State of Delaware v. Hicks. ( 2015 )


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  •        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                      )
    )
    v.                               )
    )
    VINCENT E. HICKS,                       )
    )     
    ID. No. 0812020875
                Defendant.                  )
    )
    )
    Decided: May 4, 2015
    Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
    Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is MOOT.
    ORDER
    Joseph Grubb, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Attorney
    for the State.
    Vincent E. Hicks, pro se Defendant.
    Donald R. Roberts, Esq., 900 Kirkwood Highway, Elsmere, Delaware, 19805.
    Attorney for the Defendant.
    Scott, J.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Defendant Vincent E. Hicks (“Defendant”) was arrested on February 12,
    2009. He was indicted by a grand jury on March 16, 2009, for Possession of a
    Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Kidnapping First Degree, Assault
    Second Degree, Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm by a Person
    Prohibited, and Conspiracy Second Degree. Defendant was originally represented
    by Brian J. Chapman, Esq., and trial was scheduled for September 22, 2009.
    However, due to a conflict, Mr. Chapman moved for a continuance. The Trial
    Court granted the motion, and appointed new counsel, Peter N. Letang, Esq., to
    represent Defendant at trial. The new trial date was scheduled for November 3,
    2009, but was continued because the assigned prosecutor was involved in an
    unrelated murder trial. Trial ultimately commenced on February 23, 2010.
    On March 3, 2010, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the charges of Assault
    Second Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree (2 counts), Aggravated Menacing,
    Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a
    Firearm by a Person Prohibited.      Prior to trial and later before sentencing,
    Defendant attempted to appeal the matter to the Delaware Supreme Court, both of
    which were dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. On March 9, 2010, Mr. Letang
    filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on the basis of Defendant’s hostility to Mr.
    2
    Letang during the trial process. The motion was granted and Gregory M. Johnson,
    Esq. was appointed to represent Defendant at sentencing.
    Defendant was sentenced on November 15, 2010, and received 11 years at
    Level V, followed by probation at Level III.
    Defendant filed a timely appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, asserting
    (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated, (2) the indictment was improperly
    amended during trial, (3) his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth
    Amendment were violated, and (4) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
    On July 21, 2011, the Supreme Court denied Defendant’s claims and affirmed the
    conviction.
    On October 10, 2013, Defendant filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction
    Relief. Defendant was subsequently assigned counsel, Donald R. Roberts, Esq.
    (“Counsel”). Counsel then filed a Motion to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel
    pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(1) and (2) on October 31, 2013. In
    response to Counsel’s motion to withdraw, Defendant filed supplemental grounds
    for his motion for postconviction relief on January 12, 2015.
    DEFENDANT’S RULE 61 MOTION
    3
    Defendant’s motion, and supplemental claims, assert the following grounds
    for postconviction relief: (1) Defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and
    Fifth Amendment were violated because of his unlawful arrest on December 18,
    2008; (2) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) Defendant’s
    indictment was improperly amended during trial; (4) Defendant’s substantive and
    procedural due process rights were violated because of the State’s Brady violation
    during trial; (5) Defendant was entitled to a Bland jury instruction; (6) Defendant’s
    Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the stipulation of
    fact signed by the State and trial counsel that Defendant was a person prohibited at
    that time of the charged offenses; and (7) several bases for ineffective assistance of
    trial counsel. 1
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 61”)
    governs motions for postconviction relief. In reviewing motions for postconviction
    relief, Delaware law requires the Court to first look at Rule 61’s procedural
    requirements before examining the motion on its merits.2 Rule 61(i) sets forth the
    possible procedural bars to post-conviction relief: (1) a motion for postconviction
    relief cannot be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final;
    (2) any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction motion is barred; (3)
    1
    Referenced as “Ground(s) __” throughout opinion.
    2
    Ayers v. State, 
    802 A.2d 278
    , 281 (Del. 2002).
    4
    any ground for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of
    conviction is barred; and (4) any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated is
    barred.3
    A motion exceeds time limitations under Rule 61(i)(1) if it is filed more than
    one year after the conviction is finalized or the defendant asserts a newly
    recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year after it is first
    recognized.4 “A judgment of conviction is final…[i]f the defendant files a direct
    appeal or there is an automatic statutory review of a death penalty, when the
    Supreme Court issues a mandate or order finally determining the case on direct
    review.” 5
    A motion is considered repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2), and therefore barred,
    if it asserts any ground for relief “not asserted in a prior postconviction
    proceeding.” 6 Repetitive motions are only considered if it is “warranted in the
    interest of justice.”7 Under Rule 61(i)(3), grounds for relief “not asserted in the
    proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedural
    default unless movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the]
    violation.”8
    3
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
    4
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
    5
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2); Guy v. State, 
    82 A.3d 710
    , 715 (Del. 2013).
    6
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
    7
    
    Id. 8 Super.
    Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
    5
    Despite these requirements, a defendant may avoid the first three procedural
    imperatives, pursuant to Rule 61(i)(5), if the claim is jurisdictional or presents “a
    colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional
    violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness
    of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.” 9                   However, this
    fundamental fairness exception “is a narrow one and has been applied only in
    limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for
    the first time after the direct appeal.”10 “While [a] ‘colorable claim’ does not
    necessarily require a conclusive showing of trial error, mere ‘speculation’ that a
    different result might have obtained certainly does not satisfy the requirement.” 11
    Grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings
    leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding,
    or in a federal habeas corpus hearing,” are barred under Rule 61(i)(4).12 Former
    adjudications are only reconsidered if “warranted in the interest of justice.” 13
    DISCUSSION
    9
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
    10
    Younger v. State, 
    580 A.2d 552
    , 555 (Del. 1990).
    11
    State v. Getz, 
    1994 WL 465543
    , *11 (Del. Super. Jul. 15, 1994) (finding no exception under
    Rule 61(i)(5) to the procedural bars of Rule 61).
    12
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
    13
    
    Id. 6 Defendant
    has failed to overcome the procedural requirements of Superior
    Court Criminal Rule 61(i).14 The entire motion is barred for untimeliness under
    Rule 61(i)(1) because the judgment of conviction became final on the date of the
    Supreme Court’s mandate, July 21, 2011. Defendant had until July 21, 2012 to
    timely file this motion; however, Defendant did not file this motion until October
    10, 2013. Nor has Defendant asserted a retroactively applicable, newly recognized
    right.    Additionally, Defendant’s Grounds 2-3 are barred under Rule 61(i)(4)
    because those claims have been formerly adjudicated, and Grounds 4-6 are barred
    under Rule 61(i)(3) because they are grounds for relief not asserted in the
    proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. Moreover, Defendant has not
    asserted “a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice” to overcome
    these two procedural bars. 15           For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for
    postconviction relief is procedurally barred under Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(i).
    However, the Court will now more fully address each ground individually.
    I. Ground One
    Defendant’s first ground for relief on this motion relates to an alleged due
    process violation under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. Defendant argues that
    he was subjected to a warrantless arrested by Wilmington Police Department on
    14
    Bailey v. State, 
    588 A.2d 1121
    , 1127 (Del. 1991) (stating the court must first apply the
    procedural bar under Rule 61 before considering the merit of any claim); 
    Younger, 580 A.2d at 554
    .
    15
    See Rule 61(i)(5).
    7
    December 18, 2008, for a violation of probation. While there is nothing in the
    record before the Court to confirm when Defendant was arrested, the Court will
    infer the relative accuracy of Defendant’s asserted date from the Delaware
    Supreme Court’s decision on Defendant’s appeal in this matter:
    Hicks was arrested on the relevant charges on February 12, 2009, at
    the Howard R. Young Correctional Facility, where he was being held
    on a violation of probation warrant. 16
    Regardless of the date, it is clear to the Court based on the record that any arrest
    for a violation of probation, and resulting charge(s), were unrelated to Defendant’s
    convictions at issue on this motion. Therefore, this claim is not properly brought
    on this motion, and any challenge to that December 2008 arrest or subsequent
    violation of Defendant’s due process rights should have been timely filed separate
    from this matter. Accordingly, Ground 1 of Defendant’s motion for postconviction
    relief fails.
    II. Grounds Two and Three
    Defendant’s second and third grounds for this motion are procedurally
    barred under Rule 61(i)(4), as claims formerly adjudicated.17 Ground 2 asserts that
    Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. This claim was adjudicated by the
    Delaware Supreme Court on Defendant’s appeal of his convictions in this case.
    On this claim, the Supreme Court held that
    16
    Hicks v. State, No. 741, 2010, ¶ 8 (Del. Jul. 21, 2011).
    17
    See 
    Id. 8 [b]oth
    continuances were requested and granted for good cause. We
    do not find a delay of one year under the circumstances presented here
    to be presumptively prejudicial. As for the speedy trial factors, the
    record does not reflect that Hicks, either pro se or through counsel,
    ever asserted his right to a speedy trial in the Superior Court. Nor
    does Hicks identify any prejudice suffered by him as the result of any
    alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. Weighing all of the
    above, we find Hicks’s claim of a speedy trial violation to be without
    merit. 18
    Therefore, the Court finds that Ground 2 on this motion has already been
    adjudicated by the Supreme Court on Defendant’s appeal of these convictions.
    Ground 3 asserts that Defendant’s rights were violated because the
    indictment against him was improperly amended during trial. This claim was also
    adjudicated by the Supreme Court on Defendant’s appeal of his convictions in this
    case. On this claim, the Supreme Court held that
    Hicks’s claims of an improperly amended indictment and violations of
    his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are asserted without any
    record support. Nor does our review of the record in this case reveal a
    factual basis for any such claims. As such, we conclude that they, too,
    are without merit. 19
    Defendant has offered no additional record support for this claim than was before
    the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court finds Ground 3 on this motion has already
    been adjudicated by the Supreme Court on Defendant’s appeal of these
    convictions.
    18
    
    Id. at ¶¶
    8-9.
    19
    
    Id. at ¶
    10.
    9
    The “colorable claim” exception to Rule 61(i)’s procedural bars applies only
    to the first three procedural bars; it is not applicable to claims barred under Rule
    61(i)(4) as formerly adjudicated. Therefore, Grounds 2 and 3 on this motion are
    necessarily procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4). Furthermore, the Court finds
    that, for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court, these two grounds are also
    without merit. 20       Accordingly, Grounds 2 and 3 on Defendant’s motion for
    postconviction relief fail.
    III. Grounds Four, Five and Six
    In Ground 4 on this motion, Defendant asserts that his substantive and
    procedural due process rights were violated because of the State’s Brady violation
    during trial.       Ground 5 asserts that Defendant was entitled to a Bland jury
    instruction. Finally, in Ground 6 Defendant asserts that his Fifth Amendment right
    against self-incrimination was violated by the stipulation of fact signed by the State
    and trial counsel that Defendant was a person prohibited at that time of the charged
    offenses. However, each of these claims should have been objected to at trial and
    raised on Defendant’s appeal of his convictions to the Supreme Court. In other
    words, these grounds are not properly raised for the first time in this motion.
    20
    See Hicks, No. 741, 2010.
    10
    Therefore, the Court finds that these grounds are procedurally barred under Rule
    61(i)(3). Accordingly, these grounds for Defendant’s motion for postconviction
    relief fail.
    Assuming arguendo that these claims are not procedurally barred, they are
    nonetheless meritless. However, it appears that Defendant asserts Grounds 4-6
    individually and as bases for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For that
    reason, the Court will reserve any discussion on the merits of these claims for its
    analysis of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
    IV. Ground Seven
    Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is his one asserted
    ground for postconviction relief that is barred only for timeliness. 21 An ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim that alleges a constitutional basis for postconviction
    relief may overcome the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1)-(3) if the defendant
    asserts a colorable claim. 22 However, Defendant has not asserted a colorable claim
    of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and is therefore procedurally barred. Even
    21
    Though Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was previously raised on his appeal to the
    Supreme Court, Rule 61(i)(4) is satisfied because the Supreme Court declined to decide this
    claim. Thus, Defendant’s claim has not been previously adjudicated.
    22
    See Rule 61(i)(5); State v. MacDonald, 
    2007 WL 1378332
    , *4, n.17 (Del. Super. May 9,
    2007). See also State v. St. Louis, 
    2004 WL 2153645
    , *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 22, 2004) (“Since
    the Supreme Court generally will not hear a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
    appeal, the procedural default rules do not bar those assertions of errors premised on ineffective
    assistance of counsel.”).
    11
    assuming arguendo that Defendant’s motion is not procedurally barred, it
    nonetheless fails on the merits.
    Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal are
    appropriate in motions for postconviction relief. 23 Ineffective assistance of counsel
    claims are evaluated under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v.
    Washington. 24 To succeed on a claim under Strickland, the petitioner must show:
    (1) that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness;” and (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.”25
    The test articulated in Strickland creates a strong presumption that counsel’s
    representation was professionally reasonable. 26 The “benchmark for judging any
    claim of ineffectiveness [is to] be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
    proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
    having produced a just result.” 27 Therefore, a motion for postconviction relief
    23
    Flamer v. State, 
    585 A.2d 736
    , 753 (Del. 1990).
    24
    
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). See also 
    Ayers, 802 A.2d at 281
    (“A petitioner’s claim that he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel is measured under the test articulated by the United States
    Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.”).
    25
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
    , 694. See also 
    Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753
    .
    26
    
    Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753
    .
    
    27 Cooke v
    . State, 
    977 A.2d 803
    , 840 (Del. 2009) (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
    ).
    12
    “must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice, and substantiate them,” or risk
    being dismissed.28
    Turning to the merits of Defendant’s claim, Defendant makes the conclusory
    argument that his trial counsel was ineffective during the entire proceeding, but is
    unable to articulate how trial counsel’s performance was deficient.               In his
    supplemental grounds for this motion, Defendant seems to raise Grounds 4-6 in
    conjunction with this claim, as well as individually.                Even considered in
    conjunction with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court finds that
    Grounds 4-6 on this motion also fail as bases for this claim.
    Defendant asserts Grounds 4-6, whether individually and in conjunction
    with this claim, without any record support.               Instead, Defendant makes only
    conclusory allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, evidence tampering, and
    collusion between the State and trial counsel. However, Defendant offers no
    concrete evidence in support of this claim. He also makes the conclusory assertion
    that he was entitled to a Bland jury instruction because of the co-defendants that
    testified at his trial, yet Defendant offers no way in which he was prejudiced by the
    absence of the instruction. Finally, Defendant’s assertion that the submission to
    the jury of the stipulation that Defendant was a person prohibited at the time of the
    offenses was a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is
    28
    Couch v. State, 
    2008 WL 390754
    , *1 (Del. Feb. 14, 2008).
    13
    misplaced. Such a stipulation of fact is not uncommon, in order to “sanitize” the
    indictment by removing reference to the reasons for which the defendant is a
    person prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon.29 In other words, stipulating
    that the defendant is a person prohibited is a tactical decision by trial counsel for
    the purpose of removing from the indictment the details of the defendant’s prior
    conviction(s).30
    The Court’s review of the record in this case does not reveal a factual basis
    for any of these claims. Nor has Defendant articulated any way in which he was
    prejudiced by these claims, beyond a mere conclusory assertion of prejudice.
    Moreover, the Court finds that Defendant is unable to establish a claim for
    ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Defendant has failed to show
    that:    (1) trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. For
    29
    See Johnson v. State, 
    983 A.2d 904
    , 923 (Del. 2009) (Court holding that defense counsel made
    a tactical decision to stipulate that the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The
    defendant was a person prohibited as result of his 2003 conviction for Rape in the Fourth
    Degree. By stipulation, the defendant avoided the jury learning about the nature of his prior
    conviction. The stipulation did not provide the reason for Johnson's prohibited status; instead, the
    stipulation simply stated that the parties agreed Johnson “was prohibited from owning or
    possession a firearm.”); Smith v. State, 
    882 A.2d 762
    (Del. 2005) (“Here, the State redacted the
    indictment to eliminate any prejudice to Smith, in exchange for Smith's stipulation that he was a
    person prohibited by virtue of his September 2003 conviction.”).
    30
    
    Id. 14 these
    reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish any colorable
    claim for relief under his ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
    The motion to withdraw is moot.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/Calvin L. Scott
    The Honorable Calvin L. Scott Jr.
    15