Kenneth L. Horton v. Organogenesis Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    KENNETH L. HORTON,                        )
    as the Representative                     )
    for and on behalf of Payees               )
    KENNETH L. HORTON and                     )
    NUTECH MEDICAL, INC.,                     )
    )
    Plaintiff/Counterclaim       )
    Defendant,                   )
    )
    v.                                ) C.A. No. 2018-0537-KSJM
    )
    ORGANOGENESIS INC.,                       )
    )
    Defendant/Counterclaim       )
    Plaintiff.                   )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: April 25, 2019
    Date Decided: July 22, 2019
    John L. Reed, Matthew Denn, Peter H. Kyle, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Wilmington,
    Delaware; Counsel for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Kenneth L. Horton.
    Carl D. Neff, Kasey H. DeSantis, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Wilmington,
    Delaware; Matthew C. Baltay, FOLEY HOAG LLP, Boston, Massachusetts;
    Counsel for Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Organogenesis Inc.
    McCORMICK, V.C.
    The parties to a 2017 merger dispute the sellers’ entitlement to post-closing
    consideration in light of the buyer’s claim for indemnification. The buyer seeks
    indemnification for two categories of losses, and the sellers have moved to dismiss
    the buyer’s claim. For the first category, the sellers contend that the buyer’s
    purported notice of its indemnification claim failed to satisfy the contractual notice
    requirements. For the second category, the sellers contend that the buyer’s request
    for indemnification is not yet ripe because relevant costs have yet to be incurred.
    This decision concludes that the buyer’s notice as to the first category satisfied the
    merger agreement’s notice requirements. As to the second category, the Court
    agrees with the sellers that the indemnification claim is not yet ripe. Accordingly,
    the sellers’ motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part.
    I.       FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The facts are drawn from the buyer’s Amended Verified Counterclaim for
    Contractual Indemnification, the documents incorporated by reference therein, and
    matters not subject to reasonable dispute, including allegations admitted in the
    buyer’s answer to the complaint.1
    In March 2017, defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Organogenesis Inc.
    (“Organogenesis”) acquired NuTech Medical, Inc. (“NuTech”) for a mix of cash and
    stock. Both Organogenesis and NuTech operated in the regenerative medicine field.
    1
    C.A. No. 2018-0537-KSJM Docket (“Dkt.”) 9, Answer; Dkt. 20, Am. Countercl.
    1
    The parties executed a merger agreement (“Merger Agreement”)2 on
    March 18, 2017, and the merger closed on March 24, 2017. The Merger Agreement
    designated plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Kenneth L. Horton as the sellers’
    representative. 3
    Under the Merger Agreement, Organogenesis agreed to pay the sellers
    consideration comprised of $20 million in cash and 1,794,455 shares of
    Organogenesis common stock.4 Of the cash payment, (1) $12 million was to be paid
    at closing, (2) $1 million was to be paid on each quarterly anniversary of the closing
    for the first four quarters following the closing, and (3) $4 million was to be paid on
    the fifteen-month anniversary of the closing, or June 24, 2018.5 The Merger
    Agreement defines the last two categories of cash payments as “Post-Closing Cash
    Consideration” 6 and further requires Organogenesis to pay simple interest on the
    Post-Closing Cash Consideration at a rate of 6% per annum, due with the last cash
    payment. 7
    2
    Am. Countercl. Ex. A (cited as “Merger Agr.”).
    3
    Merger Agr. § 16.13.
    4
    
    Id. § 1.1.
    5
    Id.; see also 
    id. § 3.4(a)–(b).
    6
    
    Id. § 1.1.
    7
    
    Id. The equity
    consideration was transferred in full at closing, but divided into two
    categories—non-restricted and restricted equity. 
    Id. The restricted
    equity was subject to
    forfeiture in the event certain marketing capabilities were restricted. See 
    id. §§ 3.4(c)–(d),
    14.1.
    2
    The sellers agreed to indemnify Organogenesis, subject to certain restrictions
    and caps, for eight categories of “Losses,” two categories of which are relevant in
    this case. The first category includes Losses incurred in connection with any
    breaches of representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement by the sellers
    and NuTech.8 The second category includes Losses incurred in connection with
    litigation pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Alabama captioned MiMedx Group, Inc. v. NuTech Medical, Inc., C.A. No. 2:15-cv-
    00369-VEH (the “MiMedx Litigation”).9 The Merger Agreement defines “Loss” to
    include “any damage, liability, demand, claim, action, cause of action, cost, . . . or
    other loss or out-of-pocket expense[.]” 10
    Section 12.1(d) of the Merger Agreement imposed restrictions on how and
    when Organogenesis could assert claims for indemnification for breaches of
    representations or warranties.11
    8
    
    Id. § 12.2(a)(i).
    9
    
    Id. § 12.2(a)(v).
    10
    
    Id. § 14.1
    (“‘Loss’ means, with respect to any Person, any damage, liability, demand,
    claim, action, cause of action, cost, deficiency, penalty, Tax, fine or other loss or out-of-
    pocket expense (including reasonable attorneys’, accountants’, consultants’ and other
    advisors’ fees), whether or not arising out of a third party claim, against or affecting such
    Person; provided, that the Parties agree that ‘Loss’ shall not include consequential damages
    that are not reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances, special damages, punitive
    damages or indirect damages (including diminution in value) (other than any such special,
    punitive, indirect or unforeseeable consequential damages actually paid to a third party).”).
    11
    See 
    id. § 12.1(d).
    3
    As to timing, the Merger Agreement precluded the parties from raising
    indemnification claims after expiration of the contractual limitation period
    applicable to the corresponding representations and warranties, unless those claims
    were timely and appropriately noticed.12 The contractual limitation period for
    representations and warranties relevant to this litigation terminated fifteen months
    after the closing—i.e., on June 24, 2018.13
    As to process, the Merger Agreement required Organogenesis to provide
    notice of its claims as follows:
    deliver[] written notice to the other party of an
    indemnification claim for a breach of the representations,
    warranties and covenants (stating in reasonable detail the
    nature of, and factual and legal basis for, any such claim
    for indemnification and, if known, an estimate and
    calculation of the amount of Losses resulting
    therefrom) . . . . 14
    If Organogenesis delivered the requisite notice before June 24, 2018, its
    indemnification claims for breaches of representations and warranties would
    “survive until resolved or judicially determined.”15 The Merger Agreement did not
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.
    The Merger Agreement extended the survival period to three years after the closing
    for certain representations and warranties defined as the “Significant Representations” and
    outlined in Section 12.1(c) of the Merger Agreement. 
    Id. § 12.1(c).
    14
    
    Id. § 12.1(d).
    15
    
    Id. 4 impose
    similar restrictions on indemnification claims resulting from the MiMedx
    Litigation.
    Organogenesis failed to make multiple payments post-closing. On March 24,
    2018, Organogenesis did not make the last of the quarterly $1 million payments.
    Then, on June 24, 2018, Organogenesis did not make either the final $4 million post-
    closing payment or the contemporaneously due interest payment.
    The parties exchanged correspondence concerning Organogenesis’s non-
    payments. On June 23, 2018, Organogenesis sent a letter to Horton (the “June 23
    Notice”), the express purpose of which was “to preserve [Organogenesis’s] rights
    under the Merger Agreement[.]” 16 This Notice informed Horton of five post-closing
    “issues.” 17 For each issue, the Notice included a short factual description. The
    Notice further stated that “these matters are ongoing and may involve breaches of
    representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement.”18
    On June 28, 2018, Horton’s counsel responded challenging the sufficiency of
    the June 23 Notice. Horton further asserted that Organogenesis had breached its
    payment obligations under the Merger Agreement and demanded immediate
    payment of $5,917,465.75 for the unpaid Post-Closing Cash Consideration and
    16
    Am. Countercl. Ex. B at 1.
    17
    
    Id. at 1–2.
    18
    
    Id. at 2.
    5
    interest thereon.19 Horton gave Organogenesis until July 3, 2018, to satisfy the
    demand. Organogenesis did not accede to the demand.
    On July 24, 2018, Horton commenced this litigation. Horton’s Verified
    Complaint asserts three counts for breach of contract, specific performance, and
    declaratory judgment. Organogenesis answered the Verified Complaint and asserted
    one counterclaim for contractual indemnification.           Horton moved to dismiss
    Organogenesis’s counterclaim.        In response, Organogenesis filed an amended
    counterclaim for contractual indemnification. Horton renewed his motion to dismiss
    and the parties completed briefing on March 14, 2019. 20 The Court heard oral
    argument on April 25, 2019.21
    II.   LEGAL ANALYSIS
    Horton has moved to dismiss Organogenesis’s amended counterclaim
    pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). On a motion pursuant to Rule
    12(b)(6), the Court accepts “all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as
    true, [and] accept[s] even vague allegations in the Complaint as ‘well-pleaded’ if
    19
    This demand also reflected $15,000 in “Losses” for which the sellers sought
    indemnification from Organogenesis.
    20
    Dkt. 26, Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Def.’s Am. Verified
    Countercl. (“Pl.’s Opening Br.”); Dkt. 34, Organogenesis Inc.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n
    to Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Def.’s Am. Verified Countercl. (“Def.’s Ans. Br.”); Dkt. 41, Pl.’s
    Reply Br. in Further Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Def.’s Am. Verified Countercl. (“Pl.’s
    Reply Br.”).
    21
    Dkt. 49, Tr. of Oral Argument on Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Def.’s Am. Verified Countercl.
    (“Oral Arg. Tr.”).
    6
    they provide the defendant notice of the claim[.]” 22 The Court “is not, however,
    required to accept as true conclusory allegations without specific supporting factual
    allegations.” 23 The Court draws “all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,
    and den[ies] the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably
    conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.” 24
    As discussed above, Organogenesis seeks indemnification for two categories
    of Losses: those incurred in connection with alleged breaches of representations and
    warranties in the Merger Agreement and those incurred in connection with the
    ongoing MiMedx Litigation.25 Horton argues that Organogenesis fails to state a
    claim in connection with either category.
    First, Horton contends that Organogenesis’s claim for indemnification for
    alleged breaches of representations and warranties must be dismissed because (i) the
    June 23 Notice failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section
    12.1(d) of the Merger Agreement and (ii) Organogenesis fails to adequately plead
    damages resulting from the subject breaches. 26
    22
    Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 
    27 A.3d 531
    , 536 (Del.
    2011) (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 
    812 A.2d 894
    , 896–97 (Del. 2002)).
    23
    In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 
    897 A.2d 162
    , 168 (Del. 2006) (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    24
    Cent. 
    Mortg., 27 A.3d at 536
    (citing 
    Savor, 812 A.2d at 896
    –97).
    25
    Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 2, 27–31.
    26
    Pl.’s Opening Br. at 21–23, 28–29.
    7
    “Delaware adheres to the objective theory of contracts, i.e. a contract’s
    construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable
    third party.” 27 “To determine what contractual parties intended, Delaware courts
    start with the text.”28 “When the contract is clear and unambiguous, [Delaware
    Courts] will give effect to the plain-meaning of the contract’s terms and
    provisions.”29
    Under the plain meaning of the Merger Agreement, the June 23 Notice
    satisfies Organogenesis’s notice obligations.       Section 12.1(d) of the Merger
    Agreement requires that a party claiming indemnification for breaches of
    representations and warranties must state in writing and “in reasonable detail” the
    nature of and both the factual and legal bases for the claim. 30 The June 23 Notice
    states in reasonable detail the nature of and factual bases for Organogenesis’s
    indemnification claim arising out of the alleged breaches of representations and
    warranties. The Notice lists five different issues underlying the alleged breaches and
    provides a paragraph-length description as to each issue.
    27
    Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 
    991 A.2d 1153
    , 1159 (Del. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    28
    Sunline Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 
    206 A.3d 836
    , 846 (Del.
    2019) (citing Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Delaware Racing Ass’n, 
    840 A.2d 624
    , 628 (Del.
    2003)).
    29
    
    Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1159
    –60.
    30
    Merger Agr. § 12.1(d).
    8
    Horton argues that the June 23 Notice fails to provide reasonable detail for the
    legal basis for Organogenesis’s indemnification claim. Horton notes that the June 23
    Notice does not identify the provisions of the Merger Agreement that the sellers
    allegedly breached. Instead, the Notice states that the five identified issues “may
    involve breaches of representations and warranties.”31 The Merger Agreement,
    however, only required “reasonable detail;” it does not require references to specific
    sections of the Merger Agreement. 32 The reference to the Agreement, standing
    alone, is sufficiently reasonable to identify the legal basis for Organogenesis’s claim,
    particularly given that the sellers are charged with knowledge of their
    representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement. 33
    31
    Pl.’s Opening Br. at 22–23 (emphasis omitted); Pl.’s Reply Br. at 7–8 (emphasis
    omitted).
    32
    Horton also appears to contend that the June 23 Notice’s lack of reference to a specific
    section of the Merger Agreement renders Organogenesis’s pleadings insufficient. See Pl.’s
    Opening Br. at 22–23. The amended counterclaim, however, does plead the requisite
    elements of a predicate breach of contract claim—a contractual obligation, breach, and
    damages. See Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 11–15 (alleging the existence of representations and
    warranties), 22–26 (alleging breaches of representations and warranties and resulting
    damages), 30 (generally alleging damages).
    33
    See W. Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, 
    2007 WL 3317551
    , at
    *9 n.82 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2007) (“It is a basic principle of contract law that a person is
    bound by the terms of a contract he signs, even if he has not read the agreement or is
    otherwise unware of its terms.” (citing Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    565 A.2d 908
    , 913 (Del. 1989))), aff’d, 
    985 A.2d 391
    (Del. 2009); Russykevicz v. State Farm Mut.
    Auto Ins. Co., 
    1994 WL 369519
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. June 29, 1994) (“Knowledge of the
    [plaintiff’s] insurance policy provision that provided for uninsured motorist arbitration
    upon written demand by either the insured or insurer is imputed to plaintiff.”).
    9
    Organogenesis has satisfied the standard for pleading damages as to its claim
    for indemnification for breaches of representations and warranties. At the pleadings
    stage, “[a]llegations regarding damages can be pled generally.” 34 The amended
    counterclaim generally alleges that it is “entitled to a reduction of Post-Merger Cash
    Consideration owing and a forfeiture of Equity Consideration in an amount to be
    determined in this action.”35       Beyond this general allegation, the amended
    counterclaim alleges that Organogenesis has incurred “fees and expenses of outside
    counsel and consultants” related to government compliance efforts, “unexpected
    costs and expenses” related to a NuTech product, and a decline in excess of $5
    million in customer revenue in 2017—all in connection with alleged breaches of
    representations and warranties by the sellers. 36
    For these reasons, Horton’s motion to dismiss Organogenesis’s claim for
    indemnification for breaches of representations and warranties fails.
    Second, Horton contends that Organogenesis’s indemnification claim for
    Losses resulting from the MiMedx Litigation must be dismissed as unripe because
    Organogenesis has not yet incurred any Losses from that Litigation.37
    34
    In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Deriv. Litig., 
    2016 WL 301245
    , at *30 (Del. Ch.
    Jan. 25, 2016).
    35
    Am. Countercl. ¶ 30.
    36
    
    Id. ¶¶ 23,
    25–26.
    37
    Pl.’s Opening Br. at 23–28.
    10
    Section 12.2(a) of the Merger Agreement states: the sellers will “indemnify
    and hold harmless Buyer . . . from and against any Losses that any Buyer Indemnitee
    incurs . . . resulting from, arising in connection with or caused by: (v) the litigation
    captioned ‘MiMedx Group, Inc. v. Nutech Medical, Inc. et al’ in the U.S. District
    Court, Northern District of Alabama . . . .” 38 The Merger Agreement does not define
    “incur.”
    “Delaware courts look to dictionaries for assistance in determining the plain
    meaning of terms which are not defined in a contract.” 39 Black’s Law Dictionary
    defines incur as “[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).”40 The
    Delaware Supreme Court has previously interpreted “incur” in the context of legal
    fees to mean that the party “must have been liable for a payment at some point.”41
    Based on the above definitions of “incur,” Horton argues that under Section
    12.2(a), Organogenesis cannot seek indemnification for Losses resulting from the
    MiMedx Litigation that it has not become liable for or for which it has no payment
    obligation. 42 Organogenesis responds that whether Organogenesis has become
    38
    Merger Agr. § 12.2(a) (emphasis added).
    39
    Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 
    903 A.2d 728
    , 738 (Del. 2006).
    40
    Incur, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Merriam-Webster similarly defines incur
    as “to become liable or subject to.” Incur, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/incur (cited in Pl.’s Opening Br. at 25).
    41
    Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund, 
    68 A.3d 665
    , 684 (Del. 2013).
    42
    Pl.’s Opening Br. at 25–26.
    11
    liable for a payment in connection with the MiMedx Litigation is irrelevant.
    According to Organogenesis, Losses are not limited to monetary amounts but also
    include any “demand, claim, action, [or] cause of action” such as the MiMedx
    Litigation. 43 And Organogenesis says that because it has incurred—or become
    subject to—the MiMedx Litigation, it is entitled to indemnification.44
    Organogenesis’s position ignores the purpose of the Merger Agreement’s
    indemnification provisions—to indemnify and hold harmless the indemnitee from
    and against Losses incurred. 45 If Organogenesis suffers no costs, fees or adverse
    judgments in the MiMedx Litigation, there is no reason to indemnify or hold
    harmless Organogenesis.
    Organogenesis’s amended counterclaim does not allege that Organogenesis
    has incurred any Losses in connection with the MiMedx Litigation. Accordingly,
    Organogenesis’s claim for indemnification for the MiMedx Litigation is not ripe and
    is dismissed without prejudice.
    III.       CONCLUSION
    Horton’s motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim is denied in part and
    granted in part.           Horton’s motion to dismiss Organogenesis’s claim for
    43
    Def.’s Ans. Br. at 14.
    44
    
    Id. 45 Merger
    Agr. § 12.2.
    12
    indemnification for breaches of representations and warranties is DENIED.
    Horton’s motion to dismiss Organogenesis’s claim for indemnification for potential
    Losses resulting from the MiMedx Litigation is GRANTED, and Organogenesis’s
    claim for indemnification for potential Losses resulting from the MiMedx Litigation
    is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
    13