Dale Riker v. Teucrium Trading, LLC ( 2023 )


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  •                                 COURT OF CHANCERY
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    LORI W. WILL                                                     LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
    VICE CHANCELLOR                                                      500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
    WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
    Date Submitted: July 3, 2023
    Date Decided: July 7, 2023
    Joseph B. Cicero, Esquire                        T. Brad Davey, Esquire
    Paul D. Brown, Esquire                           Mathew A. Golden, Esquire
    Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole, LLP                 Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
    1313 North Market Street, Suite 5400             1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor
    Wilmington, Delaware 19801                       Wilmington, Delaware 19801
    RE:    Dale Riker et al. v. Teucrium Trading, LLC,
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    Dear Counsel:
    This letter resolves defendant Teucrium Trading, LLC’s Application for
    Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal (the “Application”). 1 The Application
    concerns my June 13, 2023 bench ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary
    judgment (the “Ruling”) and implementing order. 2 In the Ruling, I granted the
    plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment on their entitlement to advancement
    1
    Def.’s Appl. for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal (Dkt. 50) (“Appl.”).
    2
    See Tr. of June 13, 2023 Telephonic Rulings of the Ct. on Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J.
    on Entitlement to Advancement and Def.’s Cross-Motion for Summ. J. (Dkt. 55) (“Ruling
    Tr.”); see also Minute Order (Dkt. 46).
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 2 of 7
    and denied the defendant’s cross-motion. For the following reasons, the Application
    for an interlocutory appeal of that Ruling is refused.
    I.        BACKGROUND
    This advancement action was filed by plaintiffs Dale Riker and Barbara Riker
    on November 15, 2022. Dale Riker is the former Chief Executive Officer of
    defendant Teucrium Trading, LLC. Barbara Riker is the company’s former Chief
    Financial Officer. The plaintiffs sought advancement of certain fees and expenses
    incurred in connection with a plenary action captioned Gilbertie v. Riker, C.A. No.
    2020-1018-LWW, as well as fees on fees. Advancement was sought pursuant to the
    October 26, 2009 Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of
    Teucrium Trading, LLC (the “LLC Agreement”).
    In the Ruling, I concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated their
    entitlement to mandatory advancement under the LLC Agreement as a matter of
    law.3 I also determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to fees on fees.4 In terms of
    next steps, I “aske[d] that the parties meet and confer on any remaining allocation
    disputes or specific disputes about time entries” in light of my guidance on each
    3
    Ruling Tr. 27-28.
    4
    Id. at 27.
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 3 of 7
    claim and counterclaim at issue.5 Any outstanding disputes were to be resolved
    “under the Fitracks process.”6
    Teucrium filed the Application on June 23, 2023. On July 3, 2023, the
    plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Application.
    II.       ANALYSIS
    Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42 governs interlocutory appeals.
    Rule 42(b)(i) provides that “[n]o interlocutory appeal will be certified by the trial
    court or accepted by this Court unless the order of the trial court decides a substantial
    issue of material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.”7
    Instances where the trial court certifies an interlocutory appeal “should be
    exceptional, not routine, because [interlocutory appeals] disrupt the normal
    procession of litigation, cause delay, and can threaten to exhaust scarce party and
    judicial resources.”8 For this reason, “parties should only ask for the right to seek
    interlocutory review if they believe in good faith that there are substantial benefits
    that will outweigh the certain costs that accompany an interlocutory appeal.”9
    5
    Id. at 28.
    6
    Id.
    7
    Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i).
    8
    Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).
    9
    Id.
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 4 of 7
    When determining whether to certify an interlocutory appeal, the trial court
    should consider the eight factors set out in Rule 42(b)(iii). The court is to “identify
    whether and why the likely benefits of interlocutory review outweigh the probable
    costs, such that interlocutory review is in the interests of justice. If the balance is
    uncertain, the trial court should refuse to certify the interlocutory appeal.”10 After
    balancing these factors and weighing the costs and benefits, I conclude that
    interlocutory review should be denied.
    Teucrium asserts that the Ruling “decided a ‘substantial issue of material
    importance’ because it resolve[d] all underlying questions of liability for
    advancement on each claim for which the Rikers have sought advancement.”11 In
    some advancement cases, the substantial issue criterion has been met.12 But even if
    it were met here, any benefit from permitting an interlocutory appeal of the Ruling
    would be uncertain at best and outweighed by the considerable costs.
    Teucrium insists that an interlocutory appeal would carry a “modest price”
    compared to the “substantial burden” it bears from the plaintiffs’ ongoing
    10
    Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii)(H).
    11
    Appl. ¶ 5.
    12
    See Pontone v. Milso Indus. Corp., 
    2014 WL 4967228
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2014)
    (holding that an order granting partial advancement determined a “substantial issue” for
    purposes of an interlocutory appeal request).
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 5 of 7
    advancement requests.13 The court considered and rejected a similar argument in
    Sider v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.14 In Sider, the defendant was ordered to make
    advancement payments and sought an interlocutory appeal before the payments
    commenced. The court explained that the defendant’s approach would upend the
    normal course of advancement proceedings and the “dynamic favoring advancement
    claimants.”15 The court observed: “‘[t]he policy of Delaware favors advancement
    when it is provided for, with the Company’s remedy for improperly advanced fees
    being recoupment at the indemnification stage,’ or on appeal after issues of
    reasonableness have been finally resolved.” 16 Here, Teucrium’s argument is
    similarly problematic.
    Moreover, none of the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors cited by Teucrium—specifically,
    (A), (B), (G), and (H)—support interlocutory review.17 First, the Ruling did not
    present an issue of first impression; it considered a factual situation that has some
    differences from applicable precedent.18 The court also applied straightforward and
    13
    Appl. ¶ 5.
    14
    
    2019 WL 2501481
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2019) (ORDER).
    15
    
    Id.
     (“[I]t should be easier to turn the ‘advancement spigot’ on than to turn it off.”)
    (citation omitted).
    16
    Id. at *3 (quoting Mooney v. Echo Therapeutics, Inc., 
    2015 WL 3413272
    , at *6 (Del. Ch.
    May 28, 2015)).
    17
    Appl. ¶¶ 6-11.
    18
    Ruling Tr. 17-20.
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 6 of 7
    well-settled principles of contract interpretation.19 Second, Teucrium does not cite
    any decision squarely conflicting with the Ruling. Third, an appellate ruling on
    advancement entitlement will not dispose of the action entirely. Even if the appeal
    were successful, Teucrium will be responsible for advancement on certain claims
    and the Fitracks procedure will continue.20 Finally, an interlocutory appeal would
    not serve considerations of justice. As discussed above, Delaware public policy
    favors advancement. This policy interest “suggest[s] that interlocutory appeals in
    advancement cases should be reserved for particularly exceptional cases.”21
    There is nothing exceptional about this case or the Ruling.              The LLC
    Agreement grants advancement rights. The court interpreted the LLC Agreement
    on a paper record and determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to advancement.
    19
    Id. at 20-21; see West Willow-Bay Ct., LLC v. Robino-Bay Ct. Plaza, LLC, 
    2007 WL 4357667
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 2007) (denying certification where “[n]o novel or
    unsettled law . . . informed the Court’s reading of the Agreement. That a trial court may
    have been (or was) wrong is not the standard for interlocutory review.”).
    20
    In its cross-motion, Teucrium did not challenge whether the plaintiffs were named
    defendants or respondents with respect to Counts V through VII in the plenary action.
    Thus, a successful appeal would not affect the Ruling on those counts. Further, the Ruling
    did not address Teucrium’s “by reason of the fact” arguments because that requirement
    only pertains to indemnification under the plain text of the LLC Agreement. If a similar
    requirement were read into the advancement provision of the LLC Agreement, this court
    would need to revisit the issue.
    21
    Salomon v. Kroenke Sports & Ent., LLC, 
    2020 WL 3963937
    , at *3 (Del. Ch. July 8,
    2020) (declining to certify an interlocutory appeal of an advancement decision).
    C.A. No. 2022-1030-LWW
    July 7, 2023
    Page 7 of 7
    And a procedure was set to resolve disputes over the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’
    requested fees and expenses.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Under these circumstances, I cannot certify the Ruling for an interlocutory
    appeal. The costs of certification, including the drain on judicial resources from
    adjudicating piecemeal appeals, would outweigh any benefit.22 Accordingly, the
    Application is refused.23
    To the extent necessary for this decision to take effect, IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Sincerely yours,
    /s/ Lori W. Will
    Lori W. Will
    Vice Chancellor
    22
    See Sup. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii); see, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Axiall
    Corp., 
    2019 WL 4795508
    , at *2 (Del. Oct. 1, 2019) (TABLE) (refusing an interlocutory
    appeal because the ruling was “not exceptional” and “the potential benefits of interlocutory
    review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an
    interlocutory appeal”).
    23
    See Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(iv)(D) (directing that the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court
    attach “[t]he order, if any, of the trial court certifying or refusing to certify the interlocutory
    appeal”).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-1030-LWW

Judges: Will V.C.

Filed Date: 7/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/7/2023