Stone & Paper Investors, LLC v. Richard Blanch ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STONE & PAPER INVESTORS, LLC, )
individually and derivatively on behalf of )
CLOVIS HOLDINGS LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2018-0394-PAF
)
RICHARD BLANCH, VIVIANNA BLANCH, )
RED BRIDGE & STONE, LLC, BRIAN )
SKINNER and SKINNER CAPITAL, LLC, )
)
Defendants, )
)
v. )
)
CLOVIS HOLDINGS LLC, )
)
Nominal Defendant. )
_______________________________________ )
RICHARD BLANCH, RED BRIDGE & )
STONE, LLC, and CLOVIS HOLDINGS, )
LLC, )
)
Counterclaim and Third-Party Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
STONE & PAPER INVESTORS, LLC, )
EISENBERG & BLAU, CPAS, P.C., DDK & )
COMPANY, LLP, and RICHARD )
EISENBERG, )
)
Counterclaim and Third-Party Defendants. )
_______________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: April 6, 2021
Date Decided: July 30, 2021
Richard I. G. Jones, Jr., David B. Anthony, BERGER HARRIS LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; David Lackowitz, Zaid Shukri, MOSES & SINGER LLP, New York,
New York; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Stone & Paper
Investors, LLC.
Catherine Damavandi, NURICK LAW GROUP, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware;
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaim and Third-Party Plaintiffs Richard
Blanch, Vivianna Blanch, and Red Bridge & Stone, LLC.
John A. Elzufon, ELZUFON AUSTIN & MONDELL, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware;
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants Eisenberg & Blau CPAS, P.C., Richard
Eisenberg, and DDK & Company, LLP.
Richard Skinner, pro se.
FIORAVANTI, Vice Chancellor
This case presents a dispute among the members and managers of Clovis
Holdings, LLC (“Clovis” or the “Company”), which was created in 2014 to acquire
a business that sold stone-based paper products. The Company’s non-managing
preferred member, Stone & Paper Investors, LLC (“Stone & Paper”), alleges that
the Company’s two managers, Richard Blanch and Brian Skinner, fraudulently
induced Stone & Paper to invest $3.5 million in the Company and then spent the
Company’s capital on themselves while doing nothing to advance the Company.
Stone & Paper alleges that Blanch and Skinner’s conduct breached their fiduciary
duties and the Company’s limited liability company agreement. 1 Stone & Paper
claims that affiliates of Blanch and Skinner aided and abetted the managers’
breaches of fiduciary duty and were unjustly enriched through receipt of
unauthorized payments. The Company, at the direction of Blanch and Skinner, has
asserted counterclaims alleging that Stone & Paper breached the LLC Agreement
and was unjustly enriched when it received over $100,000 in Company funds and
caused Clovis to pay unauthorized expenses charged to a credit card held in the name
of one of Stone & Paper’s principals.
The LLC Agreement required Blanch and Skinner to devote the Company’s
resources to acquiring the stone paper business of Tier1 International, Inc. d/b/a
1
See JX 36 (Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement of Clovis Holdings, LLC,
dated as of January 1, 2014) (the “LLC Agreement”).
ViaStone (“ViaStone”). ViaStone has a distribution agreement with stone paper
manufacturer Taiwan Lung Meng (“TLM”) to distribute its product in the United
States. The LLC Agreement required Stone & Paper’s approval if the Company
engaged in any business other than the ViaStone business. The LLC Agreement also
contained restrictions and disclosure requirements on interested transactions, as the
term is defined in the LLC Agreement. The evidence shows that Blanch and Skinner
initially devoted their time, effort, and the Company’s resources to acquiring
ViaStone, but later changed course. By no later than late November 2015,
unbeknownst to Stone & Paper, Blanch and Skinner abandoned the effort to acquire
ViaStone and sought alternative pathways to enter the stone paper business. All the
while, Blanch and Skinner were paying themselves $20,000 per month from Clovis’s
funds, which were deposited into accounts of their affiliates, Red Bridge & Stone,
LLC (“Red Bridge”) and Skinner Capital, LLC (“Skinner Capital”). Stone &
Paper’s principal, John Diamond, initially agreed to the payments to Skinner, but not
to Blanch.
After abandoning efforts to acquire ViaStone, Skinner and Blanch embarked
on draining nearly all of ViaStone’s remaining funds and sought to conceal their
activity by trying to recharacterize the payments to them as loans. By May 2018,
when this action was filed, Skinner and Blanch had transferred approximately $2.5
2
million from Clovis to themselves or their affiliates, ultimately leaving Clovis with
just $6,500 remaining in its bank account.
In this post-trial opinion, I find that Skinner and Blanch did not fraudulently
induce Stone & Paper to invest in Clovis. The managers did, however, breach the
LLC Agreement, violate their fiduciary duties to Clovis, and fraudulently conceal
their conduct from Stone & Paper. I also find that Skinner’s affiliate, Defendant
Skinner Capital, and Blanch’s affiliates, Defendants Vivianna Blanch and Red
Bridge, are liable for civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting the managers’
breaches of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment.
I find that Clovis’s claim alleging that Stone & Paper received $100,000 in
unauthorized payments is time-barred, but that Clovis prevails with respect to
$21,000 paid for a newsletter subscription. I also find that Skinner, not Stone &
Paper, caused Clovis to pay credit card expenses that were not reasonable Clovis
expenses. Skinner is therefore liable to Clovis for the credit card payments.
3
I. BACKGROUND
The following recitation reflects the facts as the court finds them after trial.2
The facts discussed herein have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
There were 689 trial exhibits submitted into evidence. Six witnesses testified at the
four-day trial,3 with testimony from two more witnesses presented through video
clips of their depositions. Some witnesses were more credible than others. Among
the key players, Blanch was the least credible witness. I have therefore afforded his
testimony minimal weight. Skinner’s testimony was reliable at times, but overall he
was willing to testify falsely when necessary to support his own self-interests.
Vivianna Blanch was more reliable than Blanch or Skinner. I found her to be
credible on many issues but evasive on others, particularly those implicating her
husband’s wrongdoing. John Diamond, a principal of Stone & Paper, was a
generally reliable witness, but at times his recollection was vague. Because the
parties’ testimony is often in direct conflict, I have generally afforded
contemporaneous documents and disinterested witness testimony the greatest weight
in making my factual findings.
2
The trial testimony is cited as “Tr.”; deposition testimony is cited as “Dep.”; trial exhibits
are cited as “JX” or “PX”; and stipulated facts in the pre-trial order are cited as “PTO,”
with each followed by the relevant page, paragraph, or exhibit number.
3
Trial was held remotely via Zoom technology.
4
A. The Members and Managers of Clovis Holdings, LLC
Clovis is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal place of
business in New York. 4 Defendants Richard Blanch and Brian Skinner are the
Company’s sole managers. 5 Skinner was in charge of Clovis’s finances.6
Clovis has two common members and one preferred member.7 The common
members are Defendant Red Bridge and Defendant Skinner Capital, with each
owning 37,500 common units of Clovis. 8 Red Bridge and Skinner Capital
collectively control 75% of Clovis’s total voting units.9 Red Bridge is a Delaware
limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York.10
Defendant Vivianna Blanch, who is married to Blanch,11 was the sole member at
Red Bridge’s formation.12 Defendants Red Bridge, Richard Blanch, and Vivianna
Blanch are collectively referred to herein as the “Blanch Defendants.” Skinner
4
PTO ¶ 2.
5
Id. ¶¶ 3 & 6.
6
Tr. 404:20–23 (Skinner).
7
LLC Agreement at A-1.
8
Id.; PTO ¶¶ 4 & 5.
9
PTO ¶ 5.
10
Id.
11
Id. ¶ 7. To avoid confusion, Richard Blanch will be referred to as “Blanch” and Vivianna
Blanch will be referred to as “Vivianna Blanch.” No disrespect is intended.
12
Tr. 929:23–930:9 (V. Blanch).
5
Capital is a Delaware limited liability company.13 Brian Skinner is the principal of
Skinner Capital. 14 Brian Skinner represented himself pro se at trial in this action.
Plaintiff Stone & Paper is a Delaware limited liability company and Clovis’s
sole preferred member. 15 Stone & Paper holds 25,000 preferred units of Clovis and
25% of the Company’s voting power. John Diamond and Albert Carter formed
Stone & Paper to invest in Clovis. 16
B. The Parties’ Relations Before Clovis
Diamond and Carter were long-term business partners who founded Diamond
Carter Trading, LLC (“Diamond Carter Trading”).17 Diamond Carter Trading
engaged in the business of market making in options and exchange traded funds. 18
Skinner joined Diamond Carter Trading in 2001 after graduating from
college.19 Skinner distinguished himself in his work, impressed Diamond and
Carter, and rose to become a junior partner and Chief Operating Officer of Diamond
Carter Trading. 20 Diamond, Carter, and Skinner became as close as family, with
13
PTO ¶ 4.
14
Id. ¶ 3.
15
Id. ¶ 1.
16
Tr. 17:19–22 (Diamond).
17
Tr. 7:24–8:9 (Diamond).
18
Tr. 9:21–10:2 (Diamond).
19
Tr. 8:13–23 (Diamond).
20
Tr. 9:11–19 (Diamond).
6
Carter describing Skinner as a “brother” and Diamond describing Skinner as a
“son.”21 Diamond testified repeatedly that he previously harbored a great deal of
trust in Skinner. 22
Blanch and Skinner met in 2003.23 Blanch is a self-described “entrepreneur”24
who previously founded a marketing consultancy named Masters of Branding.
Blanch was also the CEO of a company known as Metier Tribeca LLC d/b/a Le
Metier de Beaute (“Metier”), described as a “a beauty company that sold in retail.”25
Diamond and Carter met Blanch around 2007, and Skinner reintroduced Blanch to
them in or around 2011 or 2012.26 Diamond testified that he did not know Blanch
well prior to getting involved in business together.27
On July 3, 2013, investors in Metier filed litigation against Blanch and Metier
in the Southern District of New York (the “Metier Action”).28 The plaintiffs in the
21
Tr. 8:13–23 (Diamond) & 9:8–17 (Diamond) (“[Carter] used to say that [Skinner] was
like a brother to him. I used to say that he was like a son to me.”).
22
See Tr. 23:1–5 (Diamond) (“Brian Skinner and I had worked closely together for more
than a decade. He was my right-hand man in business. I worked more closely with him
than I did with [Carter]. I trusted him.”); Tr. 118:3–12 (Diamond) (testifying that he trusted
Skinner); Tr. 126:7–12 (Diamond) (same); Tr. 257:24–259:10 (Diamond) (same).
23
Blanch Dep. 50:12–19.
24
Blanch Defs.’ Pre-Tr. Br. 7.
25
Tr. 512:23–513:18 (R. Blanch); see also Tr. 154:11–157:1 (Diamond) (explaining the
history of Metier).
26
Tr. 9:1–7 (Diamond); Tr. 945:13–19 (Carter).
27
Tr. 9:10–13 (Diamond).
28
JX 7.
7
Metier Action alleged that they had invested approximately $5 million in Metier
based on representations and contractual guarantees that the investments would
generally fund the working capital requirements of the company. They alleged that
Blanch “wired hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Company’s accounts to his
personal bank account, and to the bank accounts of other insiders, only hours after
receiving Plaintiffs’ investment monies.”29 According to the complaint in the Metier
Action, Blanch “then altered the books and records of the Company to post
backdated amounts due,” and later characterized it as an accounting error. 30
C. Blanch and Skinner Encourage Diamond and Carter to Invest in
the Stone Paper Business.
On May 16, 2013, Blanch sent Skinner an email with advice on how to further
maximize his profits from his relationship with Diamond Carter Trading, Diamond,
and Carter. 31 Blanch created a list of priorities “for how [Skinner] need[ed] to focus
[his] negotiations” with Diamond and Carter in order to achieve “$330,000 in annual
salary with $7MM of their capital at risk.” 32 To do so, Blanch laid out a multi-step
plan, which included Skinner asking Carter and Diamond to give Skinner $5 million
29
Id. ¶ 2.
30
Id.
31
JX 4 (“Based on the conversations that we are having, I have come up with the following
list of priorities for how you need to focus your negotiations with [Carter] and
[Diamond].”).
32
JX 4.
8
to “fund future deals.”33 Blanch reiterated that acting on his plan in full would enable
Skinner to “put $7MM into play in the next 6 months, make yourself $330,000
annually, and give yourself piece [sic] of mind for at least three years.”34
Skinner then presented to Diamond a potential investment in ViaStone.
ViaStone was an entity jointly owned and managed by Jeff and Christine Chow.35
ViaStone held a distribution agreement with TLM, a stone paper manufacturer in
China.36 In an email dated May 20, 2013, Skinner exhorted Diamond to focus on
the ViaStone opportunity: “ViaStone . . . is something we really need to look at”
even though “this is not our normal thing.” 37 Skinner worked on the prospect of
having Carter and Diamond invest in the ViaStone entity during ViaStone’s Series
A financing round through Henry Kang, an investment banker at the Ajia Group
(“Ajia”). On Blanch’s side, Blanch introduced Kang to Drew Aaron, a close friend
of Blanch. 38 Aaron’s family business, The Aaron Group, is one of the world’s
largest paper brokers. 39
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
PTO ¶ 8. Because Jeff Chow was more involved in the events underlying this dispute
than his wife, Christine Chow, references to “Chow” herein refer to Jeff Chow.
36
Id.
37
JX 5; Tr. 222:19–223:14 (Diamond).
38
Tr. 517:17–519:1 (R. Blanch).
39
Tr. 289:8–16 (Skinner).
9
In or around July 2013, ViaStone and Ajia circulated a draft stock purchase
agreement.40 Although the stock purchase agreement was purportedly never
executed, Ajia made a deposit payment to ViaStone of at least $250,000.41 On
September 9, 2013, Kang sent Skinner a draft of an email to Diamond and Carter
regarding the status of their prospective investment in ViaStone, which Skinner
approved. 42 Kang sent the email to Diamond and Carter, and on September 11, 2013,
Carter responded, stating that “our Diamond Carter group continues to maintain its
desire to be included in this ViaStone investment round.”43 Carter requested that
Ajia “continue to work closely with Mr. Brian Skinner so that we may be included
in the ViaStone venture.” 44
Later the same day, Skinner and Kang exchanged a series of contentious
emails. Skinner accused Kang of withholding information from him and making
false representations regarding the status of another key investor’s investment.45
Skinner aggressively demanded information regarding the purchase price of
ViaStone and how much money Kang had personally invested in the Series A
40
PTO ¶ 8; see also JX 19.
41
PTO ¶ 8; JX 19, JX 20, JX 21.
42
JX 588.
43
JX 14.
44
Id.
45
JX 15 at S0018203–5.
10
financing.46 Kang took offense, and in response informed Skinner that the parties
had “lost trust in each other” and that it was “time for us to move on.”47
On September 14, 2013, Blanch emailed Skinner regarding “how to play this
thing out.”48 Blanch schemed to cut Ajia and Henry Kang out of the deal by
purchasing ViaStone through a new limited liability company, using funding from
Diamond, Carter, and Aaron.49 Blanch and Skinner persuaded ViaStone’s founder,
Chow, to end his negotiations with Ajia. 50 On September 20, 2013, Chow did just
that, by having ViaStone’s counsel notify Ajia’s counsel that ViaStone was ending
further negotiations with Ajia.51 The next month, Blanch, Skinner, and Diamond
attended a dinner with Chow and Aaron at The Aaron Group’s corporate
headquarters.52 Diamond testified that this dinner lent significant credibility to
46
Id.
47
Id. at S0018203.
48
JX 17.
49
Id.
50
Tr. 1052:17–1053:12 (Chow).
51
JX 19 & 20. ViaStone and Ajia disputed the import of the July stock purchase agreement.
PTO ¶ 8. ViaStone represented that it would return the $250,000 deposit and a $200,000
loan, and it took the position that ViaStone and Ajia had never validly entered into any
agreement for the purchase of ViaStone. JX 19. Kang disagreed, and considered litigation
against ViaStone. See JX 55. Blanch never notified Diamond of this dispute. Tr. 26:11–
27:1 (Diamond).
52
Tr. 19:13–20:6 (Diamond).
11
Blanch both in the stone paper industry and in others areas, such as the cosmetics
industry. 53 Shortly thereafter, Diamond committed to invest in acquiring ViaStone.
On November 2, 2013, just as Blanch’s and Skinner’s negotiations with
ViaStone were ramping up, Chow suddenly ceased conversations with Blanch and
Skinner until they agreed to execute a confidentiality agreement. 54 In an email to
Skinner, Blanch recommended that they not sign the confidentiality agreement.
Blanch indicated that he planned to ignore the request and to proceed with attempting
to finish the transaction. Blanch also indicated that, eventually, he and Skinner could
potentially seek to “go straight to China and buy direct”:
Seems that this is [ViaStone’s lawyer] trying to get some control in the
negotiations. This is common stuff. I would let it glide at this point.
Next steps are to get the transaction done for Diamond and Drew into
the new LLC and for us to get the paperwork done between that LLC
to the Ajia/Stone Paper LLC. Then for the Stone Paper/Ajia LLC to
get paperwork with Tier 1.
[The ViaStone managers] are not very bright. They are amateurs and
do not seem to understand that if for any reason we pull the plug, they
are back to dealing with Ajia and a lawsuit.
Aaron Paper will NOT work with them if we walk away. And we do
NOT sign anything here . . . as we might need to go straight to China
and buy direct. Signing this kind of crap could give them ammunition
to challenge us in that situation. 55
53
Id.
54
JX 29.
55
Id. (ellipsis in original).
12
Skinner agreed, and stated, “[a]s for China we spoke about going direct a while ago
but easier said than done but I’m sure we can pull it off if what we have been told is
true.” 56
Negotiations with ViaStone resumed. On December 22, 2013, Blanch
notified ViaStone’s managers, Michael Cheng and Jeff Chow, that “Brian and I were
able to get the deal done with Drew [Aaron] and Jo[h]n Diamond.” 57 According to
Blanch, he “hope[d] to have paperwork” submitted to ViaStone’s managers “before
January 1st.”58 By this time, ViaStone’s managers trusted Blanch enough to have
provided him with a “viastone.net” email address.59
D. The Parties Form Clovis to Purchase ViaStone.
In early 2014, Diamond, Carter, Skinner, and Blanch began preparing for the
formation of Clovis to purchase ViaStone. In January 2014, Blanch and Aaron
discussed Aaron’s future involvement, including by investing in ViaStone and
distributing its stone paper product through Aaron’s entity, The Aaron Group.60
During the same period, Blanch began holding himself out as the successful owner
56
Id.
57
JX 33.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
JX 592. This is an email from Aaron to Blanch, copied within an email from Skinner to
Christopher Ezold, an attorney involved in the formation of Stone & Paper. JX 590. It is
not clear from the record how the email was transmitted from Blanch to Skinner.
13
of an “environmentally friendly paper company.”61 In an email dated January 17,
2014, Blanch wrote to a friend with an update regarding his life:
I started a private equity fund with an old friend of mine and we have
bought a[n] environmentally friendly paper company. We hold patents
that allow us to make paper from limestone (calcium carbonate), with
NO pulp or water required in its production, and the paper is
competitive with any pulp based product on the market (the Chinese
government just built us a $250MM plant in China that produces
360MM tons annually). 62
Blanch’s autobiographical update was pure fiction. When Blanch sent this email, he
was not: (1) the cofounder of a private equity fund, (2) the purchaser of an
environmentally friendly paper company, (3) the holder of patents relating to stone
paper, or (4) the recipient of a $250MM paper plant in China that the Chinese
government had built for his non-existent private equity fund. At trial, Blanch
characterized his email’s statement regarding his ownership of an “environmentally
friendly paper company” as “shorthand,” called the statement that the “Chinese
government . . . built us a $250MM plant in China” an “embellishment,” and
confessed to being “embarrassed” about it. 63 In the same January 17, 2014 email,
Blanch further represented to his friend that Metier had become a “powerful brand
61
JX 40.
62
Id.
63
Tr. 714:24–19:7 (R. Blanch).
14
with industry credibility.” 64 Less than one month later, Metier filed for
bankruptcy.65
In February 2014, Diamond sent Skinner an email indicating that he wanted
to include contractual limitations on the use of funds invested in Clovis. He sought
“[c]lear language” in any limited liability company agreement “limiting the use of
the capital provided by [Stone & Paper] solely to investment in the ‘Viastone
Business,’” defined as “the acquiring of the equity or assets of Tier1 International.”66
Skinner responded and said, “Fine with me.” 67 Skinner forwarded Diamond’s email
to Blanch and their attorney, Robert Okulski. Blanch indicated to Skinner and
Okulski that the contractual limitation was acceptable to him.68 Okulski cautioned
that Diamond’s proposed language might be “too restrictive,” because “a large
portion of the capital is also going to be used to fund the operations of the Viastone
business post-closing” and that “the funds are also to be used to cover the formation
and ongoing operating costs of Clovis.”69 In response, Blanch noted that “they want
to ensure the money is used for what we have stated – notably to purchase and run
64
JX 40 (writing regarding Metier and stating that “Many call us the Rolls Royce or
Hermes of the Beauty Industry – its nice to hear.”).
65
Tr. 155:21–156:9 (Diamond).
66
JX 47.
67
Id.
68
JX 48 at SA026515.
69
Id. at SA026514.
15
Tier1/ViaStone,” and proposed “a small carve out regarding Clovis expenses,” but
otherwise providing that “money is for purchase and ongoing working capital for
[ViaStone].”70
Blanch told Diamond that it was necessary to finalize the Clovis LLC
Agreement by early March 2014 so that Clovis could purchase ViaStone before
Aaron Paper issued ViaStone a “20,000 ton commitment” as its “opening order.”71
There is no evidence that Aaron or any entity affiliated with Aaron ever purchased
paper from ViaStone. 72
On or about April 4, 2014, the parties executed Clovis’s LLC Agreement.73
The LLC Agreement restricts the ability of Clovis to take any action defined as a
“Major Decision” without approval in writing by Clovis’s board of managers and
“the Preferred Members.” 74 Clovis’s board of managers consisted of the two
Managers, Blanch and Skinner, and Clovis’s only Preferred Member was Stone &
70
Id.; PTO ¶ 10.
71
JX 44.
72
See Tr. 721:4–22 (R. Blanch) (acknowledging that Aaron Paper did not submit any
purchase order to purchase paper from Clovis).
73
PTO ¶ 11. Blanch and Skinner signed the LLC Agreement as Managers of Clovis,
Vivianna Blanch signed on behalf of Red Bridge, Skinner signed on behalf of Skinner
Capital, and Diamond signed on behalf of Stone & Paper. LLC Agreement, Signature
Page. The parties stipulated that, even though the LLC Agreement is dated “as of January
1, 2014,” it was, in fact, executed on or about April 4, 2014. PTO ¶ 11.
74
LLC Agreement § 5.1.
16
Paper.75 Thus, any “Major Decision” required Stone & Paper’s written consent.
Section 5.1(c) of the LLC Agreement provides that the “Major Decisions” include
“[e]ngaging in any business other than the Viastone Business, including, but not
limited to, the funding and purchase and operations thereof through a subsidiary.”76
“Viastone Business” is defined in the LLC Agreement as “the paper business
currently conducted by Tier1 International, Inc., a California corporation that the
Company is seeking to acquire through a subsidiary either pursuant to a stock or
asset purchase.”77
The LLC Agreement contains limitations on transactions between the
Company and its members and managers. Section 5.2 provides that the Company
may not:
enter into an Interested Transaction . . . unless it has first fully disclosed
the terms and conditions of such Interested Transaction to the Board
and the Members and the Board determines that the Interested
Transaction is fair and reasonable to the Company and the terms and
conditions are at least as favorable to the Company as those that are
generally available from persons capable of similarly performing them
and in similar transactions between parties operating at arm’s length. 78
The LLC Agreement defines “Interested Transaction” as “any transaction between
a Member, a Manager or a member of the Board, or any Affiliate thereof, on the one
75
PTO ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.
76
LLC Agreement § 5.1(c).
77
Id. § 1.1(kk).
78
Id. § 5.2.
17
hand, and the Company, on the other hand.” 79 The LLC Agreement then provides
that, “in the event that the Company acquires the Viastone business through a stock
or asset purchase, the current Managers, directly or through their Member entities,
will be actively involved in the management thereof and will receive a fee or like
compensation therefor.” 80
E. Skinner and Stone & Paper Take a “Salary” from Clovis.
Stone & Paper initially capitalized Clovis with $3.5 million on April 8, 2014.81
Clovis maintained a single bank account at Citibank, with Blanch, Skinner, and
Diamond as the sole signers on the account. 82 Later that month, Skinner began
wiring regular payments from Clovis to Stone & Paper, Skinner Capital, and Red
Bridge.83
Skinner requested permission from Diamond to draw a salary of $20,000 per
month for work relating to Clovis. Though Diamond did not recall specifically when
he gave permission for Skinner to draw a salary from Clovis, Diamond testified that,
“a few months after we had funded Clovis,” he approved Skinner’s requested salary
Id. § 5.2. “Member” is defined to mean “each of the Preferred Members and Common
79
Members listed on Schedule A hereto,” in addition to any future members. Id. § 1.1(w).
80
Id. § 5.2.
81
PTO ¶ 12.
82
Id.
83
Id.; JX 503.
18
in the “spring, summer, or fall” of 2014, and he never withdrew his approval for
Skinner’s salary. 84 Skinner began wiring $20,000 per month from Clovis to Skinner
Capital beginning on April 18, 2014.85 Diamond testified that his “understanding”
was that Skinner would not draw a salary for very long because he believed that the
“purchase of ViaStone was imminent.”86 Nevertheless, in July 2015, although
Clovis still had not acquired ViaStone, Skinner notified Diamond that Skinner was
being paid $20,000 per month by Clovis, and Diamond did not object. 87
At around the same time that Skinner requested a salary, he and Diamond
agreed that Clovis would make regular payments to Stone & Paper. Diamond
testified that Skinner approached him to propose paying Plaintiff $10,000 per month
in exchange for Diamond’s providing computer programming services. 88 Diamond
testified that he would have performed the computer programming services for free,
but that Skinner insisted on paying the $10,000 salary to him. 89 Diamond was never
84
Tr. 45:18–46:14 (Diamond); Tr. 121:16–122:10 (Diamond).
85
PTO ¶ 12.
86
Tr. 46:6–14 (Diamond).
87
JX 597; JX 604. These documents are ambiguous, but Diamond testified that he was
asking Skinner regarding his projected income from Clovis and that he did not object to
Skinner’s withdrawal of $20,000 per month because Skinner told him that he was working
on Clovis matters. Tr. 61:6–62:10 (Diamond).
88
Tr. 48:6–49:11 (Diamond).
89
Tr. 48:6–49:11 (Diamond).
19
asked to perform—and never performed—any computer programming for Clovis.90
Skinner testified that Diamond requested to take money out of Clovis, and Skinner
agreed to $10,000 per month.91 Between April and December 2014, Skinner wired
ten equal payments of $10,000 to Stone & Paper, until Skinner informed Diamond
that Aaron wanted the payments to stop.92
Blanch and Skinner agreed to make $20,000 monthly payments from Clovis
to Blanch as well. But before Skinner could wire the funds, Blanch needed to create
an account and a cover story. On April 16, 2014, Blanch sent Vivianna Blanch an
email directing her to open a bank account based on the following details:
Red Bridge & Stone LLC is a consulting business: Marketing
Consulting. You have one client which will be Stone Paper Holdings
LLC, a manufacturer of Paper in Asia and a DE based LLC. You will
be assisting in the building of a new brand for the business. You will
receive $20,000/month in consulting fees per a contract with Stone
Paper Holdings LLC. You need a business bank account for Red
Bridge & Stone that allows for bank wires. You will also need a
checkbook and a debit card for the account under your name.93
Blanch’s instructions to his wife were founded on pure fabrication. There was no
contract between Red Bridge or Vivianna and “Stone Paper Holdings LLC” pursuant
90
Tr. 96:7–21 (Diamond).
91
Tr. 323:22–324:11 (Skinner).
92
Tr. 48:6–49:11 (Diamond).
93
JX 76 (formatted).
20
to which Red Bridge would receive $20,000 per month in consulting fees. 94 And
Vivianna Blanch admitted that she never “assist[ed] in the building of a new brand
for the business.” 95
Vivianna Blanch followed her husband’s instructions that day.96 She sent an
email to First Republic Bank with the subject line “Vivianna Blanch Business
Account,” and requested “next steps in creating a business account.” 97 Vivianna
Blanch informed the bank that she had “started a Marketing Consulting company,”
that she had “a client that will start to wire me $20,000/month in consulting fees,”
and that she wanted to get her account “set up as soon as possible.” 98 Blanch emailed
their family accountant, Spencer Barback, stating that “Viv has created a consulting
company (Red Bridge & Stone, LLC) that will be working with an Asian paper
manufacturer to market paper built from stone (calcium carbonate) in the US market
place.”99 Blanch wrote that “Viv also has been given equity in the company,” and
94
Tr. 796:21–797:1 (R. Blanch); Tr. 895:3–9 (V. Blanch).
95
Tr. 894:15–23 (V. Blanch).
96
Richard testified that he sent this email from his joint email account with his wife. Tr.
644:7–645:11 (R. Blanch). see also Tr. 888:23–889:1 (V. Blanch). Richard’s testimony
regarding this issue is not credible. Even if it were credible, it is not legally significant
because, as detailed further herein, there is other evidence that Vivianna Blanch knowingly
participated in her husband’s efforts to shelter funds from scrutiny.
97
JX 74.
98
Id.
99
JX 77.
21
that “she will be receiving $20,000/month in payments per a contract to assist in
marketing.”100 Blanch copied a joint email account held by himself and Vivianna
on the email.101
The following day, on April 17, 2014, Vivianna wrote to the bank, reiterating
that she had a “client . . . ready to wire my monthly fee of $20k in. Once I send
them the bank information, they will wire it (can be done today if possible to get
account opened up that fast).”102 The same day, Vivianna went to First Republic
Bank to open up the account through a Master Signature Card and Agreement to
Open Account. In the agreement, Vivianna wrote that Red Bridge was in the
business of “management consulting (including HR and Marketing).” 103 Vivianna
knew that she would not be performing any services for Red Bridge.104 In fact,
Vivianna believed that Red Bridge had been formed to “mitigate any risks” from the
Metier Action and “didn’t ask too many questions.” 105 That evening, Blanch
emailed Skinner asking him to “please send that wire tonight,” noting that “[w]e
have everything set up with First Republic and that wire confirms the account.”106
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
JX 81.
103
JX 78.
104
Tr. 895:22–896:17 (V. Blanch).
105
Tr. 881:5–18 (V. Blanch).
106
JX 79.
22
On April 18, 2014, Skinner wired $20,000 of Clovis’s funds to Red Bridge.
Clovis continued to wire $20,000 to Red Bridge almost every month over the
following two years.107 Between April 18, 2014 and October 5, 2016, Skinner wired
a total of $797,000 to Red Bridge. 108 Red Bridge had no other sources of revenue.109
There is no evidence in the record that Stone & Paper—through Diamond or
Carter—approved the payments to Red Bridge, or that Red Bridge or Vivianna ever
performed any consulting services for Clovis. Blanch and Vivianna used the funds
wired from Clovis to Red Bridge for their personal expenses, including for payment
of their American Express credit card, day care, babysitters, and private school.110
Despite never having performed any services for Red Bridge or Clovis, Vivianna
testified that using Red Bridge’s funds for child care constituted “legitimate business
expenses.”111
In May 2014, after having made several loans to Metier, Dimaco purchased
Metier out of bankruptcy and assigned its assets to a new entity named Le Maison
107
PTO ¶ 12.
108
Id.
109
Red Bridge Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 45:8–11.
110
Tr. 932:17–936:3 (V. Blanch); JX 522; JX 140.
111
Tr. 933:18–934:5 (V. Blanch). Richard Blanch and Vivianna Blanch often equivocated
on the subject of the use of Red Bridge’s funds during their testimony. See Tr. 923:20–
926:3 (V. Blanch); Red Bridge Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 45:21–52:19.
23
de Beaute (“Maison”). 112 After the acquisition, Blanch and Skinner both worked for
Maison in addition to being managers of Clovis.
F. Richard Blanch, Brian Skinner, and Their Foray into the Stone
Paper Business.
Once Clovis was formed, Blanch and Skinner indicated to Chow that their
purchase of ViaStone was imminent. On April 14, 2014, Blanch emailed Chow and
Skinner with an outline of the terms of the deal with ViaStone.113 The subject line
of the email was “Via Stone | Deal Overview.”114 According to Blanch, his attorneys
were working on an asset purchase agreement through which “Stone & Paper
Holdings LLC will buy the assets of Tier 1 for $1.25mm,” Chow would receive 20%
of the equity in Stone & Paper Holdings, LLC, Ajia would receive 8% of the equity
in Stone & Paper Holdings, LLC, and Chow and ViaStone would make various
payments to Ajia.115 Blanch wrote, “[w]e are close here gentlem[e]n. Let’s close
this deal and go forward.” After Chow responded that he and his wife “tentatively
agree[d] to the outlined overview below,” Blanch responded that his “hope” was to
have “legal paperwork for all next week.”116
112
Tr. 155:21–156:14 (Diamond).
113
JX 83.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
24
Even though Blanch and Skinner represented to Chow that the purchase of
ViaStone was imminent, Blanch and Skinner were chary of sharing any future power
or control and were still considering the possibility of supplanting ViaStone as
TLM’s distributor. Only one month after Stone & Paper funded Clovis for the
purpose of purchasing ViaStone, Blanch wrote to Okulski indicating that he was
prepared to abandon the deal and “go direct to the plant” in Taiwan:
We are not interested in giving anyone anything but passive rights. As
far as I am concerned, we are being overly generous in the current deal.
It is take it or leave it in regards to rights in the new company.
We do not need any assets from the Chows or Henry [Kang] to make
this business work. In short, we are willing to use our $1.25mm to start
our own entity and go direct to the plant without the assistance of
Jeff/Mike.117
Thus, although Blanch and Skinner continued to act as though they were interested
in purchasing ViaStone, 118 they were willing to go it alone.
In June 2014, Blanch connected with Michael Fruhling, a longstanding
acquaintance who specialized in business development and R&D innovation.119
Blanch asked Fruhling for help finding a supply chain into which they could insert
and scale their stone paper product.120 Fruhling contacted Procter & Gamble,
117
JX 96.
118
See, e.g., JX 91 (draft asset purchase agreement dated May 7, 2014).
119
Tr. 555:21–556:21 (R. Blanch).
120
Tr. 556:7–557:17 (R. Blanch).
25
Church & Dwight, Crayola, Unilever, Bayer, and Pfizer on Blanch’s behalf.121
During this process, Blanch repeatedly lied about who he was, who he represented,
and his ability to distribute stone paper:
• In June 2014, Blanch copied Aaron on an email to Crayola proposing
a meeting, representing that “[Aaron] is the head of Aaron Paper and
the co-owner of Via Stone with me.”122
• In a June 2014 email to the United States Playing Card Company,
Blanch represented himself as the “CEO” of “Via Stone.”123
• On July 14, 2014, Blanch signed a non-disclosure agreement with Fort
Dearborn, a company involved in the business of corrugated
packaging, as the CEO of “Tier 1 Corporation.”124
• In September 2014, after having been put in contact with Procter &
Gamble by Fruhling,125 Blanch indicated to Proctor & Gamble that he
was the “CEO” of “Via Stone/Tier 1.” 126
121
Fruhling Dep. 34:16–19.
122
JX 653.
123
PX 1.
124
PX 6.
125
Fruhling Dep. 30:14–31:19.
126
PX 4.
26
• In December 2014, Fruhling drafted an email for Blanch’s approval
indicating that “Stone and Paper Operations, LLC . . . represents the
consolidation of a dozen or more tiny brands . . . that had dotted the
marketplace until Blanch assumed the rights for worldwide
distribution of the material from TLM.” 127 According to that email,
“[Blanch] purchased the Via Stone Company, whose technical and
warehousing operations are based in California. He then purchased the
individual distributors (and their brands) and has, in effect, shut them
down.”128 Fruhling testified that he believed Blanch gave him the
information contained in his draft email. 129
Blanch’s misrepresentations continued to mount. In emails addressed to Fort
Dearborn discussing Unilever’s supply chain, Blanch indicated that he was the CEO
of “Via Stone & AaronStone.” 130 Blanch was never the CEO of AaronStone.131
Blanch told Fort Dearborn that “[t]here are over 40 patents in place that we own the
rights to and we own the manufacturing in mainland China.” 132 According to
127
PX 7.
128
Id.
129
Fruhling Dep. 38:7–23.
130
JX 201 at S0006615.
131
Tr. 823:20–23 (R. Blanch).
132
JX 201 at S0006612.
27
Blanch, “We are the mill owners. We are the brand owners.”133 All of this was
untrue.
To prepare for a series of meetings with prospective clients, Blanch had Clovis
pay $150,000 to purchase stone paper inventory from a company named Design and
Source Production a/k/a Terraskin. The paper was to be used to make samples for
prospective clients. 134 Chow advised Blanch not to purchase the paper because it
was not coated and was unsuitable for printing.135 Chow testified at his deposition,
on behalf of ViaStone, that the stone paper purchased from Terraskin could not be
sold, that it could only be used as a sample because it could damage presses, and that
most of it was ultimately warehoused and recycled at his expense. 136 The Blanch
Defendants submitted samples of the purchased stone paper inventory as trial
exhibits.
Blanch leveraged his relationship with Fruhling into meetings with several
large companies to pitch potential applications for stone paper. In doing so, Blanch
made misrepresentations to his direct business contacts. Fruhling testified that he
believed that Blanch was the CEO of ViaStone. 137 Blanch also lied to Aaron. In
133
Id.
134
PTO ¶ 18; Tr. 588:15–593:14 (R. Blanch).
135
ViaStone Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 48:10–51:14.
136
Id. at 163:14 –169:6.
137
Fruhling Dep. 31:13–19.
28
November 2014, Aaron sent Blanch and Skinner a list of questions regarding the
source of Blanch’s funds and his relationship to TLM. As to the source of funds,
Blanch represented that “$3.5MM was invested by [Skinner] and myself and is given
to John Diamond as a preferred return.” 138
Fruhling’s efforts on behalf of Blanch led to Blanch and Skinner embarking
on trial runs for stone paper products in 2015. According to Skinner:
• In or about January 2015, Blanch, Skinner, Aaron, and Chow met to
run trials of stone paper for Procter & Gamble.
• In or about May 2015, Blanch, Skinner, and Chow met to run trials of
stone paper for Pfizer.
• In or about July 2015, Skinner ran a trial of stone paper for Biersdorf in
Germany.
• In or about October 2015, Blanch and Aaron conducted trials for a
company named Dogan Group in Turkey.139
These trials and sales pitches were Blanch and Skinner’s primary focus, and
the acquisition of ViaStone was a secondary objective. When their attention finally
returned to ViaStone, their concept of the deal had become unrealistic. On February
138
JX 152 at S0007558.
Skinner Opening Br. at 17–19. See also ViaStone Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 63:6–7 (“Brian
139
was at most all of the meetings more than Richard.”).
29
11, 2015, Blanch informed Okulski that Blanch had refused to negotiate a settlement
agreement with Kang regarding the stock purchase agreement between ViaStone and
Ajia as part of Clovis’s acquisition of ViaStone.140 On May 7, 2015, a year after
Blanch had told Chow that they were on the verge of closing, Blanch sent Okulski
an email with new deal terms, describing them as “the deal points that make
sense.”141 Blanch’s new terms contained no cash consideration for the purchase of
ViaStone—a significant departure from the $1.25 million in cash consideration
contemplated the prior year. Okulski cautioned that the deal would make no sense
for ViaStone to accept and recommended that Blanch not convey the new terms to
Chow:
1. The structure calls for acquiring certain assets of Tierl pursuant to
the existing Asset Purchase Agreement and the melding of that business
into Operations. I would recommend against delivering the term sheet
to Jeff [Chow] without some prefatory explanation - from a cash
perspective, the Chows are going from receiving $1,000,000 (after
payment of the $250,000 to [Ajia]) for the business to receiving nothing
other than the additional percentage participation in the net profits of
his existing accounts. 142
It is not clear from the record whether Blanch ultimately submitted these terms
to Chow, but it is apparent that Chow had come to distrust Blanch. Chow testified
140
JX 181.
141
JX 191.
142
Id.
30
that Blanch was “not a trustworthy guy [the] more you get to know him.”143 By
August 2014, Chow believed the deal with Blanch was a “scam” and that Blanch
and Skinner were “a couple of scammers.” 144 Chow continued to engage with
Blanch and Skinner based on his desire to maintain friendly contact with Skinner.145
Based on the record, it is also apparent that Chow sought to leverage Blanch’s and
Skinner’s efforts to contact customers into opportunities for ViaStone.
In October 2015, a TLM representative informed Blanch that “[t]he president
of TLM” was unhappy with him because he felt that Blanch had been dishonest with
them. 146 TLM informed Blanch that he should discuss any further business with
Chow before any further meetings with TLM. 147 Even though Blanch’s relationship
with Chow had soured, he reached out to Chow for help in dealing with TLM.
Blanch forwarded TLM’s email to Chow and asked him how he would “like to
proceed regarding the email chain between TLM and us.” 148 Blanch wrote: “I know
you were disappointed in our conversation a few months ago and see me as the
143
ViaStone Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 129:7–19.
144
Id. at 55:5–20.
145
Id. at 55:5–57:5.
146
JX 262 at S0005803.
147
Id.
148
Id. at S0005801.
31
reason for that disappointment . . . . Just want to move things forward and want us
all working together. We can be a large contributor to the success of VS.” 149
Just one month later, however, Blanch had concluded that an acquisition of
ViaStone “wasn’t going to happen.” 150 Rather than pursue selling stone paper by
acquiring and operating ViaStone, which was to be the focus of Clovis, Blanch
attempted to cut out Chow and ViaStone and establish a direct relationship with
TLM. 151 In November 2015, Blanch reached out to TLM directly, copying Chow
and Aaron, informing TLM that he was “unable to meet [Chow]’s demands for the
sale price of his company” but that Aaron Paper wanted to market TLM’s product
in Turkey as “AaronStone Paper.” 152 Blanch had made a tremendous miscalculation
by underestimating TLM’s loyalty to its U.S. distributor.
TLM rejected Blanch’s attempt to circumvent Chow and ViaStone. TLM told
Blanch that it wanted to “keep this business relationship simple” and would “only
work via ViaStone as the single window contact for our business relationship.”153
In response, Blanch attempted to leverage his relationship with Aaron, arguing that
149
Id.
150
Tr. 816:4–8 (R. Blanch) (testifying that, by November 29, 2015, he had “determined
that the acquisition of ViaStone wasn’t going to happen”).
151
JX 266.
152
JX 267.
153
JX 274 at S0005310.
32
working through ViaStone was impossible because Chow had “no interest in selling
product to us, or assisting us in achieving our stated goals.” 154 Blanch requested a
meeting to discuss the matter further, but TLM again rejected Blanch, writing that it
had a “strong relationship” with ViaStone, “so if ViaStone can not meet your needs,
it would be no different for TLM.”155 In a final effort, Blanch threatened TLM in a
December 22, 2015 email. Blanch stated that his business relationships at “Aaron
Paper, Beiersdorf, Dogan, Pfizer, Unilever, Heinzel (through Aaron Paper) and
many other respective clients working on stone paper trials will be put on permanent
hold until further word from me.”156 He requested that TLM and Chow “rethink”
their position.157 Neither TLM nor Chow responded. 158
Blanch, Skinner, and Aaron continued to search for potential customers to buy
stone paper products.159 The record is devoid of any indication that Blanch or
Skinner ever successfully sold any material amount of stone paper. During the
December 8, 2020 pre-trial conference, the Blanch Defendants argued for the first
time that they had a customer for a stone paper product, therefore indicating that
154
Id. at S0005309.
155
Id. at S0005308.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
ViaStone Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. 60:4–6.
159
JX 291.
33
Blanch’s and Skinner’s efforts were legitimate. According to the Blanch
Defendants’ counsel, they possessed a purchase order dated November 4, 2020
regarding a purchase of stone paper from their “first client,” and they attempted to
condition its production to Plaintiff before trial on Plaintiff’s entry into
confidentiality agreement. 160 There is no confidentiality order governing the
treatment of discovery material in this action. At the pre-trial conference on
December 8, 2020, the Court ordered production of the newly touted purchase order.
The purchase order is for $6,810 of corrugated sheets of stone paper from an entity
named Custom Liners, Inc.161 At trial, Blanch testified that the customer reached
out to him in February 2020 and purchased a trial order. 162 The Blanch Defendants
argued that it was not required to produce any documents relating to this order
because the discovery cutoff for requests for production was in 2020. 163
G. Clovis Never Acquires ViaStone, and Skinner and Blanch Drain
Clovis’s Funds.
Blanch and Skinner often used Clovis’s funds for personal expenses. In
November 2014, Blanch invested $75,000 of Clovis funds in a company named
160
Pre-Trial Conference Tr. 16–18.
161
JX 499.
162
Tr. 847:8–848:2 (R. Blanch).
163
Tr. 767:1–22 (R. Blanch).
34
Spangler Scientific, LLC (“Spangler”). 164 Blanch testified that he told Diamond that
he would be investing in Spangler and that Clovis would pay the funds to Spangler
Scientific “in lieu of [Blanch] receiving management fees.”165 Skinner and Diamond
testified that neither Diamond nor Carter (i.e., Stone & Paper) approved the use of
Clovis’s funds to invest in Spangler.166 Blanch also used $105,000 of Clovis funds
to pay his personal attorneys at the Roth Law Firm.167 Blanch testified that this
payment was out of “convenience” and that the payment was made to “replace . . .
management fees that I was being paid.”168 Blanch and Skinner also caused Clovis
to pay $11,510 on a bill for the Blanch Defendants’ American Express card.169
Skinner effected all of these transfers from Clovis’s account. 170
Blanch testified that, by November 29, 2015, he had “determined that the
acquisition of ViaStone wasn’t going to happen.”171 And by then, his effort to
develop a relationship directly with TLM had also failed. At that point, Skinner and
Blanch turned their attention to draining Clovis’s bank account. On December 1,
164
JX 503 at CITIBANK_1724; JX 510 at Spangler_40.
165
Tr. 646:21–648:15 (R. Blanch).
166
Tr. 63:21–64:4 (Diamond); Tr. 428:17–22 (Skinner).
167
PTO ¶ 15; Tr. 733:5–734:1 (R. Blanch).
168
Tr. 645:19–646:20 (R. Blanch).
169
PTO ¶ 17.
170
Id. ¶¶ 15 & 17.
171
Tr. 816:4–8 (R. Blanch).
35
2015, Skinner wired Red Bridge and Skinner Capital $240,000 each.172 Skinner and
Blanch testified that this wire was made because Clovis’s accountant, Richard
Eisenberg, instructed Skinner to treat the following year’s “management fees” as a
single lump sum loan. 173 Eisenberg testified that he “received specific instructions”
from both Blanch and Skinner “to treat those disbursements of $240,000 as loans”
to Blanch and Skinner. 174 Eisenberg categorically denied ever instructing Blanch
that “he should advance himself $240,000 as a loan rather than take 12 equal monthly
loans of $20,000 from Clovis Holdings.”175
The documentary evidence supports Eisenberg’s testimony, which I find
credible. On October 11, 2016, in preparation for filing Clovis’s 2015 tax returns,
Skinner instructed Eisenberg that “[a]ll cash to Red Bridge and Stone in 2015 and
2016 (this year for next year’s taxes) should be a loan.”176 Eisenberg was concerned
because he had been instructed to treat the regular $20,000 payments in 2015 as
“guaranteed payments” and that he was being separately instructed to treat the
$240,000 payment as a loan. He wrote, “Are you sure about this? There were
payments during the year that were called guaranteed payments, and then a payment
172
PTO ¶ 12.
173
Tr. 418:3–13 (Skinner); Tr. 635:21–637:15 (R. Blanch).
174
Tr. 1065:14–21 (Eisenberg).
175
Tr. 1066:12–20 (Eisenberg).
176
JX 321.
36
in December of $240K apiece that was called a loan. Were all payments made
during the year meant to be loans?” 177 Skinner responded by stating, “Red Bridge
should all be loans[,] for Skinner Capital you can leave as is. Unless you think they
need to be the same.”178
Eisenberg grew concerned. On November 20, 2016, he emailed Diamond
indicating that one issue “that we never fully resolved is a request to treat the money
sent by [Clovis] to [Red Bridge] during the year as a loan instead of a guaranteed
payment.”179 Eisenberg notified Diamond that the payments totaled $280,000 and
were made in increments of $20,000, and that Skinner was asking to recharacterize
the payments as loans rather than as guaranteed payments. Eisenberg further
notified Diamond that there had been another “$240,000 payment in December 2015
that has been booked as a loan.”180 Diamond responded: “If Brian wants to treat it
as a loan I have no problem with it. I[s] there something something [sic] else that I
am missing here?” 181
Blanch and Skinner testified that the $240,000 was intended as an “advance”
for management fees in 2016, yet they continued to wire themselves Clovis funds at
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
JX 317.
180
Id. (emphasis in original).
181
Id.
37
an accelerated rate in the following year. Between July 13 and November 5, 2016,
Skinner wired $780,000 of Clovis funds to Skinner Capital. 182 In July 2016, Skinner
wired $170,000 to Red Bridge.183 Defendants characterize the 2016 payments as
loans. In total, between 2014 and 2016, Skinner wired $797,000 to Red Bridge and
$1,482,500 to Skinner Capital from Clovis’s bank account. 184
H. The Accounting Treatment of the Payments to Skinner Capital and
Red Bridge Raises Questions and Triggers Litigation.
In 2017, Skinner directed Eisenberg to treat the $1,020,000 disbursed in 2016
to Red Bridge and Skinner Capital as loans. 185 Eisenberg requested “loan documents
evidencing the loans and the repayment terms,” and documentation of the “pre-2016
loans.”186 Skinner then sent Eisenberg three unsigned promissory notes (the
“Promissory Notes”). The first Promissory Note is between “Clovis, LLC” and Red
Bridge, is dated December 31, 2015, and provides for a loan of $240,000 to Red
Bridge with 2% interest due on the last business day of 2030. 187 The second
Promissory Note is between “Clovis, LLC” and Red Bridge, is dated December 31,
182
PTO ¶ 12.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
JX 370.
186
Id. Eisenberg also inquired as to the credit card expenditures from the AMEX Account.
Id. Skinner advised that all of the credit card expenditures were “all business related,” JX
375.
187
JX 402.
38
2016, and provides for a loan of $360,000 to Red Bridge with the same interest rates
and maturity date as the first Promissory Note.188 The third Promissory Note is
between “Clovis, LLC” and Skinner Capital, is dated December 31, 2016, and
appears to provide for a loan of $660,000 to Skinner Capital with the same interest
rates and maturity date as the first Promissory Note. 189 This Promissory Note
contains an unedited remnant from the second Promissory Note because it provides
for a loan with the principal sum of “THREE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($660,000.00).”190
Eisenberg’s accounting firm refused to prepare Clovis’s 2016 tax returns and
terminated Clovis as a client.191 Skinner attempted to work with Citrin Cooperman,
a different accounting firm, in order to file Clovis’s 2016 tax return. In doing so, he
forwarded the Promissory Notes he had sent to Eisenberg and advised Citrin
Cooperman to “[dis]regard the note for Skinner Capital” because “the note is wrong
as some of it is income not a note.” 192 Skinner also informed Citrin Cooperman that
the 2015 tax returns were erroneous and indicated that $310,000 of the payments
188
JX 403.
189
JX 401.
190
Id.
191
JX 380.
192
JX 391.
39
previously labeled as loans should have been income. 193 Diamond testified that, in
February and March 2018, in connection with preparing Clovis’s 2017 tax return,
Citrin Cooperman notified Diamond that Skinner was attempting to recharacterize
an additional $295,000 in loans from Clovis to Skinner Capital as income.194
In February 2018, in connection with preparing Clovis’s 2017 tax return,
Skinner instructed Citrin Cooperman to convert half of Skinner Capital’s loans into
guaranteed payments. 195 To Skinner’s and Blanch’s consternation, Citrin
Cooperman copied Diamond on the response. 196 Diamond objected to Skinner’s
directions, and he requested that Citrin Cooperman provide him financials and loan
documentation and that they not file any tax returns until he had had a chance to
review the documents. 197 On May 18, 2018, Diamond made a formal request on
behalf of Stone & Paper to inspect Clovis’s books and records under the LLC
Agreement and 6 Del. C. § 18-305. 198 Rather than waiting to receive any documents,
however, Stone & Paper filed the complaint in this action on May 31, 2018.
193
JX 406.
194
Tr. 86:10–88:23 (Diamond).
195
JX 413.
196
JX 414 (email from Blanch to Skinner: “FYI, [Citrin Cooperman] add[ed] John
Diamond. I will take that up with [Citrin Cooperman].”).
197
JX 416.
198
JX 435.
40
I. Skinner Uses the Diamond Carter Trading American Express
Account and Causes Clovis to Pay for the Milton Berg Newsletter.
Diamond Carter Trading had a credit card account with American Express
(the “AMEX Account”). The AMEX Account was in Carter’s name and was
guaranteed by Carter personally, 199 but Diamond, Carter, and Skinner each had
individual cards on the account.200 As COO of Diamond Carter Trading, Skinner
processed the bulk of the transactions with his card.201 Soon after Clovis was
formed, Skinner asked to use the AMEX Account for Clovis expenses. Diamond
and Carter permitted Skinner to use his card on the AMEX Account for Clovis
expenses on the condition that Clovis pay for its share of the charges on the AMEX
Account. 202 This agreement was not made in writing.203
The monthly AMEX Account statements all generally display similar
spending patterns by the three cardholders. Diamond charged his monthly internet
bill to the AMEX Account and made occasional smaller transactions. In one outlier
purchase, from November 2016, Diamond spent $1,695.98 to buy a laptop computer
199
Tr. 307:7–308:9 (Skinner).
200
Tr. 437:19–23 (Skinner).
201
Tr. 171:5–21 (Diamond); Tr. 213:15–215:24 (Diamond); Tr. 994:2–995:21 (Carter).
202
Tr. 14:5–15:16 (Diamond); Tr. 235:2–11 (Diamond).
203
Tr. 995:18–21 (Carter).
41
at Best Buy. 204 Diamond testified that all of these expenses were related to his
trading business and that he never put personal expenses on the AMEX Account. 205
Carter also used his card for miscellaneous transactions. He also used the card
to pay $28,000 to his personal accountant in October 2016. Carter testified that the
charge to the accountant and all other charges on his card were business expenses.206
The vast majority of the expenses on the AMEX Account were Skinner’s.
While Diamond’s and Carter’s monthly purchase totals varied from a few hundred
to a few thousand dollars, Skinner routinely charged tens of thousands of dollars to
the AMEX Account. Skinner’s more frequent usage was not unexpected to the
parties, as he was the COO of Diamond Carter Trading and a managing member of
Clovis. Some of Skinner’s transactions appear to have been business-related, such
as subscriptions for domain names, trading services, and the Amazon servers that
Diamond’s entities shared. 207 Most of Skinner’s transactions related to travel,
transportation, restaurants, and entertainment.208 Skinner testified that some of these
latter transactions were business expenses that he incurred while visiting employees
204
JX 565.
205
Tr. 174:9–175:10 (Diamond).
206
Tr. 996:4–19 & 1015:20–1016:11 (Carter).
207
Tr. 296–302 (Skinner); Tr. 439–40 (Skinner).
208
See generally JXs 531–579 (AMEX Account monthly statements from January 2, 2014
to January 2, 2018).
42
of ViaStone or Maison de Beaute.209 He also testified that high-level employees of
Maison de Beaute charged their Uber rides to the AMEX Account. 210 Other
transactions, however, are not defensible as business expenses. For example, in
2014 alone, Skinner spent over $100,000 going to strip clubs by himself.211
Nevertheless, Skinner testified, “I kind of put whatever I wanted on the card. [The
accountant] expensed it as a business expense, so it’s a business expense.”212
Skinner testified that he was the only cardholder to put charges for Clovis on
the AMEX Account.213 Because the AMEX Account was being used for both Clovis
and Diamond Carter Trading business, Skinner would inform the accountants each
year of how the charges should be allocated between the two entities. 214 For fiscal
year 2014, Skinner sent to Eisenberg a spreadsheet entitled “clovis expenses on dct
card.xls”.215 In a tab labeled “Total Clovis”, the spreadsheet listed 169 transactions
209
Tr. 302:5–303:24 (Skinner).
210
Tr. 304:1–19 (Skinner).
211
On April 12, 2014, Skinner charged $37,306.81 to the AMEX Account on behalf of
Clovis. JX 649. The AMEX Account records for 2014 indicate that Skinner incurred an
additional $26,616.73 at strip clubs between January 7, 2014 and April 5, 2014. Id.
Skinner testified that he frequented the strip clubs by himself. Tr. 452:13–16 (Skinner).
212
Tr. 438:2–5 (Skinner).
213
Tr. 436:16–437:3 (Skinner).
214
Tr. 305:3–306:9 (Skinner) (“[W]e really didn’t itemize all the charges as to which entity
they went to until it was time to work with Mr. Eisenberg at the end of the year.”).
215
JX 648.
43
made by Skinner in 2014, totaling $175,103.97.216 Many of the transactions
predated Clovis’s April 2014 capitalization. For fiscal year 2016, Skinner informed
the accountants that the charges on the AMEX Account totaled approximately
$407,000, with “$308,650.90 going to Clovis [and] $98,163.84 going to DCT.”217
Skinner then followed up with a spreadsheet reflecting similar totals for each of
Clovis and Diamond Carter Trading, broken down into specific categories.218 For
fiscal year 2017, Skinner sent his accountants a year-end summary for Clovis from
American Express.219 The summary shows that total charges in 2017 were
$51,698.61, a significant decline from prior years.220 Not including fiscal year
2015, 221 Skinner told Clovis’s accountants to allocate a total of $535,453.48 of the
charges on the AMEX Account to Clovis.
216
JX 649.
217
JX 362.
218
JX 363.
JX 408 (“[A]attached is tax year 2017 Clovis Amex . . . . All of the Amex charges here
219
were paid by Clovis NOT Diamond Carter Trading for 2017.”).
220
JX 409.
221
The record does not indicate that Skinner or anyone else instructed Clovis’s accountants
as to how the 2015 AMEX Account charges should be allocated between Clovis and
Diamond Carter Trading. The AMEX Account statements from 2015 generally follow the
pattern as the charges in other years, with Skinner charging tens of thousands of dollars
each month and with most transactions relating to travel, transportation, and restaurants.
See JXs 544–555.
44
Skinner testified that the allocation of charges on the AMEX Account did not
always reflect the allocation of payments to the AMEX Account. For example, when
Diamond Carter Trading’s checking account was low on funds after its brokerage
account closed in 2016,222 Skinner paid for all charges out of Clovis’s checking
account.223 Diamond testified that Diamond Carter Trading should have incurred
very few charges after its brokerage account closed. 224 Skinner testified that
Clovis’s funds were used to pay Diamond Carter Trading’s American Express card
because Diamond did not care which entity paid it, because all the money originated
from Diamond. 225 In total, from August 6, 2014 through September 21, 2017, Clovis
paid $510,124.35 to the AMEX Account. 226
In 2016, Skinner also used Clovis’s funds to pay for the Milton Berg
newsletter, an investment newsletter that provided stock trading
recommendations. 227 Skinner and Diamond reviewed the newsletter as part of their
trading business. 228 In 2016, Diamond Carter Trading had a bill from the publisher
222
See Tr. 236:4–237:24 (Diamond).
223
JX 408 (“All of the Amex charges here were paid by Clovis NOT Diamond Carter
Trading for 2017.”); Tr. 305:3–306:9 (Skinner).
224
Tr. 237:2–8 (Diamond).
225
Tr. 305:3–306:9 (Skinner).
226
PTO ¶ 16.
227
Tr. 89:15–90:16 (Diamond).
228
Tr. 163:3–18 (Diamond).
45
of the Milton Berg newsletter for $21,000.229 At the same time, Clovis purportedly
owed money to Diamond Carter Trading for having underpaid its share of the
charges on the AMEX Account.230 Diamond and Skinner decided that Clovis would
pay the bill for the Milton Berg newsletter as a way to reduce Clovis’s debt to
Diamond Carter Trading. 231 Skinner caused Clovis to pay the $21,000 bill on
August 31, 2016.232
J. Procedural History
On May 31, 2018, Stone & Paper filed the Complaint initiating this action
against the Blanch Defendants, Skinner, and Skinner Capital. 233 The defendants
moved to dismiss the Complaint, and this court denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss in a May 31, 2019 Memorandum Opinion (the “2019 Memorandum
Opinion”). 234 On July 24, 2019, the Blanch Defendants and Clovis filed
counterclaims against Stone & Paper and third-party claims against a plethora of
defendants: Diamond Carter Trading, JAD Trading, LLC, (another entity associated
229
Tr. 424:23–426:10 (Skinner).
230
Tr. 89:24–90:10 (Diamond).
231
They dispute who first raised the idea. Diamond testified that Skinner proposed that
Clovis pay the bill, while Skinner testified that Diamond asked him to pay the bill.
Compare Tr. 90:2–16 (Diamond), with id. 425:4–426:10 (Skinner).
232
JX 503 at CITIBANK_001767.
233
Dkt. 1.
234
See Stone & Paper Inv’rs, LLC v. Blanch, 2019 WL 2374005 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019).
46
with Diamond), Diamond and his wife, Kanokpan Khumpoo, and Carter and his
wife, Elizabeth Carter (collectively, the “Diamond Carter Defendants”); as well as
Eisenberg, the accounting firm Eisenberg & Blau, CPAs, P.C., and its successor
firm, DDK & Company, LLP (collectively, the “Eisenberg Defendants”).235 On
August 23, 2019, Stone & Paper and the Diamond Carter Defendants moved to
dismiss the counterclaims and third-party claims. In a June 29, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion (the “2020 Memorandum Opinion”), the court dismissed all third-party
claims and all counterclaims except for the claims of breach of the LLC Agreement
and unjust enrichment (in part) against Stone & Paper.236
Shortly before trial, on September 22, 2020, the defendants again amended
their complaint to assert new counterclaims and third-party claims. 237 On November
18, 2020, the court entered an order dismissing two of those claims and severing
four others from trial.238 Those claims are not considered in this opinion.
II. ANALYSIS
This opinion first addresses Stone & Paper’s claims, followed by Clovis’s
remaining counterclaims.
235
Dkt. 64. The Eisenberg Defendants were not served with the counterclaim and third-
party complaint.
236
See Stone & Paper Inv’rs, LLC v. Blanch, 2020 WL 3496694 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2020).
237
Dkt. 221.
238
See Dkt. 293.
47
A. Plaintiff’s Affirmative Claims
Plaintiff’s post-trial briefing focuses on five claims: (1) breach of the LLC
Agreement by Blanch and Skinner; (2) breach of fiduciary duties by Blanch and
Skinner as managers of Clovis; (3) fraudulent inducement and fraudulent
concealment of misconduct by Skinner, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital; (4) civil
conspiracy by Skinner Capital, Red Bridge, and Vivianna Blanch; and (5) aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by Skinner Capital, Red Bridge, and
Vivianna Blanch. Plaintiff further argues that Vivianna Blanch should be held liable
for any judgment against Red Bridge on an alter ego theory. Based on these claims,
in total, Plaintiff seeks an award of $3.4 million plus pre- and post-judgment interest
and an order denying Defendants the ability to share in any recovery by Clovis.239
1. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff alleges that Blanch and Skinner, as managers of Clovis, breached
the LLC Agreement. The elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the
existence of a contract; (2) the breach of an obligation imposed by the contract; and
(3) damages arising from the breach.240 Plaintiff must demonstrate each element by
a preponderance of the evidence. Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 2021 WL 537325,
239
Pl.’s Post-Tr. Opening Br. 60.
Zayo Group, LLC v. Latisys Hldgs., LLC, 2018 WL 6177174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26,
240
2018); VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).
48
at *18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2021). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means
proof that something is more likely than not.” Trascent Mgmt. Consulting, LLC v.
Bouri, 2018 WL 4293359, at *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2018) (internal citations
omitted). Defendants bear the burden of proof on affirmative defenses to the breach
of contract claim and must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence. Basho
Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv., LLC, 2018 WL 3326693, at *2
(Del. Ch. July 6, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Davenport v. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC,
221 A.3d 100 (Del. 2019). Defendants do not dispute that the LLC Agreement is a
valid contract, and the first element is satisfied.
When construing and interpreting a limited liability company agreement, a
court applies the same principles that are used when construing and interpreting
other contracts. Godden v. Franco, 2018 WL 3998431, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21,
2018). “‘Delaware adheres to the objective theory of contracts, i.e., a contract’s
construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable
third party.’” Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Del. 2010) (quoting NBC
Universal v. Paxson Commc’ns Corp., 2005 WL 1038997, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005)); accord Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 367–68 (Del. 2014). When a
contract’s language is clear and unambiguous, the Court will give effect to the plain
meaning of the contract’s terms and provisions. Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1159–60. The
49
contract is to be read as a whole, giving effect to each term and provision, so as not
to render any part of the contract mere surplusage. Id. at 1159.
a. Section 5.1
Section 5.1 of the LLC Agreement provides that “no action shall be taken with
respect to a [‘Major Decision’] without approval in writing by the Board and the
Preferred Members.” 241 One of the Major Decisions is defined to be “[e]ngaging in
any business other than the Viastone Business, including, but not limited to, the
funding of the purchase and operations thereof through a subsidiary.” 242 “Viastone
Business” is defined as “the paper business currently conducted by Tier1
International, Inc., a California corporation that the Company is seeking to acquire
through a subsidiary either pursuant to a stock or asset purchase.” 243 This definition
of “Viastone Business” differed from Diamond’s original proposal, which would
have defined the term more narrowly to mean “the acquiring of the equity or assets
of Tier1 International.” 244
Plaintiff claims that Blanch and Skinner breached Section 5.1 of the LLC
Agreement by conducting stone paper trials, working to develop a stone paper
market in Turkey, purchasing Terraskin paper inventory, seeking to work directly
241
LLC Agreement § 5.1.
242
Id. § 5.1(c).
243
Id. § 1.1(kk).
244
JX 47.
50
with TLM, and working on behalf of a separate entity named AaronStone without
obtaining Plaintiff’s written consent.245 Plaintiff construes the contract too narrowly.
The LLC Agreement required Plaintiff’s written consent if the managers of Clovis
engaged in any business other than the paper business “currently conducted by”
ViaStone. 246 The LLC Agreement does not require that Clovis must purchase
ViaStone by a certain date or that Clovis’s funds must first be spent on the purchase
of ViaStone. The terms of the LLC Agreement do not require consent to engage in
activities in furtherance of ViaStone’s business. Before Blanch and Skinner
determined that purchasing ViaStone was no longer possible, they were attempting
to create demand for ViaStone’s stone paper products with a number of prospective
customers. 247 ViaStone’s manager, Chow, was directly involved in Blanch’s and
Skinner’s efforts to increase customer demand for ViaStone’s products.248 Blanch
told Diamond that Blanch and Skinner were working on paper trials, and Diamond
245
Pl.’s Opening Post-Tr. Br. 26–27.
246
LLC Agreement § 1.1(kk).
247
See JX 653, PX 1, PX 4, PX 6, PX 7.
248
For example, Chow “would constantly introduce [Skinner] to new players” in the stone
paper industry. Tr. 271:23–272:1 (Skinner). Chow also attended a meeting at a stone paper
mill in China with Blanch, Skinner, a representative of Aaron Paper, and potential
customers from Turkey. Tr. 528:1–5 (R. Blanch); Tr. 534:13–21 (R. Blanch); Tr. 270:24–
271:2 (Skinner).
51
did not object. 249 That conduct readily constituted “engaging” in the “paper business
[then] currently conducted by . . . [the] corporation that [Clovis] is seeking to
acquire.” 250 Plaintiff has not proven that Blanch and Skinner, from the outset, never
intended for Clovis to purchase ViaStone. I find that for at least some period of time
before and after Clovis’s formation, Blanch and Skinner engaged in genuine—
though failed—negotiations with Chow to acquire the ViaStone business.251
Plaintiff has therefore not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the entirety
of Blanch’s and Skinner’s general business conduct in the furtherance of ViaStone’s
business breached Section 5.1.
The analysis is different with respect to Blanch’s and Skinner’s work relating
to stone paper products after November 2015. Although Blanch and Skinner started
out with the purpose of having Clovis acquire ViaStone, there came a point in time
when they no longer harbored a legitimate interest in purchasing ViaStone. That
evolution is well documented, as Blanch attempted an end run around Chow and
ViaStone, seeking to develop a direct pipeline to TLM with the ambitious goal of
establishing their own entity with the assistance of Aaron. It is difficult to precisely
249
See JX 170 (May 5, 2015 email from Blanch to Diamond, noting that “Skinner and I are
in VA the next few days working on paper trials for Crayola, P&G, Pfizer and a slew of
other clients”).
250
LLC Agreement §§ 1.1(kk), 5.1(c).
251
See, e.g., JX 191 (May 6, 2015 email from Blanch to Okulski, proposing terms for an
acquisition of ViaStone).
52
pinpoint when Blanch and Skinner were no longer devoting their time, and spending
Clovis’s funds, to acquire the ViaStone business. But the record conclusively
establishes, by Blanch’s own admission, that by November 29, 2015 he had
“determined that the acquisition of ViaStone wasn’t going to happen.” 252 On
November 29, 2015, Blanch and Skinner sent an email to TLM, in which they sought
to work directly with TLM to distribute TLM’s stone paper in Turkey under the
name “AaronStone Paper.”253 The email also noted that they and ViaStone had
“agreed to not work together at this time.” 254 That email constituted a breach of
Section 5.1. At that point, Blanch and Skinner were using the Company and its
resources to “[e]ngag[e] in [a] business other than the Viastone Business”—namely,
the AaronStone business.255 The AaronStone business was not the “Viastone
Business.” Once Blanch and Skinner knew that purchasing ViaStone was no longer
an option, any action or commitment of Clovis resources to any business was action
that required Stone & Paper’s written approval. Blanch admitted that he had no
written approval from Stone & Paper to do any business other than to buy
ViaStone. 256 Plaintiff has therefore proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
252
Tr. 816:4–8 (R. Blanch).
253
JX 267.
254
Id.
255
LLC Agreement § 5.1(c).
256
Tr. 731:7–13 (R. Blanch).
53
Blanch and Skinner breached Section 5.1 of the LLC Agreement to the extent
discussed herein.
b. Section 5.2
Section 5.2 governs transactions between Clovis and its managers and
members, defined as “Interested Transactions.” An Interested Transaction is “any
transaction[]” between Clovis and its own managers, members, or their affiliates,
“including, without limitation, . . . any transaction evidencing a loan (or the
forgiveness of a loan).” 257 Interested Transactions are prohibited under the LLC
Agreement unless (1) the Company “first fully disclose[s] the terms and conditions”
of the transaction to the Board and the members, and (2) the “Board determines that
the Interested Transaction is fair and reasonable to the Company and the terms and
conditions are at least as favorable to the Company as those that are generally
available from persons capable of similarly performing them and in similar
transactions between parties operating at arm’s length.”258 The court previously held
that Plaintiff’s claims under Section 5.2 are direct claims. 259
Plaintiff argues that every payment from Clovis to Skinner Capital and Red
Bridge was an impermissible Interested Transaction under Section 5.2 of the LLC
257
LLC Agreement § 5.2.
258
Id. § 5.2.
259
2019 Memorandum Opinion, 2019 WL 2374005, at *4.
54
Agreement. Defendants generally characterize these payments as either
management fees or loans. The record lacks reliable documentary evidence
supporting these characterizations. On the contrary, Blanch and Skinner attempted
to characterize payments from Clovis to Red Bridge and Skinner Capital with
whatever label would be most advantageous to them at the moment. Regardless,
because the purported management fees (or salaries) and loans present different legal
and factual issues, this opinion addresses Defendants’ contentions regarding the
purported management fees first, followed by the loans.
i. The Management Fees
Blanch and Skinner contend that Red Bridge and Skinner Capital were entitled
to the $20,000 per month they took from Clovis beginning in April 2014 (the
“Management Fees”). The record reflects that Clovis paid Skinner Capital and Red
Bridge the Management Fees for twenty months, from April 2014 through
November 2015, for a total of approximately $400,000 each. 260 Defendants’
assertion that the Management Fees were part of a “salary” or a “guaranteed
payment” is not justified by reference to any contract between Clovis and Skinner
Capital or Red Bridge. An Interested Transaction is “any transaction between a
260
PTO ¶ 12. The regular monthly payments were occasionally interspersed with extra
payments, and there were a few months were Red Bridge received less than $20,000. To
be exact, between April 2014 and November 2015, Skinner Capital received $462,500 and
Red Bridge received $387,000. Id. As discussed below, the wires to Red Bridge were not
the only Management Fees that the Blanch Defendants received.
55
member, a manager, . . . or any Affiliate thereof, on the one hand, and the Company,
on the other.”261 Furthermore, Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement specifically
provides that, “in the event that the Company acquires the Viastone business . . . ,
the current managers, directly or through their respective Member entities, will be
actively involved in the management thereof and will receive a fee or like
compensation therefor.” 262 Because Clovis did not acquire ViaStone, Blanch and
Skinner would have been entitled to the Management Fees only if they had satisfied
the approval requirements of Section 5.2.
Defendants argue that the Management Fees were fully disclosed and that
Plaintiff otherwise acquiesced to the Management Fees. To prove their affirmative
defense of acquiescence, Defendants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Plaintiff had “full knowledge of [its] rights and the material facts,” and “(1)
remain[ed] inactive for a considerable time; (2) freely [did] what amount[ed] to
recognition of the complained of act; or (3) act[ed] in a manner inconsistent with the
subsequent repudiation, which le[d] the other party to believe the act ha[d] been
approved.” Basho, 2018 WL 3326693, at *41 (internal citations omitted).
Payments to Red Bridge. The Blanch Defendants did not “first fully
disclose[] the terms and conditions” to Plaintiff before sending the Management
261
LLC Agreement § 5.2.
262
Id.
56
Fees to Red Bridge, as required by Section 5.2.263 The Blanch Defendants failed to
cite any documentary evidence indicating that Plaintiff approved the Management
Fees to Red Bridge before the Management Fees were paid. Diamond, Plaintiff’s
principal, did not recall discussing a salary for Blanch and said he did not approve
one. 264 The Blanch Defendants argue that Diamond was aware of the Management
Fees to Red Bridge because Eisenberg emailed Diamond about the Management
Fees on November 20, 2016, 265 but the email does not suggest that Diamond had at
any time previously approved the Management Fees to Red Bridge. Diamond
credibly testified that he would not have approved a salary to Blanch in the amount
of $20,000 per month because Diamond did not have any relationship with Blanch,
and Blanch was already drawing a full-time salary as CEO of Metier, which
Diamond had purchased out of bankruptcy.266 The Management Fees to Red Bridge
were therefore not “first fully disclosed” to Plaintiff, as required by Section 5.2.
The record lacks any evidence that Blanch and Skinner, as managers of
Clovis, met the other procedural requirements of Section 5.2. Blanch and Skinner
never determined that the Management Fees were “fair and reasonable to the
263
Id.
264
Diamond Dep. 86:23–87:5; Stone & Paper Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. (Diamond) (“I don’t
recall being told or asked for Mr. Blanch to be paid a salary because I would not have
approved it.”).
265
JX 317.
266
Tr. 46:15–47:11 (Diamond).
57
Company,” or that “the terms and conditions” of the Management Fees were “at least
as favorable to the Company as those that are generally available from persons
capable of similarly performing them and in similar transactions between parties
operating at arm’s length.”267 Defendants do not argue otherwise. Indeed, the record
reflects that Blanch and Skinner were generally unconcerned with corporate
formalities or fairness to Clovis. Thus, because the Management Fees were paid to
Red Bridge before disclosure to Plaintiff as a member of Clovis and without any
determination that the Management Fees were “fair and reasonable,” Plaintiff has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Management Fees to Red Bridge
breached Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement.268
The Blanch Defendants have not proven that Plaintiff acquiesced to the
Management Fees to Red Bridge. The only evidence cited by the Blanch Defendants
in support of this argument is the November 2016 email between Eisenberg and
Diamond. In that email, Eisenberg notified Diamond that Clovis had paid $280,000
to Red Bridge in 2015; that the payments were principally made through monthly
disbursements of $20,000; that they were previously treated as “guaranteed
payments”; and that Skinner had requested that the payments be recharacterized as
267
LLC Agreement § 5.2.
268
There is no evidence that the Management Fees deposited in Red Bridge’s new checking
account were paid pursuant to an unwritten consulting agreement with Vivianna Blanch,
as Blanch and Vivianna Blanch represented to others. See JX 81.
58
“loans.”269 Eisenberg also notified Diamond about a December 2015 payment of
$240,000 that had already been booked as a loan. Diamond agreed with Skinner’s
requested treatment of the payments, stating that if “Brian wants to treat it as a loan
I have no problem with it.”270 Diamond testified that Skinner sought to affirmatively
dissuade him from confronting Blanch about the payments.271
For at least two reasons, the November 2016 email does not support a
conclusion that Plaintiff acquiesced to the Management Fees paid to Red Bridge
because Plaintiff did not have full knowledge of the material facts about the
payments. First, Diamond did not have full knowledge of the material facts about
the purpose of the payments or the fact that the payments began back in April 2014.
Diamond’s email indicates that he lacked knowledge when he added, “[is] there
something [] else that I am missing here?” 272 The November 2016 email exchange
occurred almost a year after the last of the Management Fees were paid, which
further suggests that Diamond was not kept informed of the material facts.
Second, Eisenberg’s November 2016 email cannot establish that Diamond
had full knowledge of the material facts because the $240,000 paid to Red Bridge
was not, in fact, a loan. Apart from after-the-fact justifications for payment of the
269
JX 317.
270
Id.
271
Tr. 124:9–125:24 (Diamond).
272
JX 317.
59
Management Fees, there is no indication that Clovis can contractually demand
repayment of the Management Fees from Red Bridge or that the $240,000 paid to
Red Bridge or the Management Fees were otherwise loans. There is no indication
as to what the loan terms would be with respect to the Management Fees. That is
because recharacterizing the Management Fees as a loan was a fabrication. Plaintiff
could not validly acquiesce to a loan that was not a loan. Nor did Diamond know at
the time of the November 2016 email that Skinner and Blanch had abandoned efforts
to acquire ViaStone and had breached the LLC Agreement. Because Plaintiff did
not have “full knowledge of [its] rights and the material facts,”273 Plaintiff could not
have acquiesced to the payment of the Management Fees to Red Bridge through the
November 2016 email.
The Management Fees to Red Bridge also include Clovis’s $75,000 payment
to Spangler and Clovis’s $105,000 payment to the Roth Law Firm. The investment
in Spangler was made on behalf of Blanch, and Blanch and Skinner both testified
that they used Clovis’s funds to make the investment “in lieu of [Blanch] receiving
management fees.” 274 Similarly, the payment to the Roth Law Firm was to pay for
Blanch’s personal attorney, and Blanch and Skinner both testified that they paid
Blanch’s legal bills with Clovis’s funds “in []place of management fees that [Blanch]
273
Basho, 2018 WL 3326693, at *41.
274
Tr. 414:11–24 (Skinner); Tr. 646:21–648:15 (R. Blanch).
60
was being paid.”275 Thus, both of these payments were among the Management Fees
to Red Bridge that violated Section 5.2.
Payments to Skinner Capital. Diamond testified that, in the spring or
summer of 2014, he approved a salary to Skinner in the amount of $20,000 per month
after Skinner informed him that operating Clovis had effectively “turned into . . . a
full time job.”276 The Management Fees to Skinner Capital began on April 18, 2014,
just two weeks after Clovis was funded.277 As with the payments to Red Bridge,
however, there is no evidence that Clovis’s Board determined that the Management
Fees paid to Skinner Capital were fair and reasonable to Clovis.
Even if payment of the Management Fees to Skinner Capital would have
breached Section 5.2, Skinner has proven that Plaintiff acquiesced to the payment of
the Management Fees to Skinner Capital. Plaintiff’s principal, Diamond, consented
to their payment shortly after Clovis was funded. In its post-trial briefing, Plaintiff
acknowledges that “Diamond agreed to a request by Skinner to temporarily be paid
a monthly salary from Clovis.”278 In addition, in July 2015, Skinner notified
Diamond that his income from Clovis was $20,000 per month,279 and there is no
275
Tr. 326:19–327:1 (Skinner); Tr. 645:19–646:20 (R. Blanch).
276
Tr. 45:18–46:14 (Diamond); Tr. 121:16–122:10 (Diamond); Diamond Dep. 85:8–86:22.
277
PTO ¶ 12.
278
Pl.’s Post-Tr. Opening Br. 21.
279
JX 595; JX 597; JX 604.
61
indication that Diamond ever objected to the payment of the Management Fees to
Skinner. Plaintiff argues that Diamond’s agreement to the Management Fees to
Skinner was made in “reasonable reliance on Skinner’s knowingly false
representations that the ViaStone acquisition was imminent and that Skinner was
working ‘full time’ for Clovis.” 280 Plaintiff’s argument fails because there is no
indication that Diamond lacked knowledge of the material facts regarding the
monthly payments to Skinner. At least through July 2015, Diamond knew that
Skinner was receiving Management Fees even though ViaStone had not been
acquired, and he never sought to end regular payment of Management Fees to
Skinner Capital. Thus, Plaintiff had “full knowledge of [its] rights and the material
facts” regarding the Management Fees payments to Skinner Capital and nevertheless
“remain[ed] inactive for a considerable time.” Basho, 2018 WL 3326693, at *41.
Skinner has therefore proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff
acquiesced to the payment of $400,000 to Skinner Capital in Management Fees. 281
280
Pl.’s Post-Tr. Opening Br. 21.
281
PTO ¶ 12. Although Skinner Capital received $462,500 in Management Fees between
April 2014 and November 2015, the record only supports a finding that Diamond
acquiesced to payments of $20,000 per month, for a total of $400,000 over the twenty-
month period.
62
ii. The Purported Loans
In December 2015, after Blanch and Skinner had determined that purchasing
ViaStone was no longer possible, Clovis ceased to wire the monthly Management
Fees and instead wired Red Bridge and Skinner Capital $240,000 each. 282 In 2016,
Skinner wired $780,000 to Skinner Capital, consisting of six wires of $120,000 each
and one wire of $60,000.283 Skinner also wired $170,000 to Red Bridge in two
payments of $120,000 and $50,000, respectively. 284 Collectively, these payments
are described in this opinion as the “Purported Loans” because Defendants
characterize these payments as loans or advances of management fees.
The Purported Loans are breaches of Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement.
They are impermissible Interested Transactions because they are transactions
between Clovis and its own managers. Section 5.2 defines “Interested Transaction”
to include “any transaction evidencing a loan” to a manager or a manager’s affiliate.
Defendants cite no evidence indicating that the Purported Loans were pre-approved
by Clovis’s members, including Plaintiff. Blanch and Skinner cite no evidence that
they ever made any determination regarding the fairness and reasonableness of the
282
PTO ¶ 12.
283
Id.284
Id.63
Purported Loans as required by Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement. Defendants do
not argue that the Purported Loans complied with Section 5.2.
The Blanch Defendants argue, without citation to legal authority, that
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Purported Loans are not ripe because the Promissory
Notes are not due until 2030.285 They also argue that Diamond acquiesced to the
Purported Loans through his November 2016 email exchange with Eisenberg.286
Both arguments fail. The Promissory Notes are no defense to Plaintiff’s claim for
breach of the LLC Agreement. They are sham documents that were generated in
response to Eisenberg’s request for loan documentation. The Promissory Notes
purport to reflect loans from Clovis to Red Bridge in the amount of $240,000 and
$360,000, and a loan from Clovis to Skinner Capital in the amount of $660,000, with
2% interest rates and a maturity date at the end of 2030.287 The Promissory Notes
are not executed. 288 Skinner testified that he prepared the Promissory Notes after
the funds had already been paid to Skinner Capital and Red Bridge. 289
The
Promissory Notes bear dates indicating they were created after the Purported Loans
285
Blanch Defs.’ Post-Tr. Ans. Br. 12, 28. The Blanch Defendants did not raise a ripeness
defense on the Purported Loans prior to their post-trial answering brief.
286
Id. 32.
287
JX 401; JX 402; JX 403.
288
JX 401; JX 402; JX 403.
289
Tr. 492:6–12 (Skinner).
64
were made because they are dated December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2016.290
The loan amounts in the Promissory Notes do not match the amounts paid to Skinner
Capital and Red Bridge after November 2015. Also, for similar reasons as described
above with respect to the Management Fees, the Blanch Defendants’ argument that
Diamond acquiesced to the Purported Loans through his November 2016 email to
Eisenberg fails: Diamond could not have acquiesced to loans that were not, in fact,
loans. 291 Indeed, as of November 2015, the Promissory Notes did not even exist and
therefore Diamond could not have acquiesced to them. 292
Even if the Promissory Notes were not sham documents, there is no evidence
that Blanch or Skinner disclosed the Promissory Notes to Plaintiff as required by the
LLC Agreement. Diamond testified that he first saw the Promissory Notes during
this litigation.293 There is also no evidence that the terms of the Promissory Notes
were determined to be fair and reasonable pursuant to the requirements of the LLC
Agreement. Defendants did not present any experts. Skinner testified that he
believed that the Promissory Notes to Skinner Capital were commercially
290
JX 401; JX 402; JX 403.
291
See JX 317.
292
To the extent that Defendants imply that any difference between the Promissory Notes
and the payments to Skinner Capital and Red Bridge resulted from a purported advance of
management fees, the November 2016 email between Diamond and Eisenberg makes no
mention of advances of management fees or guaranteed payments, and Diamond therefore
could not have consented to any such advance. Id.
293
Tr. 141:3–10 (Diamond).
65
reasonable.294 This testimony is not credible because the terms of the Promissory
Notes are facially not commercially reasonable. They are 2% notes with a 15-year
maturity date, for hundreds of thousands of dollars, and there are no factual
circumstances warranting their issuance. The Purported Loans were breaches of
Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement.
iii. Defendants’ General Acquiescence and Unclean
Hands Defenses
Skinner argues that he did not commit any breach of the LLC Agreement
because all of his actions in controlling Clovis’s finances were purportedly done at
the “direction” of Diamond.295 At trial, Skinner testified that Diamond “knew what
payments were going on” and had “access to the checking [account].”296 In his post-
trial brief, Skinner contended that Diamond and Carter treated all of Diamond’s
entities as a single entity, that Diamond was able to monitor Clovis’s tax returns
through Eisenberg, that Skinner and Diamond spoke regularly, and that Diamond
“had complete control of Brian Skinner.”297 Skinner’s arguments are not supported
by any specific evidence and they are no defense to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of
the LLC Agreement. The evidence does not support Skinner’s claim that Diamond
294
Tr. 484:1–8 (Skinner).
295
Skinner’s Post-Tr. Br. 24.
296
Tr. 340:4–20 (Skinner).
297
Skinner’s Post-Tr. Br. 24.
66
directly controlled his actions. The connections between Diamond Carter Trading,
Clovis, and Maison do not support Skinner’s claim that they were all treated as a
singular entity.298 Apart from the Management Fees, as discussed above, Skinner
has cited no documentary evidence establishing that Diamond knew of any of the
other payments from Clovis to Skinner Capital or for Skinner’s personal expenses
before the payments occurred or that Diamond subsequently ratified them.
Most fundamental, the documentary evidence indicates that, rather than act
under Diamond’s control, Skinner sought to control and conceal financial
information regarding Clovis from Diamond. In 2015, Diamond asked Skinner to
“go over” some questions from Eisenberg relating to Clovis’s tax treatment of
payments to Richard and Skinner.299 In response, Skinner wrote “[Eisenberg] should
direct questions about Clovis to me. Makes no sense to relay the answers.
Everything below is wrong.”300 Skinner provided Schedule K-1s to Plaintiff that did
298
Skinner cites joint trial exhibits 598 and 627 in support of his argument that Clovis “was
an extension of Diamond Carter Trading, LLC.” Skinner’s Post-Tr. Br. 24. JX 598 is a
life insurance policy for Skinner. JX 627 is an email chain between Skinner and an attorney,
Christopher Ezold, regarding a telephonic conversation about ViaStone with Diamond and
Skinner’s direction to Ezold to create a limited liability company for the purchase of
ViaStone. The email chain is dated in the summer of 2013, before Clovis was created.
Neither document demonstrates that Clovis “was an extension of Diamond Carter Trading,
LLC,” as Skinner claims. Nor does Skinner provide legal support to treat the entities as
one.
299
JX 233.
300
Id.
67
not accurately reflect the Company’s actual assets and cash.301 In 2018, Skinner
directed Citrin Cooperman to send Diamond only Stone & Paper’s K-1, rather than
“the whole Clovis Tax Return.”302 Skinner even tacitly acknowledged in testimony
that his characterizations of treatment of payments from Clovis were inconsistent
and could raise potential tax liability issues. 303 At bottom, Skinner’s argument that
he acted in deference to Diamond is ultimately not credible because his actions—
including making payments to himself and Blanch from Clovis’s funds and
attempting to recharacterize the payments back and forth between salaries and
loans—are consistent with a course of conduct intended to profit himself at Stone &
Paper’s, and indirectly Diamond’s, expense.
The Blanch Defendants argue that any recovery by Plaintiff as to the
Management Fees should be barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. “The doctrine
of unclean hands is based on the long-established rule that if a party who seeks relief
in a Court of Equity ‘has violated conscience or good faith or other equitable
principles in his conduct, then the doors of the Court of Equity should be shut against
301
Compare JX 524 at P00211 (showing that Plaintiff’s capital account for Clovis held
approximately $1.7 million in assets at the end of 2016) and JX 523 at P0038 (showing
that Plaintiff’s capital account for Clovis held approximately $1.4 million in assets at the
end of 2017) with JX 503 at CITIBANK_001773, CITIBANK__001797 (showing that
Clovis only had approximately $194,000 in its only bank account at the end of 2016 and
$17,000 in its only bank account at the end of 2017).
302
JX 411.
303
Tr. 491:5–492:5 (Skinner).
68
him.’” Universal Enter. Gp., LP v. Duncan Petroleum Corp., 2014 WL 1760023, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2014) (quoting Bodley v. Jones, 50 A.2d 463, 469 (Del. 1947)),
aff’d, 99 A.3d 228 (Del. 2014) (ORDER). “[C]ourts of equity have extraordinarily
broad discretion in application of the [unclean hands] doctrine.” Nakahara v. NS
1991 Am. Tr., 718 A.2d 518, 522 (Del. Ch. 1998); SmithKline Beecham Pharm. Co.
v. Merck & Co., Inc., 766 A.2d 442, 448 (Del. 2000) (“The Court of Chancery has
broad discretion in determining whether to apply the doctrine of unclean hands.”).
For the doctrine of unclean hands to apply, Plaintiff’s inequitable conduct must
generally have an “immediate and necessary” relationship to its claims. Nakahara,
718 A.2d at 523. In applying the doctrine, the court must “‘examine the particular
transactions and circumstances involved . . . which are alleged to taint [the subject
of the suit.’” Id. at 523–24 (quoting Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S.
383, 388 (1944)).
The Blanch Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s recovery should be barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands defense based on the purported salary of $100,000 paid to
John Diamond and payments from Clovis to the AMEX Account that allegedly
benefited Diamond and Carter. Neither argument is persuasive. Diamond testified
that Skinner wanted to pay him the $100,000 salary in exchange for computer
programming services, and this testimony was credible. Diamond did not demand
the salary. There was no reason why he would have done so: the $100,000 repaid
69
to Plaintiff was money that Diamond had invested in Clovis just days earlier, and
Diamond did not behave inequitably by accepting Skinner’s representation that
Clovis would need his computer programming services.304 I find more credible
Plaintiff’s theory that Skinner offered monthly payments to Diamond to later justify
any objections to the monthly payments to Skinner Capital and Red Bridge. With
respect to the AMEX Account, Skinner was responsible for all of the charges
allocated to Clovis on the AMEX Account, 305 and Defendants have not established
that any of Skinner’s allocations resulted from inequitable conduct by Plaintiff.
The Defendants bear the burden of persuasion to establish unclean hands by a
preponderance of the evidence. I am not persuaded that the conduct of Plaintiff or
its principals warrants denial of relief. Plaintiff received $100,000 in unauthorized
payments from Clovis. I find that Skinner proposed those payments, which equated
304
Tr. 48:6–49:11 (Diamond) (“I said to him, you know, we just put in 3 1/2 million. You
don’t have to give any money back. I don’t understand. If you have computer
programming to do, I’ll do it for free. I don’t care.”).
305
Tr. 444:16–449:17 (Skinner). Skinner testified that he discussed allocating AMEX
Account charges between Diamond Carter Trading and Clovis with Diamond and that
Diamond would “ultimately approve the Diamond Carter Trading tax return.” Tr. 458:4–
11 (Skinner); Tr. 441:3–442:13 (Skinner). Skinner’s testimony does not prove that
Diamond knew that Skinner was misallocating funds between the entities, and Skinner’s
own description of the process suggests that Skinner was primarily responsible for the
allocation. See Tr. 446:21–23 (Skinner) (testifying that he would allocate charges between
the entities “quickly, talk to John, tell him what we’re going to do, and give it to the
accountants”); Tr. 442:6–8 (Skinner) (“Did John and I sit down and go through with a fine-
tooth comb every charge? No. Most of the time we just looked at the year-end
summary.”); see also Tr. 459:20–460:8 (Skinner) (testifying that “there was no rhyme or
reason” as to how charges were allocated between entities).
70
to a fraction of Plaintiff’s $3.5 million investment in the Company, which Skinner
and Blanch control as its managers. Skinner was also the manager responsible for
allocating expenses charged to the AMEX account. There is no evidence that
Plaintiff or Diamond transferred any funds from Clovis or attempted to conceal the
payments that Skinner made to Plaintiff. “This court has consistently refused to
apply the doctrine of unclean hands to bar an otherwise valid claim of relief where
the doctrine would work an inequitable result.” Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940
A.2d 43, 81 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Dittrick v. Chalfant, 948 A.2d 400, 408 n.18
(Del. Ch. 2007)). Applying the doctrine in these circumstances would also work an
inequitable result, allowing the Defendants to keep their ill-gotten gains through
breaches of loyalty and deception, to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Company.
As the court held at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s claim for breach
of contract pursuant to Section 5.2 states a direct claim against Blanch and Skinner
because it is a “personal right belonging to the members” of Clovis. 2019
Memorandum Opinion, 2019 WL 2374005, at *4. Accordingly, Stone & Paper is
entitled to recover directly from Blanch and Skinner with respect to the claim for
breach of Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement.
c. Sections 4.10 and 10.7
Section 4.10 requires Clovis to provide the Members with annual financial
disclosures in the form of a statement of cash flows, a report setting forth the
71
Members’ closing capital accounts, and a copy of each Member’s Schedule K-1.306
Section 10.7 requires Clovis to “maintain records and accounts of all operations and
expenditures of the Company.”307
Skinner did not maintain any financial records for Clovis, including cash flow
statements, general ledgers, or profit and loss statements.308 The only financial
records available for Clovis are its bank account statement from Citibank and its tax
records. The Blanch Defendants argue that Eisenberg kept Clovis’s books and
records. 309 This argument is unsupported by any citation to the factual record or
legal authority, and it does not absolve Skinner and Blanch from their contractual
obligation to maintain books and records or provide them to members consistent
with the terms of the LLC Agreement. Skinner’s and Blanch’s failure to maintain
any financial records for Clovis constituted a breach of Sections 4.10 and 10.7 of the
LLC Agreement.
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Plaintiff claims that Blanch and Skinner, as managers of Clovis, breached
their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care “by improperly diverting the bulk of the
306
LLC Agreement § 4.10.
307
Id. § 10.7.
308
Tr. 404:18–406:12 (Skinner).
309
Blanch Defs.’ Ans. Br. 39.
72
Company’s capital to their member-affiliates.” 310 Clovis is a Delaware limited
liability company. Under Delaware law, “LLC agreements import corporate
fiduciary duties by default, unless the pertinent agreement provides to the contrary.”
Marubeni Spar One, LLC v. Williams Field Servs. - Gulf Coast Co., L.P., 2020 WL
64761, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2020); see also Beach to Bay Real Estate Ctr. LLC
v. Beach to Bay Realtors Inc., 2017 WL 2928033, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 10, 2017)
(“Delaware LLCs are known for their contractual flexibility; however, our Courts
have interpreted the Delaware LLC Act to imply default fiduciary duties
to managers of a LLC unless such duties are clearly disclaimed.”) (emphasis in
original). Section 18-1101(e) of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the
“Act”) provides that “a limited liability company agreement may provide for the
limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach
of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager or other person to a
limited liability company” except with respect to “bad faith violation[s] of the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” 311
Section 4.3 of the LLC Agreement, titled “Fiduciary Duties of the Managers,”
provides, in its entirety, that “A Manager shall perform his duties hereunder in good
310
Pl.’s Post-Trial Opening Br. 29.
311
6 Del. C. § 18-1101(e).
73
faith and in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Act.” 312 The LLC
Agreement does, however, contain a limitation on personal liability. Section 7.1(a)
provides that the managers “shall not have personal liability to the Company or its
Members for any breach of duty in such capacity, provided that nothing in this
Section 7.1(a) shall eliminate or limit the liability of any such Manager or Officer if
a judgment . . . establishes that his or her acts or omissions were in bad faith or
involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or that he or she
personally gained in fact a financial benefit to which he or she is not entitled.”313
The LLC Agreement does not expressly disclaim fiduciary duties, and Defendants
do not argue otherwise.
This court recently elaborated on the fiduciary duties of a manager of a
Delaware limited liability company:
In the limited liability context, as in the corporate context, the duty of
loyalty mandates that the best interest of the company and its
stakeholders take precedence over any interest possessed by the
manager and not shared by the stakeholders generally. A manager is
not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
their private interests. Nor can fiduciaries intentionally act with a
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation. Specifically, and very pertinently to this case, such
fiduciary duties include the duty not to cause the corporation to effect
a transaction that would benefit the fiduciary at the expense of the
minority stockholders.
312
LLC Agreement § 4.3.
313
Id. § 7.1(a).
74
Largo Legacy Grp., LLC v. Charles, 2021 WL 2692426, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 30,
2021) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, “[a] failure to act in good faith may
be shown . . . where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation.” In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.,
907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
Blanch and Skinner breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty to the Company.
Blanch and Skinner acted in bad faith by approving the Management Fees and the
Purported Loans as payments to Red Bridge and Skinner Capital. Those transactions
were designed to enrich Blanch and Skinner at Clovis’s expense and were not
intended to “advance[e] the best interests” of Clovis. As described above, these
payments were not authorized in the manner required by the LLC Agreement, did
not advance Clovis’s interests, and were often made to support Blanch’s and
Skinner’s personal expenses. The record reflects that Blanch and Skinner were
conscious of their wrongdoing because each engaged in acts of subterfuge designed
to conceal their conduct. Blanch, with Vivianna’s assistance, attempted to create a
misleading paper trail regarding Red Bridge and the source of its funds, and
attempted to shelter payments from Clovis to Red Bridge through Vivianna
Blanch. 314 After abandoning an acquisition of ViaStone, Skinner accelerated
314
JX 74; JX 77; JX 81; see also Tr. 881:5–18 (V. Blanch). Vivianna testified that she
assumed that the misrepresentations regarding Red Bridge were intended to assist in
sheltering assets from claimants in the Metier Action. This assumption does not affect my
75
payments from Clovis to Skinner Capital, attempted to disguise them as loans
through the sham Promissory Notes, and then later attempted to recharacterize them
as guaranteed payments to Clovis’s accountants. These acts demonstrate that
Blanch’s and Skinner’s breaches were intentional. Further, for the reasons described
above, Blanch and Skinner breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty. Thus, apart from
Diamond’s acquiescence to Skinner paying Skinner Capital $400,000 in
Management Fees, the Management Fees and the Purported Loans constitute
breaches of Blanch’s and Skinner’s fiduciary duties of loyalty.315
Plaintiff has also established that Skinner breached his fiduciary duties with
respect to the payments to the AMEX Account.316 From 2014 to 2017, Skinner
allocated over $535,000 of AMEX Account charges to Clovis. During that same
time period, Skinner paid approximately $510,000 to the AMEX Account from
determination. Blanch’s actions are consistent with a motive to shelter unauthorized
payments from Clovis from any scrutiny, not just from claimants in the Metier Action.
315
Because Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and breach of contract claim may
affect the measure of damages, it is necessary to adjudicate both claims. Backer v.
Palisades Growth Cap. II, L.P., 246 A.3d 81, 109 (Del. 2021) (“The bootstrapping case
law only requires dismissal where a fiduciary duty claim wholly overlaps with a concurrent
breach of contract claim,” and recognizing that this court may decline to treat such claims
as duplicative where different remedies may result). See also 2019 Memorandum Opinion,
2019 WL 2374005, at *6 n.57 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (holding, at the motion to dismiss
stage, that the breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims could proceed because
they were grounded in distinct factual allegations).
316
Plaintiff generally argues that both Skinner and Blanch breached their fiduciary duties
with respect to the AMEX Account payments, but Plaintiff has not established that Blanch
is or should be responsible for those payments, which were processed only by Skinner.
76
Clovis’s funds. Plaintiff has established that many, if not most, of the charges that
Skinner allocated to Clovis (and then paid for with Clovis’s funds) were in Skinner’s
self-interest rather than in Clovis’s interest. For example, in 2014, over $100,000 of
the $175,104 that Skinner allocated to Clovis were for strip clubs that Skinner
frequented alone.317 Although some of the charges that Skinner allocated to Clovis
may have had legitimate Clovis-related purposes, Skinner did not allocate the
charges between Diamond Carter Trading and Clovis on any principled basis.
Skinner testified that there was “no rhyme or reason exactly how they got
allocated.”318 Skinner’s inability to properly account for the charges on the AMEX
Account with any specificity cannot be not a defense to Plaintiff’s allegation that
Skinner used Clovis’s funds to pay the AMEX Account in bad faith. By continually
allocating his personal expenses to Clovis and then using Clovis’s funds to pay for
those expenses, Skinner acted in bad faith as a manager of Clovis with respect to
payments to the AMEX Account.
The LLC Agreement’s limitation on liability provides that “[t]he Managers
and Officers shall not have personal liability to the Company or its Members for any
breach of duty in such capacity, provided that nothing in this Section 7.1(a) shall
317
JX 649; Tr. 452:13–16 (Skinner).
Tr. 459:24–8 (Skinner) (“Sometimes it was accurate and sometimes it was just, hey, put
318
some on this entity, put some on that entity.”).
77
eliminate or limit the liability of any such Manager or Officer if a judgment . . .
establishes that his or her acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law or that he or she personally gained in fact
a financial benefit to which he or she is not entitled.”319 In this case, the limitation
of liability does not apply because Blanch and Skinner’s conduct was intentional and
because they each, through their respective LLCs, gained a financial benefit to which
they were not entitled. Blanch and Skinner are personally liable for their breaches
of fiduciary duty.
3. Fraud
Plaintiff claims that Blanch, Skinner, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital
committed fraud in two respects. First, Plaintiff argues that the defendants
fraudulently induced Plaintiff to invest $3.5 million into Clovis. Second, Plaintiff
argues that the defendants fraudulently concealed their draining of Clovis’s funds.
Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must prove fraud by a preponderance of the
evidence. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 54 (Del. Ch. 2001).320
319
LLC Agreement § 7.1(a).
320
Some parties have argued that the standard for fraud in Delaware is clear and convincing
evidence. Cf. Ross Hldg. & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Grp., LLC, 2014 WL 4374261,
at *37 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (applying clear and convincing evidence standard to a fraud
in the inducement claim). Ross did not state the burden for a common law fraud claim
under Delaware law. Instead, the case involved a fraud claim under New Jersey law. See
id. at *37 & n.283 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1247 (N.J. 2006),
for the applicable standard). In an earlier opinion in that case, the court observed: “The
parties agree that New Jersey law governs the substantive issues in this case.” Ross Hldg.
78
a. Fraudulent Inducement
“The elements of fraudulent inducement are the same as those of common law
fraud.” Trascent Mgmt. Consulting, LLC v. Bouri, 2018 WL 4293359, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 10, 2018) (internal citations omitted). The elements of fraud are:
(1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant;
(2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was
false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent
to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff’s
action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation;
and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.
Id. (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d
457, 461-62 (Del. 1999)). Fraud can be committed through “(1) an overt
misrepresentation; (2) silence in the face of a duty to speak; or (3) active
concealment of material facts.” In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 804 (Del.
Ch. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Louisiana v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 11 A.3d 228 (Del. 2011). A party that owes
common law fiduciary duties owes a duty to speak. Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner,
LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
& Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Grp., LLC, 2010 WL 1838608, at *5 n.10 (Del. Ch. Apr.
28, 2010). In addition, the post-trial briefs addressed the fraud claim under New Jersey
law. See Ross Hldg. & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Grp., LLC, C.A. No. 4113-VCN
(Dkt. 278), Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 78 (“A cause of action in legal fraud in New
Jersey requires the proof of five elements by clear and convincing evidence . . . .” (emphasis
in original)); id. (Dkt. 248), Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 39 (citing New Jersey case law for the
elements of fraud). The parties here have briefed the fraud claims under Delaware law and
none of them have argued that any other state’s law applies.
79
As discussed above, the LLC Agreement does not eliminate Blanch’s and Skinner’s
fiduciary duties.
Plaintiff claims that Blanch, Skinner, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital
“fraudulently induced Plaintiff to invest in Clovis.” 321 In support of their fraud
theory, Plaintiff argues that Skinner and Blanch “knowingly and falsely represented
that: (1) Clovis was a legitimate business being formed to purchase ViaStone; (2)
Plaintiff’s capital investment would be used solely to fund the purchase and
operations of ViaStone; (3) the purchase of ViaStone was imminent; and (4) Drew
Aaron would be involved in providing order flow for the post-acquisition
ViaStone.”322 Plaintiff therefore seeks all of its $3.4 million invested—$3.5 million
minus the $100,000 previously paid to Plaintiff—as a damages award from Skinner
and Blanch.
Plaintiff’s fraud claim proceeds from the premise that Clovis was a sham
entity ab initio. Plaintiff cites an email between Skinner and Blanch prior to the
formation of Clovis in which Blanch urges Skinner to persuade Diamond and Carter
to set aside funds under Skinner’s control for Skinner to invest on their behalf.323
This email does not establish that Clovis was an illegitimate business or not intended
321
Pl.’s Post-Tr. Opening Br. 35.
322
Id.323
JX 4.
80
to acquire ViaStone. Blanch’s email proposes a course of action to enable Skinner
to leverage Diamond’s and Carter’s money to enrich himself through salary and
equity through various deals (including a deal with Metier). 324 Blanch speculates
that Skinner will be able to obtain significant returns from Diamond’s and Carter’s
investments and that this will be “lucrative, long term, for all parties,” including
Diamond and Carter.325 In a similar vein, Plaintiff cites an email between Skinner
and Blanch prior to the formation of Clovis in which Blanch and Skinner discuss the
possibility of working directly with TLM rather than acquiring ViaStone.326 The
email indicates that Skinner and Blanch consider this a secondary plan—a Plan B—
to the acquisition of ViaStone. Though Blanch states “we might need to go straight
to China and buy direct,” he also sets out “next steps” for the acquisition of ViaStone
and demeans the ViaStone managers for purportedly failing to understand the
benefits that Clovis purchasing ViaStone will provide to them. 327
I am not persuaded that Blanch and Skinner never intended for Clovis to
acquire ViaStone. For more than a year after forming Clovis, Blanch and Skinner
324
JX 4 (advising Skinner to “secure your $180,000 base salary,” to “participate in the
upside of D+C deals,” and to “utilize D+C capital to slowly diversify the business into
other categories of finance”).
325
Id. (“Meantime, you are building a track record for D+C, for Brian Skinner and doing
it at a rather low commitment. Much more lucrative, long term, for all parties, then having
$10MM in an underfunded hedge fund.”).
326
JX 29.
327
Id.81
performed work on behalf of Clovis to generate interest for ViaStone’s stone paper
products, including by meeting with Chow and potential stone paper customers.328
Blanch and Skinner directed their attorney, Okulski, to take an aggressive position
with Chow during negotiations to purchase ViaStone.329 But this course of
conduct—however mendacious—contradicts Plaintiff’s theory that Clovis was a
sham designed to defraud it into handing over $3.5 million to Defendants. At least
initially, Blanch and Skinner acted to maximize leverage for the possible acquisition
of ViaStone and to lay the groundwork for the possibility of lucrative customer
relationships after the acquisition. The fact that their initial strategy did not succeed
does not mean that Blanch’s and Skinner’s intent at Clovis’s formation was to
defraud Plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that it was told that the purchase of ViaStone was
“imminent,” that Aaron was going to supply ViaStone with paper orders, and that
its investment would only be used “to fund the purchase and operations of
328
Tr. 626:9–627:13 (R. Blanch) (testifying that Clovis spent “four years doing nonstop
testing, due diligence, paper trials, [and] client meetings.”). Though Plaintiff faults
Defendants for failing to secure any agreements or benefits to Clovis through this work,
Pl.’s Opening Br. 32, Plaintiff does not contest that these meetings and this work actually
occurred. The evidence indicates Blanch and Skinner performed work regarding the
subjects listed by Blanch in his testimony at least nominally on behalf of Clovis for some
period after its formation. See PX 1; PX 4, PX 6; PX 7; JX 201; see ViaStone Rule 30(b)(6)
Dep. 63:6–7 (“Brian was at most all of the meetings more than Richard.”).
329
JX 191.
82
ViaStone.”330 Plaintiff has failed to establish fraudulent inducement based on these
representations. Plaintiff cites Diamond’s testimony that he was repeatedly told that
everything was “going well” with the stone paper business and that in August 2014,
he was told that an acquisition of ViaStone was imminent.331 These statements post-
date Clovis’s formation and Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that these statements were knowingly false or made with a reckless
indifference to the truth at the time that they were made.
Plaintiff’s evidence regarding representations by Blanch to Diamond
regarding Aaron’s involvement in Clovis do not prove that Clovis was intended to
defraud Plaintiff from the outset. Plaintiff cites a February 2014 email from Blanch
to Diamond and others pressuring them to invest sooner to take advantage of a
prospective 20,000 ton order from Aaron. 332 The contemporaneous evidence,
however, indicates that Blanch believed that Aaron was going to make an order from
ViaStone. In December 2013, Blanch advised his attorney that Aaron would not be
investing in the acquisition entity for ViaStone, but that he would be providing a
“$23MM opening order for paper” “through Tier 1/ViaStone.” 333 Blanch stated that
Aaron’s anticipated 20,000 ton “order automatically makes our company legitimate
330
Pl.’s Post-Tr. Opening Br. 35.
331
Tr. 59:12–21 (Diamond); Tr. 118:13–119:1 (Diamond).
332
JX 44.
333
JX 35.
83
and makes us all money.” 334 Diamond met with Blanch, Skinner, and Aaron in
October 2013, which convinced Diamond to invest in ViaStone. 335 In January 2014,
Blanch and Aaron were actively discussing the possibility of Aaron making a 20,000
ton order from ViaStone. 336 Aaron did not testify in this action. There is no evidence
from which the Court can determine that Blanch’s statement was knowingly false or
made with a reckless indifference to the truth. Plaintiff’s arguments that Blanch and
Skinner falsely represented that its investment would only be used “to fund the
purchase and operations of ViaStone” fail because the contract does not expressly
require Blanch and Skinner to exclusively use Clovis’s investment to first purchase
and then operate ViaStone.337 It is also contradicted by Diamond’s agreement to
allow Skinner to take a $20,000 monthly fee starting in April 2014 and Diamond’s
acceptance of $10,000 in monthly payments to Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore has not
proven that Blanch and Skinner fraudulently induced Plaintiff to invest in Clovis.
b. Fraudulent Concealment
To establish a claim for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff must prove the
following elements: “(1) [d]eliberate concealment by the defendant of a material
past or present fact, or silence in the face of a duty to speak; (2) [t]hat the defendant
334
JX 44.
335
Tr. 19:13–20:6 (Diamond).
336
JX 592.
337
LLC Agreement §§ 1.1(kk), 5.2.
84
acted with scienter; (3) [a]n intent to induce plaintiff’s reliance upon the
concealment; (4) [c]ausation; and (5) [d]amages resulting from the concealment.”
DG BF, LLC v. Ray, 2021 WL 776742, at *20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2021) (quoting
Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987)).
The record is replete with evidence that Skinner and Blanch purposefully
aimed to conceal their self-dealing from Plaintiff. Blanch’s and Skinner’s
communications with Clovis’s accountants, characterizing payments from Clovis to
Skinner Capital and Red Bridge as loans, worked a fraud on the Plaintiff because
they were not loans. 338 Skinner’s instructions in 2018 to Citrin Cooperman to
recharacterize certain loans as guaranteed payments was a further intentional act to
conceal the nature of the payments, as were the Promissory Notes themselves. 339 In
addition, the Schedule K-1s that Skinner provided to Plaintiff indicated that
Plaintiff’s capital account was worth $1.7 million at the end of 2016 and $1.4 million
at the end of 2017,340 while Clovis held only $193,000 in its bank account at the end
of 2016 and $16,000 in its bank account at the end of 2017.341 Skinner and Blanch
338
See Tr. 1065:14–21 (Eisenberg) (testifying that Richard and Skinner instructed him to
treat $240,000 disbursements as loans); JX 233 (Skinner informing Diamond that only he
should communicate with Eisenberg).
339
JX 406.
340
JX 524 at P00211; JX 523 at P0038.
341
JX 503 at CITIBANK_1773.
85
sought to keep Diamond uninformed about Clovis’s financial status,342 and they
were frustrated when their accountants notified Diamond about the
recharacterization of the loans.343
These acts constituted “overt misrepresentation[s]” and “active concealment
of material facts,” and I find that they were knowingly false. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
965 A.2d at 804. Skinner and Blanch engaged in a broad scheme intended to induce
Plaintiff into inaction regarding their misappropriation of funds from Clovis,
Plaintiff was induced into inaction, and Plaintiff’s interests were damaged as a result.
Id. For the foregoing reasons, Blanch and Skinner are liable for fraudulent
concealment. Their fraudulent concealment, however, does not support a damages
award beyond the damages awardable from Skinner’s and Blanch’s breaches of
contract and fiduciary duty. In its briefing, Plaintiff argues that Blanch and Skinner
intended to prevent Plaintiff from requesting an early return of its capital. But the
LLC Agreement prevented Plaintiff from obtaining a return of capital without the
managers’ approval, so Plaintiff was not harmed in that manner. Plaintiff’s damages
resulting from Blanch’s and Skinner’s fraudulent concealment are already subject to
In an email, Skinner instructed Citrin Cooperman to send Diamond “only the Stone and
342
Paper Investors K-1,” stating that “he does not need the whole Clovis Tax Return.” JX
411. Skinner carefully added, “[i]f this is not possible please let me know.” Id.343
When a Citrin Cooperman accountant copied Diamond on her response to Skinner’s
request to convert part of the loan to a guaranteed payment, Skinner sent a separate email
to Blanch: “FYI, Spencer had her add John Diamond. I will take that up with Spencer.”
JX 414.
86
recovery by Plaintiff through its breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
claims.
4. Civil Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting
Plaintiff also asserts claims that Defendants engaged in civil conspiracy and
that Vivianna Blanch, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital aided and abetted the
breaches of fiduciary duty and contract by Blanch and Skinner. “[C]ivil conspiracy
and aiding and abetting are quite similar.” Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG
Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 2014 WL 6703980, at *22 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014).
“The two theories differ in their emphasis: ‘[A]iding and abetting is a cause of action
that focuses on the wrongful act of providing assistance, unlike civil conspiracy that
focuses on the agreement.’” Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City,
Missouri Tr. v. Presidio, Inc., 251 A.3d 212, 282 (Del. Ch. 2021) (quoting
WaveDivision Hldgs., LLC v. Highland Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 2011 WL 5314507, at *17
(Del. Super. Nov. 2, 2011), aff’d, 49 A.3d 1168 (Del. 2012)). “This court largely
has equated claims for aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy, noting that the two
theories often cover the same ground and that the distinctions usually are not
material.” Id.The elements for civil conspiracy are “(i) a confederation or combination of
two or more persons; (ii) an unlawful act done in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
(iii) damages resulting from the action of the conspiracy parties.” Agspring Holdco,
87
LLC v. NGP X US Hldgs., L.P., 2020 WL 4355555, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2020)
(internal citations omitted). A plaintiff need not “prove the existence of an explicit
agreement; a conspiracy can be inferred from the pled behavior of the alleged
conspirators.” Am. Int’l Group, 965 A.2d at 806.
Plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants
engaged in a civil conspiracy to misappropriate Clovis’s funds. For the reasons
described above, I find that all of the Defendants formed part of the conspiracy to
misappropriate Clovis’s funds because Blanch, Vivianna Blanch, and Skinner acted
in concert to misappropriate funds from Clovis. Blanch and Skinner paid themselves
Management Fees in breach of the LLC Agreement. They directed the payment of
those fees to Skinner Capital and Red Bridge. After definitively deciding not to
acquire ViaStone, Blanch and Skinner turned to looting Clovis. They accelerated
payments to Red Bridge and Skinner Capital for their personal use and acted jointly
to instruct Eisenberg to recharacterize the $240,000 disbursements to Red Bridge
and Skinner Capital as loans rather than guaranteed payments.344 Skinner interceded
with Diamond to avoid scrutiny of payments to Red Bridge. 345 Blanch and Skinner
each relied on the sham Promissory Notes to disguise their self-dealing. Blanch and
344
Tr. 1065:14–24 (Eisenberg).
345
Tr. 124:9–125:25 (Diamond).
88
Skinner regularly communicated with each other, both before and after they formed
Clovis, and they excluded Diamond from most of their communications. 346
Vivianna Blanch participated in the conspiracy. She is Red Bridge’s sole
member. She established a bank account for the purpose of receiving Blanch’s
Management Fees, under false pretenses. She then used the money flowing into Red
Bridge to pay for personal expenses.347 Vivianna Blanch testified that she knew that
Red Bridge was being formed to shield payments from recovery. 348
346
See, e.g., JX 414 (February 23, 2018 email from Blanch to Skinner, informing Skinner
that, to their chagrin, Clovis’s accountants had copied Diamond on an email chain about
Clovis forgiving loans made to Skinner Capital).
347
Tr. 930:7–9 (V. Blanch). There is no credible evidence adduced at trial that any person
other than Vivianna Blanch was ever a member of Red Bridge, and Vivianna Blanch was
repeatedly held out as Red Bridge’s sole member. See, e.g., JX 42 (Blanch stating that Red
Bridge “is my wife’s company”); JX 78 (agreement to open an account at First Republic
Bank listing Vivianna as the sole signer); JX 353 (June 3, 2017 email from Blanch to
Diamond, Carter, and Skinner, stating that Red Bridge is “an LLC owned by Vivianna
Blanch”). During discovery, the Blanch Defendants produced an operating agreement of
Red Bridge dated April 18, 2014 purporting to reduce Vivianna’s ownership of Red Bridge
to 1%. The operating agreement is not a credible document. The document was produced
with no metadata, it is inconsistent with other documents, and Vivianna testified at her
deposition that she did not know when she signed the document. V. Blanch Dep. 102:16–
103:2. Vivianna’s testimony regarding this issue at trial was disjointed and unreliable. Tr.
916:19–22 (V. Blanch) (“Q. And when did you sign this document? A. In April. Q. Of
this year? A. I think it was dated 2014.”). It was a conscious attempt to avoid damaging
testimony regarding the provenance of the document. In their opening post-trial brief,
Plaintiff argued that the operating agreement was a sham document. Pl.’s Opening Post-
Tr. Br. 51–53. The Blanch Defendants did not respond to this argument or make any
argument regarding Red Bridge’s purported operating agreement, and any such argument
is waived.
348
Tr. 881:5–18 (V. Blanch) (“I made the assumption that it was to help mitigate any risk
from the previous lawsuit . . . . So I didn’t ask too many questions. I just said, sure. Just
let me know what I need to do.”).
89
Blanch and Skinner misappropriated funds from Clovis in breach of their
fiduciary duty of loyalty and, in so doing, committed fraud. They did so with the
aid of Vivianna Blanch, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital. These unlawful acts
caused damage to Clovis, and so each of the elements of civil conspiracy has been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Vivianna Blanch, Red Bridge, and
Skinner Capital aided and abetted Blanch’s and Skinner’s breaches of fiduciary duty.
To prove aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove “(i)
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a breach of the fiduciary's duty, (iii)
knowing participation in that breach by the defendants, and (iv) damages
proximately caused by the breach.” RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d
816, 862 (Del. 2015). Claims for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty and
civil conspiracy “often rise and fall together.” In re Pattern Energy Group Inc.
S’holders Litig., 2021 WL 1812674, at *76 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2021).
For the reasons described above, Blanch and Skinner breached their fiduciary
duties owed to Clovis. Vivianna Blanch, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital
knowingly participated in those breaches. They were mechanisms through which
Blanch and Skinner obtained and funneled the misappropriated assets. Vivianna
Blanch actively participated in creating a bank account for Red Bridge for receipt of
the funds from Clovis, falsely representing that the funds were the product of a
90
consulting agreement she had with the Company. She provided no services to the
Company. She was the sole member of Red Bridge, and her “knowing behavior . .
. and her knowledge can be imputed to Red Bridge.” 2019 Memorandum Opinion,
2019 WL 2374005, at 7. Similarly, Skinner’s knowledge of his improper conduct
can be imputed to Skinner Capital.
“[T]he receipt of improper benefits suffices to prove their participation in the
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.” Carlton Investments v. TLC Beatrice Int’l
Hldgs., Inc., 1995 WL 694397, at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1995); see also 2019
Memorandum Opinion, 2019 WL 2374005, at *7 (holding, at the motion to dismiss
stage, that Plaintiff’s Complaint stated a claim for aiding and abetting fiduciary duty
liability because Vivianna Blanch and Skinner Capital accepted “large monetary
payments directly from the Company for an extended period of time” without
performing substantial work or conferring other benefits to Clovis). The
misappropriations proximately caused damage to Clovis. Plaintiff has therefore
proven its claim for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against Vivianna
Blanch, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital.349
349
Because I find that Vivianna Blanch, Red Bridge, and Skinner Capital are liable for civil
conspiracy and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, I need not reach Plaintiff’s
veil-piercing claim that Blanch, Vivianna Blanch, and Red Bridge are each separately
liable for damages against the Blanch Defendants.
91
B. Nominal Defendant Clovis’s Affirmative Counterclaims
The crux of Clovis’s counterclaims is that Stone & Paper breached the LLC
Agreement. Clovis alleges that Stone & Paper violated two provisions of the LLC
Agreement. The first provision is Section 4.9, which governs reimbursement of
expenses from Clovis: “The Managers will receive from the Company
reimbursement for all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred upon submission
of receipts for such expenses; provided that the reimbursement of any expense item
in excess of $5,000 shall require Board approval.”350 The managers of Clovis are
Skinner and Blanch; 351 Stone & Paper is a passive investor, not a manager.352 As
the Court held in the 2020 Memorandum Opinion, Section 4.9 “only govern[s] the
relationship between the between the managers and the Company and do[es] not
impose any obligations on Stone & Paper.” 2020 Memorandum Opinion, 2020 WL
3496694, at *7 n.29. Because Section 4.9 does not impose any obligation on Stone
& Paper, Stone & Paper did not breach Section 4.9. See Lavender v. Koenig, 2017
WL 443696, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017) (“Defendants must have owed
Plaintiffs a contractual obligation in order for Plaintiffs to assert successfully a
350
LLC Agreement § 4.9.
351
Id. §§ 1.1(v), 4.1(a).
352
Tr. 120:3–121:15 (Diamond).
92
breach of contract claim.”) (citing H–M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129,
140 (Del. Ch. 2003)), aff’d, 171 A.3d 1117 (Del. 2017).
The second provision is Section 9.6, which governs withdrawal of capital:
A Member shall not be entitled to demand or receive from the
Company the liquidation of his or its Membership Interest in the
Company until the Company is dissolved . . . . Notwithstanding the
foregoing . . . , [Stone & Paper] may request the return of its initial
Capital Contribution, provided such amounts are available and
approved by the Board consisting of at least two (2) Managers.353
Clovis argues that Stone & Paper received a return of its initial capital contribution
without approval of both managers, in violation of Section 9.6 of the LLC
Agreement, when Clovis (1) paid ten $10,000 monthly payments to Diamond in
2014 (the “2014 Payments”), (2) paid $510,124.35 to the AMEX Account, and (3)
paid $21,000 for the Milton Berg newsletter.
1. The 2014 Payments
In early 2014, Skinner proposed paying $10,000 each month to Stone & Paper
in exchange for Diamond performing computer programming services for Clovis.354
From April 2014 to December 2014, Clovis sent to Stone & Paper a total of $100,000
over ten payments. 355 Skinner authorized and processed these payments.356
353
LLC Agreement § 9.6.
354
Tr. 48:6–49:11 (Diamond).
355
JX 643 at P06297.
356
Tr. 49:2–11 (Diamond).
93
Diamond received the last payment in December 2014, after Aaron learned about
the payments and asked that they be stopped.357 Diamond never performed any
computer programming for Clovis. 358 Diamond considered the $100,000 to be a
return of capital to Stone & Paper,359 and he kept $70,000 for himself and transferred
$30,000 to Carter, per their ownership shares in Stone & Paper.360
Clovis argues that the $100,000 was an improper return of capital to Stone &
Paper, in violation of Section 9.6 of the LLC Agreement, which permits return of
Stone & Paper’s initial capital contribution only upon request with approval of the
managers. Clovis also argues that Stone & Paper was unjustly enriched by the
$100,000 payment. 361 The 2014 Payments form the basis for the only portion of
Clovis’s claim for unjust enrichment that survived Stone & Paper’s motion to
dismiss. 362
357
Id.
358
Tr. 99:16–21 (Diamond).
359
Tr. 108:18–109:17 (Diamond) (“The plaintiff, Stone & Paper Investors, who had
invested $3.5 million, received $100,000 back of its initial capital contribution.”).
360
Tr. 96:10–97:10 (Diamond).
361
In its post-trial briefing, Clovis generally states that Stone & Paper was unjustly
enriched by all three actions, but the substance of the briefing only focused on the aspects
of the unjust enrichment claim that were previously dismissed in the 2020 Memorandum
Opinion. Def.’s Opening Post-Tr. Br. 13–14. Stone & Paper argues that Clovis abandoned
its unjust enrichment claim as to the 2014 Payments by not substantively addressing it in
post-trial briefing. Pl.’s Ans. Post-Tr. Br. 34. Because I am denying Clovis’s
counterclaims on other grounds, it is not necessary to determine whether Clovis has waived
this argument by only making a mere mention of it in its brief.
362
2020 Memorandum Opinion, 2020 WL 3496694, at *13.
94
Clovis’s claims with regard to the 2014 Payments are barred by laches.
“[Laches] is generally defined as an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing
suit after the plaintiff learned of an infringement of his rights, thereby resulting in
material prejudice to the defendant.” Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182 (Del. 2009).
“Under ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will not be stayed for laches before,
and will be stayed after, the time fixed by the analogous statute of limitations at law.”
Id. at 183 (quoting Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69, 72–73 (Del. 1923)). “Absent a
tolling of the limitations period, a party’s failure to file within the analogous period
of limitations will be given great weight in deciding whether the claims are barred
by laches.” Whittington v. Dragon Grp., L.L.C., 991 A.2d 1, 9 (Del. 2009). For
Clovis’s contract claims, “the analogous statute of limitations is 10 Del. C. § 8106,
under which a breach of contract action must be brought within three years from the
date that the cause of action accrued.” Levey v. Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 76
A.3d 764, 768 (Del. 2013). Similarly, “Delaware law sets a three[-]year statute of
limitations for claims for unjust enrichment.” Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs.
N.V., 2009 WL 4345724, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2009).
“Typically, the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues, not when the injury is discovered.” Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 451
(Del. Ch. 2008). Clovis’s claims accrued when the last of the 2014 Payments was
made in December 2014. The three-year statute of limitations for the breach of
95
contract and unjust enrichment claims expired in December 2017. Clovis did not
assert its counterclaims until July 2019. If the plaintiff asserts its claim after the
expiration of the analogous statute of limitations, the delay is presumptively
unreasonable. Levey, 76 A.3d at 768; In re Sirius XM S’holder Litig., 2013 WL
5411268, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2013) (“After the statute of limitations has run,
defendants are entitled to repose and are exposed to prejudice as a matter of law by
a suit by a late-filing plaintiff who had a fair opportunity to file within the limitations
period.”); Baier v. Upper New York Inv. Co. LLC, 2018 WL 1791996, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 16, 2018) (same).
Two circumstances in which the statute of limitations will be equitably tolled
are (1) when the defendant affirmatively acted to prevent the plaintiff from gaining
knowledge of the facts (i.e., fraudulent concealment) or (2) when the plaintiff
“reasonably relies on the competence and good faith of a fiduciary.” Weiss, 948
A.2d at 451. The 2014 Payments do not present circumstances that would toll the
statute of limitations or justify Clovis’s delay in bringing its claims. Stone & Paper
does not owe fiduciary duties to Clovis, and Stone & Paper has taken no action to
conceal the existence of the payments from Clovis. From the very beginning,
Skinner had knowledge of the 2014 Payments, as he was the one who proposed and
processed the payments. Furthermore, Skinner is a signatory of the LLC
96
Agreement, 363 and thus had knowledge of Section 9.6’s limitation on the return of
capital. As a manager of Clovis with authority over Clovis’s finances, Skinner’s
knowledge is attributed to Clovis.364
The Blanch Defendants contend that Clovis’s claim challenging the payment
of $100,000 to Stone & Paper is not barred by laches because Blanch was unaware
of it until 2018. Blanch’s testimony regarding this issue was not credible, and the
circumstances of the payments to Stone & Paper further discredits his testimony.365
It is undisputed that Skinner, the other Manager, was aware of the payments. Skinner
made them, and there is no evidence that he tried to conceal those payments from
363
JX 36 at 28.
364
See LLC Agreement § 4.1(b)–(d) (providing that management of the business, affairs,
and day-to-day operations of Clovis shall be vested in each of the Managers); In re Am.
Int’l Grp., Inc., Consol. Deriv. Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 887 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“When a
corporation empowers managers with the discretion to handle certain matters and to deal
with third parties, the corporation is charged with the knowledge of those managers when
the corporation is sued by innocent parties.”), aff’d sub nom. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of
Louisiana v. Gen. Re Corp., 11 A.3d 228 (Del. 2010); Albert v. Alex. Brown Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 2005 WL 2130607, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2005) (“Delaware law states the
knowledge of an agent acquired while acting within the scope of his or her authority is
imputed to the principal.”).
365
Blanch Defs.’ Ans. Br. 11 (citing Tr. 48:6–22 & 90:3–10 (Diamond) and Tr. 607:2–21
& 608:17–23 (Blanch)). The cited testimony does not address Blanch’s knowledge of the
$10,000 payments to Plaintiff. Blanch did, however, testify that he was not aware that
money was being wired back to Plaintiff. Tr. 658:5–8 (R. Blanch). Obviously, Blanch
became aware of the payments at some point, but he did not indicate when he became
aware of the payments.
97
anyone.366 The payments are reflected in Clovis’s 2015 tax return. 367 Furthermore,
the payments ceased after Skinner told Diamond that Aaron, a non-member of
Clovis, told Skinner “not to send any more money back to Stone & Paper
Investors.”368 Given that Aaron, Blanch’s friend,369 was aware of the payments to
Stone & Paper as of December 2014, it is not credible that Blanch was unaware of
them in 2014.370 More important, it is not credible that Clovis was unaware of the
payments in 2014. Clovis had knowledge of the payments to Plaintiff as far back as
April in 2014. Clovis’s five-year delay in bringing its claim is presumptively not
reasonable. Therefore, Clovis’s claim pertaining to the 2014 Payments is time-
barred by laches. 371
366
Tr. 324:19–20 (Skinner) (“[Diamond] never told me to specifically - - he never said
don’t mention [the $10,000 monthly payments].”). Skinner testified that “Blanch didn’t
know about the payments.” Tr. 473:14–15. Skinner did not indicate when Blanch first
learned of the payments.
367
PTO ¶ 20.
368
Tr. 49:7–8 (Diamond).
369
Tr. 518:24–519:1 (R. Blanch) (“Drew [Aaron] and I had been close friends, pretty good
friends, for years, since 2006, 2007.”).
370
Blanch is “designated as the Tax Matters Partner of the Company for purposes of
Chapter 63 of the [Internal Revenue] Code and Treasury Regulations thereunder.” LLC
Agreement § 10.9. Blanch understood this to mean that he would “liaison between . . . the
IRS and the members in the entity.” Tr. 697:13–17 (R. Blanch).
371
Clovis has not directly asserted any claims against Skinner for approving or making
these payments to Stone & Paper.
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2. AMEX Account Payments
Clovis argues that “[Stone & Paper] knowingly violated Section 9.6 of the
LLC Agreement when Clovis Holdings’ funds were used to pay the American
Express card account.” 372 This breach of contract claim fails. Stone & Paper took
no affirmative action that amounted to a breach of a contractual obligation. It was
Skinner, acting on behalf of Clovis, who requested to use Diamond Carter Trading’s
AMEX Account for Clovis’s own expenses. 373 Diamond and Carter, who were the
principals of both Stone & Paper and Diamond Carter Trading, permitted Clovis to
use the AMEX Account on the condition that Skinner allocate the charges between
the two entities and have Clovis pay for its own expenses.374 Diamond and Carter
did not ask Clovis to apply its funds towards any non-Clovis charges on the AMEX
Account, much less any charges that would amount to a return of capital to Stone &
Paper. Although the AMEX Account belonged to Carter, Skinner had the sign-in
credentials for the AMEX Account and regularly made payments.375 It was Skinner
who was responsible for allocating charges between Clovis and Diamond Carter
Trading, and it was Skinner who processed every dollar that left Clovis’s checking
372
Def.’s Opening Post-Tr. Br. 11.
373
Tr. 14:20–15:16 (Diamond).
374
Id.
375
Tr. 171:5–21 (Diamond) (testifying that, prior to Clovis, Skinner was responsible for
paying the AMEX Account out of DCT’s accounts); Tr. 440:12–441:2 (Skinner) (testifying
that Skinner would log in with Carter’s credentials and make payments).
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account, including payments to the AMEX Account.376 Clovis has not factually or
legally established that Stone & Paper is liable for Skinner’s actions regarding the
payments to the AMEX Account. For this reason, Clovis has not established that
Stone & Paper breached the LLC Agreement with respect to Clovis’s AMEX
Account payments.
3. Milton Berg Newsletter
Clovis argues that Stone & Paper breached Section 9.6 of the LLC Agreement
by allowing Clovis to pay $21,000 for the Milton Berg investment newsletter. The
Milton Berg newsletter is an investment newsletter that provided stock trading
recommendations. 377 In 2016, Diamond Carter Trading had a bill from the publisher
of the Milton Berg newsletter for $21,000.378 At the same time, Clovis owed money
to Diamond Carter for having underpaid its share of the AMEX Account charges.379
Diamond and Skinner conferred and decided that Clovis would pay the bill for the
Milton Berg newsletter as a way to reduce Clovis’s debt to Diamond Carter
Trading. 380
376
Tr. 348 (Skinner).
377
Tr. 89 (Diamond).
378
Tr. 426 (Skinner).
379
Tr. 90 (Diamond).
380
Diamond testified that Skinner proposed that Clovis pay the bill, while Skinner testified
that Diamond asked him to pay the bill. Compare Tr. 90:2–16 (Diamond), with id. 425:4–
426:10 (Skinner).
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Stone & Paper argues that Section 9.6 of the LLC Agreement is inapplicable
to the payment for the Milton Berg newsletter because it was not a return of
capital.381 Stone & Paper, however, is prevented from making this argument due to
judicial estoppel. “Judicial estoppel acts to preclude a party from asserting a position
inconsistent with a position previously taken in the same or earlier legal proceeding.”
Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859 (Del. 2008). The doctrine is
appropriate in “lengthy litigation such as this.” Id. “Judicial estoppel operates only
where the litigant’s [position] contradicts another position that the litigant
previously took and that the Court was successfully induced to adopt in a judicial
ruling.” Id. at 859–60 (internal quotation omitted and emphasis in original).
In moving to dismiss Clovis’s original counterclaims, Stone & Paper argued
that Clovis’s unjust enrichment claim, including Clovis’s allegation that the payment
for the Milton Berg newsletter unjustly enriched Stone & Paper, “[relied] on the
same factual basis, and [sought] the same damages, as the breach of contract
claim.”382 Stone & Paper argued that the claim, which was “premised on allegations
that Stone & Paper ‘misappropriated’ funds of Clovis by receiving a return of some
[of] its initial capital contribution,” should be dismissed because the alleged
381
Pl.’s Ans. Post-Tr. Br. 22–23 (citing Def.’s Opening Post-Tr. Br. 8, 10).
382
Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 34 (Dkt. 83).
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wrongdoing was governed by Section 9.6 of the Operating Agreement.383 Stone &
Paper now argues that the very same allegations are not governed by Section 9.6.
Stone & Paper’s new position is inconsistent with its previous position. The Court
relied on Stone & Paper’s earlier position when it ruled in Stone & Paper’s favor and
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim as to the AMEX Account and the Milton Berg
newsletter, because the claim had no basis “independent of the allegations
supporting the breach of contract claim.” 2020 Memorandum Opinion, 2020 WL
34996694, at *13; id. at *7 n.30 (citing Stone & Paper’s brief). For this reason,
Stone & Paper is estopped from now contending that Section 9.6 is inapplicable to
the payment for the Milton Berg newsletter.
Clovis has established that payment for the Milton Berg newsletter was an
improper return of capital to Stone & Paper. As of 2016, Clovis has not generated
any revenue and had no other source of funding. All of Clovis’s funds came from
Stone & Paper’s initial $3.5 million capital contribution. Thus, the $21,000 that left
Clovis to pay for the Milton Berg newsletter necessarily came from Stone & Paper’s
capital contribution. The subscription for the Milton Berg newsletter benefitted
Stone & Paper’s principals, Diamond and Carter, by substituting for a payment that
they would have otherwise needed to pay with funds from Diamond Carter Trading,
383
Id.102
another company of theirs. 384 Furthermore, Diamond knew that Clovis would be
paying for a Diamond Carter Trading expense. Stone & Paper’s prior knowledge of
the arrangement undermines the argument that Clovis, through Skinner, unilaterally
made unrequested returns of capital. Under these circumstances, the $21,000
payment for the Milton Berg newsletter was effectively a return of Stone & Paper’s
initial capital contribution.
Under Section 9.6 of the Operating Agreement, Stone & Paper needed
approval from both Clovis managers to receive a return of its initial capital
contribution. Although Skinner was complicit in the payment, Blanch was unaware
of the Milton Berg newsletter or any payment therefor until this litigation.385
Because Stone & Paper did not have approval of both Clovis managers, the return
of capital by way of payment for the Milton Berg newsletter was a violation of the
Operating Agreement.
C. Damages
“Where the injured party has proven the fact of damages . . . less certainty is
required of the proof establishing the amount of damages. In other words, the injured
384
The fact that Clovis potentially received the benefit of reducing its debt to Diamond
Carter Trading does not negate the fact that the payment was a return of capital to Stone &
Paper’s principals. The companies’ cash-on hand took on particular significance in late
2016, after Diamond Carter Trading had closed its brokerage account and Clovis was
running low on funds.
385
Tr. 659:18–660:13 (R. Blanch).
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party need not establish the amount of damages with precise certainty ‘where the
wrong has been proven and injury established.’” Siga Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene,
Inc., 132 A.3d 1108, 1131 (Del. 2015) (quoting Delaware Exp. Shuttle, Inc. v. Older,
2002 WL 31458243, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002)); see also Older, 2002 WL
31458243, at *15 (“Responsible estimates that lack mathematical certainty are
permissible so long as the court has a basis to make a responsible estimate of
damages.”). For the foregoing reasons, I find that damages are as follows:
1. The Blanch Defendants are liable for $988,510. This amount is derived
from (1) the payments from Clovis to Red Bridge; 386 (2) the payments from Clovis
to Spangler and the Roth Law Firm; 387 and (3) the payments from Clovis for personal
expenses of Richard Blanch and Vivianna Blanch.388 These payments all resulted
from Interested Transactions that violated Section 5.2 of the LLC Agreement.
Because these are direct claims, these damages are to be paid to Plaintiff.
2. Skinner and Skinner Capital are liable for $1,082,500. This amount is
derived from the payments from Clovis to Skinner Capital, 389 minus the amount of
386
PTO ¶ 12 ($797,000).
387
Id. ¶ 15 ($75,000 to Spangler and $105,000 to the Roth Law Firm)
388
Id. ¶ 17 ($11,510 to the Blanch Defendants’ American Express card)
389
Id. ¶ 12 ($1,482,500).
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Management Fees to which Diamond acquiesced.390 These payments also resulted
from breaches of Section 5.2. Accordingly, these damages are to be paid to Plaintiff.
3. Skinner is additionally liable to the Company for $510,124.35. This
amount is derived from the amount paid by Clovis to the AMEX Account.391 This
payment breached Skinner’s fiduciary duties, giving rise to a derivative claim on
behalf of Clovis. 2019 Memorandum Opinion, 2019 WL 2374005, at *4 (“Any
recovery related to improperly paid expenses would flow to the Company.”).
Plaintiff has argued that Defendants, as wrongdoers in control of the Company and
indirect owners of a majority of its equity, should be prohibited from sharing in any
derivative recovery by Clovis. 392 The parties have not meaningfully briefed this
issue, and additional briefing would be helpful to the court. The parties should
submit supplemental briefing on whether the $510,124.35 should be paid to Plaintiff,
to Clovis, or to the members of Clovis.
4. Stone & Paper is liable for $21,000 to Clovis. This amount is derived
from the amount paid by Clovis for the Milton Berg newsletter.
The Blanch Defendants, Skinner, and Skinner Capital are jointly and severally
liable for the damages in paragraphs 1 and 2. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders
390
Supra section II.A.1.a.i ($400,000).
391
PTO ¶ 16.
392
Pl.’s Opening Post-Tr. Br. 31.
105
Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 221 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“A defendant who aids and abets a breach
of fiduciary duty is jointly and severally liable for the damages resulting from the
breach.”).
Each of the damages awards described above is subject to the payment of pre-
and post-judgment interest. The damages shall accrue pre- and post-judgment
interest at the legal rate, compounded quarterly. See, e.g., 6 Del. C. §
2301(a); Narayanan v. Sutherland Glob. Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 3682617, at *15
(Del. Ch. Jul. 5, 2016) (“In Delaware, pre-judgment interest accrues at the legal rate
set forth in 6 Del. C. § 2301(a) and is compounded quarterly.”); Avande, Inc. v.
Evans, 2019 WL 3800168, at *19 (Aug. 13, 2019) (awarding pre- and post-judgment
interest at the legal rate).
Further, given that Plaintiff has indicated that it will not consent to the
Company engaging in any business other than the purchase of ViaStone, and because
the purchase of ViaStone is no longer viable, the parties should confer regarding
whether dissolution of Clovis is appropriate. See In re Silver Leaf L.L.C., 2005 WL
2045641, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005) (ordering dissolution of an LLC because
the company was no longer able to “carry on its business in a reasonably practicable
manner”). If there is any dispute, the parties shall submit supplemental briefing on
that subject.
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D. Request for Fee-Shifting
Stone & Paper has sought an award of its attorneys’ fees and expenses to be
paid by the Blanch Defendants. The Blanch Defendants, in turn, seek an award of
their attorneys’ fees and expenses from Stone & Paper. This court follows what is
commonly known as the American Rule. “Under the American Rule, absent express
statutory language to the contrary, each party is normally obliged to pay only his or
her own attorneys’ fees, whatever the outcome of the litigation.” Johnston v.
Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG, 720 A.2d 542, 545 (Del. 1998). There are
exceptions to the American Rule, one being the bad faith exception. Id. While there
is no single definition of bad faith conduct, “courts have found bad faith where
parties have unnecessarily prolonged or delayed litigation, falsified records or
knowingly asserted frivolous claims.” Id.; accord Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 2021
WL 3087027, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2021). Other “behavior that has been found
to constitute bad faith in litigation includes misleading the court, altering testimony,
or changing position on an issue.” Beck v. Atl. Coast PLC, 868 A.2d 840, 851 (Del.
Ch. 2005).
The court defers ruling on the competing requests to shift fees. The court
requests that the Blanch Defendants and Plaintiff submit supplemental briefing on
the fee requests in light of the conclusions reached in this opinion on liability and
damages.
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III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of proving fraud in the inducement to
invest in Clovis. Plaintiff has carried its burden of proving fraudulent concealment,
and that Skinner and Blanch breached Sections 5.1, 5.2, 4.10, and 10.7 of the LLC
Agreement and their fiduciary duties. Plaintiff has also carried its burden of proving
that Red Bridge, Skinner, and Vivianna Blanch aided and abetted Blanch and
Skinner’s breaches of fiduciary duty and engaged in a civil conspiracy.
Clovis’s counterclaim for breach of the LLC Agreement and unjust
enrichment as to $100,000 in payments to Plaintiff in 2014 is barred by laches.
Clovis has proved is claim for breach of contract concerning payment for the Milton
Berg Newsletter. Clovis failed to prove its counterclaims in all other respects.
Plaintiff is awarded $988,510 in damages against the Blanch Defendants and
$1,082,500 from Skinner and Skinner Capital, for which Defendants are jointly and
severally liable. Clovis is awarded damages in the amount of $510,124.35 from
Skinner. Clovis is also awarded damages in the amount of $21,000 from Plaintiff.
The parties are to confer and submit a schedule for supplemental briefing on
the remaining issues of allocation of damages owed to Clovis and the competing
applications for fee-shifting under the bad faith exception to the American Rule.
Briefing shall be completed within 45 days of this opinion.
108