acknowledged and taken into account. I cannot conclude Ms. Rinnier did not
    act in good faith or diligently.
    Perhaps most critically, however, Mr. Bowdoin offers little to support his
    claim of prejudice other than the boilerplate assertion that the prejudice caused by
    70
    
    Id. at 182-83
    . Accord Fike v. Ruger, 
    752 A.2d 112
    , 113 (Del. 2000). See also Hudak v.
    Procek, 
    806 A.2d 140
    , 154 (Del. 2002) (―burden to prove the elements of laches – both delay
    and prejudice to the defendants – rests upon the defendants.‖).
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 20
    Ms. Rinnier‘s delay was ―clear,‖ because Mrs. Bowdoin‘s internal organs ―have
    long-since putrefied‖ and ―[t]he condition of any other bodily remnants is
    speculative at best.‖71 A defense of laches will not prevail in the absence of a
    showing of specific prejudice or a detrimental change in position arising from the
    delay.72 For example, the unavailability of key witnesses, or a loss of other critical
    evidence, may support a finding that a defendant was prejudiced by a claimant‘s
    unreasonable delay. Although Mr. Bowdoin may well be correct in his assessment
    of the state of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains, he has not explained, let alone shown, how
    that prejudices his position. To the contrary, if Ms. Rinnier‘s theory is accurate,
    the passage of time makes it even less likely that a second autopsy would reveal
    evidence implicating Mr. Bowdoin in the death of Mrs. Bowdoin.              In short,
    because Mr. Bowdoin has not established any of the three necessary elements, I
    recommend that the Court conclude Ms. Rinnier‘s claim is not barred by laches.
    B. Ms. Rinnier has not met the standard necessary to justify an autopsy
    after burial
    Although there are almost no published cases in Delaware addressing the
    issue, it appears relatively well settled that this Court‘s equitable powers include
    the power to order disinterment of a body so a second autopsy may be performed.
    Under early English law, the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
    71
    Resp‘t‘s Answering Post-Tr. Br. at 18.
    72
    Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starr, 
    575 A.2d 1083
    , 1089 (Del. 1990).
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 21
    the dead, including applications to exhume a body.73 In this country, the law
    developed so that jurisdiction over such actions lies with courts with equitable
    powers.74     Although I could not find any Delaware decisions addressing
    jurisdiction over an action to exhume a body for purposes of autopsy, this Court
    has express statutory jurisdiction over actions to disinter and reinter a body arising
    under other circumstances.75
    In the only Delaware Supreme Court case addressing the standard applicable
    to an action to disinter a body in order to perform an autopsy, that court expressly
    adopted the standard announced by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
    McCulloch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York.76 In McCulloch, the Fourth
    Circuit explained:
    While it is difficult to lay down a rule generally applicable under all
    circumstances, it is safe to say that two conditions must concur to
    justify an autopsy after burial. It must appear that through no fault of
    the [claimant] it was impracticable to demand and perform the
    autopsy before interment, and secondly, it must be reasonably certain
    that an examination of the body will reveal something bearing on the
    rights of the parties which could not otherwise be discovered.77
    73
    See Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 
    126 A.2d 886
    , 555 (N.J. 1956) (citing authorities).
    74
    Id. at 555-56.
    75
    12 Del. C. § 264(c). See also In re Estate of Necastro, 
    1990 WL 105620
    , at *3-7 (Del. Ch.
    July 25, 1990).
    76
    
    109 F.2d 866
     (4th Cir. 1940) (cited with approval in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v.
    Young & Revel, Inc., 
    250 A.2d 509
    , 510 (Del. 1969)).
    77
    McCulloch, 
    109 F.2d at 869-70
    .
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 22
    The cases that follow the McCulloch standard apply it strictly, such that only the
    ―rarest of cases‖ will justify ―reaching into the grave in search of ‗the facts.‘‖78
    Although one reasonably might ask what the harm in ordering disinterment and
    autopsy might be, the standard to take such action is high because the search for
    ―the truth‖ cannot overlook issues of religion, the decedent‘s wishes, the effect on
    loved ones, or the public interest.79
    Ms. Rinnier has met the first element of the McCulloch standard, because
    she could not foresee the need for the second autopsy before Mrs. Bowdoin was
    buried. Although the first autopsy was performed shortly after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s
    death, the medical examiner‘s report was not issued until September 12, 2008, two
    and a half months after Mrs. Bowdoin was buried. Until that time, Ms. Rinnier
    could not be expected to know what conclusions the medical examiner would
    reach, or that the manner of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death would be ruled ―undetermined.‖
    Ms. Rinnier has not, however, demonstrated with reasonable certainty that a
    second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains will reveal information about how she
    died. In view of the respect typically afforded to a decedent‘s remains and their
    resting place, this Court should not disturb those remains unless it reasonably is
    certain that doing so is likely to be a fruitful exercise. Although I genuinely
    78
    Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 
    126 A.2d 886
    , 891 (N.J. 1956) (cited with approval in
    Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Young & Revel, Inc., 
    250 A.2d 509
    , 510 (Del. 1969)).
    79
    Sheffield, 126 A.2d at 891.
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 23
    sympathize with Ms. Rinnier‘s grief, and her desire to learn the reason for her
    daughter‘s death, personal sympathies cannot be the determining factor in a
    petition to disinter bodily remains and subject them to autopsy.
    Although Ms. Rinnier‘s suspicions regarding the circumstances and timing
    of her daughter‘s death are understandable, she has presented no evidence – other
    than motive – to cast suspicion on Mr. Bowdoin. More fundamentally, she has not
    shown that an autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains, seven years after her death, is
    reasonably certain to lead to new evidence regarding the manner of death. At
    most, Mrs. Bowdoin has shown, through Dr. Manion‘s testimony, that there are
    unanswered questions regarding how Mrs. Bowdoin ingested Zolpidem and
    whether that substance alone could have caused her death. Dr. Manion‘s testimony
    did not convince me that the additional tests he would perform during a second
    autopsy were likely – as opposed to simply possible – to add material information
    to the record regarding how Mrs. Bowdoin died and whether she might have been
    murdered. Although Dr. Manion theorized that further testing might show Mrs.
    Bowdoin chronically ingested Zolpidem, such a finding could not reasonably
    support a conclusion that Mr. Bowdoin repeatedly ―fed‖ Mrs. Bowdoin the drug
    without her knowledge; it is at least equally possible that – if tests showed chronic
    use of the drug – Mrs. Bowdoin repeatedly and voluntarily took the sleep aid that
    had not been prescribed, but to which she had access. Similarly, Dr. Manion‘s
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 24
    testimony about wanting to examine the hyoid bone cannot overcome Dr.
    Anderson‘s convincing testimony that the autopsy report shows the medical
    examiner examined the hyoid bone during the first autopsy.
    Moreover, Dr. Manion‘s testimony was unconvincing regarding the
    likelihood he would be able to perform those tests eight years after a body was
    autopsied. Although Dr. Manion has autopsied remains several years after death,
    none of those autopsies were conducted on bodies that previously were autopsied.
    Dr. Anderson explained that the autopsy, and the manner in which the remains are
    reassembled after the autopsy, in addition to the passage of time, likely destroyed
    any useable tissue or contaminated the remains to the point that any test results
    would be unreliable.
    At its core, Ms. Rinnier‘s request would require this Court to second guess
    the processes and decisions of the medical examiner who conducted the first
    autopsy.   None of the witnesses testified that the medical examiner failed to
    perform an acceptable or reliable autopsy. There is nothing in the record that
    suggests the medical examiner was motivated to reach any particular conclusion.
    Ms. Rinnier has not cited, and my own research has not revealed, any case in
    which a court has ordered a second autopsy after burial. All the cases the parties
    cite involve requests for a first autopsy. In my view, the standard in a case
    involving a request for a second autopsy should be even stricter, and should require
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 25
    the claimant to come forward with some compelling evidence that renders the first
    autopsy unreliable or demonstrably incomplete. Whether applying that standard,
    or the McCulloch standard, Ms. Rinnier has not met her burden of proof.
    C. Motions to Strike
    Finally, Mr. Bowdoin filed motions to strike large portions of both Ms.
    Rinnier‘s post-trial briefs.    Mr. Bowdoin contends that Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs
    referred to, and attached exhibits referring to or containing, evidence that either (1)
    was not admitted during trial, or (2) specifically was excluded from trial on the
    basis of relevance. In addition, Mr. Bowdoin contends that Ms. Rinnier made
    accusations about Mr. Bowdoin, and attached photographs from an unknown
    source, that are both scandalous and immaterial.
    Mr. Bowdoin is correct that Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs and the exhibits thereto
    repeatedly reference information that was not admitted into evidence at trial. To
    the extent she has done so, I have not considered that evidence in making my
    recommendation to the Court. In view of Ms. Rinnier‘s status as a self-represented
    litigant, however, I do not believe it is fair to strike her post-trial briefs. Although
    many of the exhibits she attached to her briefs were not admitted into evidence at
    trial, most consist of pleadings or other materials of which this Court may take
    judicial notice. I do, however, believe that Exhibits B, C, and D(10) to Ms.
    Rinnier‘s opening post-trial brief should be stricken from the record as an improper
    C.A. No. 6473-ML
    November 24, 2015
    Page 26
    attempt to admit evidence after trial. Those exhibits consist of two affidavits, one
    from a fact witness who did not testify at trial and one from Dr. Manion, along
    with photographs Ms. Rinnier contends are of Mr. Bowdoin and an expensive boat
    he purchased after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court deny Ms. Rinnier‘s
    petition for removal of a corpse. I also recommend that the Court grant Mr.
    Bowdoin‘s motion to strike Exhibits B, C, and D(10) to Ms. Rinnier‘s first post-
    trial brief, but that the Court otherwise deny Mr. Bowdoin‘s motions to strike.
    This is my final report and exceptions may be taken in accordance with Rule 144.
    Sincerely,
    /s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
    Master in Chancery
    cc:   Michael D. Fluke, Esquire