Mary L. Rinnier, Administratrix v.Gracelawn Memorial Park Inc. ( 2015 )

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
ABIGAIL M. LEGROW
MASTER IN CHANCERY NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734
Submitted: August 12, 2015
Final Report: November 24, 2015
Ms. Mary L. Rinnier
301 Feryn Farms Drive
New Castle, DE 19720
Somers S. Price, Jr., Esquire
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
1313 N. Market Street, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 951
Wilmington, DE 19899
Suzanne I. Seubert, Esquire
Suzanne I. Seubert, P.A.
1328 King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: Mary L. Rinnier, Administratrix v.
Gracelawn Memorial Park Inc., et al.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
Dear Counsel and Ms. Rinnier:
The petitioner filed this action seeking disinterment of the corpse of her
daughter, who passed away and was buried more than seven years ago. Although
an autopsy was performed by the Florida medical examiner a day after her
daughter‘s death, the petitioner believes that her daughter‘s death was not the result
C.A. No. 6473-ML
November 24, 2015
Page 2
of an accident or suicide, but rather a murder committed by the respondent, who
was married to the petitioner‘s daughter. The petitioner hopes a second autopsy on
her daughter‘s remains will reveal how her daughter died.
This case is difficult for many reasons, not the least of which is the
petitioner‘s understandable grief, and even suspicion, which alone are enough to
prompt my sincere sympathies. It would be tempting to grant the petitioner the
relief she seeks on the off chance it will bring her clarity and closure.
Unfortunately, but for good reason, there is a high standard a party must meet
before this Court will order exhumation of a corpse so an autopsy may be
performed. I do not believe the petitioner has come close to meeting that standard.
I therefore recommend that the Court deny the petition to remove the corpse. This
is my final report.
BACKGROUND
These are the facts as I find them after trial. The petitioner, Mary L. Rinnier
(―Ms. Rinnier‖), is the mother of Laura Bowdoin (―Mrs. Bowdoin‖). Mrs.
Bowdoin, who was married to the respondent, George Bowdoin (―Mr. Bowdoin‖),
died in Pasco County, Florida on June 19, 2008. Mr. and Mrs. Bowdoin had one
daughter, B., who was twelve at the time this case was tried. B. resides with her
father, Mr. Bowdoin.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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Page 3
At the time of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death, she was estranged from her husband,
having filed for divorce on May 12, 2008. Mrs. Bowdoin allegedly was
developing a relationship with another man and was looking forward to pursuing a
new life. Unfortunately, and unexpectedly, Mr. Bowdoin found Mrs. Bowdoin
dead in the marital home on the morning of June 19, 2008. No suicide note was
found, and the cause of death was not immediately apparent.
Ms. Rinnier argues that the police did not immediately investigate the
circumstances of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death or examine the scene. Ms. Rinnier
suggests, in fact, that the police never adequately investigated this case. An
autopsy, however, was performed on June 20, 2008, by the District Six Medical
Examiner for Pasco and Pinnellas Counties, Florida.1 The Pinnellas County
Forensic Laboratory also analyzed blood and tissue samples taken during the
autopsy.2 The autopsy findings were (1) pulmonary edema and congestion, and (2)
post-mortem toxicology, finding 930 ng/ml Zolpidem in the blood and negative for
ethylene glycol in the blood.3 The medical examiner concluded that the cause of
Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death was ―Zolpidem toxicity.‖4 Zolpidem is marketed under a
1
Respondent‘s Trial Exhibit (―RX‖) 2.
2
RX 3
3
RX 2. Ethylene glycol is the primary ingredient in automotive antifreeze. See ―Ethylene
Glycol: Systemic Agent‖ available at
http://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/ershdb/EmergencyResponseCard_29750031.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2015).
4
RX 2 at 1.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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Page 4
number of different brand names, including Ambien. The medical examiner
concluded the manner of death was ―Undetermined.‖ That is, the medical
examiner could not conclude from the autopsy whether the death was accidental or
intentional.5
Concerning the exterior of the body, the medical examiner found no visible
scar or injury on the neck and no visible injury to the chest.6 Mrs. Bowdoin‘s chest
cavity was normal, with the ribs, clavicles, and sternum intact.7 The pleural (lung)
and abdominal cavities were normal, with no excess blood, fluid, or exudate.8 The
pericardium (membrane enclosing the heart) was intact and contained a minimal
amount of yellow serous fluid.9 Concerning Mrs. Bowdoin‘s neck, her strap
muscles were free of injury, and the thyroid cartilage and hyoid bone were intact.10
There was nothing notable reported about the liver.11 The right and left lungs were
570 and 510 grams, respectively.12 The parenchyma of the lungs was congested.13
The bronchi were intact.14 The pulmonary arteries were intact and free of
5
See e.g., Trial Transcript (hereinafter ―Tr.‖) Vol. II at 5-6 (Dr. Manion) (explaining the
difference between ―manner of death‖ and ―cause of death‖).
6
RX 2 at 2.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
RX 2 at 3.
13
Id.
14
Id.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
November 24, 2015
Page 5
thromboemboli (blood clots).15 The skull, brain, and spinal cord appeared normal
and free of injury, with no hemorrhage.16
After the autopsy, Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body was embalmed and interred at
Gracelawn Memorial Park Cemetery (―Gracelawn‖) in New Castle, Delaware on
June 27, 2008. The results of the autopsy and laboratory results were not available
to Ms. Rinnier before Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body was buried. Even before she received
the autopsy results, however, Ms. Rinnier suspected that Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death
was not accidental, claiming that statements Mr. Bowdoin made – particularly after
the divorce filing – suggested that he was jealous and angry about the divorce and
Mrs. Bowdoin‘s interest in pursuing a relationship with another man. Ms. Rinnier
also believed the Pasco County Sheriff‘s Office, which investigated Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s death, did not conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation, in part
because they did not immediately treat Mrs. Bowdoin‘s house as a possible crime
scene. Ms. Rinnier also was suspicious of Mr. Bowdoin because he was the
beneficiary of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s $1.2 million life insurance policy, as well as her
retirement account and other property. Finally, Ms. Rinnier was surprised by, and
suspicious of, the fact that Zolpidem was found in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s system,
15
Id.
16
Id.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
November 24, 2015
Page 6
because she did not have a prescription for that medication, although Mr. Bowdoin
had been prescribed Ambien.
Ms. Rinnier initiated this action on May 11, 2011 with a Petition for
Removal of a Corpse (the ―Petition‖). Although Gracelawn was named as a
defendant in the Petition, the parties stipulated to Gracelawn‘s dismissal on the
condition that Gracelawn agree to abide by any decision of the Court regarding the
disposition of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains.17 Upon Mr. Bowdoin‘s request, the Court
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent B.‘s interests in this action.
This case then proceeded, slowly, through discovery. Until approximately
August 2013, Ms. Rinnier was represented by counsel. Her counsel was permitted
to withdraw, however, and she has proceeded without counsel since that time. Ms.
Rinnier did not vigorously prosecute this case, either when she was represented by
counsel, or thereafter. In fairness, however, she was not sitting idly by while this
case sat unattended. Rather, Ms. Rinnier undertook a number of efforts in Florida
to find answers about her daughter‘s death. Among other things, Ms. Rinnier hired
a private investigator, Michael Peasley, to assist in her efforts to uncover the
manner of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. With Mr. Peasley‘s help, Ms. Rinnier contacted
various Florida authorities, including the sheriff‘s office and the state attorney. 18
17
Stipulation of Dismissal, Jun. 30, 2011.
18
Tr. Vol. I at 47-48 (Peasley).
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Ms. Rinnier also filed a petition in Florida to be appointed personal representative
of her daughter‘s estate, which was granted in June 2010,19 as well as a wrongful
death action against Mr. Bowdoin.
This case finally proceeded to trial in March 2015. Over the course of the
two-day trial, both sides presented expert testimony regarding the key issue in the
case: whether a second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body, performed several years
after her death, was likely to produce any new information about the cause or
manner of her death. Ms. Rinnier‘s expert, Dr. William Manion, is a medical
examiner in New Jersey. In Dr. Manion‘s view, the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s system was above the therapeutic dose, but was not a level typically
considered lethal. For that reason, Dr. Manion opined that the Zolpidem in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s body did not completely explain her death, and it was possible she was
suffocated in a manner that did not leave any significant marks on her body. 20
Although he could not say so with absolute certainty, Dr. Manion believes it is
possible that a second autopsy might reveal additional information regarding the
cause of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death.
19
Ms. Rinnier later was removed as personal representative of the estate, a decision that the
Florida Court of Appeal affirmed on December 5, 2014. Although Mr. Bowdoin points to this
fact and concludes that Ms. Rinnier only is acting ―for herself‖ in this action, he does not directly
argue Ms. Rinnier lacks standing to pursue exhumation or a second autopsy.
20
Tr. Vol. II at 7-8.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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Dr. Manion testified there are two types of additional testing that he would
like to perform on the body, both of which tests he believes still could be effective
81 months after the body originally was buried. First, Dr. Manion said that he
would like to pursue further toxicology to see if Ambien was taken chronically by
the decedent or if this was a one-time acute overdose.21 Second, Dr. Manion
testified that he would like to take an x-ray of the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage
to see if there is a hairline fracture, which the medical examiner could have
missed.22 Dr. Manion suggested that, as the Ambien was not prescribed to Mrs.
Bowdoin, if toxicology were to reveal chronic ingestion, this could suggest that the
decedent was being chronically fed the drug in food or drink without her
knowledge.23 Similarly, damage to the hyoid bone or thyroid cartilage could reveal
suffocation or strangling. Dr. Manion admitted, however, that if the decedent was
greatly impaired, it may have been possible to gently suffocate her with a pillow,
which would not damage these structures.24
In his testimony, Dr. Manion drew several inferences from the report of the
initial autopsy as support for his conclusion that a second autopsy might reveal
additional information regarding Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. For example, Dr. Manion
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id. at 8.
23
Id. at 7.
24
Id. at 8.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
November 24, 2015
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concluded that, because the medical examiner found the manner of death to be
―undetermined,‖ the medical examiner likely believed that investigation of the
scene, as well as other police work, was necessary to reach a conclusion regarding
the manner of death.25 Dr. Manion also noted that the autopsy report did not
specifically indicate whether the hyoid bone was removed, and testified that, if the
hyoid bone was not removed, an examination of it and the surrounding areas might
reveal Mrs. Bowdoin was murdered.
Dr. Manion described what he viewed as several suspicious circumstances
surrounding Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. First, Ambien was not prescribed to Mrs.
Bowdoin.26 Second, there were no pills in her stomach as would indicate a sudden,
massive overdose.27 Third, while Dr. Manion agreed that the Zolpidem level was
―high‖ and ―certainly above the therapeutic level,‖ he opined that it was much
lower than what usually is seen when a person dies from Zolpidem overdose.28 He
further testified that even where Zolpidem is lethal, there is usually alcohol or a
secondary drug present in the system. 29 He explained that Zolpidem is a
respiratory depressant (as is alcohol, for example), and what typically is seen is
another respiratory depressant acting synergistically with the Zolpidem to cause
25
Id. at 6.
26
Tr. Vol. II at 7.
27
Id. at 7.
28
Id.
29
Id.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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respiratory system failure.30 Given these circumstances, Dr. Manion suggested
someone caused Mrs. Bowdoin to unknowingly ingest the Ambien, which
weakened her to the point that she could be suffocated without the perpetrator
having to exert much force.31
Dr. Manion further testified that, even though Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body had
been interred for 81 months, he still could collect this information from her
remains. He testified that he had examined bodies exhumed five to seven years
after burial, and that those remains still could be analyzed because of the fixative
properties of embalming fluid.32 Dr. Manion could not say, however, whether
these bodies previously had been autopsied before the burial.33 When pressed on
cross-examination, Dr. Manion acknowledged that, after the first autopsy, Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s organs would have been combined in one bag and replaced in her
body.34 He nevertheless opined that he would be able to glean valuable
information from the organs, in part because the funeral director will have put
embalming fluid and a sawdust-like absorbent material inside the bag.35
Dr. Manion conceded on cross-examination that several of the findings of
the autopsy were consistent with the Respondent‘s theory of death by suicide or
30
Id. at 8.
31
Id. at 8.
32
Tr. Vol. II at 13.
33
Id. at 30-32.
34
Id. at 14.
35
Id. at 14-15.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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accidental overdose due to Ambien. For example, the lungs were swollen with
fluid, indicating heart failure, which Dr. Manion confirmed is ―a telltale sign of
drug overdose.‖36 Dr. Manion pointed out, however, that there also usually is froth
in the trachea and around the mouth in cases of overdose, and no froth was
observed in the instant case.37 Similarly, Dr. Manion confirmed that there was no
petechial hemorrhaging as would be consistent with a quick death due to
suffocation.38 Dr. Manion argued that this evidence still is consistent with his
theory that the decedent was suffocated gently after already being in a
compromised state due to the Ambien.39 Dr. Manion suggested that Mrs. Bowdoin
may very well have been in a state of overdose, ―but not necessarily lethal
overdose,‖ when someone caused her death by suffocation.40
Dr. Manion‘s conclusions regarding the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s body, and whether she ingested a lethal dose, were based upon a report
authored by Dr. O‘Malley, a toxicologist with whom Ms. Rinnier corresponded
after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death, as well as on Dr. Manion‘s internet research.41 From
that information, Dr. Manion concluded that the level of Zolpidem in Mrs.
36
Id. at 16-17.
37
Id. at 17-18.
38
Tr. Vol. II at 18.
39
Id. at 18-19.
40
Id.
41
Tr. Vol. I at 45, 65-66 (Peasley); Tr. Vol. II at 24-25 (Manion).
C.A. No. 6473-ML
November 24, 2015
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Bowdoin‘s body was ―consistent with overdose‖ but ―not consistent with lethal
overdose.‖42
In response to Dr. Manion‘s testimony, Mr. Bowdoin offered the testimony
and an affidavit43 of Dr. William R. Anderson, a Florida physician who, among
other things, performs private autopsies. Dr. Anderson disputed the bulk of Dr.
Manion‘s conclusions, particularly regarding whether (1) the Zolpidem in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s system was a lethal dose, (2) there was any evidence to suggest that
additional testing of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body might reveal that she was strangled or
suffocated, and (3) an exhumation and second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body
was likely to reveal any additional information about the cause or manner of her
death, given the time that had elapsed since her death.
Specifically, as to the level of Zolpidem in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s system, Dr.
Anderson disputed Dr. Manion‘s conclusion that the level was not consistent with
what typically is a lethal dose. Dr. Anderson cited a recent FDA report that found
that Zolpidem has a greater effect on women than on men.44 He also testified that
the level of Zolpidem in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s bloodstream was three times the
42
Tr. Vol. II at 26.
43
I allowed Mr. Bowdoin to submit a post-trial affidavit from Dr. Anderson, responding to
opinions offered by Dr. Manion, because Dr. Manion unexpectedly was not available to testify
on the first day of trial and had not offered a written report, so Dr. Anderson could not
adequately respond to Dr. Manion‘s opinions during trial. Tr. Vol. I at 26-27.
44
Tr. Vol. I at 110.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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therapeutic level.45 Concerning metabolites of a particular drug, Dr. Anderson
confirmed that these can be detected in the blood as well as in liver tissue; he also
testified, however, that the deterioration of the tissue several years after burial
―would tend to make results of a liver analysis questionable at this point.‖ 46 Dr.
Anderson argued that the absence of pills in the stomach tends to suggest that Mrs.
Bowdoin had ingested the pills over several hours, suggesting accidental death
rather than suicide.47 Dr. Anderson concluded that the findings ―are consistent
with an accidental intoxication from Zolpidem at levels now recognized to be
potentially dangerous in a female patient‖ and that ―it is highly unlikely that any
further information would be elicited by further examination of the body.‖ 48
Dr. Anderson further disputed any notion that Mrs. Bowdoin was strangled
or suffocated, testifying that the first autopsy showed that her lungs were swollen
with fluid, indicating that death took place over time, ―15, 20 minutes or more,
maybe even several hours,‖ rather than suddenly.49 Dr. Anderson testified that
there would not be edema in the case of strangulation or suffocation because death
would be almost instantaneous, which would not allow time for the lungs to fill
45
Id. at 112.
46
Anderson Aff., Resp‘t‘s Answering Post-Tr. Br. Ex C.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Tr. Vol. I. at 114.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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with fluid.50 He further pointed to the lack of petechial hemorrhaging in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s case as evidence she was not strangled or suffocated, although he
conceded that petechial hemorrhaging does not occur in all such cases.51 In light
of all the evidence obtained through the first autopsy, including the absence of any
trauma to Mrs. Bowdoin‘s neck, lips, or nose, Dr. Anderson stressed that the ―full
picture‖ did not suggest strangulation or suffocation of Mrs. Bowdoin.52 On cross-
examination, Dr. Anderson again explained that Mrs. Bowdoin would not have
died if a blanket or pillow were simply placed over her face. According to Dr.
Anderson, a suffocation death would have required positive pressure being applied
to obstruct the airway, which would have caused death over a matter of minutes, or
less, and which would not have resulted in the pulmonary edema observed in Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s body during the first autopsy.53
Dr. Anderson opined that there would be ―no advantage‖54 to conducting a
second autopsy, both because a complete autopsy previously was performed and
because of the amount of time that had elapsed since Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death. When
asked if the first autopsy was complete, Dr. Anderson alternately called it ―very
50
Id. at 114-15; 126.
51
Id. at 116.
52
Id. at 116-17.
53
Id. at 124-25.
54
Id. at 121-22.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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complete‖ and ―reasonably complete.‖55 Dr. Anderson‘s only small criticism of
the autopsy was that he might have taken microscopic sections of some of the
tissues, which might have revealed, for example, mild hemorrhaging or signs of
pneumonia—the latter of which would have provided an alternative explanation
for the swelling of the decedent‘s lungs.56 Dr. Anderson, however, made clear that
he did not think that a failure to take additional microscopic sections rendered the
autopsy incomplete and added that it would not be unusual for a forensic
pathologist not to do these additional tests.57
When asked about the possibility of x-raying the hyoid bone, Dr. Anderson
testified that it would not be necessary because relevant damage would be apparent
from removing the bone and visually examining it, which Dr. Anderson concluded
must have been done by the medical examiner.58 When pressed by Ms. Rinnier to
explain how he knows from the report that the hyoid bone actually was removed,
Dr. Anderson pointed to the statement in the report that ―the thyroid cartilage
bones are intact‖ and concluded that the only way that the pathologist could know
55
Tr. Vol. I. at 118.
56
Id. at 118; 141.
57
Id. at 118 (―I would have liked to have seen them take some micros, but I‘m a surgical
pathologist as well. And so some of the forensic pathologists don‘t take microscopic sections‖).
Regarding the thoroughness of the autopsy, there was testimony at trial from Mr. Pellan (director
of investigations at the district medical examiner‘s office where the autopsy on the decedent was
performed) that even if foul play had been suspected there would not have been anything that
they would have done differently, with the possible exception of saving an additional tube of
blood for DNA analysis by law enforcement. Tr. Vol. I at 97-98.
58
Tr. Vol. I. at 126-27.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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this is if she performed a full dissection, which would, as a matter of course,
include a visual inspection of the removed hyoid.59 In his post-trial affidavit, Dr.
Anderson further clarified that it is clear from the autopsy report that no trauma to
the head or neck was identified after a complete dissection of the area, ―including
the laryngeal cartilages as well as the epiglottis—which can only be visualized
upon removal of these organs from the body.‖ 60 Dr. Anderson therefore disagreed
with Ms. Rinnier‘s suggestion that the neck structures were not removed but only
felt during the autopsy.61
Dr. Anderson testified that he has autopsied a number of exhumed bodies.62
When questioned about the usefulness of a second autopsy several years after
burial, Dr. Anderson testified that he could see ―no advantage‖ to doing a second
autopsy under the circumstances.63 He opined that the bag of organs would be
decomposed to the point of not being helpful, and the hyoid bone might not even
still be with the body, as it sometimes is removed and kept by the medical
examiner.64 Dr. Anderson testified that the only thing that might still be
determined from a body this long after death is whether there was some sort of
59
Id. at 128-29.
60
Anderson Post-Trial Aff. at 1.
61
Id.
62
Tr. Vol. I. at 122.
63
Id. at 121.
64
Id. at 122.
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trauma.65 In Dr. Anderson‘s opinion, however, it would not be reasonable to look
for trauma at this stage as (1) the body already had been subjected to a thorough
autopsy that should have revealed trauma significant enough to cause death, and
(2) death by trauma would have been sudden, which is not consistent with the signs
of slow death observed in Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body.66
At the conclusion of trial, the parties and the guardian ad litem submitted
post-trial briefing. Much of Ms. Rinnier‘s post-trial submissions strayed into areas
I previously concluded were not relevant to the questions before the Court and
which I therefore excluded from trial. Mr. Bowdoin moved to strike those portions
of Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs and associated attachments. This post-trial report addresses
the motions to strike, as well as Mr. Bowdoin‘s laches defense and Ms. Rinnier‘s
entitlement to the relief she seeks.
ANALYSIS
A. Ms. Rinnier’s petition is not barred by the doctrine of laches.
Mr. Bowdoin first argues that Ms. Rinnier‘s petition to exhume Mrs.
Bowdoin‘s body in order to perform a second autopsy is barred by the doctrine of
laches, both because she delayed unreasonably before filing this action and
because she failed to prosecute this action vigorously even after it was filed. In
65
Id. at 121.
66
Id. at 121, 124.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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response, Ms. Rinnier argues that her delay in filing this action is attributable to
miscommunication or misunderstandings she had with various authorities in
Florida, who caused Ms. Rinnier to believe for a period of time that she did not
need a court order to exhume Mrs. Bowdoin‘s body. Ms. Rinnier also explains that
the delay in prosecuting this action was partially a result of her status as a self-
represented litigant.
The defense of laches arises from the equitable maxim that ―equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.‖67 Laches is similar to, but distinct
from, the statutes of limitation that bar legal claims; although statutes of limitation
do not strictly apply to equitable claims, an action in equity ordinarily is not barred
by laches before the analogous statute of limitations has run, but typically will be
barred after that time.68 Despite the similarities, a court of equity presented with a
laches defense considers, in addition to the analogous limitations period, whether a
party has acted with conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.69 A party
asserting a defense of laches must establish three things: (1) the claimant had
67
Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182 (Del. 2009) (quoting 2 Pomeroy‘s Equity Jurisprudence §§
418, 419 (5th ed. 1941)).
68
Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69, 72-73 (Del. 1923).
69
Reid, 970 A.2d at 183.
C.A. No. 6473-ML
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knowledge of the claim, (2) the claimant delayed unreasonably in pursuing the
claim, and (3) the delay caused prejudice to the defendant.70
Mr. Bowdoin does not directly address the first two elements of laches,
except to argue that Ms. Rinnier had knowledge of the alleged need for a second
autopsy no later than December 2008 or January 2009, but delayed filing this
action until May 2011 and then did not seek expedited relief or diligently prosecute
her claims. The facts of record, however, indicate Ms. Rinnier was advised,
incorrectly, by various Florida officials, that she would be able to obtain a second
autopsy if she were appointed personal representative of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s estate.
When she discovered that was not accurate, she retained counsel and pursued this
action. Mr. Bowdoin has not shown Ms. Rinnier delayed unreasonably in filing
this claim. Although this case ideally would have been resolved much more
promptly, I cannot conclude that Ms. Rinnier delayed unreasonably. The
difficulties she faced, including pursuing much of this action without counsel, must
be acknowledged and taken into account. I cannot conclude Ms. Rinnier did not
act in good faith or diligently.
Perhaps most critically, however, Mr. Bowdoin offers little to support his
claim of prejudice other than the boilerplate assertion that the prejudice caused by
70
Id. at 182-83. Accord Fike v. Ruger, 752 A.2d 112, 113 (Del. 2000). See also Hudak v.
Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 154 (Del. 2002) (―burden to prove the elements of laches – both delay
and prejudice to the defendants – rests upon the defendants.‖).
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Ms. Rinnier‘s delay was ―clear,‖ because Mrs. Bowdoin‘s internal organs ―have
long-since putrefied‖ and ―[t]he condition of any other bodily remnants is
speculative at best.‖71 A defense of laches will not prevail in the absence of a
showing of specific prejudice or a detrimental change in position arising from the
delay.72 For example, the unavailability of key witnesses, or a loss of other critical
evidence, may support a finding that a defendant was prejudiced by a claimant‘s
unreasonable delay. Although Mr. Bowdoin may well be correct in his assessment
of the state of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains, he has not explained, let alone shown, how
that prejudices his position. To the contrary, if Ms. Rinnier‘s theory is accurate,
the passage of time makes it even less likely that a second autopsy would reveal
evidence implicating Mr. Bowdoin in the death of Mrs. Bowdoin. In short,
because Mr. Bowdoin has not established any of the three necessary elements, I
recommend that the Court conclude Ms. Rinnier‘s claim is not barred by laches.
B. Ms. Rinnier has not met the standard necessary to justify an autopsy
after burial
Although there are almost no published cases in Delaware addressing the
issue, it appears relatively well settled that this Court‘s equitable powers include
the power to order disinterment of a body so a second autopsy may be performed.
Under early English law, the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
71
Resp‘t‘s Answering Post-Tr. Br. at 18.
72
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starr, 575 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Del. 1990).
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the dead, including applications to exhume a body.73 In this country, the law
developed so that jurisdiction over such actions lies with courts with equitable
powers.74 Although I could not find any Delaware decisions addressing
jurisdiction over an action to exhume a body for purposes of autopsy, this Court
has express statutory jurisdiction over actions to disinter and reinter a body arising
under other circumstances.75
In the only Delaware Supreme Court case addressing the standard applicable
to an action to disinter a body in order to perform an autopsy, that court expressly
adopted the standard announced by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
McCulloch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York.76 In McCulloch, the Fourth
Circuit explained:
While it is difficult to lay down a rule generally applicable under all
circumstances, it is safe to say that two conditions must concur to
justify an autopsy after burial. It must appear that through no fault of
the [claimant] it was impracticable to demand and perform the
autopsy before interment, and secondly, it must be reasonably certain
that an examination of the body will reveal something bearing on the
rights of the parties which could not otherwise be discovered.77
73
See Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 126 A.2d 886, 555 (N.J. 1956) (citing authorities).
74
Id. at 555-56.
75
12 Del. C. § 264(c). See also In re Estate of Necastro, 1990 WL 105620, at *3-7 (Del. Ch.
July 25, 1990).
76
109 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1940) (cited with approval in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v.
Young & Revel, Inc., 250 A.2d 509, 510 (Del. 1969)).
77
McCulloch, 109 F.2d at 869-70.
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The cases that follow the McCulloch standard apply it strictly, such that only the
―rarest of cases‖ will justify ―reaching into the grave in search of ‗the facts.‘‖78
Although one reasonably might ask what the harm in ordering disinterment and
autopsy might be, the standard to take such action is high because the search for
―the truth‖ cannot overlook issues of religion, the decedent‘s wishes, the effect on
loved ones, or the public interest.79
Ms. Rinnier has met the first element of the McCulloch standard, because
she could not foresee the need for the second autopsy before Mrs. Bowdoin was
buried. Although the first autopsy was performed shortly after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s
death, the medical examiner‘s report was not issued until September 12, 2008, two
and a half months after Mrs. Bowdoin was buried. Until that time, Ms. Rinnier
could not be expected to know what conclusions the medical examiner would
reach, or that the manner of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death would be ruled ―undetermined.‖
Ms. Rinnier has not, however, demonstrated with reasonable certainty that a
second autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains will reveal information about how she
died. In view of the respect typically afforded to a decedent‘s remains and their
resting place, this Court should not disturb those remains unless it reasonably is
certain that doing so is likely to be a fruitful exercise. Although I genuinely
78
Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 126 A.2d 886, 891 (N.J. 1956) (cited with approval in
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Young & Revel, Inc., 250 A.2d 509, 510 (Del. 1969)).
79
Sheffield, 126 A.2d at 891.
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sympathize with Ms. Rinnier‘s grief, and her desire to learn the reason for her
daughter‘s death, personal sympathies cannot be the determining factor in a
petition to disinter bodily remains and subject them to autopsy.
Although Ms. Rinnier‘s suspicions regarding the circumstances and timing
of her daughter‘s death are understandable, she has presented no evidence – other
than motive – to cast suspicion on Mr. Bowdoin. More fundamentally, she has not
shown that an autopsy of Mrs. Bowdoin‘s remains, seven years after her death, is
reasonably certain to lead to new evidence regarding the manner of death. At
most, Mrs. Bowdoin has shown, through Dr. Manion‘s testimony, that there are
unanswered questions regarding how Mrs. Bowdoin ingested Zolpidem and
whether that substance alone could have caused her death. Dr. Manion‘s testimony
did not convince me that the additional tests he would perform during a second
autopsy were likely – as opposed to simply possible – to add material information
to the record regarding how Mrs. Bowdoin died and whether she might have been
murdered. Although Dr. Manion theorized that further testing might show Mrs.
Bowdoin chronically ingested Zolpidem, such a finding could not reasonably
support a conclusion that Mr. Bowdoin repeatedly ―fed‖ Mrs. Bowdoin the drug
without her knowledge; it is at least equally possible that – if tests showed chronic
use of the drug – Mrs. Bowdoin repeatedly and voluntarily took the sleep aid that
had not been prescribed, but to which she had access. Similarly, Dr. Manion‘s
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testimony about wanting to examine the hyoid bone cannot overcome Dr.
Anderson‘s convincing testimony that the autopsy report shows the medical
examiner examined the hyoid bone during the first autopsy.
Moreover, Dr. Manion‘s testimony was unconvincing regarding the
likelihood he would be able to perform those tests eight years after a body was
autopsied. Although Dr. Manion has autopsied remains several years after death,
none of those autopsies were conducted on bodies that previously were autopsied.
Dr. Anderson explained that the autopsy, and the manner in which the remains are
reassembled after the autopsy, in addition to the passage of time, likely destroyed
any useable tissue or contaminated the remains to the point that any test results
would be unreliable.
At its core, Ms. Rinnier‘s request would require this Court to second guess
the processes and decisions of the medical examiner who conducted the first
autopsy. None of the witnesses testified that the medical examiner failed to
perform an acceptable or reliable autopsy. There is nothing in the record that
suggests the medical examiner was motivated to reach any particular conclusion.
Ms. Rinnier has not cited, and my own research has not revealed, any case in
which a court has ordered a second autopsy after burial. All the cases the parties
cite involve requests for a first autopsy. In my view, the standard in a case
involving a request for a second autopsy should be even stricter, and should require
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the claimant to come forward with some compelling evidence that renders the first
autopsy unreliable or demonstrably incomplete. Whether applying that standard,
or the McCulloch standard, Ms. Rinnier has not met her burden of proof.
C. Motions to Strike
Finally, Mr. Bowdoin filed motions to strike large portions of both Ms.
Rinnier‘s post-trial briefs. Mr. Bowdoin contends that Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs
referred to, and attached exhibits referring to or containing, evidence that either (1)
was not admitted during trial, or (2) specifically was excluded from trial on the
basis of relevance. In addition, Mr. Bowdoin contends that Ms. Rinnier made
accusations about Mr. Bowdoin, and attached photographs from an unknown
source, that are both scandalous and immaterial.
Mr. Bowdoin is correct that Ms. Rinnier‘s briefs and the exhibits thereto
repeatedly reference information that was not admitted into evidence at trial. To
the extent she has done so, I have not considered that evidence in making my
recommendation to the Court. In view of Ms. Rinnier‘s status as a self-represented
litigant, however, I do not believe it is fair to strike her post-trial briefs. Although
many of the exhibits she attached to her briefs were not admitted into evidence at
trial, most consist of pleadings or other materials of which this Court may take
judicial notice. I do, however, believe that Exhibits B, C, and D(10) to Ms.
Rinnier‘s opening post-trial brief should be stricken from the record as an improper
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attempt to admit evidence after trial. Those exhibits consist of two affidavits, one
from a fact witness who did not testify at trial and one from Dr. Manion, along
with photographs Ms. Rinnier contends are of Mr. Bowdoin and an expensive boat
he purchased after Mrs. Bowdoin‘s death.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court deny Ms. Rinnier‘s
petition for removal of a corpse. I also recommend that the Court grant Mr.
Bowdoin‘s motion to strike Exhibits B, C, and D(10) to Ms. Rinnier‘s first post-
trial brief, but that the Court otherwise deny Mr. Bowdoin‘s motions to strike.
This is my final report and exceptions may be taken in accordance with Rule 144.
Sincerely,
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Master in Chancery
cc: Michael D. Fluke, Esquire