Tenet Healthcare Corporation v. Steward Health Care System LLC ( 2023 )


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  •                                  COURT OF CHANCERY
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    MORGAN T. ZURN                                                        LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
    VICE CHANCELLOR                                                          500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
    WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
    April 4, 2023
    Michael A. Barlow, Esquire                        Lewis H. Lazarus, Esquire
    Abrams & Bayliss LLP                              Morris James LLP
    20 Montchanin Road, Suite 200                     4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200
    Wilmington, DE 19807                              Wilmington, DE 19805
    RE: Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    Dear Counsel,
    Thank you, again, for your patience with this matter. As you know, the parties
    dispute whether an arbitration award secured under one provision of an asset
    purchase agreement is subject to offsets contemplated by another provision of that
    agreement. That dispute has manifested in the respondent’s motion to modify or
    stay that arbitration award (the “Motion”), which has been briefed, argued before
    Vice Chancellor Glasscock, and further framed by the parties’ January 4 letters and
    our conversation earlier this month after the Motion’s reassignment to me.1 For the
    reasons that follow, I believe the Motion should be denied and the award confirmed.
    The Motion’s grounds for modifying the award are rooted in the terms of the
    governing asset purchase agreement (the “APA”).2 The parties have joined issue
    over whether an arbitration award under Section 2.5(c) of the APA (the “Award”)
    should be confirmed and remitted as awarded, or whether the Award is properly
    subject to a potential set-off under Section 8.18. In another action, Steward Health
    Care System, LLC v. Tenet Business Services Corporation, C.A. No. 2022-0289-SG
    (the “Set-off Litigation”), the parties dispute the extent of any set-off under Section
    8.18. In this action, the petitioners seek confirmation of the Award but are willing
    to stand by on collecting it so long as the awarded amount is escrowed or secured
    pending resolution of the Set-off Litigation. They suggest that the propriety of any
    1
    Docket Item (“D.I.”) 36, D.I. 44, D.I. 47, D.I. 48 Ex. A, D.I. 60, D.I. 66, D.I. 69.
    2
    D.I. 1, Ex. B [hereinafter “APA”].
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 2 of 8
    set-off could then be determined in a consolidated action. The respondents ask the
    Court to decide the interplay between Section 2.5(c) and Section 8.18 as a matter of
    law, and then (assuming the Court finds the Award could be set off) order that the
    Award would not be collectable until the amount of any set-off is determined.
    The APA and its performance is governed by Delaware law,3 which provides
    that as in the APA, in the absence of an explicit reference to the Delaware Uniform
    Arbitration Act, arbitration-related disputes are to be decided in conformity with the
    Federal Arbitration Act.4 Reflecting Delaware’s policy favoring arbitration “to
    avoid expensive litigation and settle disputes without undue delay,”5 the standard for
    modifying an arbitration award is high6 and borne by the party contesting the award.7
    The court will modify an arbitration award where:
    1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
    in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the
    award;
    2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
    and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
    decision upon the issues submitted; or,
    3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits
    of the controversy.8
    “To determine what contractual parties intended, Delaware courts start with
    the text.”9 In doing so, the Court aims to “‘give priority to the parties’ intentions as
    3
    APA § 10.3.
    4
    10 Del. C. § 5702(c).
    5
    Baltimore Barn Builders v. Jacobs, 
    1990 WL 237094
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1990).
    6
    TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel Sec., Inc., 
    953 A.2d 726
    , 732 (Del. Ch.
    2008) (providing for modifications under the FAA).
    7
    Roberts v. Shelly’s of Delaware, Inc., 
    1982 WL 17827
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 1982).
    8
    Baltimore Barn Builders, 
    1990 WL 237094
    , at *1; TD Ameritrade, 
    953 A.2d at 731
    .
    9
    Sunline Com. Carriers, Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 
    206 A.3d 836
    , 846 (Del. 2019).
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 3 of 8
    reflected in the four corners of the agreement,’ construing the agreement as a whole
    and giving effect to all its provisions.”10 The Court will “give effect to the plain-
    meaning of the contract’s terms and provisions,” “will read a contract as a whole and
    . . . will give each provision and term effect, so as not to render any part of the
    contract mere surplusage.”11
    Article II of the APA addresses “Transactions at the Closing.” Within that
    topic, Section 2.5 addresses the means of calculating and paying the “Purchase
    Price,” defined as
    an amount equal to (a) $1,100,000,000, plus (b) the amount, if any, by
    which the Actual Net Working Capital exceeds the Target Net Working
    Capital, minus (c) the amount, if any, by which the Target Net Working
    Capital exceeds the Actual Net Working Capital, minus (d) the Actual
    Capital Lease Amount plus (e) the DPP Payment Amount.12
    Section 2.5(c) provides procedures for arriving at a “resulting Purchase Price” based
    on Actual Net Working Capital and Actual Capital Lease Amounts, including
    submitting disputes over those amounts to an arbitrator.13 Section 2.5(c) provides
    the arbitrator shall provide a “final, binding and conclusive resolution” of those
    particular disputes, and that “judgment may be entered upon the written
    determination of the Arbitrator in accordance with Section 10.4,” which waives a
    jury trial.14 The parties disputed net working capital and followed Section 2.5(c)’s
    procedures; the arbitrator resolved that dispute and issued an award in favor of the
    sellers in the amount of $20,325,075.00 (the “Award”); and petitioners filed in this
    Court to confirm that award and obtain a judgment.
    10
    Salamone v. Gorman, 
    106 A.3d 354
    , 368 (Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (quoting GMG Cap. Inv., LLC. v. Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 
    36 A.3d 776
    , 779 (Del.
    2012)).
    11
    Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 
    991 A.2d 1153
    , 1159–60 (Del. 2010); Kuhn Constr., Inc.
    v. Diamond State Port Corp., 
    990 A.2d 393
    , 396–97 (Del. 2010).
    12
    APA § 1.1.
    13
    APA § 2.5(c).
    14
    APA §§ 2.5(c), 10.4.
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 4 of 8
    Section 2.5(d) goes on:
    Subject to each Party’s rights set forth in Section 8.18, if the Purchase
    Price, as finally determined pursuant to Section 2.5, is (i) greater than
    the Estimated Purchase Price, Buyers will promptly pay to Sellers an
    amount equal to the difference between the Purchase Price and the
    Estimated Purchase Price in immediately available funds, or (ii) is less
    than the Estimated Purchase Price, Sellers will promptly pay to Buyers
    an amount equal to the difference between the Purchase Price and the
    Estimated Purchase Price in immediately available funds.15
    Section 2.5(d) orders prompt payment of any difference between the Purchase Price
    and the Estimated Purchase Price: it is this obligation that is “[s]ubject to each
    Party’s rights set forth in Section 8.18.”16
    And Section 8.18 provides:
    Set-Off Right. Buyers, on the one hand, and Sellers, on the other, shall
    be entitled to set-off or recoup against amounts due by such Party
    pursuant to this Agreement any amounts due or payable by Buyers or
    any other Buyer Indemnified Party, in the case of the Sellers, or by
    Sellers or any other Seller Indemnified Party (including for the
    avoidance of doubt, Conifer Revenue Cycle Solutions, LLC), in the
    case of Buyers, pursuant to this Agreement, including any amounts due
    by Buyers under the Transition Services Agreement, Revenue Cycle
    Master Services Agreement, Medicare Transition Services Agreement,
    and any amounts due by either Party pursuant to the purchase price
    adjustment due pursuant to Section 2.5(d), any amounts due pursuant
    to Section 8.16 and any indemnification payment due pursuant to
    Sections 9.1 or 9.2, but excluding any amounts due to Buyers pursuant
    to the Revenue Cycle Master Services Agreement. The exercise of such
    15
    APA § 2.5(d).
    16
    APA § 2.5(d).
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 5 of 8
    set-off right by a Party, whether or not ultimately determined to be
    justified, shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement.17
    I believe the plain terms of the APA are readily interpreted, which supports
    undertaking that task up front. Section 2.5(c)’s provisions for obtaining and
    judicially confirming an Award stand on their own. Under the plain meaning of
    Section 2.5(c), the Award is final, binding, conclusive, and susceptible to being
    reduced to a judgment. In the meantime, and in the background, other sources of
    set-offs arise under Section 8.18: by way of relevant example, amounts come due
    under Section 8.16 on a monthly basis. But by its plain terms, Section 2.5(c) is not
    subject to Section 8.18. The plain terms of Sections 2.5(d) and 8.18 subject only
    Section 2.5(d) to Section 8.18.
    Certainly, an award under Section 2.5(c) informs a final determination of the
    Purchase Price under Section 2.5, to be paid under Section 2.5(d) subject to Section
    8.18. But that practical truth does not bear on the procedural mechanisms of Section
    2.5(c) set forth in plain text. Nothing in the APA subjects any award under Section
    2.5(c) to Section 8.18.
    Further, Section 8.18 requires a set-off to be “due or payable”; Post Holdings,
    Inc. v. NPE Seller Rep LLC explains such language requires the set-offs to be
    liquidated.18 To borrow from Post Holdings:
    At common law, a contingent or unmatured obligation which is not
    presently enforceable cannot be the subject of set-off or, put differently,
    there is no right to set-off of a possible unliquidated liability against a
    liquidated claim that is due and payable. Delaware law, of course,
    encourages parties to contract freely to create those contractual rights
    they see fit. Thus, the parties certainly could have created a contractual
    17
    APA § 8.18.
    18
    
    2018 WL 5429833
     (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2018); see also CanCan Development, LLC v.
    Manno, 
    2011 WL 4379064
     (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2011) (concluding a litigant “has no right
    to set-off [the adversary’s] unliquidated potential liability . . . against [its] liquidated, due,
    and payable claim”). The cases cited in the Motion favoring a setoff addressed liquidated
    amounts. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 
    2012 WL 1831720
     (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2012);
    Pochat v. Lynch, 
    2013 WL 4496548
     (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2013).
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 6 of 8
    right to permit [respondent] to net against a[n arbitration award] to be
    remitted . . . the amount of a[] claim [pursuant to Section 8.16]. In one
    case, for example, this court found that the parties had done so where
    the contract stated that a party may “set off all or any portion of the
    claimed amount of any . . . Direct Claim.” Here, however, the parties
    did not do so. Instead, the plain language of Section [8.18] expressly
    limits what [respondent] can net against [the Purchase Price] to the
    amount of an indemnification payment that is “[due],” which implies
    that the “indemnification payment” in question is for a presently
    payable amount and not some uncertain amount that is contingent in
    nature.19
    Until the Set-off Litigation is resolved, the disputed set-offs are not “due,” or “due
    or payable,” under Section 8.18. Therefore, even if Section 8.18 offered a set-off
    against a Section 2.5(c) arbitration award specifically, which I do not believe it does,
    the common law and language of Section 8.18 makes that set-off available only once
    the claims in the Set-Off Litigation are liquidated. The parties agreed in Section
    2.5(c) that in the meantime, the parties agreed the Award could advance to judgment.
    Under my interpretation of the APA, the Motion offers no grounds to modify
    the Award.20 The Award must be confirmed.
    The next question is when the Award must be paid: the Motion also seeks a
    stay of this action. Certainly, the Set-Off Litigation will inform the net direction in
    which funds will ultimately flow between the parties. “This Court possesses the
    inherent power to manage its own docket, including the power to stay litigation on
    the basis of comity, efficiency, or simple common sense.”21 Both common sense
    19
    
    2018 WL 5429833
    , at *6 (quoting Brace Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Peterson Enters.,
    Inc., 
    2017 WL 2628440
    , at *4 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2017)) (other internal quotations and
    citations omitted). The respondent here misparses Brace: the operative language permitted
    setting off a “claimed amount of any . . . Direct Claim against any amount otherwise
    payable.” Brace, 
    2017 WL 2628440
    , at *3, *4. The setoff of an unliquidated amount was
    accomplished by the language permitting the setoff of a “claimed amount of any Direct
    Claim” – not the “payable” language the respondent relies on.
    20
    See Baltimore Barn Builders, 
    1990 WL 237094
    , at *1; TD Ameritrade, 
    953 A.2d at 731
    .
    21
    Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 
    985 A.2d 392
    , 397 (Del. Ch. 2009).
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 7 of 8
    and efficiency concerns support staying this action and reducing the parties’ disputes
    to a single judgment.
    But Section 2.5(c) of the APA specifically provides that judgment may be
    entered on the Award, thereby making it collectible separate and apart from Section
    2.5(d)’s “prompt payment” of any difference between the Purchase Price and the
    Estimated Purchase price as “finally determined pursuant to Section 2.5” “[s]ubject
    to each Party’s rights set forth in Section 8.18.”22 “The FAA not only authorizes,
    but mandates, that . . . courts confirm arbitration awards by converting them into
    enforceable judgments through a summary proceeding.”23 A strict reading of the
    APA, and the FAA, supports entry of judgment that would permit prompt collection.
    The parties took on any inefficiencies inherent in this process, by which an
    arbitration award is not subject to set-offs and is amenable to being reduced to
    judgment before any set-offs are due and payable, when they agreed to that process.
    It is not for this Court to interfere in or alter that agreement.
    Count II of this action, seeking attorneys’ fees, remains pending before Vice
    Chancellor Glasscock.24 I believe my involvement in this matter is at an end, but if
    I can be of further assistance, please contact my chambers.
    Sincerely,
    /s/ Morgan T. Zurn
    Vice Chancellor
    22
    APA § 2.5(d).
    23
    Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Serv., 
    966 F.3d 245
    , 248 (3d Cir. 2020).
    24
    When the parties and I spoke last month, I indicated that I thought consolidation would
    be appropriate. Upon further reflection as explained in this letter, I have concluded that a
    final judgment in this matter is the correct course as charted by the APA.
    Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al. v. Steward Health Care System LLC, et al.,
    Civil Action No. 2022-0774-MTZ
    April 4, 2023
    Page 8 of 8
    MTZ/ms
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