Wu v. Delaware Technical Community College ( 2022 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    CHENMOU WU,                                    )
    )
    Plaintiff,                           )
    )
    v.                                             )   C.A. No. N21C-07-045 EMD
    )
    DELAWARE TECHNICAL                             )
    COMMUNITY COLLEGE,                             )
    )
    Defendant.                           )
    ORDER (i) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
    OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR A MORE
    DEFINITE STATEMENT AND (ii) PROVIDING LEAVE TO AMEND
    Upon consideration of the Complaint; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the
    Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant Delaware
    Technical Community College (“DTCC”); Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Evidence to Defendant and White
    and Williams LLP (the “Response”) filed by Plaintiff Chenmou Wu (“Plaintiff”); State of
    Delaware and Kathleen Jennings (collectively, “Defendants”); the arguments made in the Motion
    and the Motion for Leave; the entire record of this civil proceeding; and the Court having
    determined that no hearing on the Motion or the Response is necessary,
    1.       The Complaint seeks damages for a purported fraud. Plaintiff contends that
    someone “who might work or study at DTCC used the college email system” to defraud Plaintiff
    of $9,650. Plaintiff contends that he relied upon emails sent from dfears1@dtcc.edu and
    kennethjones040214@gmail.com to become employed. Plaintiff then received a FedEx Express
    Package with checks and (maybe) instructions. Plaintiff followed the instructions, cashed the
    checks and then transferred money to “some places and someone.” Bank of America
    subsequently informed Plaintiff that the checks had been returned due to insufficient funds.
    Plaintiff ended up using Plaintiff’s own money to cover the transfers. DTCC subsequently
    notified Plaintiff that dfears1@dtcc.edu was a fraudulent email address obtained during an email
    security breach.
    2.       The Motion seeks to dismiss the Complaint for failing to state a fraud claim. In
    the alternative, the Motion asks that the Court order Plaintiff for a more definite statement of the
    allegations of fraud against DTCC. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Plaintiff argues that DTCC
    should have been more responsive to Plaintiff’s inquires as to the dfears1@dtcc.edu email. In
    addition, Plaintiff provides additional facts not otherwise contained in the Complaint.
    3.       Upon a motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court (i) accepts all well-
    pleaded factual allegations as true, (ii) accepts even vague allegations as well-pleaded if they
    give the opposing party notice of the claim, (iii) draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
    non-moving party, and (iv) only dismisses a case where the plaintiff would not be entitled to
    recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.1 However, the Court must
    “ignore conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.”2
    4.       Under Civil Rule 9(b), a party must plead fraud and negligence with
    particularity.3 “The purpose of [Rule 9(b)] is to apprise the adversary of the acts or omissions by
    which it is alleged that a duty has been violated.”4 To plead fraud or negligence with the
    particularity required by Rule 9(b), a party must include the “time, place, contents of the alleged
    fraud or negligence, as well as the individual accused of committing the fraud” or negligence.5
    1
    See Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 
    227 A.3d 531
    , 536 (Del. 2011); Doe v.
    Cedars Academy, No. 09C-09-136, 
    2010 WL 5825343
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 27, 2010).
    2
    Ramunno v. Crawley, 
    705 A.2d 1029
    , 1034 (Del. 1998).
    3
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9(b).
    4
    Mancino v. Webb, 
    274 A.2d 711
    , 713 (Del. Super. 1971).
    5
    See TrueBlue, Inc., v. Leeds Equity Partners IV, LP, C.A. No. N14C-12-112 WCC CCLD, 
    2015 WL 5968726
    , at *6
    (Del. Super. Sept. 25, 2015) (quoting Universal Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Micco World, Inc., C.A. No. N10C-07-039-
    RRC, 
    2012 WL 1413598
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 2012)).
    2
    5.       Plaintiff’s claim appears to be a claim for fraudulent inducement. To prove
    fraudulent inducement, a plaintiff must show:
    (1) a false representation, usually one of fact . . .; (2) the defendant's knowledge or
    belief that the representation was false, or was made with reckless indifference to
    the truth; (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the
    plaintiff's action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation;
    and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.6
    In Delaware, there are three types of fraud: “(1) false statements represented as truth; (2) active
    concealment of facts which prevents the other party from discovering them; and (3) silence in the
    face of a duty to speak.”7 “Under Delaware law, to establish a claim of fraud or negligent
    misrepresentation, the plaintiff must demonstrate justifiable reliance on false representations
    made by the defendant.”8
    6.       The Court will grant the Motion for two reasons. First, the Complaint fails to
    meet the pleading requirements of Civil Rule 9. Plaintiff fails to identify the person or persons at
    DTCC that made material misrepresentations to Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead
    justifiable reliance. In fact, the Response seems to allege new facts that demonstrate that
    Plaintiff should have known that the correspondence with dfears1@dtcc.edu and
    kennethjones040214@gmail.com were part of an independent fraud not involving DTCC—e.g.,
    one email contained references to both “Chippewa Community College” and “Job Placement &
    Student Services, Delaware Technical Community College.” Second, the Response seems to
    supplement the record with facts not contained in the Complaint. Plaintiff could potentially use
    these facts to supplement the allegations contained in the Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff
    might seek to plead a cause of action other than fraud like negligence.
    6
    Hauspie v. Stonington Partners, Inc., 
    945 A.2d 584
    , 586 (Del. 2008) (quoting Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 
    611 A.2d 467
    , 472 (Del.1992)).
    7
    DRR, L.L.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    949 F. Supp. 1132
    , 1137 (D. Del. 1996).
    8
    Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., 
    85 A.3d 725
    , 775 (Del. Ch. 2014).
    3
    7.      Based on the “Questions” presented in the Response, the Court believes that
    Plaintiff is contending that DTCC’s purported silence in failing to respond to inquiries
    constituted fraud in a situation where DTCC remained silent “in the face of a duty to speak.”
    However, the Court is unclear as to the fraud purportedly committed by DTCC or what duty
    DTCC owed to Plaintiff. The Complaint clearly pleads fraud as to dfears1@dtcc.edu and
    kennethjones040214@gmail.com but those are third parties and not DTCC.
    8.      The Court is granting the Motion. The Court will allow Plaintiff leave to amend
    the Complaint. The Court has provided Plaintiff with the requirements of Civil Rule 9 and the
    elements of fraud. Plaintiff may be in possession of more facts that can be alleged to more
    specifically plead why DTCC is responsible for the fraud committed on Plaintiff by
    dfears1@dtcc.edu and kennethjones040214@gmail.com or an alternative theory based in
    negligence or alike.
    9.      The Court will give Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend the Complaint. Failure to
    amend the Complaint may result in this civil action being dismissed without further notice from
    the Court.
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated herein, the Motion is
    GRANTED, and that Plaintiff must file an amended Complaint within thirty (30) days that
    meets the pleading standards of Civil Rule 9.
    Dated: January 13, 2022
    Wilmington, Delaware
    /s/ Eric M. Davis
    Eric M. Davis, Judge
    cc:    File&ServeXpress
    Chenmou Wu (by mail)
    4