State v. Husfelt ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : ID No. 1908011284
:
:
v. :
:
BRADFORD J. HUSFELT, :
:
Defendant. :
Submitted: December 15, 2022
Decided: February 13, 2023
ORDER
On this 13th day of February 2023, upon consideration of the Defendant
Bradford J. Husfelt’s motion for postconviction relief, the Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. Mr. Husfelt pled guilty on September 1, 2021, to one count of
Manslaughter, 11 Del. C. § 632. In his plea agreement with the State, he accepted
the State’s recommendation that the Court sentence him to twenty-five years
incarceration suspended after seven years, two years of which constituted a
minimum mandatory sentence, to be followed by probation. The Court sentenced
him consistently with that recommendation.
2. Mr. Husfelt then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The Court referred the matter to a
Superior Court commissioner for findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to
10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62. She issued her findings
and recommendations in the Report attached as Exhibit A. In her Report, she
explained why Mr. Husfelt failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed
ineffectively. To the contrary, she recognized that his attorney acted reasonably.
As a result, she recommended that the Court deny his Rule 61 motion.
3. After she issued her Report, neither party filed written objections as
permitted by Superior Court Criminal Rule 62(a)(5)(ii). Accordingly, the Court
accepts her findings and recommendations.
NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this matter,
and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation
dated November 17, 2022:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation attached as Exhibit A in its entirety. Accordingly,
Mr. Husfelt’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61 is DENIED.
/s/Jeffrey J Clark
Resident Judge
JJC/klc
oc: Prothonotary
cc: The Honorable Andrea M. Freud
Jason Cohee, DAG
Trial Counsel
Bradford Husfelt, Pro Se
Exhibit A
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : I.D. No. 1908011284
: In and For Kent County
v. :
:
:
BRADFORD J. HUSFELT, : RK-19-090429-01 MANSLAUGHTER
SBI # 00568684 :
:
Defendant.
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant’s Motion For Postconviction Relief
Pursuant To Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Department of Justice for State of Delaware
Bradford J. Husflet, pro se
FREUD, Commissioner
November 17, 2022
The defendant, Bradford J. Husfelt (“Husfelt”) pled guilty on September 1,
2021, to one count of Manslaughter 11 Del.C. § 0632. He had also been charged
with one count of leaving the Scene of a Collision Resulting in Death, one count of
Hindering Prosecution, one count of Driving While Suspended or Revoked, one
count of Reckless Driving, one count of Criminal Mischief, one count of Vehicular
Homicide, in the First Degree, one count of Operating an Unregistered Vehicle, one
count of Driving Off the Roadway, one count of Driving on a Sidewalk or Bike Path
Prohibited, one count of Not Remaining at the Scene of a Fatal Accident, one count
of Failure to Report a Collision, and one count of Following a Motor Vehicle Too
Closely. As part of the plea deal, the State agreed to enter nolle prosequis on the
remaining charges and along with the Defense recommended a sentence of twenty-
five-years’ incarceration, suspended after serving seven years, two years of which
were mandatory minimum, followed by probation. Had Husfelt gone to trial and
been found guilty as charged, he faced many years in jail including seven years of
mandatory minimum time. Additionally, as part of the lengthy plea bargain process,
the State agreed to not indict Husfelt for Murder in the Second Degree. The Court
agreed with the sentence recommendation of the parties and sentenced Husfelt in
accordance with the plea agreement recommendation.
Husfelt did not appeal his conviction to the State Supreme Court. Instead, he
filed the pending Motion for Postconviction Relief, pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 on November 29, 2021, in which he alleges ineffective assistance
of counsel.
FACTS
According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, on August 17, 2019, at
approximately 8:30 pm, a Pedestrian, David Rabenold, age 78, was walking on the
northern sidewalk near 25 Front Street, Wyoming, DE.
While Mr. Rabenold was walking on the northern sidewalk, two vehicles
were approaching his location, both traveling westbound on Front Street toward
North Layton Ave. The first car was a dark blue Honda CR-V driven by Emily
Pummer. She was being closely followed by the second car, a blue Dodge Neon,
which was not registered. The Dodge Neon driven by Bradford J. Husfelt, began to
pass the Honda CR-V on the right, as it was driving straight. Pummer stated that the
Dodge Neon had been intermittently following her very closely from the area of
Caesar Rodney High School to the scene of the crash.
Front Street is a residential roadway in the town of Wyoming, the posted
speed limit for the roadway is 25 MPH. The roadway is delineated by solid double
yellow centerline, and no fog lines. The travel portion of the roadway is bordered by
sidewalks. Beyond the sidewalks the roadway is bordered by residences to the north
and south. The nearest intersection is North Layton Avenue, and the collision
occurred approximately 417 feet south of North Layton Avenue.
As Husfelt’s car began to pass Pummer’s car, Husfelt left the roadway, and
went onto the sidewalk and partially into the front yard of 25 Front Street. Husfelt
then completely left the street and had his left side tires on the sidewalk, and its
right-side tires on the yard/grass. Next Husfelt struck and snapped a landscape
timber on Mr. Michael Bakota’s property. Husfelt continued driving westward,
straddling the sidewalk and the landscape on 25 Front Street. All the while, gaining
on Pedestrian/Victim, David Rabenold. While Husfelt was driving on the sidewalk,
his vehicle collided with Rabenold, throwing him onto the windshield of the vehicle,
and causing him to vault off of the vehicle’s roof.
Husfelt’s car sustained heavy windshield damage, which caused the right side
of the windshield to partially cave into the cabin compartment of the car. Mr.
Rabenold was thrown a distance in the air before sliding on the roadway for a final
rest. Mr. Rabenold was rushed to Kent General Hospital where he died from the
injuries sustained in this collision, later that evening.
After hitting Rabenold, Husfelt managed to pull his vehicle back on Front
Street, coming to a stop in the roadway, directly in front of Pummer, who saw
Husfelt, lean out of the window, look back at the Rabenold, and then started to
slowly pull his vehicle away from the scene without stopping to assist the elderly
man he had just violently struck with his car while he was illegally driving on the
pedestrian sidewalk.
Occupants in Pummer’s car began to yell for Husfelt to stop his vehicle, but
he looked back and continued westbound. Neighbors who were outside of the
residences realized partially what had happened. They also yelled for Husfelt to
stop. Husfelt then yelled back at one of them and told them to mind their own
business.
Shortly after the collision, the State Police received a call at Troop 3
concerning to the whereabouts of the Husfelt’s vehicle. The caller stated the vehicle
was located at 150 Center Street Wyoming, DE. Troopers then responded to that
location.
Cpl. Christine Bowie was the first to arrive to 150 Center Street. When there,
she saw a green vehicle with no registration parked in front of the residence. The
green vehicle did not have any damage to the front windshield. Cpl. Bowie observed
a white male sitting on the stoop of the residence. Cpl. Bowie asked the man if he
was in a collision earlier in the evening. The man, who later identified himself as
Bradford J. Husfelt, stated, “I was wondering when you would show up.” Husfelt
stated he had driven to Brown’s Tavern and came outside to find his car was
damaged. Husfelt stated he believed the damage occurred at Brown’s Tavern. Cpl.
Bowie asked to see the vehicle, at which time Husfelt walked to the driveway where
additional cars were parked. One of the vehicles was covered in a brown car cover.
Husfelt took off the brown car cover to reveal a blue Dodge Neon with a shattered
front right windshield. When asked about the damage, Husfelt claimed it must have
happened at Brown’s and the reason he did not call was because the car has no
registration, and he has an active capias. Cpl. Bowie observed blood to the upper
right area of the windshield with hair follicles protruding from the glass. Husfelt
again confirmed that he was the driver of that vehicle. He was then taken into
custody. While in the back of Cpl. Bowie’s patrol vehicle, Husfelt spoke briefly
with his wife. At this time, he made spontaneous utterances stating, “I killed a man!
I am so sorry I didn’t mean to kill anyone.” Husfelt’s vehicle was seized and
transported to Troop 3 where it was stored as evidence.
While on scene, Cpl. Bowie issued Husfelt his Miranda warning and he
agreed to answer questions. Husfelt stated he left his home to drive to Brown’s
Tavern. He claims the damage to the vehicle must have occurred at Brown’s as he
did not recall any accident while on his way to the store. Cpl. Bowie informed him
of the fatal accident at which time he stated what if I killed someone? Due to the
nature of the accident, with a suspicion that Husfelt may have been impaired, Cpl.
Bowie took him to Troop 3 for further testing.
Cpl. Bowie proceeded to conduct a series of National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration Field Test (NHTSA). Cpl. Bowie noted eye conditions that were
indicative of marijuana impairment. During the walk and turn, Husfelt needed to be
reminded to hold the instructional position of heel to toe. He also began the test
prior to being instructed to do so. During the rest, he stepped offline on step 3 and 7.
For the turn, Husfelt pivoted back into himself, with one large step (not the
instructed manner of a series of small steps). On the return, Husfelt raised his arms
from his side on step 8. Both series of steps were 9 steps. Husfelt, who is missing
the big toe of his left foot, raised his left leg for the one left stand. He performed that
test as instructed. Cpl. Bowie proceeded to perform a Drug Recognition Evaluation.
First, Husfelt acknowledged to smoking marijuana all day everyday but added that
he smoked earlier today, at approximately 4:00 pm. After Cpl. Bowie confronted
Husfelt with the findings of cannabis, Husfelt admitted to smoking marijuana from
his pen immediately after waking up from his nap, which was just prior to him
driving to the store. He also reports when he got back from the store, he took
another hit. Cpl. Bowie added that Husfelt’s overall demeanor was mostly carefree,
at times even joking. With the above listed observations and recordings, Cpl. Bowie
determined that Husfelt was under the influence of Cannabis and unable to operate a
motor vehicle safely.
Husfelt consented to a blood draw.
Following his return to Troop 3 from KGH, the investigating officer
interviewed Husfelt concerning to the collision. Husfelt was re-read his Miranda
rights and agreed to answer questions. Husfelt stated that after he woke from his nap
around 7 pm, his roommates asked him to drive to the liquor store. Husfelt left his
house and was on his way to the liquor store when he believes he fell asleep. Husfelt
awoke to someone yelling at him from another car. Husfelt did not see the damage
to his windshield because it was dark and pulled away. Husfelt explained he drove
to Brown’s Tavern and went inside to purchase the requested alcohol. Once he
exited the store, he observed the damage to his windshield and thought someone
must have damaged his vehicle when he was inside of Brown’s Tavern (maybe from
a fight). Husfelt stated that he didn’t know that he had hit anyone. Husfelt, left the
store and observed ambulances and fire trucks and then panicked and drove back
home.
HUSFELT’S CONTENTIONS
Ground One: Denial of Right to Speedy Trial.
Detained in pretrial status for 21-months with no
indictment or plea offer.
Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Lawyer led Husfelt into taking a pre-indictment plea and
one week later excepted (sp.) an indictment, which led to
that plea being used three months later to convict Husfelt.
Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Husfelt was coerced into taking pre-indictment plea by
being threatened of being indicted by Murder if Husfelt
did not except that pre-indictment plea. “coercion”
Ground Four: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Husfelt was never informed he would be sentenced under
T.I.S. which didn’t come to light until Husfelt received his
sentencing order in the mail. It was not told to him in
Court or by his attorney
DISCUSSION
Under Delaware law, the Court must first determine whether Husfelt has met
the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may
consider the merits of the postconviction relief claim.1 Under Rule 61,
postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the conviction
becoming final. 2 Husfelt’s motion was filed in a timely fashion, thus the bar of Rule
61(i)(1) does not apply to the Motion. As this is Husfelt’s initial motion for
postconviction relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2), which prevents consideration of any
claim not previously asserted in a postconviction motion, does not apply either.
None of Husfelt’s claims were raised previously at his plea, sentencing, or on
direct appeal. Consequently, they are barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i)(3) unless he demonstrates: (1) cause for relief from the procedural default; and
1
Bailey v. State, 588 A,2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)
2
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)
(2) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s rights. 3
The bars to relief are
inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or “to a claim that satisfies the pleading
requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule. 4 To
meet the requirements of Rule 61 (d)(2) a defendant must plead with particularity
that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually
5
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted or
that he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States or Delaware Supreme
Courts, applies to the defendant’s case rendering the conviction invalid. 6 Husfelt’s
motion pleads neither requirement of Rule 61(d)(2).
Each of Husfelt’s grounds for relief to some extent, are premised on
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Husfelt has alleged
sufficient cause for not having asserted these grounds for relief before accepting the
plea offer and on direct appeal. Husfelt’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
not subject to the procedural default rule, in part because the Delaware Supreme
Court will not generally hear such claims for the first time on direct appeal. For this
reason, many defendants, including Husfelt, allege ineffective assistance of counsel
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
4
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(5)
5
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii)
in order to overcome the procedural default. “However, this path creates confusion
if the defendant does not understand that the test for ineffective assistance of
counsel and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”7
The United States Supreme Court has held that:
[i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that the responsibility
for the default be imputed to the State, which may not ‘conduc[t]
trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend
themselves without adequate legal assistance;’ [i]neffective
assistance of counsel then is cause for a procedural default.8
A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he
can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss
the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington9 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.10
The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so
grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.11
Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the
7
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.).
8
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
9
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10
551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
11
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice. 12 In setting forth a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make and substantiate
concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal.13 When
examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong other the
Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was
professionally reasonable .14 This standard is highly demanding.15 Strickland
mandates that, when viewing counsel’s representation, this Court must endeavor to
“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight .”16
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly
clear that Husfelt has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claims
that his attorney was ineffective. I find Trial Counsel’s Affidavit, in conjunction
with the record, more credible that Husfelt’s self-serving claims that his Counsel’s
representation was ineffective. Husfelt’s Counsel clearly denied the allegations.
Husfelt was facing the possibility of many years in jail, including mandatory
minimum time had he been indicted on a Second-Degree Murder Charge and
convicted on all counts. The sentence and plea were very reasonable under all the
12
Id.13
See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL
466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).
14
Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)
15
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 383 (1986)).
16
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
circumstances, especially in light of the strong evidence against him. Prior to the
entry of the plea, Husfelt and his attorney discussed the case and the plea. The plea
bargain was clearly advantageous to Husfelt. Counsel was successful in negotiating
a beneficial plea bargain with the State. Counsel’s representation was certainly well
within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Husfelt entered his plea,
he stated he was satisfied with the Defense Counsel’s performance. He is bound by
his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.17
Consequently, Husfelt has failed to establish that his Counsel’s representation was
ineffective under the Strickland test.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Counsel’s representation of Husfelt was
somehow deficient, Husfelt must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test,
prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk
dismissal. 18 In an attempt to show prejudice, Husfelt simply asserts that his counsel
was ineffective by coercing him into pleading guilty. Husfelt’s Trial Counsel clearly
denied coercing him or being unprepared. My review of the facts of the case leads
met to conclude that Counsel’s representation of Husfelt was well within the
17
Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-
938 (Del. 1994)).
18
Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2(Del.Supr.) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556
(Del. 1990)).
requirements of the Sixth Amendment and no prejudice has been demonstrated. His
statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the evidence
against him. Therefore, I find Husfelt’s grounds for relief are meritless.
To the extent that Husfelt alleges his plea was involuntary, the record
contradicts such allegations. When addressing the question of whether a plea was
constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a Plea Colloquy to
determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary.19 At the
guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Husfelt whether he understood he would waive
his constitutional rights, if he entered the plea including the right to suppress
evidence; if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form (“Guilty Plea Form”); and whether he gave truthful
answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Husfelt if he had
discussed his plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court also asked
Husfelt if he was satisfied with this counsel’s representation. Husfelt answered each
of these questions affirmatively.20 I find Counsel’s representations far more credible
than Husfelt’s self-serving, vague allegations.
Furthermore, prior to entering his plea, Husfelt signed a Guilty Plea Form and
Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Husfelt’s signature on the forms indicate
19
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).
20
State v. Husfelt, Del. Super. ID No. 1908011284 (September 1, 202) Tr. at TBD
that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty
and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the
Plea Agreement. Husfelt is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty
Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.21 I
confidently find that Husfelt entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that
Husfelt’s grounds for relief are completely meritless.
CONCLUSION
I find that Husfelt’s Counsel represented him in a competent and effective
manner as required by the standards set in Strickland and that Husfelt has failed to
demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that
Husfelt’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the
Court deny Husfelt’s Motion for Postconviction Relief as procedurally barred and
meritless.
/s/Andrea M. Freud
Commissioner
AMF/jan
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Resident Judge Jeffrey J Clark
Jason C. Cohee, Esq.
Anthony J. Capone, Esq.
Bradford J. Husfelt, SCI
21
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.1997)