Crum v. Corbin, Jr. ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STACEY LYNN CRUM, :
: C.A.No. S19C-03-011 CAK
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
EARLEE W. CORBIN, JR., & :
SAMUEL CORALUZZO CO., INC., :
:
Defendants. :
Submitted: February 17, 2022
Decided: March 7, 2022
Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Defendant’s
Biomechanical Engineer - GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
R. Mark Taneyhill, Esquire, Schwartz and Schwartz, 1140 South State Street,
Dover, Delaware 19901, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Leslie B. Spoltore, Esquire and Tricia Swann, Esquire, Obermeyer Rebmann
Maxwell & Hippel LLP, 123 S. Justison Street, Suite 100, Wilmington, Delaware
19801, Attorney for Defendants.
KARSNITZ, RJ
In this tort claim stemming from a motor vehicle collision Plaintiff
seeks to exclude the proposed testimony of Andrew Rentschler, Ph.D., a
biomechanical engineer. Defendants want to present Dr. Rentschler’s opinions in
two areas: (1) how the accident occurred, and (2) Plaintiff’s ability to withstand
physical forces. Dr. Rentschler has done an analysis of the collision applying
principles of physics to describe his view of how the collision occurred. The
collision at issue was a side swipe which occurred as Coraluzzo’s truck driver,
Earlee W. Corbin, Jr. moved his truck from one lane into the lane occupied by the
vehicle driven by Plaintiff. Dr. Rentschler’s analysis led him to conclude the
accident was far less dramatic than as described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified the
vehicles were locked together for a period and Defendants’ truck dragged
Plaintiff’s vehicle for a substantial distance. Dr. Rentschler’s description entails
more of a quick contact between the vehicles.
I held argument on this motion and at it Plaintiff concluded that this
physical description offered by Dr. Rentschler is legitimate, relevant evidence
which contradicts Plaintiff’s description. The opinions meet the appropriate
standards, and Dr. Rentschler is well qualified to express them. Based upon
Plaintiff’s concession, I deny her motion as to Dr. Rentschler’s opinions regarding
how the collision occurred. Dr. Rentschler stated his opinions in his report dated
2
October 30, 2020, and concluded with a listing of each numbered one through
nine. The opinions listed as one through three, which relate to how the accident
occurred, are admissible.
Dr. Rentschler, has done an additional analysis of Plaintiff’s ability to
withstand physical forces. The remaining opinions listed as paragraphs four
through nine relate to the ability of a human body to withstand physical forces
without serous injury. In somewhat oversimplified form, Dr. Rentschler’s analysis
can be summarized as follows::
(1) Determine the forces he believes were brought to bear upon
Plaintiff;
(2) Address significant studies which seek to analyze how a normal
human body would react to such forces; and
(3) Attempt to particularize the analysis to Plaintiff. The ultimate
conclusion from Dr. Rentschler is that Plaintiff could not have
been hurt by the forces to which Defendants’ actions exposed her.
Defendants thus seek to add the patina of expertise to the
ubiquitous defense challenging the degree of Plaintiff’s injuries.
Delaware courts have addressed repeatedly the circumstances under
which an engineer may address medical causation. The starting point is Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 Daubert is well established in our law
1 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
3
generally, and specifically Delaware law and practice.2 Our Supreme Court applied
the principles of Daubert in Eskin v. Carden3 to the issue raised here. In Eskin our
Supreme Court said the following:
“We hold that trial judges may admit qualified
biomechanical expert testimony regarding the
physical forces involved in automobile accidents
and the effect on the human body those forces
may produce where the relevance, reliability and
trustworthiness of that testimony is established
by the proffer and is not outweighed by the danger
of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
We caution that even competent, qualified
biomechanical testimony may not be admissible
when that testimony purports to bridge the analytical
gap between an engineer’s application of constants
to, and a physician’s artful evaluation of, a specific
individual. Competent biomechanical expert testimony
may be admissible, however, to impeach factual assump-
tions made in expert medical testimony, where the medical
opinion relies on an injury party’s subjective statements
about the facts of an accident. Biomechanical
evidence may contradict expert medical testimony
under some circumstances – e.g., where, it purports
to quantify the forces exerted on an individual’s
body during an accident, describe an individual’s
reaction to the forces involved in the accident, or
relies upon principles of physics to rationalize
causation, diagnoses, course of treatment or an
opinion on permanency. We reaffirm that the
longstanding standard of review of abuse of discretion
2Cunningham v. McDonald, 689 A.2d 1190 (Del. 1997); M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A. 2d
513 (Del. 1999).
3 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004).
4
applies to trial judges’ rulings on the admissibility
of this testimony.”4
In Eskin the Court additionally stated:
“The words of an expert qualified to opine within
a recognized “field” do not automatically guarantee
reliable, and therefore admissible, testimony, however.
The inquiry will be whether the expert and the “field
of expertise” itself can produce an opinion that is
sufficiently informed, testable and in fact verifiable
on an issue to be determined at trial. The trial judge
must be satisfied that the generalized conclusions of
the biomechanical expert are applicable to a particular
individual. For example, did the expert consider the
effect of pre-existing medical conditions and the unique
susceptibility of a particular plaintiff to the injuries
claimed? Does the “field” of biomechanical engineering
adequately test for these highly individualized
characteristics and document verifiable statistical
results about which an expert within the field can
render a trustworthy opinion in a particular case?”5
In Eskin the Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision to exclude the
engineering testimony. The trial judge had determined the engineer had not
particularized his opinion to the specific Plaintiff, who had a history of pre-
collision medical problems which always complicates the medical causation
question.
4 id., at 1225, 1226.
5 Id., at 1228.
5
The parties have cited cases in which our Court has addressed this
problem. In Ortiz v. Smith6 the Court granted a motion to exclude biomechanical
engineering testimony finding it to be unreliable and confusing given the fact that
the injured party had unique medical issues. Defendants have also supplied me a
transcript in Fuggett v. Aronowicz7 in which the Court allowed the testimony after
analyzing it pursuant to the Daubert standard.
Daubert has a five-step test to determine admissibility of scientific or
technical expert testimony:
“The trial court must decide that: (i) the witness
is ‘qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill
experience, training or education’…; (ii) the
evidence is relevant and reliable; (iii) the expert’s
opinion is based upon information ‘reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field’…;
(iv) the expert testimony will ‘assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue’…; and (v) the expert testimony will
not create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead
the jury.8
In my view the expert and his opinions meet the first three
requirements. Dr. Rentschler is eminently qualified. He relies upon established
6 2020 WL 6278215 (Del. Super., Oct. 26, 2020).
7 C.A. No.: N11C-11-106 AML; 2017 WL 2799167 (Del. Super., June 27, 2017).
8 Eskin, supra, at 1227.
6
principles of physics, and peer reviewed studies examining how humans react to
physical forces. It is items four and five with which I find difficulty.
Plaintiff is a unique individual with a unique medical history. Her
history of medical problems similar to those for which she claims compensation
for injury here are substantial and complicated. As an aside, the medical issues are
those which have been litigated routinely, primarily through testimony of medical
experts. These issues which are unique to Plaintiff are the reason why I do not
believe the testimony should be admitted.
The studies referenced by Dr. Rentschler involve live test subjects and
cadavers. I have no doubt they outline typical tolerances for the human body to
withstand forces. Dr. Rentschler told me he used the studies in his work to design
safety features for the United States Military in the construction of vehicles to
withstand the forces created by bombs. No doubt his work is effective to prevent
or lessen injury to the typical person. Unfortunately, typical is not specific, or
here, specific to the Plaintiff.
At the Daubert hearing I questioned Dr. Rentschler about two areas.
First, I asked him how his work accounted for the “egg shell skull” victim about
which every first year law student studies. I also asked him about testimony those
who practice in the tort area have heard for years, typically from defense medical
7
experts - that a herniated disc can be caused by a sneeze or very moderate activity.
My reading of his answer is he had no real answer for these concerns about the
specific individual.
Dr. Rentschler made a significant attempt to particularize his
opinions. He discussed Plaintiff’s age and sex and reviewed her deposition
transcript and medical records. None of this significantly entered his decision
making. Simply put, he had no way to account for the peculiarities of Plaintiff’s
medical condition. For me, the opinions offered are an invasion into the medical
area by one who has no medical expertise. In the language of Daubert and its
progeny, the opinions offered would not assist the trier of fact, and would create
unfair prejudice, confusion and be misleading to the jury.
Each party has offered opinions from medical experts on the issue of
what injuries the collision caused. Defendants have, in a separate motion, attacked
the basis of the opinions of Plaintiff’s medical expert. Undoubtedly the defense
has much with which to work on the subject. For me that is the appropriate path to
challenge Plaintiff’s claims.
8
I grant Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Rentschler’s opinions
numbered four through nine. He will be permitted to testify as to opinions list as
one through three.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz
9