Strobert Tree Services, Inc. v. Kenneth Lilly Fasteners, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STROBERT TREE SERVICES, INC,           )
    )
    Plaintiff,                       )
    )
    v.                        )
    )     C.A. No. N14C-09-081 CLS
    KENNETH LILLY FASTENERS,               )
    INC.,                                  )
    )
    Defendant.                       )
    )
    )
    Date Submitted: March 29, 2019
    Date Decided: April 4, 2019
    On Defendant Kenneth Lilly Fastener’s
    Motion for Summary Judgment.
    Granted.
    Victoria Petrone, Esquire, Logan & Petrone, LLC, 100 West Commons Blvd.,
    Suite 435, New Castle, Delaware, 19720. Attorney for Plaintiff.
    David Baumberger, Esquire, Chrissinger & Baumberger, 3 Mill Road, Suite 301,
    Wilmington, Delaware, 19806. Attorney for Defendant.
    Scott, J.
    Upon consideration of the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
    record of the case, it appears that:
    1. Plaintiff’s cause of action alleges industrial fasteners supplied by Defendant
    were defective, resulting in severe damage to an industrial land clearing
    grinder.
    2. On October 16, 2018, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Exclude
    Plaintiff’s expert’s report. Defendant’s filed this Motion on March 12, 2019,
    arguing Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of their claim
    without expert testimony or opinion.
    3. The Court may grant summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
    and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
    law.”1 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material
    issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to
    the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in
    dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
    1
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 
    602 A.2d 56
    , 59 (Del. 1991).
    2
    Moore v. Sizemore, 
    405 A.2d 679
    , 680 (Del. 1979).
    3
    
    Id. at 681.
                                              2
    view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The
    Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more
    thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5
    4. Defendant originally believed the batch of industrial nuts at issue had been
    returned to the manufacturer, they were not. Defendant discovered that they
    still had the batch of nuts in their possession.
    5. On April 11, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel notified the Court that he was scheduled
    to pick up a number of the nuts for the purpose of testing.6 Plaintiff, however,
    expressed concern that the nuts picked up for testing were not from the same
    batch as the original.7
    6. In July 2018, with their Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s expert pending,
    Defendant expressed reluctance to allow more time for testing, as Plaintiff had
    failed to conduct any testing on the samples delivered the previous year.8
    7. Plaintiff has not conducted testing on any of the industrial nuts alleged to be
    faulty.
    4
    
    Burkhart, 602 A.2d at 59
    .
    5
    Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 
    180 A.2d 467
    , 470 (Del. 1962); Phillip-Postle v. BJ
    Prods., Inc., 
    2006 WL 1720073
    , at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006).
    6
    D.I. 45.
    7
    D.I. 48.
    8
    D.I. 62.
    3
    8. Trial in this action was continued on November 10, 2016, to allow for testing
    by Defendant. In their opposition to the current motion, Plaintiff seeks to
    compel production of the nuts remaining in Defendant’s possession for the
    purpose of expert testing and analysis. Plaintiff questioned the provenance of
    the same nuts in 2017, and chose not to submit them to testing at that time.
    The time for discovery and submission of expert reports has passed. The
    Court has given ample time for both parties to perform testing.
    9. To be successful on a breach of warranty of merchantability claim, a plaintiff
    must prove: “(1) that a merchant sold the goods; (2) which were defective at
    the time of sale; (3) causing injury to the ultimate consumer; (4) the proximate
    cause of which was the defective nature of the goods.9 To withstand Lilly’s
    summary judgment motion, Strobert is required to present some evidence to
    support all of the elements of its claim for a breach of the implied warranty of
    merchantability.10
    10.Plaintiff must establish the nuts product were both defective and the proximate
    cause of the injury it sustained.11 Circumstantial evidence may be submitted
    to substantiate a prima facie case that there was a breach, however “it must
    9
    Reybold Grp., Inc. v. Chemprobe Techs., Inc., 
    721 A.2d 1267
    , 1269 (Del. 1998).
    10
    Id, at 1270 (Del. 1998).
    11
    
    Id. 4 tend
    to negate other reasonable causes of the injury sustained or there must be
    expert opinion that the product was defective.”12
    11.If the matter at issue in a breach of warranty claim is within the common
    knowledge of laymen, expert opinion is not required, however, the design,
    manufacture, and use of industrial fasteners is beyond the common knowledge
    of the layperson. Accepting as true Plaintiff’s claim that the nuts delivered by
    Defendant were defective, the nature this case involves questions of
    manufacturing tolerances, metallurgical composition, torque specifications,
    and industrial lubricants, among others. These are questions of fact, which
    would require the assistance of an expert for laypersons to comprehend.
    Testimony by the Plaintiff that the nuts were defective because his grinder
    was damaged is insufficient.
    12. Negligence is never presumed, it must be proven.13 As a general rule
    questions of negligence are not decided on motions for summary judgment,
    but are left for the trier of fact.14 Where the undisputed facts compel only one
    conclusion, however, the Court has the duty to enter a judgment accordingly.15
    12
    
    Id. 13 Wilson
    v. Derrickson, 
    175 A.2d 400
    , 401-02 (Del. 1961).
    14
    Faircloth v. Rash, 
    317 A.2d 871
    , 871 (Del. 1974).
    15
    
    Id. 5 13.
    The evidence presented includes Plaintiff’s account of the events; Plaintiff
    was engaged in a large scale land clearing operation. As part of that operation
    trees were being removed and loaded into an industrial shredding machine.
    The machine employs a 1,050 horsepower diesel engine to rotate a grinding
    drum roughly three times the size of an oil drum. The grinding drum weighs
    16,000 pounds and rotates at a speed of 840 to 900 rpm. The drum has 26
    replaceable grinding teeth or hammers attached the face of the drum. The
    hammers are frequently changed as they become worn down. Each hammer
    is attached to the drum with 2 nuts and 2 bolts. These nuts and bolts are
    industrial grade fasteners. The fasteners are delivered with a certificate of
    inspection and the results of that inspection. The certificate of inspection
    includes a chemical analysis of the fastener, and adherence to manufacturing
    tolerances.
    14. The nature of the industrial fasteners in this case requires the assistance of
    expert testing and opinion. A layperson cannot be expected to know or fully
    appreciate the laws of mechanics governing the problem involved in this
    case.16   Without expert testimony, Plaintiff must rely on circumstantial
    evidence to prove their case. Plaintiffs may use circumstantial evidence to
    16
    See Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 
    216 A.2d 281
    , 284 (Del. 1966).
    6
    prove the nuts were defective, however, the evidence must be such that
    negligence is the only possible inference therefrom.17
    15. The record in this case is strikingly similar to those presented in Dilenno v.
    Libbey Glass Div., Owens-Illinois, Inc.18 and Joseph v. Jamesway Corp.,19
    wherein Plaintiffs reached the conclusion that a product was defective simply
    because of its failure. In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    Plaintiff, all Strobert has shown is that the hammers of the grinding machine
    separated from the grinding drum.
    16. Without expert testimony Plaintiff cannot establish the nuts provided were
    unfit for Plaintiff’s particular use or were otherwise defective. Testimony by
    Plaintiff’s layperson employees that the hammers separated because the nuts
    were defective would be impermissible speculation. The same is true for
    testimony that the nuts were not manufactured in accordance within the
    required specifications.
    17. Strobert’s claims for breach of contract and warranty are based on the
    assertion that the nuts were defective. Because Strobert cannot demonstrate
    17
    Joseph v. Jamesway Corp., 
    1997 WL 524126
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
    18
    
    668 F. Supp. 373
    (D. Del. 1987).
    19
    
    1997 WL 524126
    (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
    7
    that the nuts were defective the claims for breach of contract and warranty
    must fail.20
    18. In regards to Lilly’s counterclaim, the record shows Plaintiff Strobert Tree
    Services issued a check in the amount of $5,099.13, therefore Lilly’s motion
    for summary judgment on their counterclaim for payment on the nuts
    purchased is moot.
    For the forgoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
    breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of
    merchantability is GRANTED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Calvin L. Scott
    Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
    20
    See Joseph, at *6.
    8