Com. v. Cameron, P. ( 2017 )

J-S49035-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
PIERRE CARLOS CAMERON
Appellant No. 1879 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 27, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006725-2016
BEFORE: DUBOW, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2017
Appellant, Pierre Carlos Cameron, appeals nunc pro tunc from the
judgment of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common
Pleas. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress contraband and a cellphone recovered from his person because the
Commonwealth failed to establish reasonable suspicion that he was engaged
in criminal activity. We affirm.
At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
following evidence. On April 18 2016, Detective Sheila Ladner of the
Pittsburgh Police Department’s Narcotics Unit was operating undercover and
received texts from the cellphone number associated with Richard Cameron
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Richard”).1 N.T., 9/27/16, at 3. Richard was the subject of an ongoing
investigation, and his identity, appearance, and cellphone number were
known to the detective. Id. at 3-4, 10. The initial text message indicated
that the sender “had heroin to sell.” Id. at 3. Detective Ladner exchanged
text messages with the subject phone and arranged a meeting to buy fifty
packets of heroin at a residential address on April 20, 2016. Id. at 4-5.
On the day of the buy, Detective Ladner planned a “takedown” of
Richard. Id. at 7. She and her partner proceeded to the prearranged
address and waited in a vehicle across the street from the designated
address. Id. at 7. Five other officers were stationed in vehicles in the area.
Detective Ladner observed Appellant arrive on the designated street and
stand in front of the designated address. Id. at 6-7. Appellant appeared to
type on his cellphone. Id. at 7. The detective received a text message that
read, “Here.” Id. No other individuals were present at the location. Id.
Upon receiving the text message, Detective Ladner radioed the other
officers, who converged on Appellant in their vehicles, exited, and identified
themselves as police officers.2 Appellant fled, and the detectives pursued
him on foot. Appellant was apprehended and searched incident to arrest.
1
The record does not disclose whether Appellant and Richard are related.
2
The officers were wearing police vests indicating “Pittsburgh Police,” and
had badges around their necks. N.T. at 8.
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The officers recovered heroin, marijuana, and a cellphone, which bore the
same phone number used to arrange the buy.3
Appellant was charged with criminal use of a communication facility,4
resisting arrest,5 possession and possession with intent to deliver heroin,6
and possession of marijuana.7 Appellant filed a motion to suppress all
physical evidence recovered from his person claiming that he was detained
without reasonable suspicion when the officers approached him, exited their
vehicles, and announced they were police officers. Appellant’s Mot. to
Suppress, 9/6/16, at 2 (unpaginated).
The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on September 27,
2016, at which Detective Ladner testified. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion, finding, inter alia, that
Detective Ladner possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant. The
trial court reasoned that Appellant was the only individual at the
prearranged location, the detective observed him texting on a cellphone, and
the detective received a text message stating, “Here.” N.T. at 16; Trial Ct.
3
The detective confirmed the phone number by calling the subject phone
with her cellphone.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
6
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30).
7
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31).
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Op., 4/6/17, at 4. Appellant immediately proceeded to a stipulated nonjury
trial at which the trial court found him guilty of all charges. That same day,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ probation for criminal use of
a communication facility and no further penalty on the remaining offenses.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a timely direct appeal.
On November 3, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate his appellate
rights, which the trial court granted on November 10, 2016. Appellant filed
a notice of appeal within thirty days and complied with the trial court’s order
to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement by February 21, 2017. The trial
court has filed a responsive opinion.
Appellant presents the following question for review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE
EVIDENCE WHEN THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD NO
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CHASE, HANDCUFF, AND
DETAIN [Appellant] WHEN THE POLICE WERE ACTUALLY
INVESTIGATING RICHARD CAMERON, KNEW WHAT
RICHARD . . . LOOKED LIKE, BELIEVED THAT IT WAS
RICHARD’S CELL PHONE WITH WHOM THEY WERE IN
CONTACT; BUT WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LAWRENCEVILLE,
ONLY SAW [Appellant] USING A CELL PHONE?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant argues that he was seized when the detectives approached
him, exited their vehicles, and announced they were police officers.
According to Appellant, the Commonwealth failed to establish reasonable
suspicion for this seizure because Appellant “was simply not the person that
the police were looking for[,]” and Detective Ladner did not observe
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Appellant engage in unusual or suspicious activity. Id. at 14-15. Appellant
emphasizes that his use of a cellphone alone did not suggest criminal
activity, and Detective Ladner could not have known that he sent her the
text message indicating he was at the buy location. Id. Appellant further
contends that evidence obtained after the illegal detention, including his
flight and possession of the cellphone used to arrange the buy, cannot justify
the existence of reasonable suspicion at the time of his detention. Id. at 16-
17. In sum, Appellant asserts “the police lacked reasonable suspicion in
stopping and seizing [him] based on him standing in an alley texting on his
cell phone and then running away when five (5) police officers exited their
vehicles and yelled ‘Pittsburgh Police.’” Id. at 19. No relief is due.
The principles governing our review are well settled:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings
and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to our plenary review.
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Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when
examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.
***
It is well-established that there are three categories of
interaction between citizens and police officers. As our
Supreme Court has clearly articulated:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to
respond. The second, an “investigative detention [,]” must
be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a
suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not
involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or
“custodial detention” must be supported by probable
cause.
***
. . . In order to determine whether the police officer had
reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances
must be considered. In making this determination, we
must give “due weight . . . to the specific reasonable
inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.” Also, the totality of the
circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate
criminal conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of
innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further
investigation by the police officer.”
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34-35, 37 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___, 853 MAL 2016, 2017 WL
2081215 (Pa. May 15, 2017). The reasonable suspicion standard is a lower
standard than probable cause. Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673,
677 (Pa. 1999).
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Following our review of Appellant’s arguments, the relevant legal
principles, and the record, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s
denial of Appellant’s suppression motion. As noted by the trial court,
Detective Ladner arranged a time and location for the purchase by text
messages to a cellphone number. Although the detective believed that she
was corresponding with Richard, she observed Appellant arrive at the area of
the buy and stand in front of the agreed upon address. She saw Appellant
appear to use his cellphone to send a text message, and she then received a
text message that indicated the seller was at the location. No other
individuals were in the vicinity. Based on the combination of these facts, we
agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth established reasonable
suspicion to believe Appellant was a participant in the scheduled transaction
and to detain him. See Freeman, 150 A.3d at 37. Thus, no relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2017
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