Badger Holding LLC v. Edmund Kirsch ( 2018 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    BADGER HOLDING LLC and S&E             )
    BRIDGE & SCAFFOLD LLC,                 )
    )
    )
    Plaintiffs,           )
    )
    )
    v.                               ) C.A. No. 2017-0147-SG
    )
    )
    EDMUND KIRSCH,                         )
    )
    )
    Defendant.             )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: June 13, 2018
    Date Decided: October 1, 2018
    Thomas E. Hanson, Jr., of BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, Wilmington,
    Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
    Ronald L. Daugherty, of SALMON, RICCHEZZA, SINGER & TURCHI, LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
    GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
    This matter is before me primarily to enforce a covenant not to compete.
    The Defendant is Edmund Kirsch, an experienced participant in the scaffolding
    industry. In 2012, he went to work for S&E Bridge and Scaffold, LLC (“S&E”) as
    Director of Sales. At that time, he entered an employment agreement and a stock
    award agreement, both of which contained essentially identical (and typical)
    covenants not to compete. Kirsch was, however, unwilling to categorically forgo
    competitive opportunities in the future. Consequently, he specifically negotiated a
    provision in the employment agreement under which, at his voluntary termination
    of employment with S&E, the company could elect to continue to pay his salary
    and benefits for one year, as “severance pay.” If they failed to do so, he would be
    free of the contractual covenants not to compete post-employment.
    In 2016, Kirsch began to consider leaving S&E to work for a competitor. In
    October of that year, he signed an employment agreement with another scaffolding
    entity, although his employment with the entity did not begin until the following
    February. On January 3, 2017, Kirsch gave notice to S&E that he would terminate
    his employment as of January 31. S&E declined to pay him the contractual
    severance payment.
    While still at S&E in January 2017, Kirsch solicited at least one S&E
    customer to give its business to his new employer. S&E was unaware of this
    activity both when it declined to make the severance payments, and as of the time
    Kirsch left the company on January 31, 2017.
    The Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Kirsch from competing with S&E post-
    employment, for the contractual period of two years. Kirsch contends that he has
    no post-employment non-compete obligations, because S&E elected not to trigger
    such by failing to pay the severance that is a contractual precedent. The matter is
    before me on cross-Motions for Summary Judgement. The Plaintiffs argue that
    they are entitled to enforce the non-compete, regardless of severance. Primarily,
    they argue that the severance provision in the employment agreement, and the
    other obligations therein, terminated after four years by its own terms. They seek
    to enforce the stock award agreement, which does not so terminate. I find,
    however, that the parties treated the employment agreement as continuing, and that
    in any event, the stock award agreement specifically incorporates the severance
    provision, so that S&E’s obligation to elect between severance and a release of the
    non-compete survived as of January 2017.
    The Plaintiffs also point out that Kirsch breached the non-compete prior to
    the time of termination, a fact of which they were unaware until after his
    employment had ended and they had chosen not to pay him severance. Notably,
    Kirsch was not fired for cause. Under the facts here, and the language of the
    contract, enforcement of the post-employment non-compete obligation required
    2
    S&E to pay severance. Having decided not to make the trigger payments, S&E
    cannot enforce the post-employment non-compete.
    I have found that Kirsch was free to compete after January 31, 2017. He
    began doing so earlier, however, and in January he solicited business in
    competition with S&E. Regardless of the fact that S&E cannot enjoin Kirsch’s
    competition after January 31, 2017, the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages, if any,
    for breach of Kirsch’s obligations not to compete before that time. The
    determination of damages awaits a developed record. My reasoning follows.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
    Plaintiff Badger Holdings, LLC (“Badger”) is a Delaware limited liability
    company with a principal place of business in Waukesha, Wisconsin.1 Badger is a
    holding company that owns, among other entities, Plaintiff S&E Bridge & Scaffold,
    LLC.2
    Plaintiff S&E Bridge & Scaffold, LLC (“S&E”) is a New York limited
    liability company with a principal place of business in Carlstadt, New Jersey.3 S&E
    1
    Compl. ¶ 9. Badger changed its name from OIP Holdings LLC (“OIP”) in 2012. Aff. of Curtis
    Paulsen, Jan. 26, 2018 [hereinafter “Paulsen Aff.”] ¶ 4. OIP was previously known as Safway
    Holdings LLC. Aff. of Thomas E. Hanson, Jan. 12, 2018 [hereinafter “Hanson Aff.”], Ex. 5,
    Phantom Class A Unit Plan.
    2
    Paulsen Aff. ¶ 6.
    3
    Compl. ¶ 10.
    3
    is a premier provider of scaffolding, sidewalk bridges, and hoists for large, complex
    construction projects in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.4
    Defendant Edmund Kirsch is resident of Valley Cottage, New York, and a
    former Director of Sales at S&E.5 Kirsch left S&E to work for non-party DHS Fraco,
    LLC (“DHS Fraco”) in early 2017, at which time the Plaintiffs filed this suit.6
    B. Relevant Facts
    1. Kirsch Joins S&E
    Kirsch joined S&E on January 20, 2012.7 At that time, he was an experienced
    professional in the scaffolding industry, having previously worked as the President
    of one scaffolding company and as the Sales Manager of another.8 Because of his
    experience in the field, Kirsch was unwilling to enter into a non-compete agreement
    with S&E that would categorically bar him from subsequently working at other,
    similar companies.9     As such, Kirsch specifically negotiated his Employment
    Agreement with Michael Breslin, the President of S&E.10
    The Employment Agreement contains a non-compete provision:
    4
    Compl. ¶¶ 2–3.
    5
    Compl. ¶¶ 3, 15.
    6
    Compl. ¶ 7.
    7
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Emp’t Agreement. Kirsch had
    previously worked for Perimeter Bridge & Scaffold Co., Inc., which was acquired by S&E in
    January 2012. Aff. of Colm Coen, Jan. 26, 2018 [hereinafter “Coen Aff.”] ¶ 4.
    8
    See Hanson Aff. Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 9:16–19, 12:25–13:3.
    9
    See 
    id. at 17:7–17.
    10
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, Kirsch Dep. at 18:14–20.
    4
    Kirsch shall (a) at all times during his employment, and for five (5) years
    after the termination of [his] employment . . . hold in strictest confidence
    any and all proprietary and confidential information . . . provided, that
    this restriction will not apply with respect to any such data or
    information after such data or information . . . becomes public
    knowledge or generally publicly known in the industry through no
    breach by [Kirsch]; (b) not during [his] employment and for a period of
    two (2) years thereafter, without the prior written consent of [S&E],
    either directly or indirectly, operate or perform any advisory or
    consulting services for, invest in . . . or otherwise operate or become
    associated in any capacity (including as an employee) with, any
    company, corporation, partnership, organization, proprietorship, or
    other entity which develops, manufactures, sells or distributes products
    or services in competition with [S&E] as conducted during [Kirsch’s]
    employment . . . . and (d) not at any time during [Kirsch’s] employment,
    and for a period of two (2) years thereafter, without the prior written
    consent of [S&E], contact, solicit, or entice any customer of [S&E] or
    any of [S&E] Affiliates as of the Effective Date or at any time during
    the two (2) years immediately preceding the Effective Date, or any
    prospective customer to which [S&E] made a project bid or proposal
    during such period, so as to cause such customer or prospective
    customer to cease or reduce its business with [S&E] or any of [S&E]
    Affiliates.11
    The contract also contemplated severance payments from S&E to Kirsch at the time
    of his leaving the company. Although the non-competition and non-solicitation
    provisions in Section 3.1(b) and (d) prohibited Kirsch from competing with S&E,
    under Section 5.3(c), they would be enforceable after Kirsch left the company only
    11
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Emp’t Agreement § 3.1(a), (b), (d).
    5
    if S&E elected to pay Kirsch severance payments.12 If S&E did not pay Kirsch
    severance, Kirsch would be free to compete.
    The Employment Agreement is governed by New York law.13 It contains an
    irreparable harm provision: in signing it, Kirsch acknowledged that “a material
    breach of any of these covenants may result in irreparable and continuing damages
    to [his employer] for which there may be no adequate remedy at law.” 14 The
    Agreement was to be effective for four years after it was signed.15 After the initial
    four-year period, the Employment Agreement was subject to extension, which would
    be considered “employment at will, subject to the terms of [the Employment]
    Agreement;” however, the contract also provided that “absent mutual written
    agreement, there is not, nor will there be, any express or implied agreement as to
    [Kirsch’s] continued employment . . . after the Employment Period.”16 Kirsch
    signed the Employment Agreement when he began working for S&E on January 20,
    2012.17 Accordingly, Kirsch’s employment contract lasted from January 20, 2012
    to January 20, 2016, and thereafter if extended.
    12
    
    Id. § 5.3(c)
    (S&E “may, at its sole option, elect not to commence making [severance] payments,
    in which case [Kirsch] shall have no further obligation under Sections 3.1(b), (c), and (d) following
    such termination of employment.”).
    13
    
    Id. § 7.2.
    14
    
    Id. § 3.2.
    15
    
    Id. § 1.
    16
    
    Id. §§ 1,
    5.1.
    17
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Emp’t Agreement.
    6
    Kirsch’s relationship with S&E was also governed by the OIP Holdings,
    LLC Phantom Class A Unit Plan Notional Class A Unit Award Agreement (the
    “Phantom Unit Agreement”). The Phantom Unit Agreement is governed by
    Delaware law.18 The parties entered the Agreement on January 20, 2012, when
    Kirsch joined S&E.19 Under the Phantom Unit Agreement, Kirsch was awarded
    1,000 Class A shares in OIP Holdings, LLC (Badger’s predecessor), as part of his
    employment with S&E.20
    The relevant provisions in the Phantom Unit Agreement are largely identical
    to those in the Employment Agreement. The Phantom Unit Agreement contains
    the same non-competition and non-solicitation provisions: it restricts Kirsch’s
    involvement with companies competitive to OIP Holdings and prohibits Kirsch
    from soliciting customers of OIP Holdings.21 Although it does not contain a
    severance provision identical to that in the Employment Agreement, the Phantom
    Unit Agreement similarly provides that Kirsch is not obligated to comply with the
    non-solicitation and non-compete provisions, “following termination of
    employment, to the extent [Kirsch] is not obligated to comply with the
    corresponding covenant obligations in the Employment Agreement pursuant to the
    18
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 5, Phantom Class A Unit Plan § 9.
    19
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. 20:7–18.
    20
    Coen Aff. ¶ 9; Paulsen Aff., Ex. 1.
    21
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 5, Phantom Class A Unit Plan § 5(a)(ii), (iv).
    7
    last sentence of 5.3(c) in the Employment Agreement;” that is, the severance
    payment provision.22 In this way, the severance provision was incorporated into
    the Phantom Unit Agreement. The Phantom Unit Agreement also contains the
    same irreparable harm provision as does the Employment Agreement.23
    The Phantom Unit Agreement defines OIP Holdings to include any of its
    “Affiliates or direct or indirect Subsidiaries with whom the Participant has been
    materially and directly involved.”24 OIP later became Badger, and S&E is a
    subsidiary of Badger; thus, the Phantom Unit Agreement governs Kirsch’s
    relationship with S&E and Badger.
    While employed with S&E, Kirsch held the title of Sales Manager.25 He
    was responsible for “pricing, securing work for [S&E, and] making sure that the
    extras were priced right and built right.”26 Kirsch worked primarily in the five
    boroughs of New York, and occasionally in New Jersey.27
    2. Kirsch Joins DHS Fraco
    While Kirsch was employed with S&E, he was approached several times with
    employment offers by Daniel Chirila, who was the owner of Dynamic Hoisting
    22
    
    Id. § 5(b).
    23
    
    Id. § 5(c).
    24
    
    Id. § 5(f).
    25
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 16:10–21.
    26
    
    Id. at 16:17–21.
    27
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, Kirsch Dep. at 18:21–19:6.
    8
    Scaffolding Company, Inc. (“Dynamic”).28 Dynamic was not considered to be a
    competitor of S&E at the time, but it intended to expand into the scaffolding and
    hoist market, which was its reason for offering Kirsch employment.29                 Although
    Kirsch met with Chirila approximately every one to two months between January
    and June 2016, he stated in his deposition testimony that he told Chirila he was
    happily employed with S&E and did not intend to leave.30 Over time, Chirila’s offers
    “became more aggressive.”31 Eventually, in late-summer 2016, Chirila introduced
    Kirsch to Armand Rainville, the CEO of Fraco, USA, Inc. (“Fraco”), a wholly-
    owned subsidiary of Canadian Hoist Company, Inc. (“Fraco Parent”).32 Thereafter,
    Kirsch, Chirila, and Rainville met approximately once or twice a month.33
    At some point during the course of these meetings, Kirsch decided to take
    Chirila and Rainville up on their employment offer. Chirila and Rainville had
    gathered labor and purchased equipment to expand into the scaffolding and hoist
    market, and Kirsch was needed to “put the puzzle together.”34 During this period,
    there were “a lot of changes rapidly.”35 Ultimately, Dynamic merged with Fraco to
    28
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 31:10–11; Hanson Aff., Ex. 15, Chirila Dep. at 15:24–16:1.
    29
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 14, Impieri Dep. at 14:11–13; Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. 34:23–36:4.
    30
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 33:21–23, 32:10.
    31
    
    Id. at 34:19.
    32
    
    Id. at 35:2–8;
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 6, Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement at 1.
    33
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 35:14–15.
    34
    
    Id. at 35:23–36:5.
    35
    
    Id. at 38:15–16.
                                                   9
    form DHS Fraco, LLC (“DHS Fraco”).36 Together with Chirila and Rainville,
    Kirsch would run DHS Fraco, the scaffolding and hoist division of Fraco Parent.
    Kirsch knew that he was not permitted to compete with S&E, but he did not tell
    Chirila, Rainville, or anyone associated with DHS Fraco about his S&E non-
    compete agreement.37
    The record indicates that Kirsch received a draft of the DHS Fraco Limited
    Liability Company Operating Agreement (the “DHS Fraco Operating Agreement”)
    in fall 2016—by November 28, 2016 at the latest—while Kirsch was still employed
    with S&E.38 Kirsch, Chirila, and Rainville contemplated that Kirsch would leave
    S&E to be the “branch manager” of DHS Fraco.39 At some point in fall 2016, Kirsch
    also received a draft employment agreement from Chirila and Rainville.40 At that
    time, he told them, “I can sign a contract but I can’t work,” because of the non-
    competition agreement with S&E.41 Kirsch negotiated the DHS Fraco Employment
    Agreement, and signed the Agreement on October 13, 2016.42 Kirsch did not receive
    36
    
    Id. at 38:14–15.
    37
    
    Id. at 39:5–6,
    36:6–9.
    38
    
    Id. at 37:23–25;
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 11. The original date on the signed agreement was November
    28, 2016; however, the November date was later crossed out and replaced with February 3, 2017,
    the date Kirsch began working for DHS Fraco. Hanson Aff., Ex. 11; see also Hanson Aff., Ex. 1,
    Kirsch Dep. at 62:16–19.
    39
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 10.
    40
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 41:22–25, 42:18–23.
    41
    
    Id. at 42:12–13.
    42
    
    Id. at 43:13–15;
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 8. This Agreement was with Fraco Products, Inc. Hanson
    Aff., Ex. 8. A later iteration of the Fraco Employment Agreement was between Kirsch and DHS
    Fraco. Hanson Aff., Ex. 10.
    10
    compensation from DHS Fraco until February 2017, after his employment with S&E
    ended.43
    3. Kirsch Leaves S&E
    On January 3, 2017, Kirsch gave S&E notice of his resignation, effective
    January 31, 2017.44 In January 2017, while still working for S&E, Kirsch sent S&E
    clients emails to inform them that he was moving to DHS Fraco. One such email,
    sent to Peter Pavlakis of Pav-Lak Contracting, Inc. (“Pav-Lak”) on January 25, 2017,
    read: “U R the best, resigned today, have an ownership agreement again with [a]
    great company, all new hoists and patent on runways, lower prices, happy days are
    here again.”45 Pav-Lak ultimately became a customer of DHS Fraco.46
    Before Kirsch’s employment with S&E ended on January 31, 2017,
    representatives from S&E discussed with him the logistics of his leaving the
    company.47 This included ensuring that he returned all company property, that he
    submitted recent expenses for reimbursement, and that he was compensated for
    unused vacation time.48 At no time did anyone indicate to Kirsch that he would
    receive severance payments from S&E, and Kirsch never, in fact, received
    43
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 43:20–23.
    44
    Coen Aff. ¶¶ 12–13.
    45
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 2.
    46
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 3.
    47
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F, Ariza Dep. at 13:6–18:22.
    48
    
    Id. 11 severance.49
    At the time Kirsch’s resignation from S&E became effective on
    January 30, 2017, S&E was unaware of Kirsch’s efforts in January 2017 on behalf
    of DHS Fraco.50
    On February 3, 2017, Kirsch began employment with DHS Fraco.51 DHS
    Fraco is a competitor of S&E, and it is therefore also a competitor of Badger.52 After
    Kirsch was working for DHS Fraco, he sent emails to approximately five of S&E’s
    clients, stating that he had joined DHS Fraco and that DHS Fraco manufactures and
    installs various construction equipment and scaffolding.53 At deposition, Kirsch
    stated that he did not take any confidential information with him when he left S&E.54
    C. Procedural Posture
    The Plaintiffs filed this action on February 24, 2017 and brought three
    counts.55 In Count I, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment regarding Kirsch’s
    obligations under the Phantom Unit Agreement.56 Count II alleges that Kirsch
    breached the Phantom Unit Agreement.57                 In Count III, the Plaintiffs seek
    preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.58 I denied a Motion to Dismiss on June
    49
    
    Id. at 32:19–23;
    50
    Coen Aff. ¶ 13.
    51
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 62:11–12.
    52
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 14, Impieri Dep. at 39:3–6.
    53
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 76:12–14, 77:15–78:3; see also Hanson Aff., Ex. 4.
    54
    Hanson Aff., Ex. 1, Kirsch Dep. at 90:3–5.
    55
    See Compl.
    56
    
    Id. ¶¶ 33–38.
    57
    
    Id. ¶¶ 39–42.
    58
    
    Id. ¶¶ 43–50.
                                                  12
    29, 2017. On January 12, 2018, the Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment
    on the breach of contract issue and injunctive relief, and Kirsch moved for summary
    judgment on all counts.59
    II. ANALYSIS
    Under Court of Chancery Rule 56, summary judgment will be granted if
    “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”60 The moving party bears the initial
    burden of demonstrating the “absence of a material factual dispute.”61 If the
    moving party makes this initial showing, “the burden shifts to the nonmovant to
    present some specific, admissible evidence that there is a genuine issue of fact for a
    trial.”62 In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court “must view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”63 Thus, the Court
    must deny a request for summary judgment “if there is any reasonable hypothesis
    by which the opposing party may recover, or if there is a dispute as to a material
    fact or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.”64
    59
    See Apr. 19, 2018 Oral Arg. Tr. at 26:4–7 (discussing the scope of the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
    Partial Summary Judgment).
    60
    Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
    61
    In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 
    954 A.2d 346
    , 356 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Levy v. HLI
    Operating Co., 
    924 A.2d 210
    , 219 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
    62
    
    Id. 63 Merrill
    v. Crothall-American, Inc., 
    606 A.2d 96
    , 99 (Del. 1992).
    64
    In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig., 
    2014 WL 2768782
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. June
    12, 2014) (quoting Vanaman v. Milford Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 
    272 A.2d 718
    , 720 (Del. 1970)).
    13
    Where, as here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
    and have not argued that a material issue of fact exists, “the Court shall deem the
    motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the
    record submitted with the motions.”65 Nevertheless, “even when presented with
    cross-motions for summary judgment, a court must deny summary judgment if a
    material factual dispute exists.”66
    The sole issue to be determined here is whether there was a breach of
    contract and, if so, the appropriate remedy. The Plaintiffs allege that Kirsch
    breached the covenant not to compete in the Phantom Unit Agreement;
    accordingly, they contend that they are entitled to injunctive relief and damages.67
    The Plaintiffs have not moved for Summary Judgement on the issue of damages.
    To succeed on their breach of contract claim, the Plaintiffs must show that
    there was a valid contract, breach of an obligation imposed by that contract, and
    resulting damages.68 While there is disagreement about the applicability of the
    Employment Agreement, there is no dispute that the Phantom Unit Agreement
    applies. I will first discuss why the Employment Agreement governs. The next
    65
    Ct. Ch. R. 56(h).
    66
    Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Realogy Corp., 
    979 A.2d 1113
    , 1119 (Del. Ch. 2008).
    67
    Compl. ¶ 42. I note that although the Plaintiffs broadly assert that Kirsch has used S&E’s
    confidential information—which, if true, would violate Section 3.1(a) of the Employment
    Agreement—they failed to explain how or when that breach occurred. Accordingly, I consider
    here only the covenants not to compete.
    68
    VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    840 A.2d 606
    , 612 (Del. 2003).
    14
    question is whether there was a breach of the relevant contracts. To answer that
    question, I look to the terms of the contracts.69
    A. The Employment Agreement Applies
    The terms of the Employment Agreement between Kirsch and S&H
    provided that the Agreement would be effective for four years after it was signed.
    Kirsch signed the Employment Agreement on January 20, 2012; accordingly, it
    was in place until January 20, 2016, after Kirsch’s original four-year employment
    term was fulfilled. The actions at issue here did not occur until later in 2016.
    Nevertheless, the Employment Agreement states that after the initial four-year
    period, the contract is subject to extension, which will be considered “employment
    at will, subject to the terms of the [Employment] Agreement.”70
    The Plaintiffs posit that the Employment Agreement does not apply because
    the initial four-year term had expired and the contract was never extended in
    writing.71 The Employment Agreement provides that “[a]bsent mutual written
    agreement” there shall be no “express or implied agreement as to [Kirsch’s]
    69
    See Ostroff v. Quality Serv. Labs, Inc., 
    2007 WL 121404
    , at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2007) (“A
    contract’s express terms provide the starting point in approaching a contract dispute.”).
    70
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Emp’t Agreement §§ 1, 5.1.
    71
    Apr. 19, 2018 Oral Arg. Tr. at 20:20–22:1. This, they submit, means that only the Phantom Unit
    Agreement applies. 
    Id. at 22:2–4.
    Furthermore, the Plaintiffs assert that because there was no
    extension of the Employment Agreement, Kirsch was not entitled to receive severance, and so he
    was not entitled to compete on the basis of not receiving severance. Pls. Supplemental Mem. at 5.
    For reasons discussed in this Opinion, I disagree with both of these contentions.
    15
    continued employment.”72 The contract goes on to state that Kirsch’s employment
    during “any extended Employment Period will be employment at will, subject to
    the terms of this Agreement.”
    There is no doubt that Kirsch remained an employee after the initial term of
    his Employment Agreement expired. Kirsch seamlessly continued his employment
    with S&E after the four years had passed. He showed up to work every day; he
    continued to perform the same job functions in the same position as Director of
    Sales; between January and June 2016, he informed Chirila that he was happily
    employed with S&E; he gave S&E proper notice of his resignation in January 31,
    2017. On the Plaintiffs’ part, the record indicates that S&E kept Kirsch in his
    position as its Director of Sales and accepted the benefits of his continued
    employment. It continued to pay Kirsch his salary and to provide other benefits as
    set by the terms of the Employment Agreement, notably without S&E exercising
    its discretion to impose terms for Kirsch’s “compensation or benefits . . . subject to
    agreement by” Kirsch, as provided in the contract after the termination of the
    “initial or extended Employment Period.”
    In other words, at the termination of the initial four-year period, the
    Employment Agreement contemplated a written extension or a renegotiation.
    Neither occurred. Under what terms, then, was Kirsch employed? Despite the fact
    72
    Opening Br. in Support of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Emp’t Agreement § 5.1.
    16
    that the parties operated as though the Employment Agreement was still in place,
    the Plaintiffs argue that its provisions were void at the end of the initial period, and
    that, although Kirsch continued to perform his obligations, S&E was excused from
    theirs, including the severance obligation. The Plaintiffs, therefore, do not rely on
    the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of the Employment Agreement;
    they seek instead to impose the identical provision under the Phantom Agreement,
    which is not subject to the four-year term.
    Kirsch, by contrast, argues that the Plaintiffs, having continued to accept the
    benefits of his continued performance of the Employment Agreement, are estopped
    from denying their concomitant obligations thereunder. This argument appears
    persuasive. I need not reach it, however, because the Phantom Unit Agreement, on
    which the Plaintiffs purport to solely rely, in any event picks up the terms of the
    Employment Agreement. Section 5(a) of the Phantom Agreement contains the
    non-compete and solicitation covenants. Section 5(b) conditions the obligations of
    those covenants: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this
    Agreement, [Kirsch] shall not be obligated to comply with the covenant
    obligations . . .following termination of employment, to the extent [Kirsch] is not
    obligated to comply with the corresponding covenant obligation in the
    17
    Employment Agreement . . .” under Section 5.3(c), the severance election
    provision.73
    Reading these contracts together to the extent called for by their terms, and
    in light of the conduct of the parties, it is clear that after the end of the initial period
    of the Employment Agreement, the parties continued to be bound by both the non-
    compete and non-solicitation provisions of the Agreements, as well as the
    severance provisions referred to in both of the Agreements.
    B. Did Kirsch Breach the Employment Agreement?
    1. While Employed With S&E
    The Employment Agreement contains a non-compete provision, which
    prohibits Kirsch from “performing advisory or consulting services for, invest[ing]
    in, . . . or otherwise operat[ing] or becom[ing] associated in any capacity (including
    as an employee)” with any company that competes with S&E during his
    employment with S&E.74 During his employment, Kirsch was also prohibited
    from contacting, soliciting, or enticing S&E customers in a manner that would
    cause the customer to reduce or cease business with S&E.75
    To my mind, Kirsch’s actions while employed with S&E fail to comply with
    these restrictions. It is true that Kirsch’s meeting with Chirila and Rainville,
    73
    
    Id. § 5.3(c)
    .
    74
    
    Id. § 3.1(b).
    75
    
    Id. § 3.1(d).
                                                18
    without more, is insufficient to constitute breach of the Employment Agreement’s
    non-compete obligations. However, Kirsch breached his obligations when he
    became associated with DHS Fraco in November 2016. The record demonstrates
    that at that time, Kirsch, Chirila, and Rainville decided to form DHS Fraco, an
    entity that would compete with S&E. Moreover, Kirsch decided to leave S&E for
    DHS Fraco. These decisions are evidenced by the DHS Fraco Employment
    Agreement that Kirsch signed on October 13, 2016—at which time Kirsch was still
    an S&E employee, and would continue to be for more than two months.
    Additionally, Kirsch breached the Employment Agreement’s obligations
    when he contacted S&E customers in January 2017. Kirsch emailed Pav-Lak on
    January 26, 2017. Although by that time he had given his notice of resignation to
    S&E, he was still an employee of S&E. The communication was outside the scope
    of his employment with S&E; in fact, it touted DHS Fraco’s lower prices. Pav-Lak
    ultimately moved its business from S&E to DHS Fraco. This is precisely the
    situation that Section 3.1(d) of the Employment Agreement was designed to
    prevent. Thus, for these reasons, I find that Kirsch breached the obligations
    imposed by the Employment Agreement during his employment with S&E.
    2. After Leaving S&E
    The same non-compete provisions that applied during Kirsch’s employment
    with S&E also applied for two years after his employment; however, Kirsch
    19
    specifically negotiated a severance provision, which was included in the
    Employment Agreement at Section 5(c). As a result of that negotiated provision,
    the contractual non-compete would apply after Kirsch’s employment with S&E
    had concluded only if S&E elected to pay him severance.
    On January 3, 2017, Kirsch gave S&E representatives notice of his
    resignation. S&E does not contest that Kirsch gave proper notice. At that point,
    under both the Employment and Phantom Unit Agreements, S&E was faced with a
    choice. It could buy-in Kirsch’s obligations not to compete, by paying severance,
    or it could forgo both severance and the corresponding non-compete. Kirsch had
    negotiated for precisely this scenario. Section 5(3)(c) of the Employment
    Agreement, as incorporated into the Phantom Agreement, provides that where
    Kirsch terminates his employment after two years of service, he shall continue to
    receive his salary for one year in way of severance payments:
    For the avoidance of doubt, it is acknowledged and agreed that the
    severance payments under this Section 5.3(c) are additional
    consideration given in exchange for [Kirsch’s] compliance with the
    [covenant not to compete] after termination of employment . . . and,
    notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, the
    Company may, at its sole option, elect not to commence making such
    payments, in which case [Kirsch] shall have no further obligation [not
    to compete] following such termination of employment.76
    76
    
    Id. § 5.3(c)
    .
    20
    When Kirsch left for DHS Fraco, S&E elected77 to avoid severance and forgo the
    post-employment non-compete.
    S&E never indicated to Kirsch that he would receive severance, and it never
    paid Kirsch severance. Although I have found that Kirsch had breached his
    contractual obligations prior to his leaving S&E, S&E had no knowledge of
    Kirsch’s breach when it elected not to pay him severance. The severance payment
    is consideration to extend the non-compete provision after the end of Kirsch’s
    employment with S&E. Under the clear language of the Agreements, S&E’s
    failure to pay severance must be considered a release from the contracts’ restrictive
    covenants post-employment. Kirsch is not liable for breaching his contractual
    obligations after he left S&E, because S&E released him from any such
    obligations.
    The Plaintiffs also allege that Kirsch has retained the Plaintiffs’ confidential
    information, which if true, would be a violation of Section 3.1(a) of the
    Employment Agreement.78 The Plaintiffs have not identified any of Kirsch’s
    actions that utilize confidential information. Instead, they argue that the very act of
    soliciting and negotiating with S&E customers on DHS Fraco’s behalf must utilize
    77
    This election is triggered regardless of whether it resulted from a conscious decision or by
    oversight. S&E would contractually trigger the non-compete by “commencing” severance
    payments, which it never did. See 
    id. 78 Compl.
    ¶ 37.
    21
    the Plaintiffs’ confidential information, but they point to no record evidence to
    support that Kirsch actually used the Plaintiffs’ confidential information.79 Merely
    soliciting and negotiating with S&E’s customers, without more, is not a per se use
    of S&E’s confidential information. If it were, I note, the severance and non-
    competition election, discussed at length above, would be largely illusory. For
    these reasons, based on the evidence of record, I cannot find that the Plaintiffs have
    met their burden to demonstrate that Kirsch used their confidential information.
    Accordingly, Kirsch’s Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to his post-
    employment conduct is granted.
    C. Did Kirsch Fulfill His Obligations Under the Phantom Unit Agreement?
    In addition to the Employment Agreement, Kirsch’s relationship with S&E
    was also governed by the Phantom Unit Agreement. The Phantom Unit
    Agreement was executed on January 20, 2012, when Kirsch joined S&E. The
    Phantom Unit Agreement contains the same non-compete provision as does the
    Employment Agreement: it prohibits Kirsch from “performing advisory or
    consulting services for, invest[ing] in, . . . or otherwise operat[ing] or becom[ing]
    associated in any capacity (including as an employee)” during his employment
    with S&E or for two years thereafter.80 Likewise, it contains the same non-
    79
    See Pls. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 27.
    80
    Hanson Aff. Ex. 5, Phantom Class A Unit Plan § 5(a)(ii).
    22
    solicitation provision as the Employment Agreement, which prohibits Kirsch from
    contacting, soliciting, or enticing S&E customers in a manner that would cause the
    customer to reduce or cease business with S&E.81 The Phantom Unit Agreement
    also incorporates the Employment Agreement’s severance provision; S&E could
    either pay Kirsch severance or he would be entitled to compete.
    Because the non-competition, non-solicitation, and severance provisions
    were essentially the same in the Phantom Unit Agreement as in the Employment
    Agreement, my reasoning from above applies to the Phantom Unit Agreement as
    well.82 To the extent that Kirsch engaged in competitive behavior by joining DHS
    Fraco while employed with S&E, Kirsch breached the obligations of the Phantom
    Unit Agreement. Furthermore, Kirsch breached the obligations of the Agreement
    when he solicited at least one S&E client, Pav-Lak, for DHS Fraco’s benefit while
    employed with S&E. Nonetheless, S&E elected not to pay Kirsch severance.
    Thus, the obligations of the Phantom Unit Agreement did not continue after Kirsch
    left S&E.
    81
    
    Id. § 5(a)(iv).
    82
    The Plaintiffs argue that because the Employment Agreement is not applicable, neither is the
    severance payment under the Phantom Unit Agreement. See Apr. 19, 2018 Oral Arg. Tr. at 22:19–
    23:14. For reasons I have already discussed, I reject that argument.
    23
    D. Remedy
    1. Injunctive Relief
    The Plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent Kirsch from working for DHS
    Fraco.83 To succeed, they must show: (1) actual success on the merits; (2)
    irreparable harm; and (3) that the balance of hardships favors the Plaintiffs.84
    The Plaintiffs have shown that Kirsch breached the non-compete covenants
    of the Employment and Phantom Agreements during, but not following, his
    employment. Because the non-compete obligation terminated with S&E’s decision
    not to pay severance, no injunction is warranted.85
    2. Damages
    The Plaintiffs are entitled to damages, if any, for the breaches of the non-
    compete covenants prior to January 31, 2018. The record is bare of any evidence
    of damages.86 To the extent that damages exist, my findings require that those
    damages be limited to Kirsch’s breach of contract during his employment at S&E,
    since his contractual obligations terminated when he was not paid severance after
    he left S&E on January 30, 2017.
    83
    Compl. ¶ 46.
    84
    N. River Ins. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 
    105 A.3d 369
    , 380 (Del. 2014).
    85
    As discussed earlier, I have granted Kirsch’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the
    allegation that Kirsch violated his contractual confidentiality obligations. It follows logically that
    to the extent the Plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent Kirsch from using their confidential
    information, that injunction must be denied.
    86
    At oral argument, the Plaintiffs clarified that they had moved for Summary Judgment on the
    breach of contract claim and injunctive relief, but that they would like a separate hearing on
    damages. Apr. 19, 2018 Oral Arg. Tr. at 26:4–7.
    24
    The parties should confer and inform me whether further proceedings are
    necessary regarding damages.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
    granted in part and denied in part, and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
    Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The parties should submit an
    appropriate form of order.
    25