Meghan Kelly v. Donald J. Trump ( 2020 )

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
PATRICIA W. GRIFFIN CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
MASTER IN CHANCERY 34 The Circle
GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE 19947
Final Report: November 2, 2020
Via U.S. Mail
Meghan Kelly
34012 Shawnee Drive
Dagsboro, Delaware 19939
Re: Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
Dear Ms. Kelly:
Pending before me is your complaint claiming Donald J. Trump, President
of the United States, has violated your religious freedom. This complaint, while
undoubtedly sincere, must be dismissed as legally frivolous under 10 Del. C.
§8803(c). This is a final report.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff Meghan Kelly (“Kelly”) filed a complaint
against Defendant Donald Trump (“Trump”) in his individual capacity and in his
official capacity as President of the United States.1 On October 5, 2020, Kelly
1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1; D.I. 4; D.I. 5. On September 22, 2020, Kelly filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis, which was approved the same day. D.I. 3.
Kelly also filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order seeking to prohibit Trump
from supporting one perceived religion and from persecuting those with diverse religious
beliefs, a Motion to Expedite, and a memorandum of law in support of those motions.
D.I. 6; D.I. 7; D.I. 8.
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
November 2, 2020
filed her first amended complaint. 2 Under Court of Chancery Rule 15(a), a party
may amend their complaint once, as a matter of course, before a responsive
pleading is filed. 3 In her amended complaint, Kelly brought three counts alleging
that Trump has violated her religious freedom. 4 Count I alleges that Trump, in his
official capacity as President, has engaged in the unlawful establishment of
government religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment “applicable to Defendant via the [Fifth Amendment].” 5 Count II
alleges that Trump has substantially burdened Kelly’s free exercise of religion in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 and the First Amendment “applicable
to Defendant via the [Fifth] Amendment.”6 Count III alleges that Trump’s
Executive Order 13798 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
“applicable to Defendant via the [Fifth] Amendment.” 7 Kelly seeks (1) relief
permanently enjoining and restraining Trump from forcing religious views or
sponsoring religion and from persecuting those with diverse religious beliefs, while
2
D.I. 18; D.I. 19. The original complaint sued Trump in both his individual and
governmental capacities. The first amendment removes Trump as a defendant in his
individual capacity, and refers to the Defendant as the President of the United States in
case Trump is no longer in office. D.I. 16.
3
Ct. Ch. R. 15(a).
4
D.I. 19, ¶¶ 425-78.
5
Id., ¶¶ 425-434.
6
Id., ¶¶ 436-446.
7
Id., ¶¶ 448-478; Exec. Order. No. 13798, 82 C.F.R. § 21675 (2017).
2
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
November 2, 2020
he serves as President of the United States, (2) declaratory relief ordering federal
government agents, such as Trump, acting under the cloak of federal government
authority, to uphold, and not chill, constitutional freedoms, and (3) costs. 8 On
October 12, 2020, Kelly filed a second motion to amend the complaint.9
II. ANALYSIS
Kelly’s main theory of her case is that Trump creates the illusion of being a
devout Christian, while engaging in acts that Kelly contends are against the main
tenets of Christianity. 10 She claims that his actions substantially burden and injure
her “free exercise of religion” causing her “eternal harm” and “chilling [her] free
exercise of religion by [his] increased threat of government sponsored religious
persecution and, or the actual government sponsored persecution for [her] attempts
to freely exercise [her] religion.” 11 Kelly alleges that, through Trump’s deception,
he is misleading people, deceiving them to sin, and dooming them to hell. 12 The
primary harm Kelly claims is that, because Trump is leading people to hell, Kelly
will not be able to love them for eternity. 13 She also alleges that she is persecuted,
8
Id., Prayer for Relief.
9
D.I. 26; D.I. 27. Kelly filed a corrected second motion to amend on October 13, 2020.
D.I. 33; D.I. 34. In the second motion to amend the complaint, Kelly seeks to add the
United States as a necessary party. D.I. 34; D.I. 27.
10
D.I. 18; D.I. 19.
11
D.I. 18, ¶ 14.
12
See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 12, 17, 130-133; D.I. 19, ¶¶ 441, 475.
13
See, e.g., D.I. 18, ¶¶ 15-21; D.I. 19, ¶¶ 297, 438.
3
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
November 2, 2020
and her religious belief chilled, because of Trump’s support for one religious
belief, and suppression of others, which substantially burdens her freedom to
exercise her faith. 14
In cases in which an individual is proceeding in forma pauperis, if “the
Court determines the complaint is faulty because it is legally frivolous, malicious
or factually frivolous, then the Court dismisses it.”15 Even where the court does
not dismiss a complaint initially, if “the record subsequently reveals the action is
factually frivolous, malicious or the action is legally frivolous . . . the court may
upon its own motion or the motion of a party, enter judgment against plaintiff and
dismiss the complaint.” 16 A complaint is legally frivolous when it “fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.”17
14
See, e.g., D.I. 19, ¶¶ 364, 367, 368, 439, 440.
15
Cannon v. McCreanor, 2003 WL 943247, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 6, 2003); see also
Biggins v. Biden, 2010 WL 3496838, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 8, 2010), aff’d, 9 A.3d (Del.
2010).
16
10 Del. C. § 8803(c); see also Allen v. Coupe, 2016 WL 676041, at *2 (Del. Super.
Feb. 18, 2016) (“If the Court does not dismiss a petition initially, but later finds that it is
factually or legally frivolous or malicious, the Court also may dismiss the petition.”). A
legally frivolous claim is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Evans v.
Coupe, 2016 WL 1608489, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 20, 2016), aff’d, 147 A.3d 234 (Del.
2016) (citations omitted); Hall v. Hudson, 2005 WL 2249559, at *1 (Del. Super. June 16,
2005), aff’d, 889 A.2d 283 (Del. 2006). Factually frivolous claims are “allegations that
are baseless, of little or no weight, value or importance, not worthy of serious attention,
or trivial.” Hall, 2005 WL 2249559, at *1. See generally Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989) (“[a] complaint containing both factual allegations and legal conclusions
is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact . . . ‘frivolous,’ when
applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the
fanciful factual allegation”).
4
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
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In Cannon v. McCreanor, an inmate filed a complaint in forma pauperis
alleging that the defendant refused to allow him to enter the dining hall.18 The
Cannon Court held that the complaint was legally frivolous because the plaintiff
provided “no justification or facts supporting his damage claims.” 19 It found
Cannon alleged “no specific damages and his claim is clearly frivolous,” reasoning
that “if this type of claim does not fall under the definition of a ‘legally
frivolous’ claim, I do not see how any claim could meet the definition.”20
Prior to looking at the substance of a complaint, the Court must first
determine whether the plaintiff has “pled facts from which it may reasonably be
inferred that they have standing to bring their claims.” 21 The issue of standing
does not go to the “merits of the subject matter of the controversy,” but is
concerned “only with the question of who is entitled to mount a legal challenge.”22
“[T]o obtain relief a party must have a legally cognizable interest in a
controversy.” 23 If a plaintiff does not have standing, the court cannot grant relief
17
Cannon, 2003 WL 943247, at *2.
18
Id., at *2.
19
Id.20
Id.21
Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL 3094406, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016).
22
Spiro v. Vions Tech. Inc., 2014 WL 1245032, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 2014) (citing
Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991)); see also In re
Jones, 2006 WL 2035714, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2006) (citation omitted).
23
In re Jones, 2006 WL 2035714, at *4 (citations omitted).
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C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
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to that plaintiff and the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.24 “Standing is a threshold question, and, because standing is jurisdictional
in nature, the Court may raise it sua sponte.” 25
To establish standing, “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact –
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant . . . and (3) it
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.”26 The harm must be concrete and particularized, and
must have affected the plaintiff personally. 27
24
See generally Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1285
(Del. 2007).
25
In re Pantalone, 2011 WL 6357794, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (citing Thornton v.
Bernard Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 426179, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2009)); see also In re
Friends of Sandbar Vill. v. Sandcap, LLC, et al., 2019 WL 2024380, at *1, n. 1 (Del. Ch.
May 8, 2019).
26
Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del.
2003) (citations omitted); see also Thornton, 2009 WL 426179, at *4; In re Jones, 2006
WL 2035714, at *4.
27
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, n. 1 (1992) (“By particularized, we mean
that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”); see generally
Streifthau v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr., 2019 WL 1308267, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 21, 2019)
(“[Delaware] Supreme Court has recognized the standing requirements set forth in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife as generally the same for Delaware state courts”); Stuart
Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (“to achieve standing, the
plaintiff’s interest in the controversy must be distinguishable from the interest shared by
other members of a class or the public in general”).
6
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
November 2, 2020
I consider whether this complaint should be dismissed as legally frivolous
under 10 Del. C. § 8803(c). The question centers on whether Kelly has standing to
bring her claims; if she does not, she has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and the complaint is dismissed as legally frivolous. Kelly has
standing to bring her claims if she proves an injury, that the injury was caused by
the allegedly wrongful conduct and that it is likely to be remedied by a favorable
decision. Kelly fails to meet the first two elements of standing because she has not
shown an actual or concrete injury to her caused by Trump’s conduct. She claims
to be persecuted by private citizens for her criticism of Trump’s support of one
religious belief, and suppression of others, substantially burdening her freedom to
exercise religion.28 She also alleges she will suffer eternal harm because “she will
not be able to share a fuller type of love with the people [Trump] misleads to hell,”
who “will cease to exist.”29 She does not show Trump’s actions have caused harm
to her personally. Her contentions are too remote and vague to be actionable. She
28
D.I. 19, ¶¶ 439, 440. I have no basis to infer a causal connection between Trump’s
actions and the persecution, since the alleged persecution was inflicted by persons other
than Trump in response to Kelly’s actions criticizing Trump.
29
D.I. 18, ¶¶ 18, 19. Her claim that she will suffer eternal harm by her inability to have
relationships with people if Trump’s actions cause people (including
acquaintances/friends she mentions in her complaint) to go to hell is not a sufficiently
concrete injury. It is impossible for this Court to determine what happens to people after
they die and under what circumstances a person goes to hell. That determination is
appropriately left to a higher power.
7
Meghan Kelly v. Donald Trump, et al.
C.A. No. 2020-0809-PWG
November 2, 2020
has also failed to show it is likely the injury she alleges, including persecution and
eternal harm, will be redressed if her relief is granted.
It is clear that Kelly has strong religious beliefs and is sincere in her
convictions. However, this Court cannot grant the relief she desires. Kelly lacks
standing to bring this action because she has not alleged a personal, concrete and
particularized harm, or damages, resulting from Trump’s actions, and has not
shown that a decision in her favor is likely to remedy the harm. Accordingly, the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and is legally
frivolous.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the reasons set forth above, I recommend the Court dismiss the
complaint under 10 Del. C. § 8803(c) as legally frivolous.30 This is a final report
and exceptions may be taken under Court of Chancery Rule 144.
Respectfully,
/s/ Patricia W. Griffin
Patricia W. Griffin
Master in Chancery
30
With the amended complaint’s dismissal, Kelly’s second motion to amend the
complaint (which would not alter the decision to dismiss the complaint as legally
frivolous), and her other outstanding motions, become moot and do not need to be
addressed.
8