State v. Abrajan-Cobaxin ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : ID No. 2001016205
:
v. :
:
JUAN C. ABRAJAN-COBAXIN, :
:
Defendant. :
Submitted: December 1, 2022
Decided: February 13, 2023
ORDER
On this 13th day of February 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Juan C.
Abrajan-Cobaxin’s motion for postconviction relief, the Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. Mr. Abrajan-Cobaxin pled guilty on January 14, 2021, to one count of
Rape in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 772. In his plea agreement with the State,
he accepted the State’s recommendation that the Court impose a sentence of
twenty-five years incarceration suspended after ten years, to be followed by
probation. The Court sentenced him consistently with that sentencing
recommendation.
2. Mr. Abrajan-Cobaxin then filed a pro se motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and a motion seeking
appointment of postconviction counsel. The Court denied his motion for
appointment of counsel.
3. The Court then referred the matter to a Superior Court commissioner
for findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and
Superior Court Criminal Rule 62. She issued her findings and recommendations in
the Report attached and incorporated as Exhibit A. In her Report, she explained
why Mr. Abrajan-Cobaxin failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed
ineffectively before or during his guilty plea and sentencing. To the contrary, she
recognized that his trial counsel acted appropriately in all respects. As a result, she
recommended that the Court deny Mr. Abrajan-Cobaxin’s motion for
postconviction relief.
4. After she issued her Report, neither party filed written objections as
permitted by Superior Court Criminal Rule 62(a)(5)(ii). Accordingly, her report
and its recommendations are accepted as final.
NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this matter,
and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation
dated November 4, 2022:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation attached as Exhibit A in its entirety. Mr. Abrajan-
Cobaxin’s motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 is DENIED.
/s/Jeffrey J Clark
Resident Judge
JJC/klc
oc: Prothonotary
cc: The Honorable Andrea M. Freud
Stephen R Welch, Jr., DAG
Juan Abrajan-Cobaxin, Pro Se
Trial Counsel
Exhibit A
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : I.D. No. 2001016205
: In and For Kent County
v. :
:
:
JUAN C. ABRAJAN-COBAXIN, : RK-20-020001-01 RAPE 2ND WITHOUT
SBI # 00638204 : CONSENT (F)
:
Defendant.
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant’s Motion For Postconviction Relief
Pursuant To Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
Alicia Porter, Esq., Department of Justice for State of Delaware
Juan C. Abrajan-Cobaxin, pro se
FREUD, Commissioner
November 04, 2022
The defendant, Juan C. Abrajan-Cobaxin (“Abrajan-Cobaxin”) pled guilty
on January 14, 2021, to one count of Rape in the Second Degree without Consent,
11 Del.C. § 0772. He was also charged with one count of Sexual Abuse of a Child
by a Person of Trust, First Degree and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a
Child. As part of the plea deal, the State agreed to enter Nolle Prosequis on the
remaining charges and along with the defense recommended a sentence of twenty-
five years incarcerations, suspended after serving ten years, mandatory minimum,
followed by probation. Had Abrajan-Cobaxin gone to trial and been found guilty as
charged, he faced 27 years mandatory minimum, in jail time and up to life in
prison. The Court agreed with the sentence recommendation of the parties and
sentenced Abrajan-Cobaxin accordingly.
Abrajan-Cobaxin did not appeal his conviction to the State Supreme Court.
Instead, he filed a pro se Motion for Review of Sentence, which the Court denied.1
Next, Abrajan-Cobaxin filed the pending Motion for Postconviction Relief,
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on July 14, 2021, in which he alleges
in part, ineffective assistance of counsel. Abrajan-Cobaxin filed a companion
Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, which the Court denied. 2
FACTS
According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, on January 26, 2020, the
Dover Police Department was notified of a report of a sexual assault of a child.
The victim’s mother, who was the longtime girlfriend of Abrajan-Cobaxin, had
discovered a text message on her 16-year-old daughter’s cell phone that suggested
that Abrajan-Cobaxin was having a sexual relation with the victim. When
interviewed by the Dover Police, the victim stated that Abrajan-Cobaxin had been
forcing her to have sexual intercourse with her, against her will since she was 8-
years old, on a regular basis. The last incident had occurred on January 23, 2020,
1
State v. Abrajan-Cobaxin, Del. Super., ID NO 2001016205, Clark, RJ., (Apr. 16, 2021) (Order)
when Abrajan-Cobaxin penetrated her with his penis, and he was not wearing a
condom. The victim submitted to a SANE examination and the clothing she had
been wearing during the sexual assault was retained for evidence.3 When
interviewed by the police, Abrajan-Cobaxin gave vague explanations for the text
messages. When police looked at his cell phone, they discovered Abrajan-Cobaxin
had deleted all texts to or from the victim. Additionally, in his Rule 61 Motion,
Abrajan-Cobaxin explicitly admits to having intercourse with the victim when she
as 16-years old.
Abrajan-Cobaxin Contentions
Ground One: Actual Innocence by Extraordinary Circumstances.
The plaintiff is not a natural born citizen; his previous
country was Mexico. Spanish countries comparatively,
have one law for the countries (sp.) entirety; however, in
the United States, law vary from state to state, that even
natural born citizens do not know and would surprise
them. In many states, 16 is legal age of consent in U.S.
Plaintiff [] aware of 16 years old legal age, committed
sexual acts under said law, presuming the U.S. was on
one accord.
Ground Two: Forced Plea.
Attorney Abram used several tactics (to be discussed in
response brief)4 to scare Mr. Abrajan-Cobaxin, into
accepting said plea… stating, for example, if the plaintiff
refused, he was guaranteed life.
2
State v. Abrajan-Cobaxin, Del. Super., ID NO 2001016205, Clark, RJ., (Aug. 24, 2021) (Order)
3
In its reply, the State notes that DNA tests done on the victim’s swabs indicates the presence of
Abrajan-Cobaxin semen
4
I note Abrajan-Cobaxin never filed a “response brief.”
Ground Three: Unfullable (sp.) plea – Need of Immediate Release.
The plea is on the basis, as a resident of America soil,
plaintiff will do probation and remaining Level 5 time;
however simutanously (sp.) the Court has argued he
cannot stay in U.S.; thereby unfullable (sp.) without
granted citizenship.
Abrajan-Cobaxin did not file a Memorandum of Law, and this constitutes his entire
argument.
DISCUSSION
Under Delaware law, the Court must first determine whether Abrajan-
Cobaxin has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i) before it can consider the merits of the postconviction relief claim.5 Under
Rule 61, postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the
conviction becoming final. 6
Abrajan-Cobaxin’s motion was filed in a timely
fashion, thus the bar of Rule 61(i)(1) does not apply to the Motion. As this is
Abrajan-Cobaxin initial motion for postconviction relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2),
which prevents consideration of any claim not previously asserted in a
postconviction motion, does not apply either.
None of Abrajan-Cobaxin’s claims were raised previously at his plea,
sentencing, or on direct appeal. Consequently, they are barred under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) unless he demonstrates: (1) cause for relief from the
5
Bailey v. State, 588 A,2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)
procedural default; and (2) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s rights. 7 The
bars to relief are inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or “to a claim that
satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision
(d) of this rule.8 To meet the requirements of Rule 61 (d)(2) a defendant must plead
with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the
movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he
9
was convicted or that he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United
States or Delaware Supreme Courts, applies to the defendant’s case rendering the
conviction invalid.10 Abrajan-Cobaxin’s motion alleges actual innocence but he
misunderstands the law and as detailed below. Additionally, although he claims
“actual innocence” his claim is not based on “newly discovered evidence,” as
required by the Rule.
Each of Abrajan-Cobaxin’s grounds for relief are premised on allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore Abrajan-Cobaxin has alleged sufficient
cause for not having asserted these grounds for relief at trial and on direct appeal.
Abrajan-Cobaxin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not subject to the
procedural default rule, in part because the Delaware Supreme Court will not
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
8
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(5)
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)
generally hear such claims for the first time on direct appeal. For this reason, many
defendants, including Abrajan-Cobaxin, allege ineffective assistance of counsel in
order to overcome the procedural default. “However, this path creates confusion if
the defendant does not understand that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel
and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”11 The
United States Supreme Court has held that:
[i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that the responsibility
for the default be imputed to the State, which may not ‘conduc[t]
trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend
themselves without adequate legal assistance;’ [i]neffective
assistance of counsel then is cause for a procedural default.12
A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he
can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss
the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington13 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.14
The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so
grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.15
Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii)
11
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.).
12
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
13
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14
551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice.16 In setting forth a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make and substantiate
concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal. 17 When
examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong other the
Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was
professionally reasonable .18 This standard is highly demanding.19 Strickland
mandates that, when viewing counsel’s representation, this Court must endeavor to
“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight .”20
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly
clear that Abrajan-Cobaxin has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate
his claims that his attorney was ineffective. I find trial counsel’s affidavit, in
conjunction with the record, more credible that Abrajan-Cobaxin’s self-serving
claims that his counsel’s representation was ineffective. Abrajan-Cobaxin’s
counsel clearly denied the allegations.
15
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
16
Id.17
See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL
466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).
18
Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)
19
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 383 (1986)).
20
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
Abrajan-Cobaxin was facing the possibility of life in prison and 27 years of
mandatory minimum time. The sentence and plea were very reasonable under all
the circumstances, especially in light of the strong evidence against him. Prior to
the entry of the plea, Abrajan-Cobaxin and his attorney discussed the case and the
plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Abrajan-Cobaxin. Counsel was
successful in negotiating an extremely beneficial plea bargain with the State.
Counsel’s representation was certainly well within the range required by
Strickland. Additionally, when Abrajan-Cobaxin entered his plea, he stated he was
satisfied with the defense counsel’s performance. He is bound by his statement
unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.21 Consequently,
Abrajan-Cobaxin has failed to establish that his counsel’s representation was
ineffective under the Strickland test.
Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s representation of Abrajan-Cobaxin
was somehow deficient, Abrajan-Cobaxin must satisfy the second prong of the
Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and
22
substantiate them or risk dismissal. In an attempt to show prejudice, Abrajan-
Cobaxin simply asserts that his counsel was ineffective by coercing him into
21
Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-
938 (Del. 1994)).
22
Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2(Del.Supr.) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552,
pleading guilty. Abrajan-Cobaxin’s Trial Counsel clearly denied coercing him.
Abrajan-Cobaxin also claims “actual innocence” because he thought the age of
consent in Delaware was 16-years old. This is a meritless argument. First,
ignorance of the laws is not a defense to a crime. Wien v. State.23 Second, the
victim states the intercourse was not consensual. The argument is meritless.
Finally, Abrajan-Cobaxin makes an argument based on his illegal resident status.
As noted, by both Abrajan-Cobaxin’s Trial Counsel and the State, this argument is
meritless and there is no relief possible. My review of the facts of the case leads
met to conclude that Counsel’s representation of Abrajan-Cobaxin was well within
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and no prejudice has been demonstrated.
His statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the
evidence against him. Therefore, I find Abrajan-Cobaxin’s grounds for relief are
meritless.
To the extent that Abrajan-Cobaxin alleges his plea was involuntary, the
record contradicts such allegations. When addressing the question of whether a
plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a plea
colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and
voluntary.24 At the guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Abrajan-Cobaxin whether
556 (Del. 1990)).
23
882 A.2d 183, 190 (Del.2004) See also (****)
24
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).
he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading, and
whether he was voluntarily entering the plea. The Court Asked Abrajan-Cobaxin if
he was guilty of Rape in the Second degree. The Court asked Abrajan-Cobaxin if
he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he entered the plea
including the right to suppress evidence; if he understood each of the constitutional
rights listed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form (“Guilty Plea Form”);
and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court
asked Abrajan-Cobaxin if he had discussed his plea and its consequences fully
with his attorney. The Court also asked Abrajan-Cobaxin if he was satisfied with
this counsel’s representation. The Court asked Abrajan-Cobaxin if he was aware of
the immigration consequences of his plea. Abrajan-Cobaxin answered each of
these questions affirmatively.25 I find counsel’s representations far more credible
than Abrajan-Cobaxin’s self-serving, vague allegations.
Furthermore, prior to entering his plea, Abrajan-Cobaxin signed a Guilty
Plea Form and Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Abrajan-Cobaxin’s
signature on the forms indicate that he understood the constitutional rights he was
relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead
guilty to the charges listed in the Plea Agreement. Abrajan-Cobaxin is bound by
the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise
25
State v. Abrajan-Cobaxin, Del. Super. ID No. 2001016205 (January 14, 2021) Tr. at 6-16
by clear and convincing evidence.26 I confidently find that Abrajan-Cobaxin
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that Abrajan-Cobaxin’s grounds for
relief are completely meritless.
CONCLUSION
I find that Abrajan-Cobaxin’s counsel represented him in a competent and
effective manner as required by the standards set in Strickland and that Abrajan-
Cobaxin has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation.
I also find that Abrajan-Cobaxin’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny Abrajan-Cobaxin’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief as procedurally barred and meritless.
/s/Andrea M. Freud
Commissioner
AMF/jan
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Resident Judge Jeffry J Clark
Alicia Porter, Esq.
Michael Abram, Esq.
Juan C. Abrajan-Cobaxin, S
26
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.1997)