State of Delaware v. Cayla M. Stout ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF
    DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    STATE OF DELAWARE, )
    )
    )
    V. ) Case No. 1905011621
    )
    CAYLA M. STOUT, )
    )
    )
    Defendant. )
    Submitted: January 23, 2020
    Decided: March 19, 2020
    Isaac Rank, Esquire Joe Hurley, Esquire
    Deputy Attorney General 1215 King Street
    820 N. French Street, 7‘ Floor Wilmington, DE 19801
    Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for Defendant
    Attorney for the State of Delaware
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
    DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
    Manning, J.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On May 19, 2019, Cayla Stout (hereinafter “Defendant”) was arrested by
    Trooper Santangelo (hereinafter “Santangelo”) for the offense of Driving a Vehicle
    Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”) in violation of 
    21 Del. C
    . § 4177. The facts
    that gave rise to these proceedings indicate that Santangelo responded to a one-
    vehicle collision that transpired on Route 1 northbound near the Christiana Mall.
    When Santangelo arrived on the scene, Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”)
    advised him that the operator of the vehicle appeared intoxicated. EMS further
    informed Santangelo that the operator of the vehicle would not listen to their
    repeated instructions. The operator of the vehicle was transported to Christiana
    Hospital for injuries sustained in the collision.
    Upon Santangelo’s arrival at the Christiana Hospital, he met the
    operator of the vehicle who identified as the Defendant. Defendant admitted to
    Santangelo that she was at Grain Craft Bar and consumed one alcoholic beverage,
    specifically a “Titos Vodka and Sprite,” approximately three hours prior. The
    Defendant divulged that she did not consume any other alcoholic beverages.
    Santangelo detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Defendant’s person and
    further, observed that Defendant’s eyes were glassy, watery and discolored. 2010 WL 4056130
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 14, 2010).
    * Lefebvre v. State, 
    19 A.3d 287
    , 293 (Del. 2011).
    > State v. Cardona, 
    2008 WL 5206771
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 3, 2008) (quoting State v.
    Maxwell, 
    624 A.2d 926
    , 928 (Del. 1993)).
    the ‘eyes of a reasonable trained police officer in similar circumstances, combining
    the objective facts with the officer's subjective interpretation of those facts.’
    DISCUSSION
    A. Probable Cause to Arrest
    In Lefebvre, the Delaware Supreme Court held probable cause to arrest exists
    where an officer can “present facts which suggest, when those facts are viewed under
    the totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability that the defendant has
    committed a DUI offense.”’ In Bease v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court found
    probable cause to arrest existed where a motorist committed a traffic violation, spoke
    rapidly, smelled of alcohol, admitted to consumption of alcoholic beverages, and
    had blood shoot glassy eyes.° In State v. Hudgins, the Delaware Superior Court
    found bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and the odor of alcohol emanating from ones
    breath to be “ample evidence to support a finding that there was probable cause to
    arrest for a DUI offense.”’ Further, in Garner v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court
    found that “[p]robable cause can be established from either direct observation or
    4 State v. Kane, No. 1210019022, 
    2014 WL 12684290
    , at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 12, 2014); See
    Woody v. State, 
    765 A.2d 1257
    , 1262-64 (Del. 2000).
    > Lefebvre at *292.
    ® 
    884 A.2d 495
    , 498 (Del. 2005).
    
    72015 WL 511422
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 16, 2015).
    hearsay.”® “The latter, consisting generally of incriminatory reports to the police by
    informants or witnesses, is acceptable, provided that it is sufficiently corroborated
    by other facts within the officer's knowledge.”
    Here, the facts and circumstances were sufficient to put Santangelo on notice
    that Defendant was impaired. First, the Defendant was involved in a one-vehicle
    collision. Second, EMS informed Santangelo that the Defendant was dazed and
    confused, and unable to respond to instructions. Further, Defendant informed
    Santangelo that she was at a bar earlier in the evening and drank alcohol prior to the
    collision. Moreover, Defendant’s eyes were glassy, watery, and an odor of alcohol
    emanated from her person.
    Defendant’s admissions to Santangelo, coupled with his observations of
    Defendant’s physical state of being, corroborated the EMS statements. Further,
    Santangelo’s affidavit advances a sufficient facts within his knowledge that
    corroborated his belief Defendant was driving in an impaired state. Thus, the EMS
    statements to Santangelo are reliable. Under a totality of circumstances analysis, all
    of the aforementioned reasons provide reasonable grounds to believe the Defendant
    was driving under the influence of alcohol.
    
    8314 A.2d 908
    , 911 (Del. 1973).
    ” Td.
    B. Probable Cause to Support Search Warrant
    Before a magistrate issues a search warrant, the magistrate “must find that
    probable cause exists that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be
    searched.”!? “An affidavit of probable cause in support of a search warrant must
    contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause within the ‘four corners’ or on
    the face of the affidavits.”'' “Probable cause exists in the affidavit where there is ‘a
    logical nexus between the items sought and the place to be searched.’ ”!? “Such a
    nexus can be ‘inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the
    extent of an opportunity for concealment and normal inference as to where a criminal
    would hide evidence of a crime.’ ”!3
    In State v. Holden, the Delaware Supreme Court found “[a] court reviewing
    the magistrate’s determination has the duty of ensuring ‘that the magistrate had a
    substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’ ”'* “A magistrate’s
    determination of probable cause ‘should be paid great deference by reviewing
    '° Rybicki v. State, 
    119 A.3d 663
    , 668 (Del. 2015).
    '! State v. Nieves-Torres, 
    2001 WL 2083958
    , at *6 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2011) (quoting Dorsey
    v, State, 
    761 A.2d 807
    , 811 (Del. 2000).
    12 Td.
    '3 Td. (quoting State v. Cannon, 
    2007 WL 1849022
    at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 18, 2000)).
    
    460 A.3d 1110
    , 1114 (Del. 2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., 238-39, 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    ,
    
    76 L. Ed. 2d 527
    (U.S. 1983)).
    courts’ and should not, therefore, ‘take the form of a de novo review.’ ”!
    “ “Notwithstanding this deference,’ the reviewing court must determine whether the
    magistrate’s decision reflect a proper analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”’!®
    The search warrant affidavit is signed “Tpr. Santangelo #1826.” This
    information allowed the issuing magistrate to reasonably infer that Santangelo was
    a trained officer with the Delaware State Police and had the requisite training and
    knowledge to conduct a DUI investigation. Thus, Defendant’s reasoning to the
    contrary lacks merit.
    In addition, the affidavit gave a description of Santangelo’s response to the
    collision and his encounter with EMS. Further, the affidavit specified that Defendant
    had consumed alcohol prior to the collision and that Santangelo “smelled a strong
    odor of [a]lcohol coming from her person.” Moreover, the affidavit asserted that
    Defendant’s eyes were “glassy, watery and discolored.” I find the magistrates
    reliance on the information provided in the affidavit reasonable. Albeit the warrant
    in question is certainly not a paradigmatic draft and certainly could have set forth
    more particulars, the four corners of the affidavit contained enough information to
    establish probable cause to believe that Defendant’s blood may have contained
    evidence that she was driving under the influence.
    15 
    Id. '6 Td.
    (quoting LeGrande v. State, 
    947 A.2d 1103
    , 1108 (Del. 2008)).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
    The matter shall be scheduled for trial.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Badin V (As
    Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1905011621

Judges: Manning J.

Filed Date: 3/19/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/19/2020