Johnson v. Sleepy's Holdings LLC. ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
BARBARA D. JOHNSON )
)
Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. N13C-03-114 CLS
)
)
v. )
)
SLEEPY’S HOLDINGS, L.L.C, )
a Delaware Limited Liability )
Company, d/b/a SLEEPY’S )
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE )
)
Defendant. )
Date Submitted: March 11, 2015
Date Decided: May 28, 2015
On Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part.
ORDER
Joseph W. Weik, Esq. Weik, Nitsche, Dougherty & Galbraith, Wilmington,
Delaware 19805. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Kevin J. Connors, Esq. Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Attorney for Defendant.
Scott, J.
On this 28th day of May, 2015 and upon Defendant Sleepy’s
Holdings’ (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds as
follows:
1. On May 30, 2011, Plaintiff Barbara Johnson (“Plaintiff”) and her
boyfriend, Mark Sekerke (“Sekerke”), purchased a queen sized Tempur-
Pedic 30X80 mattress with two box springs at the Sleepy’s located at
3737 Kirkwood Highway, Wilmington, Delaware 19805. The following
day, persons either employed with or hired by Defendant delivered and
set up the mattress set in Sekerke’s bedroom. Plaintiff alleges that three
days later, on June 2, 2011, two of the four existing wooden slats broke,
causing the mattress and box springs to collapse while Plaintiff and
Sekerke were in it, cause personal injuries to her. Plaintiff brought this
action against Defendant, alleging negligence, breach of express
warranties, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
2. On January 16, 2015, Defendant moved for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s negligence claim, breach of express warranties, breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability and breach of the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose claims. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff
has offered no evidence to establish that Defendant breached any express
2
warranties or implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. Defendant argues that Sekerke’s failure to obtain the
proper bed frame for the Tempur-Pedic mattress voided the warranties
represented in the Tempur-Pedic Welcome Kit. Moreover, Defendant
argues that the invoice Sekerke signed upon delivery effectively
disclaimed and express or implied warranties, including exclusion of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claim of breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose necessarily fails because
Plaintiff has not plead any special use or purpose for the mattress, as
required for success on this claim. Defendant makes no argument in
support of his motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s negligence
claim.
3. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion on several bases. First, Plaintiff
asserts that summary judgment should not be granted as to any claim she
made regarding a breach of express warranties because express
warranties cannot be disclaimed. Plaintiff also asserts that summary
judgment should not be granted on her breach of implied warranty of
merchantability because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the mattress was defective in the sense that it was not fit for its
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ordinary purpose, and because Defendant did not disclaim this warranty.
Plaintiff notes that Defendant asserted no argument in support of
summary judgment for Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Finally, Plaintiff did
not respond to Defendant’s argument that summary judgment should be
granted as to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.
4. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.” 1 The initial burden of informing the court of the basis for
a motion for summary judgment and identifying the portions of the
record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
fall on the moving party. 2 Once the moving party meets its initial burden
of showing that no material issues of fact are present, the nonmoving
party cannot rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidentiary
material sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a disputed material
fact.3 Where material facts remain in dispute, the trial judge may not
1
Super. Ct. R. 56; Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
2
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
3
Phillips v. Del. Power & Light Co., 216 A.2d 281, 285 (Del. 1966).
4
conclude that issues of law.4 Only after the fact finder
first resolves the disputed facts can the legal consequences of those facts
be determined. 5
5. In this case, Defendant made no argument in support of its motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim. For that reason,
Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim is DENIED.
6. Under Delaware law, express warranties cannot be disclaimed. 6
Moreover, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant breached any express warranties that may have been made.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s breach of express
warranties claim is DENIED.
7. Under Delaware law, to be successful on a claim of breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a merchant
sold the goods; (2) which were defective at the time of sale; (3) causing
injury to the ultimate consumer; (4) the proximate cause of which was the
defective nature of the goods; and (5) the seller received notice of the
injury. 7 In this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
4
See Jones v. Crawford, 1 A.3d 299, 303 (Del. 2010).
5
Id.
6
See Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 593 (Del. 2000) (citing 6 Del. C. § 2-
316(1)).
7
Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Del.
1998).
5
whether there was a defective condition in the mattress at the time of
sale. There is also a factual dispute as to whether Defendant effectively
disclaimed this implied warranty. Factual disputes must be resolved by
the jury. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is DENIED.
8. Under Delaware law, to be successful on a claim of breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) she had a special purpose for the goods; (2) defendant knew or had
reason to know of that purpose; (3) defendant knew or had reason to
know that the plaintiff/buyer was relying on the seller’s superior skill to
select goods that fulfilled that purpose; and (4) the plaintiff in fact relief
on defendant’s superior skill. 8 However, no recovery is available where
a product is used for its ordinary purpose. 9 Defendant has satisfied its
burden on a motion for summary judgment to demonstrate that Plaintiff
has not made a prima facie showing of her claim because Plaintiff does
not allege any special purpose for the mattress apart from its ordinary
use, or that defendant knew or should have known of that special
purpose. 10 Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to provide evidence
8
Atamian v. Ryan, 2006 WL 1816936, *4 (Del. Super. Jun. 9, 2006).
9
Id.
10
See Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 323.
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that demonstrates the existence of a material factual dispute. 11 Here,
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s argument for summary judgment
as to her claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. For this reason, Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden
of demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute on this claim.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is GRANTED.
9. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Claim for Negligence is DENIED; as to Plaintiff’s Claim for
Breach of Express Warranties is DENIED; as to Plaintiff’s Claim for
Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability is DENIED; and as to
Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a
Particular Purpose is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
11
Phillips, 216 A.2d at 285.
7