Sylebra Capital Partners Master Fund v. Ronald O. Perelman ( 2020 )


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  •    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    )
    SYLEBRA CAPITAL PARTNERS                     )
    MASTER FUND, LIMITED and                     )
    P SYLEBRA LTD.,                              )
    )
    Plaintiffs,           )
    )
    v.                            )   C.A. No. 2019-0843-JRS
    )
    RONALD O. PERELMAN, KEVIN M.                 )
    SHEEHAN, M. GAVIN ISAACS,                    )
    RICHARD M. HADDRILL, PETER A.                )
    COHEN, DAVID L. KENNEDY, PAUL M.             )
    MEISTER, MICHAEL J. REGAN,                   )
    BARRY F. SCHWARTZ, FRANCES F.                )
    TOWNSEND, VIET D. DINH, GERALD J.            )
    FORD, GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD,                 )
    SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORPORATION,                )
    BALLY GAMING, INC. and                       )
    MACANDREWS & FORBES                          )
    INCORPORATED,                                )
    )
    Defendants.           )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Date Submitted: July 30, 2020
    Date Decided: October 9, 2020
    Samuel T. Hirzel II, Esquire and Gillian L. Andrews, Esquire of Heyman Enerio
    Gattuso & Hirzel LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and Patrick J. Smith, Esquire,
    Andrew J. Rodgers, Esquire and Nicholas J. Karasimas, Esquire of Smith Villazor
    LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
    William M. Lafferty, Esquire, Susan W. Waesco, Esquire and Alexandra M.
    Cumings, Esquire of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware
    and Kevin J. Orsini, Esquire and Rory A. Leraris, Esquire of Cravath, Swaine &
    Moore LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.
    SLIGHTS, Vice Chancellor
    Minority stockholders of a Nevada corporation, Scientific Games Corporation
    (“Scientific Games” or the “Company”), have sued the Company’s controlling
    stockholder and members of its allegedly “handpicked” board of directors for
    breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of the Delaware General Corporation Law
    (“DGCL”). The Company’s bylaws contain a provision that requires stockholders
    to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty in the courts of Clark County, Nevada.
    And the claims at issue here are implicated by a first-filed action brought by the
    Company against the minority stockholders in, of all places, Nevada.
    Right out of the gate, this picture ought to provoke questions, even upon a
    terse glance. Why are stockholders of a Nevada corporation invoking the DGCL?
    Why are these stockholders suing fiduciaries of a Nevada corporation in Delaware?
    In doing so, why are they asking a Delaware court to ignore a mandatory forum
    selection clause in this Nevada corporation’s by-laws? And why haven’t they
    asserted these claims in the first-filed Nevada action?
    According to the Delaware plaintiffs, to answer these questions, one must first
    take a brief sally down memory lane. Scientific Games has not always been
    chartered in Nevada. Before it relocated to Nevada in January 2018, the Company
    called Delaware home. The plaintiffs here invested in the Company when it was
    organized under Delaware law. And the conduct giving rise to the claims in this
    action—which involve an alleged scheme to force plaintiffs to redeem their
    1
    Scientific Games shares at less than fair value—began when the defendants owed
    fiduciary duties to a Delaware corporation and its stockholders at a time when the
    Company was subject to the DGCL. Thus, say plaintiffs, the picture is more nuanced
    than it first appears and they have properly asserted their claims in Delaware.
    Defendants respond that, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ attempt to create abstract
    art with creative pleading, the image of a misplaced lawsuit still shines through the
    prolix. According to Defendants, plaintiffs would have this Court adjudicate their
    claims, even though: (1) plaintiffs seek to invalidate provisions of Delaware
    constitutive documents that no longer exist and have not existed for more than two
    years; (2) plaintiffs were stockholders at the time Scientific Games left Delaware for
    Nevada, yet at no time before now have they challenged that move or sought to
    pursue their supposed Delaware claims; (3) plaintiffs’ claims require the Court to
    decide whether provisions in the constitutive documents of a Nevada corporation are
    enforceable; (4) the Company’s mandatory Nevada forum selection bylaw is broad
    and unambiguously covers plaintiffs’ supposed Delaware claims; and (5) there is a
    first-filed action pending in Nevada before a court that is fully capable of
    adjudicating all claims between these parties.
    Defendants have moved to dismiss. For reasons that follow, the motion must
    be granted.
    2
    I. BACKGROUND
    I have drawn the facts from the Verified Amended Complaint and documents
    incorporated by reference or integral to that pleading.1 For purposes of the motion,
    I accept as true the Amended Complaint’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all
    reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor.2
    A. The Parties
    Plaintiffs, Sylebra Capital Partners Master Fund, Limited (“Sylebra Capital”)
    and P Sylebra Ltd. (collectively with Sylebra Capital, “Sylebra”), are a Cayman
    Islands-based investment fund and a British Virgin Islands-based advisory client,
    respectively.3 Taken together, the Sylebra plaintiffs and another Sylebra-advised
    entity were, at all relevant times, Scientific Games’ second largest stockholder.4
    Defendant, Scientific Games, “is a publicly traded corporation organized and
    existing under the laws of the State of Nevada.”5 The Company was a Delaware
    corporation until January 10, 2018, when it “re-domesticated” to Nevada, the state
    1
    Verified Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) (D.I. 23); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co.,
    
    860 A.2d 312
    , 320 (Del. 2004) (noting that on a Motion to Dismiss, the Court may consider
    documents that are “incorporated by reference” or “integral” to the complaint).
    2
    Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 
    812 A.2d 894
    , 896–97 (Del. 2002).
    3
    Compl. ¶¶ 22–23.
    4
    Compl. ¶ 3.
    5
    Compl. ¶¶ 4, 27.
    3
    where it has maintained its principal place of business since inception.6 Scientific
    Games operates in the lottery and gaming industry. Defendant, Bally Gaming, Inc.
    (“Bally”), is an indirect wholly-owned operating subsidiary of the Company, also
    incorporated in Nevada.7
    Defendant, MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc., is a holding company formed and
    wholly owned by Defendant, Ronald Perelman, to “own and operate a diverse array
    of businesses.”8 Scientific Games is a MacAndrews & Forbes portfolio company.9
    Perelman, through MacAndrews & Forbes, beneficially owned 39% of the
    Company’s outstanding common stock and was the Chairman of its board of
    directors (the “Board”) throughout the events described in the Complaint.10
    Defendants, Kevin M. Sheehan, M. Gavin Isaacs, Richard M. Haddrill,
    Peter A. Cohen, David L. Kennedy, Paul M. Meister, Michael J. Regan, Barry F.
    Schwartz, Frances F. Townsend, Viet D. Dinh, Gerald J. Ford and Gabrielle K.
    McDonald are each current or former officers or directors of the Company.11 Sylebra
    6
    Id. 7
        Compl. ¶ 28.
    8
    Compl. ¶ 26.
    9
    Id. 10
         Compl. ¶ 29.
    11
    Compl. ¶¶ 30–41.
    4
    alleges each of these defendants are beholden to Perelman and facilitated his
    breaches of fiduciary duty, as described below.
    B. Suitability Requirements, Article Tenth and the Redemption Standard
    Sylebra first acquired stock in Scientific Games in early 2015.12 By February
    2017, Sylebra owned 8,619,044 shares (or 9.84%) of the Company’s Class A
    Common Stock.13
    As gaming companies, both Scientific Games and Bally are subject to
    numerous         “licensure   [requirements]       and   regulations”   “across   multiple
    jurisdictions.”14 These regulations include so-called “suitability” requirements that
    apply to the Company’s investors.15 Since this was Sylebra’s first foray as an
    investor in the gaming industry, it was particularly sensitive to the “suitability”
    requirements and worked diligently with the Company to ensure that it complied
    with the regulations in all jurisdictions where the Company operated.16 At first, the
    12
    Compl. ¶ 63.
    13
    Id. 14
         Compl. ¶ 64.
    15
    “Suitability” regulations generally require companies in the gaming industry to ensure
    that their investors are not engaged in or associated with illegal or illicit activity.
    Compl. ¶ 4. If a company violates suitability regulations, the company risks losing its
    gaming licenses. Compl. ¶ 78.
    16
    Compl. ¶ 65.
    5
    Company was ready and willing to assist.17 Happy to receive Sylebra’s investment,
    the Company gave Sylebra no reason to be concerned that its structure, investment
    base or investment portfolio would run afoul of any suitability requirement.18
    In April 2017, at Perelman’s bidding, the Company began to question
    Sylebra’s investment in a company called Qiwi plc (“Qiwi”).19 The questions
    followed a 2015 New York Times article, where it was reported that pro-Russian
    groups were illegally utilizing payment terminals owned by Qiwi to fund the war in
    eastern Ukraine.20 While the Company expressed alarm that Sylebra would invest
    in a company like Qiwi, government authorities apparently did not share that alarm
    as none took any action against Qiwi in response to the 2015 article.21 Thus, from
    Sylebra’s perspective, the Company’s questions were pretext for Perelman’s effort
    to drive out an investor that posed “a threat to [Perelman’s] total command over
    Scientific Games.”22
    17
    Id. 18
    
    Id.
    19
    
         Compl. ¶¶ 66–70.
    20
    Compl. ¶ 68.
    21
    Id. 22
         Compl. ¶ 66.
    6
    On April 27, 2017, unbeknownst to Sylebra, the Company ratcheted its
    questions into action when it alerted numerous gaming regulators of Sylebra’s
    investment in Qiwi.23 According to Sylebra, the Company took this step so it could
    invoke “Article Tenth” of its then-operative Amended and Restated Articles of
    Incorporation (the “Delaware Charter”).24 Article Tenth, in relevant part, provided
    that, “all Securities of the [Company] shall be held subject to the suitability
    standards . . . of the [g]aming [a]uthorities.”25 It then laid out criteria by which the
    Company could deem that a stockholder was a “Disqualified Holder”:
    any holder of the [Company’s] Securities (1) who is requested or
    required . . . to . . . submit to the jurisdiction of, or provide information
    to, any [g]aming [a]uthority and either refuses to do so or otherwise
    fails to comply with such request or requirement within a reasonable
    period of time, (2) who is determined or shall have been determined by
    any [g]aming [a]uthority not to be suitable . . . or (3) whose holding of
    Securities may result, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, in the
    failure of the [Company] or any Affiliate to obtain, maintain, renew or
    qualify for a license, contract, franchise or other regulatory approval
    with respect to the operation or conduct of the business of the
    [Company] . . . or any of its Affiliates from a [g]aming [a]uthority
    which conditions approval upon holders of the [Company’s] Securities
    possessing prescribed qualifications.26
    23
    Compl. ¶¶ 70, 79–80.
    24
    Compl. ¶ 71; Transmittal Aff. of Riley T. Svikhart to the Opening Br. in Supp. of the
    Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Verified Compl. (“Svikhart Aff.”), Ex. 8 (“Delaware
    Charter”).
    25
    Compl. ¶ 72; Delaware Charter, at 3.
    26
    Compl. ¶ 73. Delaware Charter, at 4.
    7
    If the Board deemed any stockholder to be a Disqualified Holder, then the
    Company could require the Disqualified Holder either to divest its interest within
    sixty days or, more relevant here, allow the Company to redeem the Disqualified
    Holder’s stock at a specified “Redemption Price.”27 The Redemption Price was
    defined as:
    a price equal to the lesser of (1) the average closing sale price of such
    Securities as reported for composite transactions in securities listed on
    the principal trading market on which such Securities are then listed or
    admitted for trading during the 30 trading days preceding the Notice
    Date or, if such Securities are not so listed or traded, at the fair value of
    the Securities determined in good faith by the Board of Directors and
    (2) the holder’s original Purchase Price.28
    Numerous regulators took the bait set by the Company and contacted Sylebra
    to inquire about its relationship with Qiwi.29             Most notably, the Office of
    Enforcement         Counsel    of    the    Pennsylvania      Gaming      Control        Board
    (the “Pennsylvania Regulator”) and the U.S. Virgin Islands Casino Control
    Commission (“Virgin Islands Regulator”) both initiated investigations of Sylebra’s
    suitability.30
    27
    Compl. ¶¶ 76–77; Delaware Charter, at 4.
    28
    Compl. ¶ 77; Delaware Charter, at 4.
    29
    Compl. ¶ 8.
    30
    Compl. ¶ 81.
    8
    C. The Pennsylvania and Virgin Islands Investigations
    On April 27, 2017, the Pennsylvania Regulator informed the Company that it
    had “determined that Sylebra . . . need[ed] to file a Principal Entity License . . . in
    order that a determination [could] be made as to Sylebra’s suitability to maintain its
    association with Slot Machine Manufacturer Licensee Bally Gaming, Inc. and its
    affiliate Scientific Games.”31 Prior to this date, Sylebra was granted “institutional
    investor status” by the Pennsylvania Regulator, allowing it to bypass the Principal
    Entity Licensing requirements.32       Pending completion of its investigation, the
    Pennsylvania Regulator restricted Sylebra’s ability to divest its Scientific Games
    shares without permission.33
    The following day, on April 28, the Company instructed Goldman Sachs to
    freeze Sylebra’s investment to prevent divestment.34 A few days later, on May 1,
    the Company sent a letter to Sylebra informing it of the Pennsylvania Regulator’s
    demands regarding licensing and divestment.35            The Company made similar
    31
    Compl. ¶ 84. Although not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears the process of
    obtaining a Principal Entity License includes an investigation into the applicant’s fitness
    for licensure. Compl. ¶¶ 88, 90.
    32
    Compl. ¶ 85.
    33
    Compl. ¶ 86.
    34
    Compl. ¶ 87.
    35
    Compl. ¶ 88.
    9
    demands in its own right, and requested that Sylebra identify “all record holders of
    shares under Sylebra’s management.”36            Sylebra responded by informing the
    Company that it was in discussions with the Pennsylvania Regulator and had no
    intention of divesting its Scientific Games stock.37
    On May 15, 2017, the Pennsylvania Regulator confirmed that Sylebra had
    divested a majority of its shares in Qiwi, but also confirmed that the investigation
    was still open pending Sylebra’s final divestiture of all Qiwi stock and its
    satisfactory explanation of the fund’s structure.38          On June 21, 2017, the
    Pennsylvania Regulator lifted its restrictions on Sylebra’s ability to divest its stock
    in the Company.39 Unfortunately, Sylebra’s regulatory woes did not end there.
    One day after the Pennsylvania Regulator lifted its trading restriction, the
    Virgin Islands Regulator issued a directive restricting Sylebra’s ability to divest its
    shares in the Company pending a suitability investigation of its own.40 This directive
    was issued by the Chairman of the Virgin Islands Regulator, Violet Anne Golden
    (“Chair Golden”), citing to both a letter from the Company in which it detailed the
    36
    Id. 37
         Compl. ¶ 90.
    38
    Compl. ¶ 91.
    39
    Compl. ¶ 92.
    40
    Compl. ¶ 103.
    10
    Board’s concerns, dated June 2, 2017, and Sylebra’s investment in Qiwi, as the bases
    for the directive.41
    In a strange twist, Chair Golden directed “Sylebra to tender $75,000 to the
    Virgin Islands Regulator” to conduct a suitability investigation.42           Sylebra
    reluctantly complied. It later discovered that only a small portion of its $75,000 was
    used to pay for the suitability investigation.43 Not coincidentally, Chair Golden was
    later indicted on federal charges of embezzlement, conspiracy, wire fraud and
    obtaining money under false pretenses.44
    On January 13, 2020, the Virgin Islands Regulator “lifted the trading
    restriction directive with immediate effect” after it reviewed the circumstances
    giving rise to the directive “following Chair Golden’s admission of guilt.” 45 Bally
    immediately filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking a hearing and maintenance
    of the divestiture restriction.46 This regulatory investigation remains in limbo.
    41
    Compl. ¶ 106.
    42
    Compl. ¶ 108.
    43
    Compl. ¶ 111.
    44
    Id. 45
         Compl. ¶ 114.
    46
    Id. 11 D.
    Scientific Games Performs Its Own Suitability Investigation of Sylebra
    In the midst of the Pennsylvania Regulator’s investigation, in May 2017, the
    Company sent a letter requesting that Sylebra provide the Company with the same
    information it was providing to the Pennsylvania Regulator. 47           The requested
    information included a list of Sylebra’s limited partner investors, a list of companies
    affiliated with Sylebra, a list of jurisdictions in which Sylebra is regulated and a list
    of companies in which Sylebra is invested.48 The Company explained that it sought
    this and other information about Sylebra in order to “ensure compliance with the
    Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering requirements within the gaming
    industry.”49
    Sylebra responded to the Company’s requests by providing both detail
    regarding “how Sylebra’s fund administrator applied industry-standard KYC and
    AML processes” to manage the fund and a breakdown of the world regions in which
    its investments originate.50       Sylebra explained that confidentiality restrictions
    prevented it from providing more details regarding its investors but proposed that it
    could provide that information to the Pennsylvania Regulator without violating its
    47
    Compl. ¶ 116.
    48
    Id. 49
         Compl. ¶ 118.
    50
    Compl. ¶ 121.
    12
    agreements with investors.51 The Company initially agreed that this course of action
    would satisfy its concerns, but later “reneged on the agreement” without
    explanation.52
    E. Scientific Games Amends Its Delaware Bylaws
    Amidst growing tensions between the Company and Sylebra, the Board
    amended its Delaware Amended and Restated Bylaws (the “Delaware Bylaws”) on
    June 9, 2017, to include two new provisions: Section 8.05 and Section 8.06.53
    Section 8.05 allowed the Company to invalidate the shares of any stockholder that
    had received a redemption notice following a determination that the stockholder was
    a Disqualified Holder.54 Section 8.06 required the Company to conduct a suitability
    analysis of each “Significant Stockholder,” defined as any stockholder that
    beneficially owned 5% or more of any class of stock.55 In conducting such analyses,
    this Section authorized the Company to request “all relevant information pertaining
    to suitability and/or qualification.”56
    51
    Compl. ¶ 122.
    52
    Compl. ¶¶ 122–24.
    53
    Compl. ¶¶ 127, 131.
    54
    Compl. ¶ 127.
    55
    Compl. ¶ 131.
    56
    Compl. ¶ 137.
    13
    According to Sylebra, Section 8.05 exceeded the authority provided to the
    Company in Article Tenth since that Delaware Charter provision “said nothing about
    the Company’s ability to render securities held by a Disqualified Holder invalid such
    that it could void any transfer made by a stockholder that receives a redemption
    notice.”57 As for Section 8.06, Sylebra contends this Section also conflicts with
    Article Tenth, since that Charter provision did not “sanction[] the investigation of
    stockholders who otherwise satisfied the prescribed regulations of gaming
    authorities.”58 Of course, Sylebra did nothing to challenge these new bylaws at the
    time they were adopted.
    Citing its new Delaware Bylaws, the Company sent Sylebra a letter on
    June 17, 2017, requesting further confidential information to facilitate the
    Company’s “continuing qualification and suitability analysis with respect to
    Sylebra.”59 As the Company’s suitability investigation escalated, so did tensions
    between the parties.
    57
    Compl. ¶ 128.
    58
    Compl. ¶ 133.
    59
    Compl. ¶ 140.
    14
    F. Scientific Games Reincorporates in Nevada
    On September 18, 2017, the Company announced its plans to enter into a
    merger for the purposes of reincorporating the Company in Nevada
    (the “Reincorporation    Merger”    or   “Reincorporation”).60      The    Company
    disseminated its proxy materials relating to the Reincorporation Merger
    (the “Proxy”) on October 20, 2017.61
    According to Sylebra, the Proxy was materially false and misleading in
    several respects, including that it: (i) misrepresented the Company’s reasons for
    reincorporating in Nevada by failing to explain that the real reason for the move was
    to “further Perelman’s campaign to harm the Sylebra Plaintiffs’ investment and
    consolidate his power”; (ii) falsely disclosed that “the rights of stockholders under
    the New Charter and New Bylaws are substantially the same as under the Company’s
    [Delaware] Charter and Bylaws”; (iii) did not discuss the Board’s amendments to
    the Delaware Bylaws in June 2017; (iv) did not disclose that the change in the
    definition of Disqualified Holder was part of the Company’s campaign to prompt
    government regulators to make adverse findings against Sylebra; and (v) masked the
    change in Disqualified Holder, which now allowed the Company to deem
    60
    Compl. ¶ 144.
    61
    Compl. ¶ 145.
    .
    15
    disqualified any stockholder that might “cause . . . the imposition of any materially
    burdensome or unacceptable terms or conditions on any Gaming License.”62
    Sylebra also maintains the Proxy failed to highlight three important
    distinctions between the Delaware Charter and the to-be-enacted Nevada Amended
    and Restated Articles of Incorporation (the “Nevada Charter”): (i) Article Tenth
    (now Article VIII of the Nevada Charter) was changed to grant the Company power
    to look beyond the record holder to any beneficial owners when reviewing
    suitability; (ii) the Nevada Charter’s new Article VIII also gave the Board the
    discretion “to take such other action, to the extent not prohibited by law, as it deems
    necessary or advisable to protect the Company or any of its Affiliates from the denial
    or loss or threatened denial or loss of any Gaming license”; and (iii) the Nevada
    Charter added a provision that the Company is not required to redeem or repurchase
    shares owned or controlled by a Disqualified Holder, even though delivering a
    redemption notice to a Disqualified Holder constituted a binding agreement on
    behalf of the Company to redeem.63 In addition, the Proxy did not accurately
    disclose why the new Nevada Amended and Restated Bylaws (the “Nevada
    Bylaws”) would contain a forum selection bylaw designating the courts of Clark
    62
    Compl. ¶¶ 146–56.
    63
    Compl. ¶¶ 157–62 (emphasis added); Svikhart Aff., Ex. 3 (“Nevada Charter”) at 5.
    16
    County, Nevada as the sole and exclusive forum to litigate stockholder disputes
    (the “Forum Selection Bylaw”).64
    According to the Proxy, the move to Nevada was justified because “Delaware
    law does not afford the same substantive rights and protections under Nevada law,”
    specifically noting that “reincorporation will result in the elimination of any liability
    of an officer or director for a breach of the duty of loyalty unless arising from
    intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation of law.”65 Importantly, the
    Proxy also explained that “[p]rimarily, the reincorporation merger will allow us to
    better align our legal domicile with our global corporate headquarters and our
    primary US manufacturing operations.”66
    In unanimously approving the Reincorporation Merger and recommending it
    to stockholders, the Board determined that the transaction “[was] advisable, fair to
    and in the best interests of [the] stockholders.”67 On November 27, 2017, a majority
    of Scientific Games’ stockholders approved the Reincorporation Merger. According
    64
    Compl. ¶ 164; Svikhart Aff., Ex. 2 (“Nevada Bylaws”) at 17.
    65
    Compl. ¶ 165; Svikhart Aff., Ex. 1 (“Proxy”) at 5. Along these lines, the Proxy indicates
    that incorporating in Nevada “may help us attract and retain qualified management by
    reducing the risk of lawsuits being filed against the Company and its directors and
    officers.” Proxy, at 4.
    66
    Proxy, at 4.
    67
    Compl. ¶ 168.
    17
    to Sylebra, the vote was a sham because the stockholders were misled by the Proxy
    and, therefore, did not understand that the Reincorporation was the latest salvo in
    Perelman’s campaign to drive Sylebra out of the Company.68 Sylebra also observes
    that the Reincorporation Merger would not have been approved had Perelman not
    voted his controlling block in favor of the transaction.69
    G. Scientific Games Files Suit Against Sylebra in Nevada
    The Reincorporation Merger was executed on January 10, 2018.70 In the
    months that followed, the Company ramped up its suitability investigation of Sylebra
    by peppering it with requests for confidential information while declining to explain
    the reasons for its requests.71 When Sylebra’s offers to explore “an amicable
    solution” were summarily rejected,72 it began to question why the Company was not
    investigating other stockholders given that Sylebra was “in the same position as
    every investor that holds 5% or more of [the Company].” 73 On June 14, 2019, the
    day after Sylebra sent its most direct rejoinder to the Company, the Company and
    68
    Compl. ¶¶ 169–70.
    69
    Compl. ¶¶ 169–70.
    70
    Compl. ¶ 171.
    71
    Compl. ¶¶ 174–75.
    72
    Compl. ¶¶ 176–77.
    73
    Compl. ¶ 179.
    18
    Bally filed suit against Sylebra in Nevada state court to compel Sylebra’s compliance
    with the suitability investigation under the Company’s Nevada Bylaws (the “Nevada
    Action”).74 After its attempt to remove the Nevada Action to federal court failed,
    Sylebra filed this Delaware action on October 23, 2019.75
    H. Procedural History
    In its eleven count Complaint, Sylebra primarily seeks to have this Court
    declare as invalid and unenforceable: (1) Sections 8.05, 8.06 and 10.01 of the
    Delaware Bylaws, (2) amendments to Article VIII of the Nevada Charter, and (3) the
    Forum Selection Bylaw.76 Sylebra also seeks an order enjoining Defendants from
    depriving Sylebra of its rightful holdings in Scientific Games in breach of their
    fiduciary duties, which, as explained below, I interpret as effectively asking this
    Court to declare a number of provisions in the Nevada Charter, particularly
    Article VIII, unenforceable as against Sylebra.77
    Following full briefing and oral argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
    Sylebra filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint on July 17,
    74
    Compl. ¶ 180.
    75
    Id. 7
    6
    Compl., Prayer for Relief (b).
    77
    Compl., Prayer for Relief (a).
    19
    2020. Defendants oppose that motion as untimely, prejudicial and prohibited by
    Chancery Rule 15(aaa).
    II. ANALYSIS
    The Defendants move to dismiss under both Chancery Rule 12(b)(3) for
    improper venue and Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state viable claims.
    Because I am satisfied dismissal is mandated under Rule 12(b)(3), I will not address
    the merits of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).78 Before addressing the grounds for
    dismissal, I take up Plaintiffs’ motion to amend.
    A. The Motion to Amend
    Rule 15(a) makes clear that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given.”79
    “Notwithstanding Rule 15(a),” however, this Court will deny leave to amend when
    a plaintiff fully engages on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) without first
    seeking leave to amend so that it can address the pleading deficiencies exposed in
    the motion.80 In such instances, where the plaintiff elects to oppose dismissal rather
    than amend, the Court will consider the motion to dismiss on the merits of the
    78
    In my view, it is best for a court dismissing on venue grounds to avoid addressing the
    merits of claims, lest that gratuitous analysis confound the analysis of the court where
    venue properly lies.
    79
    Ct. Ch. R. 15(a).
    80
    Rule 15(aaa) provides that “a party . . . must file an amended complaint, or motion to
    amend . . . no later than the time such party’s answering brief . . . is due to be filed” or face
    dismissal with prejudice. Ct. Ch. R. 15(aaa).
    20
    pleading as addressed in the motion, and will dismiss with prejudice where
    warranted.81
    Here, for reasons unclear, Sylebra filed its Motion to Amend two weeks after
    the hearing on Defendants’ fully briefed Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Amend
    comes too late and Sylebra offers no bases upon which the Court can or should
    excuse it from the operation of Rule 15(aaa).
    Sylebra’s attempt to invoke Rule 41(a) as a means to avoid dismissal with
    prejudice is also unpersuasive. “In order to give Rule 15(aaa) its intended scope,
    once the time for amendment has passed under that rule, a party-plaintiff will not be
    permitted to resort to Rules 41(a), 23 or 23.1 to file a ‘without prejudice’ dismissal
    of its action.”82 The Motion to Amend is denied.
    B. Sylebra’s Requests for Declarations Regarding the Delaware Charter
    Are Moot
    To the extent Sylebra implicitly or explicitly would have the Court declare
    that provisions within the Company’s Delaware Charter or Delaware Bylaws are
    invalid or unenforceable, any such request faces an immediate and insoluble
    81
    As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he purpose of Rule 15(aaa) [is] to curtail the
    number of times that the Court of Chancery [is] required to adjudicate multiple motions to
    dismiss the same action.” Braddock v. Zimmerman, 
    906 A.2d 776
    , 783 (Del. 2006).
    “The rule is intended to conserve litigants’ and judicial resources by discouraging a party
    from briefing a dispositive motion before filing an amended complaint.” E. Sussex Assocs.,
    LLC v. W. Sussex Assocs., LLC, 
    2013 WL 2389868
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2013).
    82
    Stern v. LF Capital P’rs, LLC, 
    820 A.2d 1143
    , 1147 (Del. Ch. 2003).
    21
    problem—the Delaware Charter and Delaware Bylaws no longer exist.83 They
    ceased governing Scientific Games the moment the Reincorporation Merger was
    effected. Any claim that seeks or depends upon a declaration of ongoing rights under
    these documents, or upon a declaration that provisions within them are invalid or
    unenforceable, therefore, is moot.84
    C. Sylebra’s Complaint Implicates the Internal Affairs of a Nevada
    Corporation
    Sylebra would also have the Court declare that certain amendments and
    provisions of the Company’s Nevada Charter and Nevada Bylaws, including the
    Forum Selection Bylaw and the Nevada Charter’s redemption provision, are
    unenforceable as to Sylebra. In doing so, Sylebra would have this Court do what
    this Court strongly prefers courts in other jurisdictions not do with respect to
    83
    See Compl. ¶¶ 185, 204–211, 213–220.
    84
    See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Shapiro, 
    818 A.2d 959
    , 963 (Del. 2003) (“Mootness arises
    when controversy between the parties no longer exists such that a court can no longer grant
    relief in the matter.”); Supermex Trading Co., Ltd. v. Strategic Sols. Gp., Inc., 
    1998 WL 229530
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1998) (“The record reflects . . . those amendments
    have all been rescinded. Thus, I . . . will not enter any order with respect to those bylaws
    other than to note that they have been rescinded and to dismiss the claims with respect to
    them as moot for that reason.”); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 
    1990 WL 82734
    , at *2
    (Del. Ch. June 14, 1990) (“The Court ruled that the Article Sixth claim had been mooted
    because the merger had eliminated that Article from Tri-Star’s certificate of
    incorporation.”).
    22
    Delaware corporations—decide matters that impact the internal affairs of a
    corporation chartered in another state.85
    “The internal affairs doctrine is a long-standing choice of law principle which
    recognizes that only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s
    internal affairs—the state of incorporation.”86            “By providing certainty and
    predictability, the internal affairs doctrine protects the justified expectations of the
    parties with interests in the corporation.”87 While the internal affairs doctrine is,
    fundamentally, a choice of law doctrine, as explained by the United States Supreme
    85
    See, e.g., Sternberg v. O’Neil, 
    550 A.2d 1105
    , 1124–25 (Del. 1988) (“The Delaware
    courts and legislature have long recognized a ‘need for consistency and certainty in the
    interpretation and application of Delaware corporation law.’”) (quoting Armstrong v.
    Pomerance, 
    423 A.2d 174
    , 178 (Del. 1980)) (explaining that allowing important or novel
    questions of Delaware law to be resolved by other courts “might create excessive
    uncertainty about the meaning of the Delaware law as a result of too many forums
    interpreting it since there would be no certiorari process available to the Delaware Supreme
    Court to resolve conflicts”); MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 
    1985 WL 21129
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1985) (“[N]ovel and substantial issues of Delaware
    corporate law . . . are best resolved in a Delaware court.”). Cf. Martinez v. E.I duPont
    de Nemours & Co., Inc., 
    86 A.3d 1102
    , 1107 (Del. 2014) (observing that our Supreme
    Court “has recognized that novel or important issues of Delaware law are best determined
    by Delaware courts”).
    86
    VantagePoint Venture P’rs 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 
    871 A.2d 1108
    , 1112 (Del. 2005);
    see also In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 
    924 A.2d 951
    , 953 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting “it is
    well settled that jurisdiction in any case will be declined . . . where a determination of the
    rights of the litigants involves regulation and management of the internal affairs of [a]
    corporation dependent upon the laws of [a] foreign state”) (quoting Langfelder v. Universal
    Labs., 
    56 N.E.2d 550
    (N.Y. Ct. App. 1944)).
    87
    
    VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113
    .
    23
    Court, there are notions of comity and deference inherent in the doctrine that should
    not lightly be ignored:
    It has long been settled that a court—state or federal—sitting in one
    state will as a general rule, decline to interfere with, or control by
    injunction or otherwise, [a] corporation organized under the laws of
    another state but will leave controversies as to such matters to the courts
    of the state of the domicile.88
    It is indisputable that the Nevada Charter and Nevada Bylaw provisions
    implicated by Sylebra’s claims fall within the purview of the internal affairs
    doctrine. For example, the Company’s Forum Selection Bylaw “plainly focus[es]
    on [matters] governed by the internal affairs doctrine and thus the law of the state of
    incorporation.”89 The redemption clause likewise directly affects the Company’s
    internal affairs. That provision, in Article VIII of the Nevada Charter, allows the
    Board to redeem the shares of an investor it deems unsuitable.90 This is plainly a
    “matter[] which [is] peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation
    and its current officers, directors and shareholders.”91
    88
    Rogers v. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 
    288 U.S. 123
    , 130 (1933); see also In re Topps
    
    Co., 924 A.2d at 958
    (“Venerable authority recognizes that a chartering state’s interest in
    promoting an efficient and predictable corporation law can be undercut if other states do
    not show comity by deferring to the courts of the chartering state when a case is presented
    that involves the application of the chartering state’s corporation law.”).
    89
    See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 
    73 A.3d 934
    , 962 (Del. Ch.
    2013).
    90
    Nevada Charter, at 5.
    91
    McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 
    531 A.2d 206
    , 213 (Del. 1987).
    24
    In its Prayer for Relief, Sylebra asks this Court, among other relief, to
    (1) enjoin the Defendants from depriving Sylebra of its rightful holdings in the
    Company through the enforcement of the Nevada Charter and Bylaws provisions
    that purportedly require redemption; and (2) declare, under Delaware law, that the
    amendments to the redemption provisions of the Nevada Charter are invalid and
    unenforceable.92 I would no more enter that injunction or make that declaration than
    I would declare that a Nevada statute was unenforceable in Nevada as a matter of
    Delaware law.
    The application of internal affairs and comity principles is all the more
    appropriate here given that Sylebra seeks to prevent the Company from invoking its
    constitutive documents on a future date, when any resulting injury would occur in
    Nevada, not Delaware.93 As Sylebra’s counsel readily acknowledged during oral
    argument, “the real threat to [Sylebra] . . . is [Defendants] forc[ing] [Sylebra] to
    redeem.”94 That forced redemption has not happened yet, meaning it did not occur
    92
    Compl., Prayer for Relief (a)–(b); see also Compl. ¶ 186 (asking the Court to declare
    that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by “approving the Nevada Charter” and
    “enacting the Nevada Bylaws”).
    93
    In other words, the financial injury to Sylebra will occur, if at all, while the Company is
    a Nevada corporation. This means that, at least under Delaware law, if the Company forces
    redemption, Sylebra will be injured in the Company’s legal home, Nevada. See Sample v.
    Morgan, 
    935 A.2d 1046
    , 1057 (Del. Ch. 2007).
    94
    Telephonic Oral Arg. on Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (D.I. 53) (“Tr.”) at 52.
    25
    prior to the Reincorporation when Scientific Games still called Delaware home. As
    discussed below, Scientific Games has a Forum Selection Bylaw that requires
    Sylebra to bring its claims in Nevada. Unless there is good reason not to enforce
    that bylaw, Sylebra has no business bringing its claims in this court.95
    D. The Nevada Forum-Selection Clause is Enforceable and Requires
    Dismissal
    “The proper procedural rubric for addressing a motion to dismiss based on a
    forum selection clause is found under Rule 12(b)(3), improper venue.”96 “Although
    Delaware courts have, in the past, framed a forum selection clause analysis as
    jurisdictional in some sense, recent cases have all proceeded under Rule 12(b)(3).”97
    And, when addressing a motion under Rule 12(b)(3), “the court is not shackled to
    95
    To be clear, Sylebra could have brought an action in this court back in 2017, when the
    Company was still a Delaware corporation, to enjoin the Reincorporation Merger as the
    product of a controlling stockholder’s unlawful self-interest and an inadequate Proxy that
    prevented an informed stockholder vote on the transaction. It made no such claims. Now,
    almost three years later, with the Company firmly ensconced in Nevada, Sylebra comes to
    Delaware asking the Court to declare, in essence, that the Company never should have left
    here and, more remarkably, to declare that elements of its Nevada constitutive documents
    are unenforceable. If the Court were to entertain such claims, it would not only be
    departing from its “lane,” it would be crossing the centerline into Nevada’s lane.
    96
    In re Bay Hills Emerging P’rs I, L.P., 
    2018 WL 3217650
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. July 2, 2018)
    (quoting Bonanno v. VTB Hldgs., Inc., 
    2016 WL 614412
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2016)).
    97
    Id. (quoting Troy Corp.
    v. Schoon, 
    2007 WL 949441
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2007)).
    26
    the plaintiff's complaint and is permitted to consider extrinsic evidence from the
    outset.”98
    Forum selection bylaws are enforced “in the same way [Delaware] enforces
    any other forum selection clause.”99 Such clauses “are presumptively valid and
    should be specifically enforced unless the resisting party clearly show[s] that
    enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for
    such reasons as fraud and overreaching.”100
    The Forum Selection Bylaw provides:
    To the fullest extent permitted by law, and unless the Corporation
    consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Eighth
    Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada, shall be the sole and
    exclusive forum for any actions, suits or proceedings, whether civil,
    administrative or investigative or that assert any claim or counterclaim
    (a) brought in the name or right of the Corporation or on its behalf,
    (b) asserting a claim for breach of any fiduciary duty owed by any
    director, officer, employee or agent of the Corporation to the
    Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (c) arising or asserting
    a claim arising pursuant to any provision of NRS Chapters 78 or 92A
    or any provision of the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws or
    (d) asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. In the
    event that the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada
    does not have jurisdiction over any such action, suit or proceeding, then
    any other state district court located in the State of Nevada shall be the
    sole and exclusive forum therefor and in the event that no state district
    court in the State of Nevada has jurisdiction over any such action, suit
    or proceeding, then a federal court located within the State of Nevada
    98
    Id. 99
         
    Chevron, 73 A.3d at 940
    .
    100
    Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 
    8 A.3d 1143
    , 1146 (Del. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
    27
    shall be the sole and exclusive forum therefor. Any person or entity
    purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock
    of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to
    the provisions of this Section 10.01.
    Sylebra has advanced three reasons the Court should decline to enforce this
    obviously broad Forum Selection Bylaw: (1) it did not consent to the bylaw, (2) the
    bylaw is both unjust and unreasonable and (3) the bylaw was procured by fraud.
    I address each in turn.
    Sylebra Consented to the Forum Selection Bylaw
    Sylebra maintains it did not consent to the Forum Selection Bylaw because,
    at the time the Company adopted the bylaw, Sylebra had no ability to sell its
    shares.101 This argument rests on a flawed reading of Delaware law. The ability of
    a board of directors of a Delaware corporation “to adopt binding bylaws” is “an
    essential part of the contract stockholders assent to when they buy stock.”102
    101
    Sylebra also argues it could not consent because, at the time of Reincorporation, the
    Forum Selection Bylaw would have been unlawful under Section 115 of the DGCL.
    Pls.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. (“PAB”) (D.I. 32)
    at 49–51; Tr. at 40. This argument is difficult to follow. While it is true Section 115 would
    have prevented Scientific Games from prohibiting its stockholders from bringing certain
    claims in Delaware while the Company was incorporated in Delaware, the Company was
    not incorporated in Delaware when it adopted the Forum Selection Bylaw. That clause
    exists in the Nevada Bylaws. Accordingly, Section 115 does not apply here.
    102
    
    Chevron, 73 A.3d at 940
    ; City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 
    99 A.3d 229
    , 240 (Del. Ch. 2014), superseded on other grounds by statute, 
    8 Del. C
    . § 115; see also
    Delaware Charter, at Art. Sixth (“In furtherance and not in limitation of the powers
    conferred by statute, the Board of Directors is expressly authorized to make, alter or repeal
    the Bylaws of the corporation.”).
    28
    According to Sylebra, even if it implicitly consented to the Board unilaterally
    enacting bylaws when it invested in the Company, it did so with the understanding
    that it could sell its shares at any time. If that, in fact, was Sylebra’s understanding,
    it was mistaken both as a matter of Scientific Games’ governance and as a matter of
    law.
    First, upon investing in the Company, Sylebra knew that it was subject to
    Article Tenth, which, among other things, required securities in the corporation to
    “be held subject to the suitability standards, qualifications, and requirements of the
    Gaming Authorities.”103 These standards expressly included suitability standards,
    which are subject to enforcement by gaming regulators in each of the jurisdictions
    where Scientific Games operates.104 And with enforcement comes restrictions,
    including restrictions on the sale of Company securities.105
    Second, the link Sylebra attempts to draw between the ability of a stockholder
    to sell its shares and that stockholder’s consent to the corporation’s bylaws finds no
    support in our law. In Strougo v. Hollander, a case Sylebra relies upon, the court
    deemed a fee-shifting bylaw inapplicable to the plaintiff because “a former
    103
    Compl. ¶ 71; Delaware Charter, at Art. Tenth.
    104
    32 V.I CODE R. § 444-1.10 (“It shall be the continuing duty of all applicants and
    licensees to provide full cooperation to the Commission in the conduct of such inquiry or
    investigation.”).
    105
    Compl. ¶ 86.
    29
    stockholder is not subject to . . . any bylaw amendments adopted after one’s interest
    in the corporation has been eliminated.”106 There, the plaintiff was no longer a
    stockholder in the company when the company adopted the bylaw at issue and,
    therefore, was not subject to that bylaw. That, of course, is not this case; Sylebra
    was (and still is) a stockholder when the Forum Selection Bylaw was adopted.107
    Sylebra has not cited any authority, and I am aware of none, supporting the
    proposition that when a stockholder is temporarily unable to sell its stock, that
    stockholder’s consent to current or newly enacted bylaws, by operation of that
    circumstance, is somehow withdrawn. And I can see no reason why that should be
    our law.108
    The Forum Selection Bylaw Is Not Unreasonable or Unjust
    Having determined that Sylebra consented to the Forum Selection Bylaw,
    I turn next to whether the bylaw is invalid because its enforcement would be
    106
    
    111 A.3d 590
    , 598 (Del. Ch. 2015) (emphasis in original).
    See
    id. (“[T]he bylaw cannot
    apply to Plaintiff, who was no longer a stockholder of the
    107
    Company when the Bylaw was adopted.”).
    108
    This is especially so here, where the restriction was a feature of Scientific Games’
    governance structure when Sylebra invested in the Company, and Sylebra knew, given
    MacAndrews & Forbes’ controlling stake, that no organic movement of stockholders was
    likely to alter the charter or bylaw provision that implemented the focus on investor
    suitability.
    30
    “unreasonable and unjust.”109 “Courts should assess the reasonableness of a forum
    selection clause on a case-by-case basis.”110 To escape the reach of the Forum
    Selection Bylaw on grounds that it is unreasonable or unjust, Sylebra “bears a heavy
    burden” to demonstrate that enforcement here would “place [it] at an unfair
    disadvantage” or “otherwise deny [it its] day in court.”111 Sylebra has not carried
    that burden.
    Sylebra begins its “unreasonableness” argument by observing that the timing
    of the wrongdoing “can be relevant to enforcement of a forum-selection bylaw.”112
    In support of this proposition, Sylebra points to non-Delaware authority, Galaviz v.
    Berg and In re Facebook, where the courts, purportedly applying Delaware law, held
    that a forum selection clause will be deemed unenforceable when it was “adopted by
    the directors who are defendants in this action, after the majority of the purported
    wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred.”113 If that, in fact, is the holding of these
    cases, then they have misstated our law.114 To reiterate, a stockholder in a Delaware
    109
    
    Ingres, 8 A.3d at 1146
    .
    110
    Id. 111
          Capital Gp. Cos., Inc. v. Amour, 
    2004 WL 2521295
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004).
    112
    PAB at 44.
    113
    Id.; Galaviz v. Berg, 
    763 F. Supp. 2d 1170
    , 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Facebook, Inc.
    IPO Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 
    922 F. Supp. 2d 445
    , 459–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
    114
    See First 
    Citizens, 99 A.3d at 242
    n.54 (“[T]he Galaviz and Triquint decisions, to the
    extent they purport to apply Delaware law, are based on a misapprehension of Delaware
    31
    corporation gives consent to be bound by current and future bylaws when it buys
    stock.115 Whether or not the alleged wrongdoing comes before or after the adoption
    of a forum selection bylaw is irrelevant in determining the reasonableness or overall
    enforceability of the bylaw.116
    Sylebra next argues that, “enforcement would be unreasonable where the
    Amended Complaint specifically alleges a years-long scheme aimed at the Sylebra
    Plaintiffs’ investment, an essential component of which was the forum-selection
    bylaw issue.”117 This argument attempts to answer the wrong question. As the
    law regarding the facial validity and as-applied analysis of forum selection bylaws.”);
    id. at 241
    (“[The] contention that the Forum Selection Bylaw cannot be enforced because
    it seeks to regulate the forum for asserting claims that arose before it was adopted is
    unpersuasive.”); 
    Chevron, 73 A.3d at 956
    (“[T]he conclusion reached by the United States
    District Court for the Northern District of California in Galaviz v. Berg . . . that board-
    adopted bylaws are not like other contracts because they lack the stockholders’ assent—
    rests on a failure to appreciate the contractual framework established by the DGCL for
    Delaware corporations and their stockholders.”).
    115
    Id. 116
          Id.
    117
    
       PAB at 43–44; Compl. ¶¶ 81–170. As a branch of this argument, Sylebra claims that
    the Forum Selection Bylaw was adopted via a misleading Proxy and “in furtherance of the
    campaign targeting Sylebra and the Sylebra Plaintiffs’ investment,” making the Forum
    Selection Bylaw itself unjust and unreasonable. If ever this argument were to carry any
    persuasive force, that time would have been before the stockholder vote on the
    Reincorporation Merger. Scientific Games has been chartered as a Nevada corporation for
    almost three years now operating in accordance with the Nevada Charter and Nevada
    Bylaws. The argument that enforcement of one of the Nevada Bylaws is unreasonable
    because the stockholders, way back when, were not fully informed when they approved the
    transaction that created the bylaw is not persuasive.
    32
    Defendants properly note, in determining whether a stockholder has met his burden
    to demonstrate unreasonableness in Delaware, the fundamental inquiry is whether
    the stockholder has alleged “well-pled facts calling into question the integrity” of
    the court chosen in the forum selection bylaw, or “explain[ed] how the defendants
    have advanced their ‘self-interests’ by having the claims . . . adjudicated in those
    courts instead of a Delaware court.”118 Sylebra has not alleged, likely because it
    cannot allege, either fact.
    The best Sylebra can muster is an allegation that Nevada state courts are
    accustomed to “only holding fiduciaries accountable for ‘intentional misconduct,
    fraud or a knowing violation of the law.”119 That generalized (and unsupported)
    characterization of the Nevada courts’ orientation is a far cry from raising a
    legitimate question regarding the integrity or competency of the Nevada courts to
    provide Sylebra “its day in court.”120
    As noted, the determination of unreasonableness is contextual.121      The
    gravamen of Sylebra’s claim is that Company fiduciaries, including a controlling
    stockholder and a supine Board, intend to deem Sylebra unqualified to own stock in
    118
    First 
    Citizens, 99 A.3d at 241
    .
    119
    Compl. ¶ 166 (quoting Proxy at 5); PAB at 46.
    120
    Capital Gp. Cos., Inc., 
    2004 WL 2521295
    , at *6.
    121
    
    Ingres, 8 A.3d at 1146
    .
    33
    Scientific Games and then force it to redeem its Scientific Games shares at an unfair
    price.122 That scheme, assuming it is in progress as alleged, has not come to fruition.
    When (or if) it does, the fiduciaries involved will owe duties to a Nevada corporation
    and its stockholders. And the claims will be subject to a Nevada Forum Selection
    Bylaw. Nevada courts are now, and will be, available to Sylebra to adjudicate its
    claims, even if those claims, in some measure, implicate Delaware law. Enforcing
    the Forum Selection Bylaw will not change that.123
    Any attempt to find unreasonableness in the fact that the statute of limitations
    in Nevada may have run on some of Sylebra’s claims would also be unavailing.124
    Defendants filed the Nevada Action on June 19, 2019, providing Sylebra nearly an
    entire year to file counterclaims or a separate action in the jurisdiction prescribed by
    122
    Compl. ¶ 6.
    123
    See First 
    Citizens, 99 A.3d at 241
    (“The conduct of the FC North Board in approving
    the proposed merger will not be absolved from judicial review; that review simply must
    occur in a North Carolina court.”); 
    Chevron, 73 A.3d at 960
    (“[T]he forum selection bylaws
    only regulate where a certain set of claims, relating to the internal affairs of the corporation
    and governed by the law of the state of incorporation, may be brought, not what claims.”
    (emphasis in original)).
    124
    Tr. at 69. See Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in
    Corporate “Contracts”, 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 300 (2018) (“Red flags ought to be raised
    if the selected forum has, relative to the state of incorporation, a statute of limitations for
    corporate disputes that may bar an asserted claim.”). I note that I make no finding here
    regarding whether vel non the statute of limitations bars any of Sylebra’s claims since that
    issue may be presented to a Nevada court.
    34
    the Forum Selection Bylaw.125 Instead, Sylebra chose to double down on its
    disregard of the Forum Selection Bylaw, electing to file in Delaware, file nothing in
    Nevada (even prophylactically) and then wait for the ruling on Defendants’ motion
    to dismiss, where the showcase argument is that Sylebra has filed in the wrong
    forum. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that enforcement of the Forum
    Selection Bylaw would be unreasonable or unjust.
    The Forum Selection Bylaw Was Not Procured by Fraud
    Sylebra next argues that the Forum Selection Bylaw was procured by fraud
    because it “was enacted as part of the scheme to benefit Perelman and shield
    Defendants from liability for targeting and destroying the Sylebra Plaintiff’s
    investment.”126 The prima facie elements of fraud are well settled:
    (1) the defendant falsely represented or omitted facts that the defendant
    had a duty to disclose; (2) the defendant knew or believed that the
    representation was false or made the representation with a reckless
    indifference to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the
    plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable
    reliance on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its
    reliance.127
    125
    Compl. ¶ 180; Tr. at 69 (explaining that the expiration of the statute of limitations for
    one of Sylebra’s earliest claims was June 9, 2020).
    126
    PAB at 45.
    127
    Abry P’rs V, L.P. v. F&W Acq. LLC, 
    891 A.2d 1032
    , 1050 (Del. Ch. 2006).
    35
    According to Court of Chancery Rule 9(b), all averments of fraud “shall be stated
    with particularity.”128 To meet the particularity requirement, Rule 9(b) often will
    require a plaintiff making a fraud claim to allege: “the time, place, and contents of
    the false representation, the identity of the person(s) making the representation, and
    what he intended to obtain thereby.”129
    As a preliminary matter, I note that Sylebra has not pled a fraud claim, either
    with respect to the Forum Selection Bylaw or otherwise. Moreover, even if Sylebra
    had attempted to plead that the Reincorporation Merger was procured by fraud, that
    would be irrelevant in determining whether the Forum Selection Bylaw itself was
    procured by fraud. If the Forum Selection Bylaw is valid and enforceable in its own
    right, then whether there was fraud associated with the Reincorporation Merger
    (again, not pled here) is a matter for the Nevada court to decide.
    As for the Forum Selection Bylaw, the Proxy notes that “Delaware law does
    not afford the same substantive rights and protections under Nevada law” such that
    128
    Ct. Ch. R. 9(b); see also Composite Hldgs. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
    992 F. Supp. 367
    , 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Rule 9(b) requires that allegations of fraud with respect to a
    forum selection clause—just as any other allegations of fraud—be made with
    particularity.”).
    129
    H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 
    832 A.2d 129
    , 145 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also
    Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 
    906 A.2d 168
    , 207–08 (Del. Ch.
    2006) (Strine, V.C.), aff’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Billett, 
    931 A.2d 438
    (Del. 2007) (noting that the relevant factors include “the time, place, and contents of the
    false representations; the facts misrepresented; the identity of the person(s) making the
    misrepresentation; and what that person(s) gained from making the misrepresentation”).
    36
    the “reincorporation will result in the elimination of any liability of an officer or
    director for a breach of the duty of loyalty unless arising under intentional
    misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of the law.”130 The Proxy then makes clear
    that the Company intends to adopt the Forum Selection Bylaw once chartered in
    Nevada, which would dictate where stockholders could bring claims against
    Scientific Games fiduciaries.131 Indeed, the proposed Nevada Bylaws were attached
    to the Proxy.132 Sylebra has not pled any basis to infer fraud in the adoption of the
    Forum Selection Bylaw from these disclosures or otherwise.133
    130
    Compl. ¶ 165; Proxy, at 4–5; PAB at 46.
    131
    Compl. ¶ 167; Proxy, at 9.
    132
    Proxy, at 6; Proxy, at Annex C.
    133
    
    Abry, 891 A.2d at 1050
    (holding that fraud requires proof of a “falsely represented or
    omitted fact[] that the defendant had a duty to disclose”). Sylebra further argues that the
    Forum Selection Bylaw might not apply to MacAndrews & Forbes or Bally. PAB at 51
    n.13. Here again, Sylebra misstates our law. A party “closely-related” to a signatory of a
    contract containing a forum selection clause can enforce the clause if that enforcement is
    foreseeable. Ashall Homes Ltd. v. ROK Entm’t Gp. Inc., 
    992 A.2d 1239
    , 1249 (Del. Ch.
    2010). As Defendants properly point out, the cases Sylebra cites to question the vitality of
    the closely-related test actually apply the test to decide the case. See, e.g., Neurvana Med.,
    LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, 
    2019 WL 4464268
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2019) (“In the end,
    the explication is largely academic, because the plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to
    satisfy the closely-related test even under its broad formulation of the foreseeability
    inquiry.”). Here, MacAndrews & Forbes is the Company’s largest stockholder and Bally
    is one of the Company’s wholly-owned subsidiaries; both are inextricably tied to the
    Company, making it entirely foreseeable that stockholder claims against both would be
    subject to the Forum Selection Bylaw. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 26, 29, 30–39, 95; see also Weygandt
    v. Weco, LLC, 
    2009 WL 1351808
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009) (“Several cases suggest
    that when a control person agrees to a forum, it is foreseeable that the entities controlled
    by that person which are involved in the deal will also be bound to that forum.”). The fact
    that Sylebra relegates its “closely-related” argument to a footnote in its brief suggests that
    37
    * * * * *
    Sylebra has failed to carry its “heavy burden” to demonstrate that the Forum
    Selection Bylaw is unenforceable. That clause mandates that the parties litigate their
    disputes in Nevada. Because I am satisfied that the Forum Selection Bylaw is
    controlling, I need not, and elect not to, decide whether this action is subject to
    dismissal under the McWane doctrine or for failure to state a claim upon which relief
    may be granted.134
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
    Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to Scientific Games’ Forum Selection Bylaw and must
    be brought in the Nevada court identified in that bylaw.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    it is not serious in its suggestion that the Court, on this record, should ignore or reject a
    well-established aspect of our forum selection jurisprudence. See In re Asbestos Litig.,
    
    2015 WL 5016493
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (noting that a party’s
    “relega[tion]” of an argument to a footnote in its brief suggested more of “an attempt to
    preserve it” than to advance it for serious consideration).
    134
    McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 
    263 A.2d 281
    , 283
    (Del. 1970); Ct. Ch. R. 12(b)(6).
    38