State v. Fonville ( 2016 )


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  •                                    SUPERIOR COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    E. SCOTT BRADLEY                                                       1 The Circle, Suite 2
    JUDGE                                                GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
    July 13, 2016
    STATE MAIL – S980C
    Andre G. Fonville
    SBI # 00191757
    Sussex Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 500
    Georgetown, DE 19947
    RE: State of Delaware v. Andre G. Fonville
    ID No: 1409005465
    Dear Mr. Fonville:
    This is my decision on your Motion for Postconviction Relief. You were
    arrested on multiple drug-related offenses in September 2014. The charges were
    based on the fact that the police found drugs after they executed search warrants for
    your house and a shed on a nearby property owned by your sister. As a result of those
    charges, you were also charged with violating the terms of your probation. You pled
    guilty to one count each of Possession of Heroin in a Tier 5 Quantity and Drug
    Dealing in a Tier 2 Quantity on December 16, 2014. You also admitted that you were
    a habitual offender and that you had violated the terms of your probation. I sentenced
    you on the two new drug charges to 20 years and six months at Level V, with credit
    for 100 days previously served, to be suspended after serving five years and six
    months at Level V for probation and a drug treatment program. I found you in
    violation of your probation and sentenced you to 12 years and six months at Level V,
    suspended for probation.
    You filed a direct appeal with Delaware Supreme Court. In that appeal you
    alleged 1) the State violated Brady by failing to provide you with a copy of the
    medical examiner’s drug test report, 2) the officers exceeded the scope of the search
    warrant, 3) the search warrant was executed at night when it was a day-time search
    warrant, 4) the evidence was insufficient to establish the drug possession charge, 5)
    this Court erred in not sanctioning the State for a discovery violation, and 6)
    ineffective assistance of counsel.1             The Supreme Court did not address your
    ineffective assistance of counsel allegation since it was raised for the first time in
    your direct appeal. On the five remaining allegations, the Supreme Court found that
    you had waived them by knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering your guilty
    plea.2
    You now allege (1) that your trial counsel should have challenged the search
    warrant because (a) it was executed in an unreasonable manner, (b) was based upon
    stale information, (c) covered an abandoned shed on a nearby property that you did
    not own, and (d) lacked probable cause; (2) your trial counsel should have requested
    1
    State v. Fonville, 
    125 A.3d 682
    , at **1 (Del. 2015)(TABLE).
    2
    Id. at **2.
    2
    a Flowers hearing to identify the persons who provided the information used to obtain
    the search warrants for your home and the shed on the nearby property; (3) your trial
    counsel did not develop mitigating evidence for your sentencing; (4) you were
    convicted based on evidence that was found in a shed that you had no connection to;
    (5) the police found evidence that was outside the scope of the search warrant; (6) the
    State violated Brady by not turning over the medical examiner’s drug test report; and
    (7) the Court committed error when it admitted evidence wrongfully obtained.3
    The State and your trial counsel have filed affidavits in response to your
    allegations. Given the straightforward nature of your allegations, I have concluded
    that there is no need to appoint an attorney for you or to conduct an evidentiary
    hearing.     Since you pled guilty, I must first determine if your trial counsel’s
    representation of you left you with no choice but to plead guilty. If it did not, then
    I must determine if you made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of your
    constitutional rights.
    3
    You raised a number of other allegations in your initial motion for postconviction relief
    and in your last filing. I have concluded that they all repeated your complaints about the shed on
    your sister’s property. I have not addressed them again because I have adequately addressed that
    issue before.
    3
    I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    You allege (1) that your trial counsel should have challenged the search
    warrant because (a) it was executed in an unreasonable manner, (b) was based upon
    stale information, (c) covered an abandoned shed on a nearby property that you did
    not own, and (d) lacked probable cause; (2) your trial counsel should have requested
    a Flowers hearing to identify the persons who provided the information used to obtain
    the search warrants for your home and the shed on the nearby property; and (3) your
    trial counsel did not develop mitigating evidence for your sentencing.           The United
    States Supreme Court has established the proper inquiry to be made by courts when
    deciding a motion for postconviction relief. 4          In order to prevail on a claim for
    ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, the
    defendant must show: “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
    of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that, but for counsel’s
    errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
    trial.”5 Further, a defendant “must make and substantiate concrete allegations of
    actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal.”6 It is also necessary that the defendant
    4
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984).
    5
    State v. Thompson, 
    2003 WL 21244679
     (Del. Super. April 15, 2003), citing Strickland,
    
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984).
    6
    State v. Coleman, 
    2003 WL 22092724
     (Del. Super. Feb. 19, 2003).
    4
    “rebut a ‘strong presumption’ that trial counsel’s representation fell within the ‘wide
    range of reasonable professional assistance,’ and this Court must eliminate from its
    consideration the ‘distorting effects of hindsight when viewing that representation.’”7
    (1) The Search Warrant
    You claim that your counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search
    warrant. There were two search warrants in this case. There was one for your house
    and one for a shed on a nearby property owned by your sister. You do not distinguish
    between the two search warrants in your argument. Specifically, you allege that the
    search warrant a) was executed in an unreasonable manner, b) based upon stale
    information, c) covered an abandoned shed on a nearby property owned by your
    sister, and d) lacked probable cause. In his affidavit, your trial counsel stated that he
    reviewed the evidence provided by the State in discovery, analyzed the contents of
    the search warrants, and concluded that there was no legitimate basis to challenge
    them. Your trial counsel also stated he discussed all of this information with you
    before you decided to accept the State’s plea offer. I have reviewed the search
    warrants and concluded that there was nothing for your trial counsel to challenge.
    a. Time of Execution
    The search warrants were executed at 6:06 a.m., which means they were not
    7
    Coleman, 
    2003 WL 22092724
    , at *2, quoting Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    .
    5
    executed during the nighttime as you allege.
    b. Stale Information
    The information in the search warrants was not stale. It was based on an active
    investigation spanning three months and multiple drug buys, the last of which
    occurred within a few days of the search warrants being issued and executed. The
    information in the search warrants covered the period of time from the beginning of
    July 2014 to the beginning of September 2014. The search warrants were signed on
    September 4, 2014. There was nothing stale about this information.8 You also allege
    that there should have been specific dates for the controlled buys. There is no such
    requirement.9
    c. The Shed
    You were certainly connected to the shed even though it was on your sister’s
    property.         The evidence indicates that you were selling drugs out of your house and
    8
    Sisson v. State, 
    903 A.2d 288
    , 297 (Del. 2006)(“With respect to staleness, it is clear that
    “probable cause must be based on current information, not conjecture, for stale information will
    not support a finding of probable cause. In other words, “probable cause must exist to believe
    that the specified items are presently on the premises...” While statements of dates and times are
    instructive, they are not dispositive to ascertaining the existence of probable cause. Instead,
    magistrates and courts must consider other factors including the kind of property for which
    authority to search is sought, and whether the evidence sought is highly incriminating or
    consumable and thus less or more likely to remain in one location. The validity of probable
    cause cannot be quantified “by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of
    the facts relied upon and the issuance of the affidavit.”)(Citations omitted).
    9
    
    Id.
    6
    using the shed to store the drugs. One of the confidential informants that the police
    used to buy drugs from you told the police that you used the shed to store the drugs
    you were selling. This same confidential informant, after participating in one of the
    controlled buys, told the police that while he was in your house that you told him you
    did not have enough drugs to complete the deal. You then left your house, went to
    the shed, and returned to your house with enough drugs to complete the deal. A
    police officer conducting surveillance of the controlled buy saw you leave your house
    and go to the shed and return to your house. Your sister told the police that you were
    allowed to use the shed on her property and that you were the only person who used
    it. Your sister also told the police you were the only person with a key to the shed.
    The police found this key on you after they arrested you. After you were arrested and
    read your Miranda rights, you admitted that everything in the shed was yours and that
    no one else had anything to do with it. You also admitted that you were selling drugs.
    d. Probable Cause
    There certainly was probable cause for the police to search your house and the
    shed for drugs. The police conducted an administrative search of your house in early
    July 2014 and found drugs. The police conducted three controlled buys of drugs from
    you at your house. One of the confidential informants that the police used to buy
    drugs from you told the police that you stored your drugs in the shed.    Indeed, this
    7
    same confidential informant told the police that, during one of the controlled buys,
    you went to the shed to get enough drugs to complete the transaction. A police
    officer conducting surveillance of this controlled buy saw you go to the shed and then
    return to your house. “Probable cause is an elusive concept which avoids precise
    definition. It lies somewhere between suspicion and sufficient evidence to convict.”10
    Probable cause requires a showing of a probability that criminal activity is occurring
    or has occurred.11 There certainly was probable cause to search your house and the
    shed.        Quite simply, there were no grounds available for your trial counsel to
    challenge the search warrants. Your trial counsel’s decision to not challenge the
    search warrants did not leave you with no option but to plead guilty.
    (2) The Flowers Motion
    You allege that your trial counsel was ineffective because he did not file a
    Flowers motion.           You believe that by knowing the identity of the confidential
    informants, you would then be able to challenge alleged misstatements in the search
    warrants. As the parties are well aware, a criminal defendant does not have an
    unqualified right to discover the identity of government informants.12          Under
    10
    O’Neil v. State, 
    691 A.2d 50
    , 54 (Del. 1997).
    11
    Bease v. State, 
    884 A.2d 498
    , 498 (Del. 2005).
    12
    State v. Flowers, 
    316 A.2d 564
     (Del. 1973).
    8
    Delaware Rule of Evidence 509(a), the identity of an informant is privileged.
    However, Rule 509(c) provides an exception in cases where the informer’s testimony
    will materially aid the defense. If it appears that an informant may be able to give
    testimony which would materially aid the defense, and the State invokes the privilege,
    the Court shall give the State an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to
    determining whether the informer can supply the alleged testimony.
    In this case, three different confidential informants provided information. The
    involvement of the confidential informants was limited to participating in uncharged
    drug buys, which were used solely as a factual basis to establish probable cause for
    the search warrants. None of the confidential informants were witnesses, participants
    in, or parties to the illegal conduct that resulted in your charges. As such, Flowers
    does not require disclosure of the identities of the confidential informants. Therefore,
    I would not have granted a Flowers motion even if your counsel had filed one.
    Under your Flowers argument, you also allege that the affidavit of probable
    cause contains deliberate or material misstatements, but you fail to identify what
    statements are wrong. Without more this allegation is simply conclusory and must
    be dismissed as such. Your trial counsel’s decision to not file a Flowers motion did
    not leave you with no option but to plead guilty.
    9
    (3) Mitigating Evidence
    You allege that your trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
    investigate and develop mitigating evidence in your case. You allege that had your
    trial counsel developed mitigating evidence you would not have been forced to plead
    guilty. Your allegation is vague and conclusory. You do not state what mitigating
    evidence your trial counsel should have discovered.        Presumably, if there was
    mitigating evidence available, you would have made your trial counsel aware of it.
    You were facing a life sentence. Your trial counsel was able to take the evidence that
    was available to him and successfully negotiate a plea where you would only serve
    five years and six months in jail.
    There is also no evidence that you were forced into a plea. The record
    demonstrates that you entered your plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
    This is demonstrated by your answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form
    and during the plea colloquy. The following are the applicable questions and your
    answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.
    Have you freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges
    listed in your written plea agreement?
    You answered “yes.”
    Have you been promised anything that is not stated in your written plea
    10
    agreement?
    You answered “no.”
    Has your lawyer, the State, or anyone threatened or forced you to enter
    this plea?
    You answered “no.”
    When I took your plea, I asked you if anybody forced you to take the plea and you
    responded negatively.13 That is the proper answer for someone who voluntarily
    wanted to accept the State’s plea offer. If you felt that you had been coerced to plead
    guilty because your counsel failed to develop any mitigating evidence, you should
    have answered “yes” when I asked you if anybody had forced you to take the plea and
    you should have answered “yes” to the same question on the Truth-in-Sentencing
    Guilty Plea Form. You did not. You are bound by your answers in open court.14
    Your trial counsel’s handling of developing and investigating the mitigating evidence
    did not leave you with no option but to plead guilty.
    II. Waiver of Trial Rights
    Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must engage the defendant in a
    13
    Plea Transcript at 5 (December 16, 2014).
    14
    Somerville v. State, 
    703 A.2d 629
    , 636 (Del. 1997).
    11
    series of questions in open court in order to determine the voluntariness of the plea.15
    This plea colloquy must be preserved on the record and the judge must determine that
    the defendant realizes and understands the nature of the charges and the various
    penalties provided for that offense.16 “The record must reflect that a defendant
    understands that the guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and the
    various constitutional rights to which he would have been entitled had he gone to
    trial.”17 “A defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea
    colloquy are presumed to be truthful.”18 Where the defendant has signed his Truth-in-
    Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and answered at the plea colloquy that he understands
    the effects of the plea, the defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that
    he did not sign this form knowingly and voluntarily.19 The Delaware Supreme Court
    has already made a determination that you entered your guilty plea knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily, and as such, waived your right to challenge the search
    warrants, challenge any alleged discovery issues or violations, or to challenge the
    15
    Weeks v. State, 
    653 A.2d 266
    , 269 (Del. 1995).
    16
    Sullivan v. State, 
    636 A.2d 931
    , 937 (Del. 1994).
    17
    
    Id.
    18
    Somerville v. State, 
    703 A.2d 629
    , 632 (Del. 1997).
    19
    Savage v. State, 
    815 A.2d 349
    , 
    2003 WL 214963
    , at *2 (Del. Jan. 31, 2003)(Table).
    12
    sufficiency of the State’s evidence.20           There is nothing more for this Court to
    consider.
    Other Allegations
    You allege (1) that the police found evidence that was outside the scope of the
    search warrant, (2) that the State violated Brady by not turning over the medical
    examiner’s drug test report, and (3) the Court committed error when it admitted
    evidence wrongfully obtained.
    (1) The Scope of the Search Warrant
    You allege that the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The
    search warrants authorized the police to search your house and the shed for evidence
    of your possession of drugs and drug dealing. The police found cocaine in your
    house and cocaine, crack cocaine, marijuana, heroin, fentanyl patches, oxycodone
    pills, and drug paraphernalia in the shed. Those items were certainly within the scope
    of the search warrants.
    (2) Brady Material
    You allege that the State failed to turn over Brady material. Specifically, you
    allege that the State failed to turn over to you the test report done on the drugs which
    20
    State v. Fonville, 
    125 A.3d 682
    , at **2 (Del. 2015)(Table).
    13
    would have provided the weight of the drugs that were found in your possession.
    You argue that if you had the report you could have challenged the State’s evidence
    because you do not believe the evidence supports your conviction of Possession of
    Heroin in a Tier 5 Quantity. A Brady violation is defined as any breach of the broad
    obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. 2 1 In order to establish a Brady violation
    you must show (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused; (2) the
    evidence must have been suppressed by the State; and (3) the prejudice must have
    ensued. 2 2 You have not set forth any allegations that would support the finding of a
    Brady violation. Moreover, I will note that it is irrelevant whether the evidence in
    this case would have supported a conviction because you voluntarily pled guilty. You
    could have waited for the medical examiner’s report but you chose to resolve your
    case beforehand. You knew when you pled guilty that you did not have the medical
    examiner’s report.      Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court has already made a
    determination that you entered your guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily, and as such, waived your right to challenge the search warrants,
    challenge any alleged discovery issues or violations, or to challenge the sufficiency
    21
    Atkinson v. State, 
    778 A.2d 1058
    , 1063 (Del. 2011).
    22
    
    Id.
    14
    of the State’s evidence.23 There is nothing more for me to consider. This allegation
    is without merit.
    (3) Court Error
    You allege that the Court erred when it admitted “into evidence the fruits of
    [the] illegal search and arrest of Defendant.” I note that you did not have a trial and
    no evidence was admitted against you. The Delaware Supreme Court has already
    made a determination that you entered your guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily, and as such, waived your right to challenge the search warrants,
    challenge any alleged discovery issues or violations, or to challenge the sufficiency
    of the State’s evidence. 2 4 There is nothing more for this Court to consider. This
    allegation is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    Your Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
    23
    State v. Fonville, 
    125 A.3d 682
    , at **2 (Del. 2015)(Table).
    24
    State v. Fonville, 
    125 A.3d 682
    , at **2 (Del. 2015)(Table).
    15
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Very truly yours,
    /s/ E. Scott Bradley
    E. Scott Bradley
    ESB/sal
    cc: Prothonotary
    Counsel
    16