State v. Thomas ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ID Nos. 1705004684 and 1705004742
)
)
)
KORI THOMAS, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: October 22, 2022
Decided: February 28, 2023
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
SHOULD BE DENIED
Timothy Maguire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorneys for the State.
Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, Woloshin, Lynch & Associates, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware, counsel for Defendant.
Kori Thomas, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
SALOMONE, Commissioner
This 28th day of February 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Kori
Thomas’ (“Defendant” or “Thomas”) Amended Motions for Postconviction Relief,
it appears to the Court that:
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. In April and May of 2017, there were a series of gun-point robberies at several
convenience stores, gas stations, and liquor stores in New Castle County, Delaware.
2. On May 8, 2017, Thomas was arrested in connection with those crimes and
charged with the following: (i) thirteen (13) counts of Robbery in the First Degree;
(ii) fourteen (14) counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a
Felony (PFDCF); (iii) one (1) count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree; (iv)
thirteen (13) Counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP);
and (v) thirteen (13) Counts of Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a
Felony.
3. Following plea negotiations between the parties, Thomas plead guilty to three
charges: (i) one (1) count of Robbery in the First Degree (Habitual), (ii) one (1) count
of Robbery in the First Degree (Non-Habitual), and (iii) one (1) count of Attempted
Assault in the Second Degree.
1
4. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to declare Defendant a habitual offender
pursuant to 11 Del. C. §4214(c) as to the charge of Robbery in the First Degree.1 On
November 1, 2018, the Court granted the State’s application and sentenced
Defendant to 25 years of Level V incarceration, with credit for 541 days previously
served as to Robbery First Degree (Habitual). As to the Robbery First Degree, non-
habitual offender charge, Defendant was sentenced to 25 years at Level V,
suspended after 3 years, for 6 months at Level III. Finally, as to Assault Second
Degree, Defendant was sentenced to 8 years at Level V, suspended for 6 months at
Level III.2
5. On December 26, 2018, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Modification of
Sentence, which was denied by this Court on March 22, 2019.3
6. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
RULE 61 MOTION
7. On July 23, 2019, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief
pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea and raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.4
1
In Criminal ID No. 1705004684: Superior Court Criminal Docket Index No. 48 (hereinafter
“D.I. ___”).
2
D.I. 50-52.
3
D.I. 52, 54, 58.
4
D.I. 59.
2
8. On August 5, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in
connection with his postconviction relief, which was denied by the Court on
November 21, 2019.5 That same day, the Court directed Defendant’s prior defense
counsel, Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, to submit an Affidavit responding to
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.6
9. On January 21, 2020, defense counsel filed an Affidavit in Response to
Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel denying those claims.7
10. On February 24, 2020, the State filed its Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief.8
11. On May 4, 2020, Defendant filed five separate Motions which collectively
sought to amend Defendant’s initial Rule 61 Motion (collectively, the “Amended
Motion”).9 With the Amended Motion, Thomas filed a second motion for
appointment of counsel for purposes of his postconviction relief.
5
D.I. 60-61
6
Id.
7
D.I. 63.
8
D.I. 64.
9
D.I. 65-69. Through the Amended Motion, Thomas requested that the five motions be accepted
as the “operative Rule 61 and related motions.” D.I. 65. As such, to the extent that additional or
different claims were made in the Rule 61 filed on July 23, 2019 which were not included in the
Amended Motion, the Court does not address those claims.
3
The Amended Motion also sought to have the record expanded to include the
following: (i) a transcript of the April 27, 2018 hearing at which time Thomas
entered his guilty plea and (ii) an Order requiring defense counsel to respond to
specific questions raised by the Defendant.10 On November 30, 2020, the Court
granted the Amended Motion to Expand the Record, in part, and ordered that a
transcript of the April 27, 2018 proceedings be made part of the record. 11 While
Thomas only requested the plea colloquy transcript from the April 27, 2018 hearing
be made part of the record, Defendant’s plea colloquy was, in fact, conducted over
the course of two days. As such, the Court sua sponte expanded the record to also
include the transcript from the April 30, 2018 hearing. The plea colloquy transcript
from the April 30, 2018 hearing was filed and docketed on December 14, 2020.12
The plea colloquy transcript from the April 27, 2018 hearing was filed and docketed
on March 12, 2021.13
12. On August 26, 2021, after receiving copies of the two plea transcripts,
Defendant filed a Memorandum of Law in support of his Amended Motion and
10
D.I. 68-69. The Court did not order counsel to respond to the specific questions raised by the
Defendant in his Amended Motion as she had previously filed an Affidavit in Response to
Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on January 21, 2020 in which she denied
those claims.
11
D.I. 72.
12
D.I. 73.
13
D.I. 74.
4
renewed his request for appointment of counsel.14 His claims as set forth in the
Amended Motion and Memorandum of Law can be fairly summarized as follows:
(1) Ground One: Judicial Coercion. Defendant asserts that the
statements made by the Court to him during the plea colloquy regarding the
maximum penalties he faced if he were to proceed to trial and be convicted
constituted a threat and/or scare tactic designed to coerce him into accepting the plea
offer from the State and relinquishing his Constitutional right to proceed to trial.
Thomas also contends that the decision by the Court to continue the plea hearing to
allow Thomas more time to speak with his counsel was a further act of coercion.15
(2) Ground Two: Judicial Abuse of Discretion. Along the same vein,
Defendant contends that the alleged admonishments and/or threats made by the
Court were outside of the Court’s role as a neutral arbiter and constituted judicial
abuse of discretion.16
(3) Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Thomas contends
(i) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object during the plea colloquy to
the alleged judicial coercion and abuse of discretion and (ii) defense counsel
14
D.I. 67.
15
D.I. 65-66.
16
Id. Defendant alleges that the judge admonished him during the plea colloquy, refused to accept
his rejection of the plea on three separate instances and employed fear tactics to coerce him into
accepting the plea.
5
completed the coercion by requesting additional time to discuss the plea and related
matters with the Defendant. According to the Defendant, when taken together, the
Court and defense counsel coerced him into taking a plea in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to trial.17
Due to the foregoing actions, Defendant asserts that his plea was not entered
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That is, but for the alleged deficiencies and
coercion, Defendant would have withdrawn his plea and proceeded to trial. 18
13. Defendant’s renewed Motion for Appointment of Counsel was denied on
October 25, 2022.19
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
14. Before considering the merits of the claims, the Court must first determine
whether there are any procedural bars to the Rule 61 Motion.20 Pursuant to Super.
Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief that was not previously raised is
deemed waived, and any claims that were formerly adjudicated, whether in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction
proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, are thereafter barred.21
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
D.I. 82.
20
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
21
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) and (d)(2)(i), (ii).
6
However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised at any earlier
stage in the proceedings and are properly presented by way of a motion for
postconviction relief.22
15. This is Defendant’s first motion for post-conviction relief and it was timely
filed.23 No procedural bars prevent the Court from reviewing his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on the merits but procedural bars do exist with respect
to his claims of judicial coercion and abuse of discretion.
16. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington.24 This test requires the defendant to show: (a) counsel’s deficient
performance, i.e., that his attorney’s performance fell below “an objective standard
of reasonableness,”25 and (b) prejudice.26
17. Under the first prong, judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. Courts must
ignore the distorting effects of hindsight and proceed with a strong presumption that
22
Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-Mayes, 2016 WL
4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016).
23
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (motion must be filed within one year of when conviction
becomes final); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2) (If the defendant files a direct appeal, the judgment
of conviction becomes final when the mandate is issued).
24
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
25
Id. at 688.
26
Id. at 694.
7
counsel’s conduct was reasonable.27 The Strickland Court explained that a court
deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel’s conduct.28
18. Under the second prong, in order to establish prejudice, the movant must show
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”29 In other
words, not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome
undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.30 The court must consider
the totality of the evidence and must ask if the movant has met the burden of showing
that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the
errors.31 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”32
27
Id. at 689.
28
Id. at 690.
29
Id. at 694.
30
Id. at 693.
31
Dale v. State, 2017 WL 443705, * 2 (Del. 2017); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-
696 (1984).
32
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
8
19. In the context of a plea challenge, it is not sufficient for the defendant to claim
simply that his counsel was deficient. The defendant must also establish that
counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant would not have taken a plea but would have
insisted on going to trial.33
20. The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant.34
Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make
and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice.35
21. For the reasons set forth below, the claims raised in the Amended Motion were
all waived upon the entry of Defendant’s plea, the first two claims are procedurally
barred, and all his claims are without merit.
Thomas’ Claims Were Waived Upon the Entry of His Plea
22. A defendant is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his
testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.36 In the subject action, the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Plea
33
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495(Del.) (applying Strickland to guilty pleas).
34
Oliver v. State, 2001 WL 1751246 (Del.).
35
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
36
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del. Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3
(Del. Super. 2008).
9
Agreement and plea colloquy reveal that Thomas knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently entered a guilty plea.
23. At the time of the plea, Thomas represented that he had reviewed the plea
agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with his attorney and that he
understood the Constitutional rights he was giving up by entering the plea, as well
as the potential penalties he was facing by entering his plea.37
24. At the plea hearing, Thomas admitted his guilt to the three charges comprising
the plea agreement. He admitted that while committing theft on two separate
occasions he used or threaten the immediate use of force upon each of Sevil Kangel
and Hareesh Nadendla with the intent to compel each to deliver up property and, in
the course of doing so, displayed what appeared to be a firearm during commission
of Robbery in the First Degree (2 counts). Thomas also admitted that he
intentionally attempted to cause physical injury to Sakinder Singh by firing a
handgun at his head during the commission of Assault in the Second Degree.38
25. Thomas further represented that neither his lawyer, the State, nor anyone else
threatened or forced him to enter his plea.39
37
April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 6-8.
38
April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 9-12.
39
Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, dated April 30, 2018.
10
26. The Court accepted Thomas’ guilty plea only after finding that he entered into
his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.40
27. As confirmed by the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing
Guilty Plea Form, Thomas entered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
He has not presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his testimony
at the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement or answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty
Plea Form.
28. Thomas’ valid guilty plea waived his right to challenge any alleged errors,
deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea, even those of
constitutional proportions.41
29. All of Defendant’s claims presented herein stem from allegations of
misconduct and deficiencies which existed at the time of the entry of the plea.
Therefore, all of his claims presented in the Amended Motion were waived when he
knowingly, freely and intelligently entered his plea. 42
40
April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pg. 19.
41
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del.
2009); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).
42
See, Mills v. State, 2016 WL 97494, at *3 (Del.).
11
Thomas’ Claims Are Both Procedurally Barred and Without Merit
30. In addition to Thomas’ claims having been waived, the first two claims are
also procedurally barred, and all the claims are without merit. Because all three
claims are intertwined, they will be discussed together.
31. Thomas alleges that there was judicial coercion during his plea colloquy
(which forced him to accept the guilty plea) and that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the alleged coercion.
32. In addition to having waived these claims, the claims for judicial coercion and
abuse of discretion are procedurally barred. Thomas was required to raise any claims
of judicial coercion or abuse of discretion on direct appeal if he genuinely believed
the claims had merit. He failed to do so. Therefore, such claims are now
procedurally barred.
33. The Defendant alleges that the statements made by the Court during his plea
colloquy coerced or forced him to accept the guilty plea but the record shows that
those statements were merely a recitation of the facts.
34. Defendant was charged with at least thirteen counts of each of First Degree
Robbery, Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, Possession
of a Firearm by Person Prohibited, Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a
12
Felony, and one count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree. The chart below43
reflects the potential range of incarceration time the Defendant faced if convicted of
the most significant charges, depending upon whether he was found to be a habitual
offender:
Charge If Declared a If Not Declared a
Habitual Offender Habitual Offender
First Degree Robbery 3 to 25 years for each 25 years to life for each
(13 counts) count (for a total of 39 to count (for a total of 325
325 years) years to 13 life
sentences)
Possession of a Firearm 5 to 25 years for each 25 years to life for each
during the Commission count (for a total of 70 to count (for a total of 350
of a Felony (14 counts) 350 years) years to 14 life
sentences)
Attempted Murder in the 15 years to life Life
First Degree (1 count)
Possession of a Firearm 65 to 195 years for each 15 years to life for each
by Person Prohibited (13 count (for a total of 845 count (for a total of 195
counts) to 2535 years) years to 13 life
sentences)
35. After the minimum mandatory and maximum prison time was reviewed with
the Court by defense counsel during the April 27, 2019 hearing, the Court addressed
the Defendant to make sure he had reviewed the plea agreement and to further
explain the risks associated with going to trial. The Court’s colloquy included much
discussion, but with respect to Defendant’s specific claim of judicial coercion, the
Court stated the following, in pertinent part:
43
The information in the chart is derived from the Plea Colloquy Transcript, dated April 27, 2018,
which was made part of the record by the Court. Defense counsel also provided the information
to the Defendant in writing prior to the hearings.
13
THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Thomas, you have
reviewed that plea agreement with Ms. Woloshin, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And you have had opportunity to discuss
the pros and cons. And I want to make sure, because we
are getting very close to trial and I want to be certain that
you have read what Ms. Woloshin sent you, that she
indicated she sent you, and that she’s reviewed with the
Court at the Court’s insistence. And I want to make sure
you understand that we’re headed to trial and this will go
to a jury. And if you’re found guilty of these charges,
you’re looking at spending - - just through the minimum
mandatories, you’re looking at spending the rest of your
life in prison. You will die in prison if you’re convicted
of all these charges. You will probably die in prison if
you’re only convicted on half, given the significant
minimum mandatory attached to these charges. And once
we go through a trial, once we start a trial, there’s not
going to be an opportunity to say, wait a minute, I’ve
changed my mind. . .44
36. The statement by the Court regarding the likelihood of the Defendant dying
in prison if convicted of all or only a portion of the charges he was facing accurately
reflected Defendant’s circumstances. That is, if convicted of all or only one of the
charges, Defendant would live out the rest of his natural life in jail. Given the
accuracy of the statement, defense counsel would have no basis to object and such a
44
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 9-10.
14
statement cannot be reasonably construed as tantamount to judicial coercion on the
part of the trial judge.45
37. After further discussion regarding (i) the fact that the Court intended to deny
a pending Motion to Sever as well as (ii) the Defendant’s review of the State’s
evidence, the Court continued as follows:
THE COURT: Good. I just wanted to make sure. So you
have seen some of the evidence I’m anticipating the
State’s going to introduce. And I am sure you and Ms.
Woloshin have had discussions. But now is the time, sir,
where you need to decide whether you wish to accept the
plea offer or reject it. And if you reject it, we’re heading
to trial, and you will be presumed innocent unless and until
proven guilty with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And
if you accept it, you are pleading guilty to three charges,
but avoiding significant jail time that would ensue if you
are convicted by a jury.
So this case has been going on quite some time, and I
know you’ve had multiple conversations with Ms.
Woloshin. Now would be the time where you decide and
you tell the Court your decision about whether or not you
wish to accept this plea offer that would have you serving
– well, if the Court follows the plea agreement, the State’s
planning to recommend that you serve no more than the
minimum mandatory, which is 28 years, versus - - you
heard the math. What do you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to have to go to trial.
45
Thomas cites two cases which purport to support the notion that the statements made by the
judge constituted coercion sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of his subsequent guilty plea, but
neither case supports that proposition. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 (1995) (finding trial
court’s participation in plea negotiations did not render plea involuntary); see also Brown v.
Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (1970) (holding that a judge’s participation in a plea discussion is a factor
which must be considered in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary but does not per se
render the plea involuntary).
15
THE COURT: I’m sorry?
THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to have to go to trial, Your
Honor.46
38. Immediately thereafter, counsel to the Defendant explained to the Court the
reason why she believed Thomas was rejecting the plea. Specifically, Defendant
wanted counsel to present the Court with a certain Motion to Suppress, but counsel
advised Thomas that such a Motion could not be presented pretrial, but rather was
an issue the jury would have to resolve relating to credibility of the police officers.47
Counsel then advised the Court that Thomas wished to speak with her regarding the
plea and requested that the Court take a brief recess to allow her time to do so.48 The
Court granted the requested recess and thereafter continued the hearing until April
30, 2019.49
39. After continuing the hearing, the Court addressed the import of her decision.
THE COURT: While I recognize it’s inconvenient to the
State, I also recognize that this is a very, very, important
life-altering decision for him to make. And he has
expressed a need for more time to consult with his counsel,
and I think it’s important that he has it and he has time to
think about it, even though this is - - this case has been
46
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 13-14.
47
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 14-15.
48
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 15-17.
49
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 17-20.
16
going on for a long time, but I’m glad you’re taking it
seriously, as you should; right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And I appreciate your giving
me the time to figure out what I am going to do. It’s not
like something that I can easily say let’s do it, you know,
so I appreciate that. I want to thank you.50
40. On April 30, 2019, Thomas signed the plea agreement and the Truth in
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the Court proceeded with the colloquy it had begun
on April 27th.51 Without any issue or further request for a trial, the Defendant
unequivocally pled guilty to three counts in open court.52
41. Defendant’s own words in his plea colloquy as well as his executed Truth in
Sentencing Form bely his allegations here. For these reasons, the Court cannot find
defense counsel’s failure to object during the colloquy to be so prejudicial that there
was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged deficiency, the Defendant
would not have taken the plea. Moreover, the presiding judge’s decision to continue
the plea colloquy until April 30th was the antithesis of coercion. The Court was
mindful and sensitive to the life-altering nature of such a decision and gave the
Defendant the time he needed to consult with counsel to understand all the facts and
circumstances of his case in order to make a fully informed decision to pled guilty.
50
April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 20.
51
April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript at 6-21.
52
Id.17
42. It is important to note that in his original Rule 61 Motion Thomas also claimed
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file the Motion to Suppress (which
he abandoned in his Amended Motion). Specifically, Defendant was of the view
that the police did not have probable cause to follow him on the day he was
ultimately arrested. According to defense counsel, Thomas’ argument that the police
lacked probable cause to follow and arrest him was factually inaccurate and she
explained the reasons such a Motion to Suppress was without merit to him numerous
times prior to the plea.53 The police did, in fact, have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop the Defendant based upon the similarities of all the robberies and
the Defendant’s unique physical characteristics as described by the victims.54
Moreover, even if a Motion to Suppress had been filed by counsel and granted by
the Court with respect to the robbery charge on the day of the arrest, Defendant faced
a multitude of other felony charges for earlier robberies.55 Therefore, filing a Motion
53
Woloshin Aff. at 2. On the day of Defendant’s arrest on May 8, 2017, he had been under
surveillance for the string of robberies that had been committed in the area. The police saw his
vehicle around the 300 block of North Union Street and a short time later a convenience store
robbery was committed by a man meeting the Defendant’s description near that location. His car
was followed for a long period of time and then eventually stopped by police at which time a
handgun was found on the front passenger floorboard. In addition, the Defendant was dressed in
the clothes described as being worn by the suspect of the earlier robbery. D.I 63.
54
Id. Defendant has a crippled right arm which can be seen on many of the surveillance videos
and was a trait identified by several of the victims. See State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion
for Post Conviction Relief, pg. 5, D.I. 64.
55
Woloshin Aff. at 2. D.I 63.
18
to Suppress to argue the police lacked probable cause to follow and arrest the
Defendant under such circumstances did not fall below the standard of
reasonableness and would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Nor
would it have resulted in a change in counsel’s defense strategy or her
recommendation to Defendant to take a plea offer.
43. As both the State and defense counsel contend, the evidence against the
Defendant was overwhelming. Many of the alleged offenses were caught on
surveillance tape. His face can be clearly identified in photos taken in connection
with the robberies and surveillance footage of the robberies.56 The surveillance
videos also showed a person pointing a gun at the victims.57 Defense counsel filed
a Motion to Sever offenses, but advised the Defendant that it was highly unlikely the
Court would grant that motion, due to the evidence that all the robberies were
“carried out in a similar manner and the videos and descriptions show that they were
carried out by the same person.”58 As previously noted, on the record during the
hearing on April 27, 2018, the Court indicated it was not granting the Motion to
Sever.
56
Woloshin Aff., Exh. A. D.I. 63.
57
Id.58
Id.19
44. Defense counsel sent the Defendant a thorough overview of the indictment,
the potential penalties he could face as both a habitual offender and non-habitual
offender, the State’s evidence, and her assessment of Defendant’s best option
moving forward.59
45. Based on the weight of evidence against the Defendant, defense counsel
concluded from a strategic point of view that if Defendant proceeded to trial, he
would be convicted of all charges.60 Moreover, Defendant was eligible to be
sentenced as a habitual offender thereby making his situation even more perilous.61
46. After a comprehensive review of the State’s evidence, defense counsel
concluded that the most prudent defense strategy was to attempt to reduce the
significant amount of jail time Defendant faced if convicted at trial by negotiating a
plea agreement.62 Such a strategy was “objectively reasonable” under the
circumstances given the significant number of indicted felony charges Defendant
was facing and the strength of the State’s evidence.
47. “If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable’
59
Id.60
Id.61
Woloshin Aff., Exh. A.
62
Woloshin Aff. at 1.
20
and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation.”63
48. The Court ultimately imposed a sentence of 28 years at Level V, which is a
substantially better result than the potential life imprisonment that Defendant could
have faced had he proceeded to trial and been unsuccessful.
49. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that counsel’s performance was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances and, as such, Defendant fails to
establish the first prong of the Strickland test.
50. With respect to the second prong of the Strickland test, Defendant has also
failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. “It is not enough to ‘show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,’”64 the defendant must
show a reasonable probability of a different result but the alleged errors of counsel.65
51. Although the Court finds that defense counsel did not commit any errors, as
previously noted, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors
63
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840, 852 (Del. Super. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 690-91 (1984).
64
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
65
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
21
or defects occurring prior to entry of the plea.66 After pleading guilty, a defendant
cannot reopen his case to make claims that do not address guilt.67
52. “[A] Defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea
colloquy are presumed to be truthful.”68
53. Here, Thomas voluntarily entered a guilty plea after the Court conducted a
colloquy with him prior thereto. Defendant signed a Truth in Sentencing Plea Form
and admitted guilt in open Court. The Court, in turn, accepted the plea as being
offered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. As such, the Defendant waived any
alleged defects of counsel that occurred prior to the entry of the plea and, therefore,
there can be no finding of prejudice under Strickland.
54. Moreover, Defendant’s acceptance of the plea was a rational decision to avoid
a trial where the downside could have resulted in a significantly greater prison
sentence if convicted. Defendant obtained a benefit by entering into the plea in that
the lion’s share of the charges against him were nolle prossed and the State agreed
to ask for no more than the minimum sentence required by the charges for which he
plead guilty. Indeed, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, it was
66
Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 240404, at 1* (Del. June 16, 2018); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229,
1232 (Del. 2003).
67
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1202 (Del. 2015).
68
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
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unlikely Defendant would have prevailed at trial and the plea was his best option.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet the Strickland test
with respect to his claims of a coerced plea.
55. In conclusion, Defendant’s plea represented a rational choice given the
pending charges, the evidence against him, and the possible sentences he was facing.
Defendant entered into his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The Court
finds that the trial judge did not coerce Thomas into taking a plea or otherwise abuse
its discretion nor was counsel deficient in any respect in her representation of
Defendant. Thomas’ claims are without merit.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief
should be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/ Janine M. Salomone
The Honorable Janine M. Salomone
cc: Prothonotary
Timothy Maguire, Esquire
Natalie Woloshin, Esquire
Mr. Kori Thomas, pro se
23