Delaware State Housing Authority v. Ievoli ( 2018 )


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  •        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    DELAWARE STATE HOUSING                     )   C.A. No. N15L-12-074 CLS
    AUTHORITY,                                 )
    )   Tax Parcel No. 073540234
    Plaintiff,                           )
    )   Sci. Fa. Sur Mortgage Action
    v.                            )
    )   Mortgage Instrument
    MICHELLE R. IEVOLI,                        )   20011217-0106929
    )   Assignment Instrument
    Defendant.                           )   20011217-0106930
    )
    )
    Date Submitted: July 26, 2018
    Date Decided: July 31, 2018
    On Defendant Michelle R. Ievoli’s Request for Continuance of Stay
    On Writ of Possession
    DENIED.
    OPINION
    Chase N. Miller, Esquire, McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C., 1407 Foulk Road,
    Suite 102, Wilmington, Delaware, 19803. Attorney for Plaintiff.
    Michelle R. Ievoli, pro se Defendant.
    Scott, J.
    1
    This action arises from a scire facias sur mortgage action. Plaintiff Delaware
    State Housing Authority (DSHA) filed the action against Michelle Ievoli (Ievoli) in
    2015. The property was sold at Sheriff’s Sale in December 2017.
    Facts and Procedural Background
    The facts pertinent to Defendant’s request are as follows. DSHA initiated
    foreclosure on Defendant’s home in 2015. A final judgment in favor of DSHA was
    entered in this action on September 25, 2017. Ievoli did not appeal that judgment.
    A Sheriff’s Sale of the home was completed in December 2017 and confirmed in
    January 2018. DSHA was the winning bidder at the sale, and the Sheriff’s Deed was
    recorded in February 2018. DSHA then sought and was granted a Writ of Possession
    on May 29, 2018, with no action to be taken for 60 days. Also on May 29, 2018,
    Ievoli filed a pro se complaint in this Court claiming Negligence on the part of
    DSHA related to the mortgage of the property.1 At the same time of filing the
    complaint Ievoli requested a stay on the writ of possession. This request was denied.
    Ievoli’s Negligence action seeks monetary damages including lost wages, medical
    bills, damage to her creditworthiness, and legal costs.2
    1
    Citations to the complaint infra refer to this pro se complaint.
    2
    Compl. at 6.
    2
    Parties Assertions
    Ievoli filed this emergency request seeking a continuance of the stay on the
    Writ of Possession pending adjudication of a negligence action. Ievoli’s civil suit
    alleges DSHA was negligent in its selection and supervision of Bank of America
    (BOA) as a mortgaging servicer. Ievoli highlights newspaper articles and judgments
    against BOA as proof DSHA had notice of questionable practices ongoing with
    BOA’s mortgage business. Ievoli asserts that DSHA owed a duty to “stop ongoing
    illegal actions.”3 Ievoli’s complaint, in brief, seeks to hold DSHA liable for the
    actions of its subcontractor BOA.4
    DSHA argues the Court has previously denied a stay on this Writ of
    Possession. DSHA urges that under the four-prong test adopted by this Court and
    the Delaware Supreme Court Ievoli’s motion fails and should be denied. DSHA
    argues there is little chance of success on the merits for Ievoli’s complaint. DSHA
    argues that Ievoli’s complaint is procedurally barred by the statute of limitations, res
    judicata, and collateral estoppel. As to the merits of the complaint, DSHA argues
    Ievoli’s complaint fails to show DSHA owed a duty of care to Ievoli.
    3
    Compl. at 2.
    4
    Id.
    3
    DSHA urges that as the complaint seeks only monetary damages there is no
    chance of irrevocable injury should the stay be denied. DSHA points to the final
    adjudication of this matter as evidence Ievoli will not be injured. DSHA claims they
    are now the owners of the property, and as such they are entitled to possession.
    DSHA argues that even if successful on the merits, Ievoli’s award would be
    monetary and independent from the result of this action.
    DSHA claims they will continue to suffer substantial harm if the stay is
    granted. DSHA indicates they continue to be financially liable for the home as Ievoli
    has not made payments since 2015.
    DSHA finally argues that public interest will be harmed if the stay is granted.
    DSHA urges that the public is best served by speedy resolution of title and
    possession issues. DSHA urges that lingering property disputes often result in blight
    and other negative community impacts.
    Standard of Review
    Ievoli’s motion is not an appeal from the judgment in the foreclosure action,
    but rather seeks to stay further proceedings pending the outcome of a new action.
    However, the Court finds the stay pending appeal standard of review to be relevant
    to the instant case.
    4
    In determining whether to stay a decision pending appeal this Court and the
    Delaware Supreme Court have adopted the four-prong test utilized in Evans v.
    Buchanan.5 The test requires the Court “(1) to make a preliminary assessment of
    likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) to assess whether the petitioner
    will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is not granted; (3) to assess whether any other
    interested party will suffer substantial harm if the stay is granted; and (4) to
    determine whether the public interest will be harmed if the stay is granted.”6 The
    Court must analyze all four prongs of the test in determining whether to grant a stay.7
    Analysis
    Likelihood of success of Ievoli’s negligence action
    In her complaint Ievoli claims one ground for relief, negligence. The Court
    must first review any procedural bars to Ievoli’s action before reviewing the merits
    of her case. Based on the complaint, and reviewing the complaint in light most
    favorable to Ievoli, the Court in finds 10 Del. C. §8106 to be applicable. Under the
    statute “no action based on a detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature
    of debit and credit between parties arising out of contractual or fiduciary relations,
    5
    Evans v. Buchanan, 
    435 F.Supp. 832
    , 841–42 (D.Del.1977).
    6
    Kirpat, Inc. v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 
    741 A.2d 356
    , 357
    (Del. 1998).
    7
    Id.
    5
    […] shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause
    of such action.”8
    Ievoli’s complaint alleges actions dating from 2012 through November of
    2014 constituted negligence on the part of DSHA. 9 The three year statute of
    limitations would require any action brought under the contract between Ievoli and
    DSHA to be brought before November 2017. Without making a final judgment on
    the negligence action it appears that the complaint is procedurally barred by the
    statute of limitations.
    Moving to the merits of Ievoli’s claim of whether DSHA should be held liable
    for the actions of its subcontractor, the Court must determine if a duty was owed to
    Ievoli. Ievoli’s negligence complaint appears to rely on either the doctrine of
    respondeat superior or negligent hiring and supervision. Under respondeat superior,
    an employer can be held liable for the negligent actions of his employee. Similarly,
    under a theory of negligent hiring and supervision “the employer is negligent in
    giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper regulations, or in
    the employment of improper persons involving risk of harm to others, or in the
    8
    10 Del. C. § 8106.
    9
    See generally Compl.
    6
    supervision of the employee's activity.”10 To succeed on either of these theories it
    is necessary to conclude that BOA was an agent under the direct control of DSHA.
    If a party is subjected to only general control and direction under a contract,
    that party is generally deemed to be an independent contractor. 11           Delaware
    recognizes the general rule that a “contractee will not be held liable for the torts of
    an independent contractor which are committed in the performance of the contracted
    work.”12 However, if the “contractee retains control over the activities of an
    independent contractor, the owner or contractee will be held liable for the torts of
    the independent contractor.”13
    The Court is not persuaded that Ievoli’s claim will be successful. Without
    deciding the merits of Ievoli’s complaint, the case as presented in the complaint is
    not likely to be successful in holding DSHA liable for failing to oversee BOA.
    10
    Simms v. Christina Sch. Dist., 
    2004 WL 344015
    , at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 30,
    2004).
    11
    Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 
    695 A.2d 53
    , 58 (Del. 1997).
    12
    Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 
    695 A.2d 53
    , 58 (Del. 1997).
    13
    
    Id.
    7
    Possibility of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted
    In reviewing the possibility of irreparable injury, the Court reviews the record
    in this case and Ievoli’s complaint. DSHA is the legal owner of the home. Ievoli
    remains in possession of the home.
    Ievoli’s complaint seeks an award of monetary damages from DSHA, it is not
    an appeal of the foreclosure for which a final judgment has been made. Ievoli may
    feel that the loss of the home would be an irreparable injury, but allowing DSHA to
    take possession of the property does not preclude Ievoli from pursuing the
    negligence suit.
    Possibility of harm to DSHA and the public
    DSHA argues that Ievoli has resided on the property since June 1, 2015,
    without making payments. DSHA claims they remain financially liable for the
    property including paying taxes and insurance. To allow Ievoli to reside on the
    premises would continue to harm DSHA by requiring them to remain liable for the
    property.
    The scire facias sur mortgage process provides an opportunity for the parties
    to litigate many of the issues presented in Ievoli’s negligence complaint. This
    process requires the mortgagor “appear before the Court to show cause, if there is
    any, why the mortgaged premises ought not to be seized and taken in execution for
    8
    payment of the mortgage money with interest[.]”14 That process is now complete,
    and this Court has entered Judgment in favor of DSHA. Ievoli’s negligence
    complaint cannot now serve to show cause why the property ought not be delivered
    into the possession of DSHA. The public interest requires this Court to adhere to
    the statutory process and judicial precedent.
    Conclusion
    The property in question has been the subject of litigation since the initial
    filing of foreclosure on December 16, 2015.       The parties were each granted an
    opportunity to present their case. This Court entered a final judgment in September
    2017. The Court granted a Writ of Possession for the property in May of this year
    with no action to be taken for 60 days. The scire facias sur mortgage action has now
    come to a conclusion and Ievoli must cede possession of the property.
    Without reaching a decision in Ievoli’s negligence suit, the Court is not
    convinced of the likelihood of success on the merits. Ievoli will not be subjected to
    irreparable injury should DSHA take possession of the property. However, DSHA
    will continue to sustain harm should Ievoli continue to occupy the home.
    14
    10 Del. C. §5061.
    9
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Request for Continuance of Stay on
    Writ of Possession is DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Calvin L. Scott
    Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N15L-12-074 CLS

Judges: Scott J.

Filed Date: 7/31/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2018