Vaughan v. Firestone Hotel Group, Inc. ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
RUSSELL VAUGHAN, )
)
Appellant, ) C.A. No. N13A-10-012 RRC
v. )
)
FIRESTONE HOTEL GROUP, INC, )
)
Appellee. )
Submitted: April 21, 2014
Decided: July 18, 2014
On Appeal from a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board.
AFFIRMED.
ORDER
Tara E. Bustard, Esquire, Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz & Bhaya,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant.
Amy M. Taylor, Esquire, Heckler & Frabizzio, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorney for Appellee
COOCH, R.J.
This 18th day of July 2014, upon consideration of Appellant’s Appeal
from the Industrial Accident Board (“the Board”), it appears to the Court
that:
1. Appellant Russell Vaughan (“Appellant”) was employed by
Firestone Hotel (“Appellee”) and injured his lower back while lifting
a heavy box at work on February 14, 2012. 1 He sustained a limited
1
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4.
lumbar strain and continued to work despite the injury until he was
laid off on March 19, 2012.2
2. Appellant worked for Appellee for thirty-four years prior to his
termination.3 Appellant experienced back pain prior to the injury but
described it as the type a person would experience after working on
his or her feet all day. 4 The pain after sustaining the injury was much
more severe. Appellant described it as “pain that I could not bear. I
could not. . . sit, could barely walk.”5
3. Appellant saw Dr. Arnold Glassman about five or six weeks after the
injury and had a MRI of his back completed in May. 6 In October,
Appellant experienced increased pain and Dr. Glassman ordered
another MRI, which was performed on November 29, 2012. 7 Dr.
Stephen Rodgers, who testified for Appellant, examined him on
March 5, 2013.8 Dr. Rodgers reviewed Dr. Glassman’s files and MRI
results and found that in November Appellant had new left far
annular tears and disc herniation that was, in his opinion, most likely
a result of his prior disc pathology and causally related to the
February 12 injury. 9
4. Dr. Evan Crain, who testified on behalf of Appellee, examined
Appellant on two occasions: June 20, 2012 and one year later on
June 12, 2013. 10 Dr. Crain reviewed Appellant’s medical records and
found a history of back pain. 11 Dr. Crain testified that at the time of
the first examination Appellant suffered a lumbar sprain but that he
had completely recovered from that injury. 12 In his opinion, the May
MRI showed evidence of a long-standing degenerative condition that
is consistent with ten years of back pain.13 During the second
examination, Dr. Crain determined that the November MRI did show
2
Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 4.
3
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Ex. A to Appellee’s Opening Br. at 3.
7
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4-5.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 5.
11
Id. at 6.
12
Id.
13
Id.
2
a subsequent new injury, but it was a result of his pre-existing
condition and confirmed the Appellant fully recovered from his
February 2012 injury. 14 Dr. Crain also determined that Appellant did
not have a permanent injury as a result of the February 2012
incident.15
5. The Board denied Appellant’s Petition to Determine Additional
Compensation Due.16 It found Dr. Crain’s opinion more persuasive
than Dr. Rodgers and that Appellant did not meet the burden of
showing causation between the work incident and his current lumbar
spine condition. 17 Ultimately, Dr. Crain convinced the Board that
Appellant “returned to his baseline” condition before the June 2012
exam and therefore the ongoing injuries are unrelated to the original
work accident.18
6. The Delaware Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly
emphasized the limited appellate review of an administrative
agency’s factual findings. 19 The Court’s role is limited to
determining whether the Board made an error of law and whether
substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings. 20 If substantial
evidence supports the administrative decision, it must be affirmed
unless there is an abuse of discretion or clear error of law. 21
“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 22
Additionally, when the Board accepts the testimony of one expert
over that of another, that expert’s opinion constitutes substantial
evidence for the purpose of an appeal.23 The appellate court does not
weigh evidence, resolve credibility questions, or make its own
factual findings.24 Only when there is no satisfactory factual
evidence to support the Board’s finding will the Superior Court
14
Id. at 7.
15
Id.
16
Ex. A to Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 16.
17
Id. at 15.
18
Id. at 15-16.
19
Elswick v. B.F. Rich Co., 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 512, at *6 (Del. Super. Oct. 23, 1998).
20
Munyan v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 909 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 2006).
21
Id.
22
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
23
Cottman v. Burris Fence Constr., 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 299, at *8 (Del. Super. Dec. 19, 2006).
24
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
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overturn the Board’s decision.25 The Court merely determines if the
evidence is legally adequate to support the Board’s factual findings. 26
When considering the facts, the Court defers to the Board’s expertise
and competence.27 The Court is bound by the Board’s decision even
if it would have reached a contrary conclusion based on the same
facts. 28 The Court will review the record in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below when considering substantial
evidence.29
7. Appellant contends that (1) the Board should have implemented the
“direct and natural consequences” test to determine causation and (2)
the determination that Appellant’s ongoing injury is not causally
related to his work injury was not supported by substantial evidence
in the record.30 Appellee argues that the Court should affirm the
Board’s decision because (1) Appellant recovered from his original
work injury; therefore, it used the correct legal standard and (2) the
Board’s decision was supported by substantial and competent
evidence.31
8. The “direct and natural consequences” test was not appropriate for
the Board to have applied in this case because the Appellant returned
to his “baseline” status. The “direct and natural consequences” test is
used to determine whether a subsequent injury is causally related to
the original compensable injury. In this instance, the Board found
that Appellant recovered from his original injury. Therefore, the
continuing back pain could not have been causally related to the
original injury of February 14. The Board found Dr. Crain’s
testimony was more persuasive than Dr. Rodgers’ testimony, which
is in its power of discretion. Dr. Crain, and subsequently the Board,
concluded that Appellant’s pain resulted from a degenerative
condition, despite his perfect work record and the absence of medical
treatment. There is substantial evidence in addition to Dr. Crain’s
testimony, such as chiropractor medical records and MRI results, to
25
Noel-Liszkiewicz v. La-Z-Boy, 68 A.3d 188, 191 (Del. 2013).
26
29 Del. C. § 10142(d).
27
Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993). See also 29 Del. C. §
10142(d).
28
Kreshtool v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 310 A.2d 649, 652 (Del. Super. 1973).
29
Thomas v. Christiana Excavating Co., 1994 WL 750325, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 15, 1994).
30
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2-3.
31
Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 2.
4
show that the Appellant suffers from such a condition. It is true that
Dr. Crain did not use the MRI films; however, he did examine the
Appellant on two occasions. Therefore, the Board’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and this Court will defer to its
expertise.
9. This Court finds that the Board used the appropriate analysis and that
its decision was supported by substantial evidence; further, the Board
did not commit any legal error. Therefore, the Board’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
cc: Prothonotary
Industrial Accident Board
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