Christian v. New Castle County Head Start ( 2018 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    CHANTEL A. CHRISTIAN,                  )
    )
    Appellant,                )
    )
    v.                               )      C.A. No. N17A-08-003 ALR
    )
    NEW CASTLE COUNTY HEAD                 )
    START, WENDY MARSILLI and              )
    ROBIN BROWN,                           )
    )
    Appellees.                )
    Date Submitted: January 24, 2018
    Date Decided: February 16, 2018
    On Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
    AFFIRMED
    This is an appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“Board”).
    Upon consideration of the facts, arguments, and legal authority set forth by the
    parties; statutory and decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court
    hereby finds as follows:
    1.     Appellant Chantel A. Christian (“Employee”) worked as a Head
    Teacher at New Castle County Head Start (“Employer”) from March 2015 until her
    termination on April 21, 2017.
    2.     Employer has a Social Media Policy and a Disciplinary Action for
    Cause Policy. The Disciplinary Action for Cause Policy provides, “Any employee
    who uses a personal website or other form of social media to disparage the name or
    reputation of [Employer], its practices, its governing bodies, officers, employees,
    volunteers or partners will be subject to serious disciplinary action, up to and
    including termination of employment.” Employee acknowledged receipt of the
    Social Media Policy and the Disciplinary Action for Cause Policy in March 2015.
    3.    On February 7, 2017, Employee made a negative post on her Facebook
    account regarding Employer and her co-workers. Employee identified herself as a
    Teacher with Employer on her Facebook account. In addition, Employee’s post
    specifically identified Employer by the acronym “NCCHS.”
    4.    Employer was informed about Employee’s negative social media posts
    and began an investigation. During the investigation, Employer discovered another
    negative social media post on Employee’s Facebook account regarding her position
    with Employer.
    5.    Employer terminated Employee on April 21, 2017 for violating
    Employer’s Social Media Policy.
    6.    Employee filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Division of
    Unemployment Insurance. By decision dated May 12, 2017, a Claims Deputy found
    that Employee was terminated for just cause and disqualified from receiving benefits
    pursuant to 
    19 Del. C
    . § 3314(2) (“Section 3314(2)”).
    7.    On May 17, 2017, Employee appealed the Claim Deputy’s decision to
    an Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee held a hearing on June 6, 2017. At the
    2
    hearing, the Appeals Referee heard testimony from Employer’s representatives and
    Employee. The Appeals Referee also admitted several documents into evidence,
    including Employee’s Facebook posts and Employer’s Social Media and
    Disciplinary Cause for Action Policies.
    8.    On June 19, 2017, the Appeals Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy’s
    decision disqualifying Employee from benefits pursuant to Section 3314(2). The
    Appeals Referee concluded that there was just cause for termination because
    Employee’s violation of Employer’s Social Media Policy constituted willful and
    wanton misconduct.
    9.    On June 22, 2017, Employee appealed the Appeals Referee’s decision
    to the Board. The Board held a hearing on July 5, 2017. By decision dated August
    7, 2017, the Board affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision disqualifying Employee
    from benefits pursuant to Section 3314(2) (“Board Decision”).
    10.   Employee appeals the Board Decision to this Court.
    11.   This Court reviews the Board Decision for an abuse of discretion.1
    Accordingly, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Board’s
    findings and conclusions are free from legal error and supported by substantial
    evidence on the record.2 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
    1
    Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 
    591 A.2d 222
    , 225 (Del. 1991).
    2
    PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, 
    2008 WL 2582986
    , at *3 (Del. Super. June 18,
    2008).
    3
    person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion.3 If the record contains
    substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion, the decision will not be
    disturbed.4
    12.    Delaware’s unemployment statute provides for “the compulsory setting
    aside of an unemployment reserve to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed
    through no fault of their own.”5 [T]he Unemployment Compensation Act is usually
    given a liberal construction favoring a claimant, at least when its basic policy is in
    issue.”6 An employee who is discharged for “just cause” is disqualified from
    receiving unemployment benefits.7 “Just cause” is “a willful or wanton act or pattern
    of conduct in violation of the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the
    employee’s expected standard of conduct.”8           In the context of unemployment
    benefits, the Court has held that “‘wilful’ [sic] implies actual, specific, or evil intent,
    while ‘wanton’ implies needless, malicious or reckless conduct, but does not require
    3
    Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
    621 A.2d 340
    , 342 (Del. 1993).
    4
    See 
    Funk, 591 A.2d at 225
    ; Williams v. Brandywine Counseling, 
    2016 WL 3660570
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 2016).
    5
    
    19 Del. C
    . § 3301.
    6
    Williams, 
    2016 WL 3660570
    , at *2 (quoting Delaware Auth. For Reg’l Transit v.
    Buehlman, 
    409 A.2d 1045
    , 1046 (Del. 1979)).
    7
    
    19 Del. C
    . § 3314(2).
    8
    Dep’t of Corr. v. Toomey, 
    1997 WL 537294
    , at *2 (Del. Aug. 20, 1997) (quoting
    Avon Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 
    513 A.2d 1315
    , 1317 (Del. 1986)).
    4
    actual intent to cause harm.”9 An employer bears the burden of proving by a
    preponderance of the evidence that an employee was terminated for just cause.10
    13.   The Board concluded that there was just cause for Employee’s
    termination based on its finding that Employee’s Facebook posts violated
    Employer’s Social Media Policy. Substantial evidence supports the Board Decision,
    including Employer’s Social Media Policy, Employee’s acknowledgement of the
    policy, and Employee’s Facebook posts.
    14.   In addition, the Board Decision is free from legal error.
    15.   The Board Decision is supported by substantial evidence, and is free
    from legal error, and must be affirmed.
    9
    Jackson v. Christian Care, 
    2008 WL 555918
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 29, 2008)
    (internal citations omitted). See also Brown v. First State Fabrication, LLC, 
    2015 WL 7747127
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting Coleman v. Dep’t of Labor,
    
    288 A.2d 285
    , 288 (Del. Super. 1972)) (“A willful or wanton act requires the
    employee to be ‘conscious of his conduct or recklessly indifferent to its
    consequences.’”); McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington, 
    2014 WL 6679176
    , at *8 (Del.
    Super. Nov. 3, 2014) (citing Morris v. Blake, 
    552 A.2d 844
    , 847 (Del. Super. 1988))
    (holding that wantonness is demonstrated by a conscious indifference that evidences
    an ‘I-don’t-care’ attitude).
    10
    Murphy & Landon, P.A v. Pernic, 
    121 A.3d 1215
    , 1222 (Del. 2015) (citing
    Edmonds v. Kelly Servs., 
    2012 WL 4033377
    , at *2 (Del. Sept. 12, 2012)).
    5
    NOW, THEREFORE, this 16th day of February, 2018, the August 7, 2017
    decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Andrea L. Rocanelli
    ____________________________
    The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
    6