Hastings v. Hosler ( 2018 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    LARRY HASTINGS, individually and             )
    d/b/a K & L BLACKHOE SERVICES,               )
    an unincorporated entity, and                )
    KATHY HASTINGS,                              )
    )
    Plaintiffs,               )     C.A. No. N15C-12-242 ALR
    )
    v.                                     )
    )
    NICOLE ANN HOSLER                            )
    )
    Defendant.                )
    Submitted: December 12, 2017 & January 3, 2018
    Decided: January 3, 2018
    Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    DENIED
    Upon Defendant’s Motion to Compel
    DENIED
    ORDER
    Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs
    Larry Hastings, Kathy Hastings, and K & L Backhoe Services (collectively,
    “Plaintiffs”); Defendant Nicole Ann Hosler’s (“Defendant”) opposition thereto; the
    facts, arguments, and authorities set forth by the parties; the Superior Court Civil
    Rules; statutory and decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court
    hereby finds as follows:
    1.     On December 30, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant
    alleging that Defendant was in default of several loans. Plaintiffs allege that they
    made various loans to Defendant beginning in 2012 that Defendant has not repaid.
    Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant owes the following amounts: $9,408.97
    to Larry and Kathy Hastings; $47,410.00 to K & L Backhoe Services; and
    $10,791.56 to Larry Hastings. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant owes Larry and
    Kathy Hastings $1,000.00 for posting a bond for Defendant. In total, Plaintiffs
    allege that Defendant owes $68,610.53 under the various loans.
    2.     Defendant answered Plaintiffs’ complaint on June 16, 2016. Defendant
    is self-represented.
    3.     Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that
    Defendant’s sole defense is that she was addicted to drugs at the time she entered
    into the various loans, and that Defendant has not put forth any evidence to show
    that Plaintiffs knew she was under the influence at the time Defendant entered into
    each agreement. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ motion.
    4.     In addition, Defendant filed a motion to compel, alleging that Plaintiffs
    failed to provide discovery responses by the November 18, 2017 deadline. However,
    Defendant did not specify what discovery responses she is seeking. Plaintiffs oppose
    Defendant’s motion.
    2
    5.     The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party
    can “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 The moving party bears the initial
    burden of proof and, once that is met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
    show that a material issue of fact exists.2 At the motion for summary judgment
    phase, the Court must view the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
    party.”3
    6.     There are limited circumstances in which intoxication allows a person
    to avoid contractual duties.4 The Second Restatement provides:
    A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a
    transaction if the other party has reason to know that by reason of
    intoxication (a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the
    nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in
    a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.5
    Thus, the other party to the contract must know that intoxicated person lacks capacity
    at the time of contract formation for the contract to be voidable.6
    1
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
    2
    Moore v. Sizemore, 
    405 A.2d 679
    , 680–81(Del. 1979).
    3
    Brozka v. Olson, 
    668 A.2d 1355
    , 1364 (Del. 1995).
    4
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 16 (1981) (“Second Restatement”); see also
    Robino v. Robino, 
    2017 WL 3500246
    , at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2017).
    5
    Second Restatement § 16.
    6
    
    Id. at cmt.
    a (“Hence a contract made by an intoxicated person is enforceable by
    the other party even though entirely executory, unless the other person has reason to
    know that the intoxicated person lacks capacity.”).
    3
    7.     In Robino, a defendant sought to invalidate a settlement agreement on
    the grounds that it was the product of his “diminished capacity…resulting from his
    ongoing battle with substance abuse.”7 In support, the defendant submitted various
    medical records to support his claim that he had been treated for substance abuse-
    related issues.8 The Court rejected his argument, concluding that evidence of a
    substance abuse problem by itself did not corroborate “that he was incapacitated by
    intoxication” at the time he entered into the settlement agreement, or that the other
    party would have any reason to know of the intoxication.9
    8.     Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s “intoxication” defense contains the
    same deficiencies as the defendant’s in Robino. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has
    only produced evidence that she generally suffers from a drug addiction, not that she
    was intoxicated at the time she entered into the loans or that Plaintiffs knew of any
    intoxication. As a result, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant cannot dispute her
    obligations under the various loan agreements, and that they are entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.
    9.     However, the Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate in
    this case. In addition to the evidence that she generally suffers from a drug addiction,
    Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did in fact know she was intoxicated at the time she
    7
    Robino, 
    2017 WL 3500246
    at *1.
    8
    
    Id. 9 Id.
                                               4
    entered into the various loan agreements. In addition, Defendant has indicated that
    her mother will testify to this effect on her behalf. As a result, the Court finds there
    is a dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time
    of entering into the loan agreements and whether Plaintiffs knew about her
    intoxication. As a result, summary judgment is not appropriate.
    10.    In addition, the Court finds that there are inconsistencies with respect
    to the nature of the loan agreements, and the amounts Plaintiffs claim are due
    thereunder, that preclude summary judgment.          Plaintiffs attached various loan
    documents to their motion for summary judgment.10 Upon review, these loan
    documents do not seem to support Plaintiffs’ calculation of the amounts due. For
    example, while Plaintiffs indicate that Defendant owes K & L Backhoe Services
    $47,410.00, K & L Backhoe Services is not listed as a lender on any of the loan
    documents. Similarly, while there are loan documents listing either Larry Hastings
    or Larry and Kathy Hastings as the lenders, the amounts do not seem to equal the
    amount sought in this action.11
    10
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Nov. 19, 2017, Ex. A.
    11
    Larry Hastings is listed as the lender for loans totaling $15,950.00. Larry and
    Kathy Hastings are listed as the lenders for loans totaling $62,679.00. However,
    during Defendant’s deposition, counsel for Plaintiffs indicated that one of the loan
    documents may represent a consolidation of all previous loans rather than a new loan
    amount.
    5
    11.    Further, some of the loan documents appear to be missing vital
    information. For example, the purported loan made on March 20, 2013 lists various
    amounts given to Defendant by Larry Hastings, but does not contain a promise by
    Defendant to repay those amounts. In addition, the last loan document provided to
    the Court contains only the amount of the loan and Defendant’s signature. It does
    not list the name of a lender, the date of the loan, or the date for repayment.
    12.    The Court finds that there are material facts in dispute regarding
    whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the loan agreements and whether
    Plaintiffs had knowledge of her intoxication. In addition, the Court finds that there
    are inconsistencies between the loan documents provided by Plaintiffs and the
    amounts sought thereunder. As a result, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
    must be denied.
    13.    The Court also finds that Defendant’s motion to compel is without merit
    because both parties have produced discovery in this case. On October 17, 2016,
    Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, seeking an order compelling Defendant to
    respond to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and document requests. On November 1, 2016,
    Defendant filed a motion for discovery, asking Plaintiffs to provide documentation
    for the various loan agreements.       On November 1, 2016, this Court ordered
    Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and document requests and
    ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests.          Both parties
    6
    complied with the Court’s Order and produced discovery. Thus, Defendant’s
    assertion that Plaintiffs failed to provide discovery responses by the November 18,
    2017 deadline is without support in the record. Nevertheless, to the extent that either
    party failed to produce any additional documents in discovery before the discovery
    deadline, those documents will be excluded at trial.
    NOW, THEREFORE, this 3rd day of January, 2018, Plaintiffs’ Motion
    for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED; Defendant’s Motion to Compel is
    hereby DENIED. Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order dated January 18,
    2017, this matter will proceed to a two-day bench trial beginning on March 14,
    2018. The parties are reminded that the Pretrial Stipulation is due on March
    1, 2018.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Andrea L. Rocanelli
    ______________________________
    The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N15C-12-242 ALR

Judges: Rocanelli J.

Filed Date: 1/3/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/8/2018